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Abstract
This thesis analyses the agrarian economy and social
structure in the Indian province of Bengal during the late
eighteenth century on the basis of the archives of the
English East India Company. The major purpose of the
subsequent study is to examine the central elements which
comprised the fabric of rural Bengal, viz., landed
property, peasant society, agricultural production, local
trade and markets, in order to delineate the social
relations which were embedded in the spheres of production
and exchange. This is done in order to suggest that social
relationships in rural Bengal were significantly altered in
this period.
This thesis proposes that the late eighteenth century
in Bengal was characterized by a conjuncture of certain
economic and political forces. A succession of famine and
dearth years exacerbated the impact of the conjuncture on
life in Bengal's countryside. All these forces combined to
create conditions of extensive commercialization,
especially in the rice-producing, small-peasant economy of
the province. This development emerges as the salient
feature of Bengal's economy in the period under study.
Existing studies by modern scholars have also been
examined in order to correct, what have been perceived here
to be, certain inadequacies of historical analysis. This
thesis, therefore, also enters into a debate with other
historians over questions of landed property,
stratification in peasant society and the economic context
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Preface
This thesis is an analysis of rural Bengal, its social
structure and agrarian economy, in the late eighteenth
century, Ca. 1765 to Ca.1794 on the basis of the revenue
records and other papers of the English East India Company
and Its officials. Obviously, the sole dependence on
Company records means that the conclusions remain largely
tentative till a more substantive reconstruction is
attempted by using indigenous sources too. Nevertheless,
the Company archives are by far the largest single body of
evidence available on the economic history of Bengal. They
also contain vast amounts of hitherto unutilized
information on the essential elements which shaped the
fabric of rural society and economy: dearth and famine,
landed property, the peasantry, agricultural production and
local trade.
The central purpose of the ensuing discussion is to
demonstrate that Bengal underwent an unprecedented degree
of commercialization in this period. There is no doubt that
in previous decades the province was pervaded by intricate
commercial networks linked to the trade in textiles. Later
(i.e., in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) Bengal
went through a significantly new commercial phase under the
Impact of indigo, jute and tea. Nevertheless, there seems
to be a strong case to argue that while the early
eighteenth century textile-based commerce set the tone of
a long-wave of commercialization, it was the late
eighteenth century which provided the distinctive departure
by bringing about the commercialization of the province's
rice producing economy and of the social relations which
were embedded in it. The clearest indications of these
developments are the rapid proliferation of a sharecropping
8peasantry in this period (discussed in chapter 4) and the
increasing intervention of the grain-merchant (byapari) in
agricultural production (see chapter 6). Many factors
contributed to this development-- demand, prices, revenue,
dearth and famines-- which are discussed in chapter 1, and
the details of the process, both social and economic, are
discussed in subsequent chapters. The diffuse strands of my
argument are then tied together in chapter 7.
The fact that there exists a fairly rich
historiography for Bengal in this period necessitates that
any discussion must, among other things, engage in a
dialogue with it. Therefore, one of the purposes of this
thesis is to correct some imbalances in the existing
interpretations. Three areas have been identified where
such imbalances exist.
First, there is an excessive preoccupation with the
revenue administration of the East India Company. I argue
(in chapter 1) that revenue by itself does not explain much
about the economy. It has to be situated in the context of
agricultural production for any kind of comprehensibility
to emerge.
Second, there is the question of famines and dearth.
The sole concern of historians so far has been with the
disastrous impact of the famine of 1769/70 on, what is
seen, as an economy based on traditional forms of
subsistence security. This thesis argues that the intensity
of the famine of 1769/70 was significantly less than what
has been hitherto argued. It is also suggested that the
events of 1769/70 have to be situated in relation to other
famine and dearth years in order to study the consequences
of harvest-failures in a commercialized economy where
access to food was determined, not by traditional
subsistence-security systems, but by the fluctuations in
food-supply and market-prices.
The third area of historiographical disagreement is
over the questions of peasant-society and stratification.
This thesis disagrees with the views which argue the
9existence of a rich peasant "class" in the late eighteenth
century and the increasing bargaining power of a mobile
peasantry after the famine of 1769/70. What is suggested
instead (in chapter 4) is the existence of a largely
undifferentiated peasantry operating under extremely
resource-constrained circumstances which proved conducive
for the penetration of non-peasant strata (the landed
proprietors and the byapari) into peasant production, which
appears as the distinctive feature of the late eighteenth
century commercialization in Bengal.
It is also necessary to state what this thesis does
not attempt to do. There is very little in the subsequent
pages about land-revenue administration, the role of the
East India Company or about the "drain of wealth" from
Bengal. These have been touched upon only to the extent of
tracing their influences on the actual workings of the
rural economy. They have not been dealt with as separate
problems. The reasons are twofold. First, the major
contours of these matters are fairly well established.
Second, there is an absolute necessity of going beyond
these issues in order to reconstruct the structures on
which these administrative and exploitative edifices were
based. This is not to deny the central purpose of the
Company's rule after 1765, which was to use Bengal's
resources for complex commercial, military and political
purposes, but to study that exploitation (undoubtedly one
of the dominant themes of extant historiography) divorced
from the material milieu of production seems a largely
pointless exercise.
There is also very little in this thesis about the
cultivation of the "cash crops" such as mulberry, opium or
indigo. These were commercial products par excellence, and
their vicissitudes have been quite exhaustively documented
by other historians. Additionally, these were more closely
associated with the International movements of Asian trade.
My concern is with those commodities which had the most
direct bearing on the daily lives of the people. Chapter 5
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therefore is an attempt to reconstruct the patterns of
production of crops related most closely to the Internal
market of Bengal. Cotton has figured in this chapter
because it was essentially designed for internal
consumption despite the international demand for piece-
goods. Ninety percent of Bengal's cotton cloth was
manufactured to supply Indian markets (see chapter 6). By
contrast, silk was almost entirely an export commodity.
This is clearly in evidence from the declining trend in
Bengal's silk exports to Surat between 1765 and 1789 and
the rising trend in the Company's investment for that
commodity between 1765 and 1780. These are outlined in
figure A (p.11).
Unpublished and contemporary printed works have been
given full citations in the footnotes, while secondary
sources are cited in the following fashion- - name of
author, year of publication followed by the page, or
chapter, number. Full references are provided in the
bibliography. Place names have been corrected (e.g.,
Rungpore to Rangpur) except when they figure in quotations
or specific references. For instance, Dacca has been
referred as Dhaka in the text, but the old name is retained
where ever it occurs in the records or in quotations.
My debt of gratitude to numerous scholars for their
help and encouragement is enormous. Professor P.J.Marshall
supervised this thesis. This work is a small token of
gratitude for his sharp insight, patience and kindness.
Professor Burton Stein, Professor David Arnold, Dr.Terry
Byres and Dr.Peter Robb gave my ideas the benefit of their
sharp comments. They were also ungrudgingly generous with
their time and friendship. Professor Harbans Mukhia, my
teacher of long-standing, nurtured my initial attempts at
historical research and sustained it with his constant
interest in my work.
The Association of Commonwealth Universities and the
British Council provided me with the opportunity of
researching in England for three years. The Trustees of the
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University of London Historical Trust Fund gave me
financial assistance towards the costs of producing the
thesis. I am grateful to these organizations. The members
ofthe British Museum Library and the India Office Library
provided the documents for my research with great kindness
and efficiency.
Ratna and Rhea saw me through me with their love and
understanding. My parents encouraged me with their constant
affection and blessings. It is only appropriate that this
thesis be dedicated to them.
CHAPTER 1
A Framework for Bengal's Agrarian Economy in the Late
Eighteenth Century
For too long existing historiography has tended to
view the late eighteenth century in Bengal as a period of
crisis when the supposed agricultural prosperity under the
Nizamat was irrevocably halted by a combination of state
(i.e. the East India Company's) exploitation and the
disastrous famine of 1769/70, an event, which according to
consensual wisdom, decimated 10 million people or one-third
of the province's population and unleashed a prolonged
agricultural recession. The essential focus of such studies
therefore hinges around the quantum of revenue imposed and
collected by the state and not on the actual operation of
the agrarian economy. Therefore what is characterized as
the economic history of the province is actually its
revenue history, or at best a history of changes in the
structure of landed property between 1765 and 1793'. While
there is no denying the important role performed by the
revenue squeeze in the provincial economy, there is a
pressing need to contextualize that role in the overall
framework of economic, mainly agricultural, production.
Revenue is a form in which the surplus is appropriated by
the state, but it is the mode in which that surplus is
created which provides the crucial insight into the domain
of production.
This is not to say that the entire range of history
writing for this period is encapsulated in matters
pertaining to revenue. Laudable efforts were made by
' N.K.Sinha,1968;B.B.Chaudhury,1983:86ff.
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Ratnalekha and Rajat Ray to lift the dead-weight of state-
taxation in an attempt to reconstruct the network of social
relations which constituted Bengal's agrarian economy. From
a description of land tenure they shifted our focus into
Bengal's economic and social structure and to rural power
configurations. The picture of agrarian society which
emerged from their studies was of a society polarized into
two contending classes, the zamfndar and the jotedar. The
latter category was variously described by them as the
"village landlord" or a rich peasant "class" whose
foundations were laid in the economic boom of the early
eighteenth century, but who actually came into full form in
the late eighteenth century because of the revenue policies
of the East India Company and the dislocation caused by the
famine of 1769/702.
The thesis proposed by Ratnalekha and Rajat Ray is
provocative and analytically stimulating, but one which
nevertheless embodies a number of historical problems. I
have developed a critique of their model elsewhere3.
Briefly, their analysis poses four essential problems.
First, their view that the jotedar was an established
social class in the late eighteenth century tends to read
the situation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
into the eighteenth with very little historical
justification. Second, their assumption that a rich peasant
"class" actually existed in the late eighteenth century is
not borne out by the sources. Third, they have very little
to say about the actual milieu of agricultural production
while discussing the emergence of the jotedars over two
centuries of British rule in Bengal and their sources for
the eighteenth century are confined to two districts (those
of Rangpur and Dinajpur) where a jotedarl-type social
relation seems to have emerged in an extremely rudimentary




form. Fourth, their suggestion that Bengal's agrarian
social structure was composed of two contending social
classes positioned over a mass of landless and low-caste
peasantry is misleading, not only for its convenient
simplicity but also for its almost total absence of
historical evidence. I shall return to all these issues
when discussing the problem of peasant stratification in
chapter 4 of this thesis.
There is therefore a pressing need to analyze the
specifics of Bengal's rural economy in the late eighteenth
century but within a conceptual framework which creates a
meaningful context in which that economy operated. Thus the
essential idea of this chapter is to construct some points
of reference and conceptual parameters in order to
establish a context for the analysis of Bengal's agrarian
economy in our period. It is, in other words, an exercise
in establishing a central point of reference which will set
the tone for the issues to be discussed in the subsequent
chapters.
An agenda for the study of late eighteenth century Bengal
The central purpose of this dissertation is to suggest
that late eighteenth century Bengal (Ca. 1765 to Ca.
1794) underwent a number of structural changes in its
agricultural economy and rural society. These changes were
caused by a conjuncture, in this period, between four
crucial factors. The first factor was the revenue regime
established in the province after 1765. The second one was
the changing linkages between the state and the market
brought about by the political transition in the province.
The third component was the growing demand for food in the
province, and the fourth element in the conjuncture was an
apparently fortuitous cluster of dearth and famine years
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between 1769 and 1793. The order in which these factors
have been listed does not reflect each one's hierarchical
importance in the conjuncture, but it is intended to
delineate the political and the economic in that
configuration of forces and events which shaped Bengal's
economic life in our period. The net result of this
conjuncture, I propose, was to lead the province into one
of its most intense phases of commercialization, the
uniqueness of which was the commercialization of its rice
producing small-peasant economy
The general tendency, implicit in the works of
historians like N. K. Sinha and B.B.Chaudhury, is to view
this period as antithetical to the commercialization of
Bengal's agrarian economy. Commercialization of
agricultural production is therefore located in those
sectors (like opium and indigo) which were structurally
linked to a world market 4 . S.Bhattacharya's study of
marketing structures and internal trade in eastern India5
is an excellent attempt to analyze the processes of
commercialization which were set in motion by internal
trade (itself a long neglected subject in Bengal's
historiography) but his study is nevertheless limited by an
overt emphasis on the autonomous role of trade largely
dissociated from the context of agricultural production, or
from the forces which influenced the ebb and flow of
commodities in the market and the strategies which were
designed by the merchants to reduce the inconvenience which
these fluctuations could cause to them.
On the other hand we have the tendency to see
commercialization as a state-induced phenomenon. This
approach is epitomized in Irfan Habib's writings on the
society and economy of medieval India. For Habib, the
crucial variables in India's pre-colonial economy are the




maximization of surplus appropriation in cash. Both these
variables lead to the formation of a "cash-nexus" in the
economy which leads to a process of commercialization under
conditions of accumulation characterized by a "dominant
mode of rent-extraction" by the medieval Indian state. All
other forms of economic activity are henceforth relegated
to "certain subordinate modes of accumulation" 6 . Habib's
thesis therefore presupposes that commercialization can
only come into existence under conditions of political
stability, and that economic growth or retardation are
essentially functions of the state's will. It is this
latter assumption which has led Habib into postulating that
merchant-capital in Mughal India was essentially
parasitical as it depended exclusively on state demand for
its sustenance7 . Despite Habib's essential differences with
the historiography of W.H.Moreland, he nevertheless shares
the same premise with Moreland (the primacy of the state,
for instance) in explaining the economic history of India
from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century8.
Commercialization is an ongoing economic process by
which the entire structure of production and circulation of
commodities become linked to a market. It also entails an
irreversible integration of people's lives (i. e their
social reproduction) with the market and with the agencies
who control access to such institutions. In fact the
survival of a whole set of people comes to be entirely
linked to the vicissitudes of markets and prices.
Quantities and modes of sale (whether enforced or
6 Habib,1983-85: 68-73. Habib's postulates are echoed
in a recent study by K.N.Raj who says that
commercialization in pre-colonial India "corresponded only
to the requirements of a traditional revenue' economy
[which] happened to be an indistinguishable mix of
tax,tribute and land rent" [Raj,1985: viii].
Habib, 1971.
8	 For a similar critique of Habib, see Frank
Perlin, 1983.
17
spontaneous) are therefore not the only phenomena in a
commercialized economy. Equally crucial are matters
relating to the amount of commodities which people are able
to buy back from such markets, and the procedures involved
therein. Even a temporary withdrawal from the market
(caused by high prices, inadequate supplies or mercantile
strategies) therefore invariably leads to severe crises of
survival and production for a whole range of consumers and
producers, including peasants. Additionally,
commercialization must inevitably be accompanied by social
differentiation.
The postulate that only a spontaneous sale of the
producers surplus can be construed as a normal process of
commercialization made, for instance by Axnit Bhaduri9,
apparently assumes that only stable conditions are
conducive to a process of this type to come into being.
Such an assumption overlooks the power of hazards and
uncertainty as the other important factors in commercial
growth. The influence of risk is particularly vital in
understanding economic decisions in pre-industrial
societies because of the influence of weather on production
and the absence of firm infrastructural devices. Risk
breeds uncertainty, which in turn leads to the creation of
networks and strategies to cope with them and to circumvent
them as well. But these strategies are not inimical to a
commercialized economy; they can be vital to its existence
and development.
It is in the context sketched above that I make the
For Bhaduri,"normal" commercialization can occur
only when an increasing amount of the producer's surplus is
marketed spontaneously. "Forced" commercialization comes
into existence when various forms of coercion are used to
compel the producer to sell a high proportion of the gross
output to meet a variety of pressures.Bhaduri also accepts
that these processes can become "intertwined in a complex
manner in concrete historical circumstances";yet the nature
and significance of this complex interaction is
inadequately addressed by him,despite its critical impor-
tance for the comprehension of specific social formations
[Bhaduri, 1985:309].
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following hypothesis about Bengal's agrarian economy in the
late eighteenth century. The regime of the East India
Company and the political-economy of Company rule
intensified the formation of a regionally integrated market
in the province, not only for high-value commodities like
cotton or silk, but for basic food-grains. Appropriation of
revenue was integrally linked to the expansion of Bengal's
internal market. But this expansion was more than just the
exercise of the state's political will. It was a product of
a rising demand for food in the province at prices which
were now linked on a provincial scale. The instances of
dearth and famine (including the massive famine of 1769/70)
were integrally linked to this prevalent demand for food in
an integrated market. Though these phenomena were caused by
partial or general crop failures, their significance and
intensity can be fathomed only from looking at these events
as severe dislocations in the food-market and the price
mechanism. They also forced society to make structural
adjustments in their aftermath. These adjustments were
necessary for one stratum to cope with its problems and for
another to circumvent unforeseen difficulties which
resulted in the creation of different economic strategies
by all social groups in the countryside. The net result of
these strategies was to lead agricultural production into
an unprecedented degree of commercialization.
Bengal's economy and the factor of demand
That the influence of town demand, and the rising
trend in prices had a clear effect on local trade in
agricultural produce is increasingly coming into focus10.




Calcutta's population throughout the century". Dhaka had
about 450,000 people living within its environs in 176512
and continued to be thickly peopled later on'3 . In 1757
Murshidabad was declared as "one of the richest cities in
the world"'4 and in 1764, Robert Clive described the city
of Murshidabad as "extensive, populous and rich as the city
of London, with this difference that there are individuals
in the first possessing infinitely greater property than in
the last [named] city"'5.
Apart from these premier cities there were other towns
which were positioned at medium levels of consumption and
had their combined effect on trade. Bhagwangola, near
Murshidabad, handling about 18 million maunds of grain in
the 1760s' 6 was one such centre. Azimganj in Hughli was
another, having grown during the early eighteenth century
as a centre of the grain trade between Murshidabad and
southern Bengal: "being one of the first gunges and
established under a powerful patronage, it was invested
with extensive controul [sic]" was how it was described in
1773'. Then there were the towns like Katwa and Kalna in
western Bengal which, along with Calcutta, redistributed
grain from the eastern parts of Bengal (like Jessore) to
other parts of Bengal and Bihar'8 . Chinsura, a prosperous





' Robert Clive,An Address to the Proprietors of the
East India Stock, London 1764, (IOL Tracts, vol. 113) ,p.19.
16 J.z.Holwell,Interestlng Historical Events Relative
to Bengal and the Empire of Indostan, Part 1, London
1766,p.l94.
17 IOR,BRC P/49/38,23 March 1773.
18 IOR,BRC P/51/20,7 May 1788.
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and small gardens"in 177819, whereas Chittagong was
described as a "very large and extensive town" in 178920.
The demand for food generated by these towns exerted
a crucial influence on the direction and movement of local
trade. The average monthly consumption of common quality
rice in Calcutta was 250,000 maunds in the 1780s21.
Murshidabad needed more than 130,000 maunds of rice and 57,
000 maunds of paddy for its sustenance in the 1790s22.
Towns lower down the scale needed proportionate amounts of
food. Unfortunately these needs cannot be worked out even
in the most tentative fashion because of the scarcity of
relevant statistical information. Quantitative data of the
amounts of money involved in the purchase of food and other
items of consumption are equally scarce. The fragmentary
bits of evidence which are available may perhaps allow the
following purely tentative reconstruction.
J. Paterson, commissioner at Comniilla, calculated that
a "Hindoo family in respectable circumstances" consisting
of 16 persons, including dependents, spent roughly 333.50
rupees per year on food 23 . This would give us an annual per
capita consumption of 20.54 rupees. This figure closely
approximates to the evidence from Rangpur where Francis
Buchanan's (later Buchanan-Hamilton) estimates of the
domestic consumption of "seven ranks" of people circa 1807
gives a crude per capita consumption average of 21.02
rupees a year24 . The population of Bengal and Bihar in 1790
' IOR,CCR P/67/70,30 April 1778.
20 IOR,BRP P/71/70,29 June 1789.
21 IOR,BRC P/51/17,4 March 1788.
22 Ibid,P/52/50,19 October 1792.
23 Ibid,P/51/12,19 October 1787.
24 In Rangpur the "seven ranks" of people in society
having a total of 66 persons,including dependents and
servants,spent a combined sum of 1387.43 rupees a year on
food [ Francis Buchanan, "Account of Rongoppur",IOL,Ms.Eur
(continued...)
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was stated to be 22 million25 , of which 12 million may have
been the share of Bengal 26 . Multiplying the latter figure
by the lower rate of 20.54 rupees, we arrive at a purely
tentative sum of 246.8 million rupees annually being spent
on food in the province. One contemporary observer computed
an average annual consumption of fine rice alone to be
worth 35.04 million rupees27.
An estimate such as this will be open to a wide range
of criticisms and all of them may perhaps be valid. This
estimate does not take into account the regional variations
in consumption, it assumes a fixed pattern of consumption
for all social strata, it does not discuss consumption
expenditures over time and fails to relate these
expenditures to the price situation--- these are perhaps
just a few objections which can reasonably be anticipated.
The estimate I have made is purely tentative and is an
attempt to indicate the money involved In the annual demand
for agricultural produce. The other reason is to draw
attention to the fact that such large amounts could not
have emerged from consumption in towns alone. There is
evidence to believe that town demand and the demand in
overland markets did not account for more than 20 percent
of the gross trade in agricultural produce 28 . The remaining
24( . . .continued)
G. 11, tables 38,39; hereafter, "Ronggoppur"] .These figures
pertain to predominantly rural populations,patterns of
consumption in cities would differ as large numbers of
wealthy people residing there would perhaps tend to spend
more on different types of food.
25 Reverend W.Tennant,Indian Recreations, (written in
1797),vol.2,London 18O6,p.2.
26	 IOR,Home Misc.,vol.434,George Smith to Henry
Dundas,28 February 179l,p.647.
27 Ibid,p.468.
28 Datta,1986:388.There is also some indication of a
reduction in the long-distance movement of grain from
Bengal in the eighteenth century and its replacement by
short-distance movements [ Ibid. ;also S.Arasaratnam, 1988].
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portion, excluding between 6 and 8 percent for seed
stock29 , was consumed within Bengal's countryside and this
aspect has not been given adequate weightage in the
reconstruction of Bengal's economic history, and it is to
this that I now turn.
The idea that most of Bengal was an interlinked chain
of "innumerable villages" interspersed with a few towns was
originally put forward by James Rennell in 1765°. The same
theme recurs when W. Hamilton, writing in 1828, says:
"villages from 100 to 500 inhabitants are astonishingly
numerous, and in some parts form a continued chain of many
miles along the bank of rivers" 31 . The absence of area
statistics for this period does not allow us to estimate
the number of villages in all areas of the province, or
account for their spatial distribution. Table 1 outlines
the data available.
Table 1
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anan, "Ronggoppur",IOL,Ms.Eur G.h1,table 40.
30 IOR,Home Misc.,vol.765,p.146.
31 cited in Marshall,1987: 151.
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a: Indicates the severity of the famine of
1769/70 in this district
Source: John Johnstone, Letter to the Proprietors of the
East India Stock, London, 1776, p.6; R.K.Gupta,
1977:47; Brit.Mus., Add.Ms., 29076, f.11;
Add.Ms., 29087, f.58, 97, 119; Add.Ms., 29088,
ff.116-22, f.108; bR, BRP, P/70/49, 15 December
1788; Ibid., P170/48, 7 November 1788.
Obviously clusters of villages would tend to be
greater in areas closer to important commercial and
administrative centres 32 , but the spatial distribution of
these villages does suggest a continuous, and often densely
packed, chain constituting most parts of Bengal's country-
side. Area figures given by Rennell 33
 and the data
available in table 1 suggest the following spatial
distribution of villages in our period:
32 Pargana Muragatcha in the 24-Parganas had 436
villages in 1790 because of its closer proximity to
Calcutta.This was the highest concentration of villages in
this district when compared to other parganas propo-
rtionately distanced from the city [IOR,BRP,P/7l/22,1 March
1790] .The parganas of Midnapur and Cossijura had 839 and
829 villages respectively (in 1788) thereby contributing
nearly 34 percent of the total villages in that district
[Ibid,P/70/49,16 December 1788].
James Rennell,Bengal Atlas:Contalnlng Maps of the



















Population data for these villages are practically
non-existent, though Johnstone's estimate does give us an
average of 250 persons per village in Burdwan in the
1760s34 . Relatively large villages could have more than 250
households around Murshidabad35 , whereas in a relatively
less developed district like Commilla "the average is less
than 10 persons (per] village" 36 . The crucial fact about
these villages is that they jointly accounted for about 70
percent of the agricultural product available for internal
consumption. A part of that consumption would appear to
have been natural, i. e., producers exchanged their home-
grown items without the direct mediation of money; but the
extent of such transactions were small, nor could they have
been significant enough to determine the content of
exchange relationships in the economy. An interesting
example of this phenomenon is provided by the rice of the
spring harvest (aus dhan). It was generally recognized that
this rice was intrinsically of an inferior quality than the
one produced in winter (aman) and was consumed by the
"lowest and poorer classes" 37 . Rice of this kind would
presumably have featured prominently in a system of natural
Letter to the Proprietors,op.cit.,p.6.
WBSA, PCR,Murshidabad,vol. 8,15 February 1776.
36 IOR,BRP P/70/48,7 November 1788.
WBSA,Grain,vol.1,17 October 1794.
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exchange; yet the grain merchants made it a point to
purchase the aim crop from the cultivators before they
could dispose of their surpluses independently in local
markets38 . Since the so-called "coarsest grains" were sown
in the aim season, the intervention of the merchants here
perhaps indicates the widespread dissemination of an
exchange economy in the province.
Another reason for the growing importance of rural
demand was the gradually shifting patterns of agricultural
production and the emergence in Bengal of, what Bayly has
termed "unstable areas" of production in his study of
northern India39 . Marshall has located "a shift in the
balance between western and eastern Bengal" brought about
by long-term changes in Bengal's river systems during the
course of the eighteenth century 40 . Contemporary evidence
seems to confirm such findings. Burdwan's agriculture and
manufactures had declined considerably by the mid-1770s41.
By 1775, Purnea was an "impoverished country" with a
"lowered value of lands and their produce" 42 , and it was
also recognized that the economic advantages had shifted to
"the countries in the lower part of Bengal" 43 . The
contemporary awareness of this shift also becomes apparent,
for instance from Robert Kyd's survey of the western bank
of the Hughli river in 1791 during which he noticed that
the "granaries" of Bengal were now located in areas like
Dhaka and Bakarganj in the east, when previously these had
38 Ibid.,29 October 1794.
Bayly,1983: 84-88.
40 Marshall,1987: .3-4.
41	 IOR,BRC	 P149/41,1	 October	 1773;also
ibid.,P/49/50,27 January 1775.
42 Ibid.,P/49/54,18 July 1775.
IOR,FR,Murshidabad,G/27/4,20 December 1771.
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been situated in Burdwan, Hughli and Rajshahi44 . By the
mid-1770s the decline of Rajshahi's agriculture, population
and commerce was "too evident a melancholy truth", even to
the officials of the East India Company45.
Essentially these areas had made a transition from
surplus into relatively deficit positions through a
combination of natural disasters (floods and famines) and
state taxation. It is no secret that the burden of the
Company's taxes, and the rigours of its revenue experiments
between 1760 and 1771 were borne primarily by western
Bengal46 . The overall results of these factors seem to have
been increasingly observable shortages of labour, capital
and money in these deficit areas, which in turn made them
depend heavily on the imports of essential items from
relatively surplus areas of the province.
The rising demand for food was matched by attempts to
extend cultivation on new lands, especially in the eastern
fringes of deltaic Bengal47.
The district of Bakarganj was opened up for
cultivation in the early years of the century by a
combination of state (Nizamat) initiative and	 the
enterprise	 of	 small-scale	 landed	 proprietors
(talluqdars) 48 ; by the 1750s it had become one of the prime
" IOL,Ms.Eur.F.95,f.44 a.
IOR,BRC P/49/52,5 February 1775.
46 Verelst Manuscripts,IOL,Mss.Eur.F.218/15,ff.30,31.
In fact possibly the largest single wave of
reclamation in the history of the province commenced from
the end of the eighteenth century and culminated by the
middle of the nineteenth century.Estuarine marshes in the
active delta (e.g.in Bakarganj and Jessore) were opened up
and settled,and by the end of the nineteenth century there
was very little cultivable land in Bengal which was not
fully occupied [compare,Beveridge,1876:203;
Westland, 1871:135; B.B.Chaudhuri, 1976].
48 See BRP,IOR P/71/26,4 June 1790; Beveridge,1876.
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exporters of rice to Calcutta 49 . Bakarganj's rice seems to
have become crucial to the existence of another important
centre of production, the town of Qasimbazaar, in western
Bengal. In 1754 when the Nawab threatened to blockade the
imports of rice by the English from Bakarganj, there was an
immediate panic "of the misery the place must be reduced
to" by any such act50 . Even during the famine of 1769-70,
Calcutta continued to receive a major portion of its
supplies from this district 51 , and by 1791 it was
recognized as one of the major granaries of Bengal52.
The integration of Bakarganj's rice growing economy
with the regional demand in foodgrains led to three social
developments. First, there was the formation of a hierarchy
of trading interests ranging from the wholesaler (aratadar
and goldar) and middleman (paiJcar) to the peddlar-cum-agent
(faria) in the villages 53 . Second, there appears to have
been a rapid reclamation of the Padma estuary under the
combined initiative of the talluqdar and the merchant.
Third, we see a proliferation in tenurial and sub-tenurial
arrangements, engineered by the cultivators themselves in
order to keep the best spots of land under their own
control and to attract labour on a permanent basis on lands
which were initially often inhospitable54.
The pull of regional demand, especially that of
Calcutta, saw the opening of another vast area in eastern
Marshall,1987:22.
50 Coast & Bay, IOR E/4/5,4 January 1754.
51 IOR,BPC P/1/44,14 November 1769.
52 IOL,Ms.Eur.F.95,f.44 a.
Datta,1986: 385,397.
The second and third social developments are
described in Beveridge,1876: 194-203.
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Bengal-- the Sundarbans 55 , or the estuarine forests in
Jessore, where, according to an estimate made in 1784 there
were more than 600, 000 bighas (200,000 acres) of
reclaimable land available56 . Reclamation was undertaken by
the zamlradars who granted waste lands on concessional rates
of revenue to settlers (abadkar) 57 . These settlers provided
the initial investment and when the clearing had proceeded
to a certain point, they settled the "ryotts upon the land
thus partially cleared to bring it into cultivation" 58 . The
other social group closely involved in the process of
agricultural expansion were the grain merchants interested
in controlling the rice trade from here to the cities of
western Bengal and to Dhaka. This strategy was realized by
a system of advance loans to the cultivators. The annual
practice of these merchants "to advance to the poorer class
of ryotts a sufficient quantity of grain to sow their
lands, to be repaid in kind at the time of cutting their
crops" had become the most widely prevalent method of
agricultural production by the late 1780s 59 . The process of
reclamation begun in this period was slowly coming to a
close by the 1870s when the great forests of estuarine
Jessore had almost entirely been converted into immense
rice tracts60.
Francis Buchanan's descriptions of reclamation in
Chittagong and Tippera circa 1798 suggest a rapid expansion
of land under cultivation in areas like Lakshmipur and
Noakhali. In fact the newness of reclamation in some of
See Westland,1871: 226 for the connection between
supply of rice to Calcutta and extension of cultivation in
the Jessore Sundarbans.
56 BRC,IOR P/50/63,6 August 1784.
Ibid.,P/51/9,9 August 1787.
58 Westland,1871: 228.
BRC,IOR P/51/20,7 May 1788.
60 Westland, 1871: 135.
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these areas was apparent to Buchanan "by the stumps of the
trees still remaining in the rice grounds"61.
Evidence regarding the spread of cultivable land
suggest that the following districts underwent a rapid









Markets and the State in eighteenth centur y Bengal
The importance of an orderly system of markets in the
overall movement of local trade and the connection between
trade and revenue was recognized both by the Nizamat and
the East India Company. Murshid Quli Khan, the first really
powerful Naz1 of the province, seems to have made it his
avowed policy to intervene in the movement of grain from
the countryside to the towns only during periods of food
shortages in an attempt to restrict monopolies by the grain
merchants62 . Apart from the tax motive, such intervention
by the regional state was also guided by the immediate
expedient of keeping supply lines open to towns under
threat of scarcity. Price regulations and control by the
Nlzamat was an exercise in redirecting the movement of the
agricultural surplus from the countryside to the towns
during years of scanty harvests. In normal agricultural
61 Brit.Mus. ,Add.Ms. ,19286, f.15-16.
62 Francis Gladwin,A Narrative of the Transactions in
Bengal,Calcutta,1788,p.122;also cf.BPC,IOR P/1/10,15
January 1733 and ibid.,P/1/26,19 November 1757.
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years, the relative balance between supply and demand was
allowed to regulate both the amount of staples flowing into
the towns and the prices at which these were sold. The
nlrkh (price rates) in the bazaars of the early eighteenth
century signified "the prices which the vendors generally
regulated on their own", which were then confirmed by the
official seal of the market supervisor ( daroga-i-
bazaar) 63
The Nizamat's attitude towards the market under normal
economic circumstances was guided by its own perception of
mercantile activity and by the social milieu in which these
markets were formed and functioned. The state's attitude to
mercantile activity is perhaps evident from Alivardi Khan's
assertion that the "merchants are the Kingdom's
benefactors; their Imports and exports are an advantage to
all men. •1f64• It was this attitude, held by the Nazims In
general which probably resulted In their farming the trade
of "the several articles which constitute the Internal
commerce of Bengal and Bihar" to the local merchants: "such
commerce seems to have consisted principally, If not
exclusively, in commodities of the natural produce, or
manufactures, of these provinces" wrote Henry Vansittart
(in 1762) about the state of Internal commerce under the
Nizamat65 . Such an arrangement seems to have been mutually
acceptable to both parties involved in the venture. For
the state It was certainly considered financially viable66;
so was It for the merchants.
Thus In Bishnupur, the betel-leaf (paan) merchants had
In the past the "exclusive privilege vested in them of
63 BRP,IOR P/70/44,11 July 1788;emphasis added.
64 Alivardl Khan to Barwell,9 January 1749,IOR Home
MIsc. ,vol.804,p.61.




vending all the betel produced in Bishnupur or brought from
other districts [thereby becoming] purchasers at their own
prices & vendors at what rates they please" 67 . The betel-
leaf trade at Dhaka was similarly situated. The farmer of
this trade (paan wh1) purchased zones of exclusive trade
from the state and "no other person could bring any betel
leaf from the moffusul and if anyone attempted it, the
farmer attached the leaf, as his property, by virtue of his
engagements with the government" 68 . These exclusive rights
of trade were not limited to a high-value article like
betel. The Nizamat era seems to have seen the formation of
such rights in practically all types of commercial
activity, even at the lowest rung of the market (the hat)
at the village level. At Nadia, petty retailers of rice and
paddy paid special monetary gifts (salami) to the zimfndar
for the exclusive privilege of selling rice at the hat;
there were salamis paid for acquiring similar rights over
retailing salt, over gathering shells for making lime
(chunam), for weighing and measuring commodities being
brought for sale at the hats (kagali) and even for the sale
of firewood to cremate the dead in the village69
The other factor which influenced the state's attitude
towards markets was the social origins of such places in
Bengal. What mattered here were not merely the larger
markets in towns like Dhaka and Murshidabad, but the whole
range of small and intermediate markets (hats and bazaars)
which were linked in a pervasive commercial network. Some
of these smaller centres of redistribution were created
partly by the family members of the Nazlms and by their
officials. In greater part however, they were the products
of zamindari initiative. Most of the wholesale forward
markets (ganjs) in the revenue paying circle (chakla) of
67 BRP,IOR P/71/23,25 March 1790.
68 BRC,IOR P/51/50,24 October 1789;emphasis added.
69 BR Misc.,IOR P/89/36,13 May 1790.
32
Murshidabad were established by members of the provincial
ruling elites over the years (these markets were said to be
between 17 and 300 years old in 1793)°; but the bazaars
and hats "appertain to ancient zemmindarries and the tolls
are the rent right of the zemindars" 71 . In Nadia, these
markets were created and held by "zemindars and tallokdars
(talluqdars] from whom it does not appear that any security
was ever required to be taken" 72 . In Jessore, the hats were
sub-divided into various shares by the zawIrMlars as "there
are many partners each [having] a share in the haut [hat]
and paying their revenues in distinct tahoods [contracts]
or engagements.. .
Bazaars and hats were established with the prior
permission of the state, which was easily granted, but the
actual operation of these markets were left in the hands of
the founding landholder, the "government of the soubahs
[the Nizamat contented themselves with imposing general
regulations for the prevention of undue exactions and occa-
sionally interfered to modify or abolish particular imposts
as they occurred or were discovered..." 74 . Even holders of
revenue-free, charitable, land-grants (la-kharaji) were
given governmental sanction to establish "gunges, bazaars
and hats" and were "authorized to exercise the privilege of
collecting duties thereon" 75 . It is therefore not
surprising that the zamIndars persisted in claiming from
the Company "an equal right in rents arising from gunges
and bazaars" as late as 179076, when the entire political
° BRC,IOR P/53/12,15 May 1793.
71 Ibid.,P/51/23,3 September 1788.
72 BRP,IOR P/70/32,38 August 1787.
BRC,IOR P/52/14,7 July 1790.
Ibid.,P/51/13,11 June 1790.
'	 Ibid.
76 Ibid.,P/52/9,9 April 1790.
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equation had changed in the province.
The Nizamat implicitly recognized the importance of
mercantile activity and of an articulated network of
markets to the regional economy. An illustrative example of
how commercial considerations shaped the attitudes of the
potentates of the state can be given from the case of
liquor manufacturing and retailing in the environs of
Murshidabad. Here 38 out of 80 shops selling high grade
liquor, 28 out of 53 shops retailing toddy, and 62 out of
the 139 shops dealing in opium in 1790 were owned by Nawab
Mubarak-ud-daulah and his family77 . Given the fact that the
"vend of liquor is extensive in towns" 78 , ownership of
retailing outlets provided supplementary income for the
town elites, thereby showing the extent to which the upper
crust had become integrated with the commercial network.
Further down the social scale we find merchants, even at
the hat level, willing to pay a tax (even a bribe) in
exchange of acquiring exclusive privileges of trading even
in basic staples like rice. This fact perhaps indicates
quite forcefully the extent to which markets had become
crucial to the existence of the local economies as well as
the frequency with which commercial transactions had spread
during the early eighteenth century.
But there were still major barriers in the way of a
regionally integrated market in the first-half of the
century. The fact that merchants, and even petty vendors at
the hat level, were able to carve out petty domains of
privileged trade, and that zraindars and other landed
proprietors were the prime agents for the establishment of
these markets jointly militated against the development of
an unfettered system of markets in the province. The reason
for this zm1ndar/byapari combination, expressing, and at
the same time retarding, the formation of a regionally
integrated market, was largely due to the state's internal
" BR.Misc.,IOR P/89/36,29 October 1790.
78 Ibid.,7 May 1790.
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need to balance the two social strata in order to ensure
its own stability79 in the midst of a prosperous economic
situation. However, the overall outcome of such an
arrangement seems to have been a combination of two
developments:(a) a proliferation of zrnIrkYari outposts
(chowkis) to collect tolls at various rates dictated by the
80financial predilections of an individual zaairidar ; and
(b) continuous conflicts between merchants and zairjdars,
and between zamIndars and other landed proprietors, over
the rate of tolls, over market jurisdictions and the
movement of commodities. These conflicts often assumed
violent proportions and could even disrupt marketing
networks in the short run81.
The post-1757 era saw the state and markets
interacting along significantly restructured lines because
of the changing political and commercial situations in
Bengal. The political-economy which determined such
restructuring was described in 1789 in the following words:
To keep in motion the great machine of
the Company's commerce, it is
absolutely necessary that the provision
of Cargoes for the due return of ships
be ensured. Hence the origin of
previously investing Funds at the
Aurungs [manufactories]; hence also the
necessity of being secured in due
realization of goods for which money is
advanced... . The accession of the
Company to the Government of the
Country [the Diwani] did not change
these [earlier] principles and usages,
tho' the immense increase of their
Funds and of the wealth of their
Servants, all to be center'd finally in
See Calkins, 1970:799-806; and Marshall,1987:63-64
for the political necessities facing the Nizamat.
° For example in the crucial trade route between




Europe and to be conveyed thither only
in goods exceedingly enlarged the
demands for the Market of Bengal82
These considerations necessitated a closer control
over internal markets than what had prevailed under the
previous regime. After 1757, state intervention assumed the
apparently contradictory forms of rigorous control in the
marketing of some commodities and a relatively striking
non-interference in the movement of others. The pressures
of a world market meant that commodities like textiles and
opium (and later indigo) were to be rigorously controlled
at all levels Including production. After 1772 salt was
added to the list of official monopolies, not so much for
its overseas value as for its being lucrative in the
internal trade of the province83.
For trade in other commodities, especially that in
agricultural produce, the Company's attitude was one of
ensuring " fair trade" 84 , which entailed the dissolution of
the restraints not only of the type inherited from the
Nizamat, but also of the type fostered by the Company's own
officials in the form of the Society of Trade. The latter
task was tackled by the administrative exercise of prohibi-
ting the private trade of its officials from 1771 onwards,
and by attempting to place severe restrictions on
profiteering and hoarding of grain during times of
scarcity85 . The former job occupied a major portion of its
official business, especially after the disastrous famine
of 1769-70. With regard to the internal barriers to the
82	
"Report of Commercial Occurrences,6 August
1789,IOR,Home Misc.,vol.393,pp.279-80;emphasis added.
83 Serajuddin, 1978; Barui,1985; Marshall,1987: 111-
12.
84 Minute of Warren Hastings,9 March 1773,IOR,Home
Misc. ,vol.217,p.29.
85	 Marshall,1976: 243; Datta,1986: 380.
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movement of trade, the Company's attitude was that chowkls
were inimical to fair trade and to the honest trader as
these, and the tolls levied there, meant that merchants
were "too frequently and . ..unnecessarily subjected to the
exercise of authority" other than the Company's and that
too many transit duties tended to push up prices beyond any
reasonably accepted standards. The logical step from this
type of reasoning was that the chowkis had to be abolished
and duties had to be streamlined so that prices "of
manufactures and of the necessaries of life" could be
brought down86 . Implicit also in the Company's structure of
reasoning was the need to display its newly acquired
political power. "A market is a place", wrote Vansittart in
1778, "where authority must he exercised to regulate the
weights and scales, to preserve order and to afford
protection to the persons who frequent it..."87.
The first major step in the realization of the
Company's aims came in 1773 when:
(1) all duties levied upon grain "in its
transportation from the country" were abolished;
(2) duties on trade in agricultural produce were
henceforth to be collected "only at the capital
towns whither it is brought for consumption", and
the management of such duties was to be under
five customs houses to be established and
stationed at Calcutta, Hughli, Murshidabad,
Dhaka and Patna;
(3) "all road duties [randari] whether by land or
water exacted antecedent" to the regulations of
1773 were to be made null and void;
(4) "all the inferior types of chokies [chowkis]"
over all types of trade routes were to be
86 Ibid.,pp.28-29; also cf.BRC, ICR P/49/38,p.836,1032.
Minute of Henry Vansittart,16 December 1778,CCR, ICR
P/67/72;emphasis added.
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dismantled in a phased manner; and
(5) the right of the local merchant to be "at
liberty to carry his merchandize where ever he
thinks proper for sale" was to be ensured88.
The thrust of these regulations seems to have had an
immediate impact, at least on the movement of trade to the
towns. For example, the general levies made on zamlndari
piers (ghat chowkis) between Murshidabad and Calcutta
declined from a previous (in 1756) range of 4 rupees to 1
rupee to a high of 3 rupees and a low of 0.12 rupee in
177489.
The other bottleneck in the free movement of goods,
that of the control exercised by the zmndars and
talluqdars over markets, was not so easily overcome. The
main reason for this was the continuing resistance of these
people to any state interference in what they considered to
be their hereditary and ancient rights90 . The problems in
this regard were many, thereby showing the complexities
involved in state intervention in a sphere it considered as
a pure economic institution but which was in reality a
distinct form of agrarian property. Markets were
established by"zemindars, talookdars and every denomination
of rent free holders" 91 with a view to their income, but
like all things privately owned, these were often sold to
a host of buyers which created major problems in the way of
88 "Regulations for the Future Establishments and
Regulation of Duties of the Country Government,March
1773",IOR,Home Misc.,vol.217,pp.44-49;also BRC,IOR
P/49/38,23 March 1773.
89	 Compare K.K.Datta,1936: 159-60 and WBSA,PCR
Murshidabad, vol.2,20 June 1774.
90 For the opposition of the za'.lndars in Burdwan
BRC,IOR P152/9,9 April 1790;in Jessore Ibid.,P/52/14,24
June 1790;and in Nadia,BRP,IOR P/70/32,28 August 1787.
91 BRC,IOR P/52/12,28 May 1790.
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the state's plans for outright dispossession. The buyers,
according to John Shore, were "proprietors" and
dispossessing such a person would amount to taking "away
his whole property from him; and this in Bengal would
excite clamour and discontent in the proprietors" 92 . The
apparent explosiveness of the situation forced the Company
to drag its feet till about 1790 when the first major steps
were taken to bring the landed proprietors to heel. The
option of outright dispossession was hotly debated in the
Board of Revenue, but was finally shelved. In order to
circumvent the "clamour and discontent", the state took a
close look at the pattern of ownership and the structure of
taxes and duties (sair jihat) in these market places,
established a major difference between the two and decided
to continue one and abolish another.
What the Board of Revenue did was to make a separation
between rents collected in these markets and taxes
collected on trade. Rents were designated as "any
collections made...as a consideration for the use of
grounds, shops and other buildings belonging to
landholder", whereas taxes were deemed to be those levied
as a "duty on commodities" and on transit of goods. A
landholder's right to collect rent was considered his
"private right" and therefore not to be interfered with,
but the right to tax was construed as the "exclusive right
of government"". Thus on July 20, 1790, landholders were
prohibited from all involvement in the collection of sail
jlhat in lieu of a fixed compensation, and henceforth "no
proprietor of land [would] be admitted to any participation
thereof, or be entitled to make any claims on that
count"94.
The Company's policies, those of monopolistic control
92 John Shore in FR 2,p.493.
BRC,IOR P/52/13,11 June 1790.
" Ibid.,P/53/1,p.475.
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of trade in high-value goods, ensuring unrestricted trade
in agricultural produce and the separation of rent and tax
had a major impact on the state of Bengal's internal
market. These policies led to that crucial bit of state
intervention necessary for the final crystallization of an
integrated market for agricultural produce in Bengal,
thereby bringing to a culmination the processes already set
95in motion under the Nlzamat . One major outcome of this
kind of Interference was a proliferation In market places
all over Bengal. By the 1770s Calcutta was definitely
undergoing an increase in "various kinds of hauts and
bazaars" 96, which, In some quarters (like the police) was
seen as a "great public nuisance. . . by the general exposure
of provisions of all kinds In the highways and the innume-
rable shops and sheds erected thereon" 97 . In the 1780s the
24-Parganas, situated south of Calcutta, was seeing an
"extension of hauts and bazars...by which old hauts are
destroyed and new ones constructed" 98 and by 1792 this
district had 144 markets of which hats numbered iOO. In
1001790 Jessore was served by a chain of 225 hats , and
Burdwan had 17 ganjs and 345 hats In the same year101 . The
following figures'°2 give some indication of the Increase
In the numbers of market places in some districts of Bengal
during our period:
Marshall,1987: 13-14 also locates the formation of
an integrated market in Bengal during this period.
96 CCR,IOR P/67/72,16 December 1778.
' Ibid., P/67/62,13 May 1776.
98 BRP,IOR P/70/27,8 May 1787.
BR,Misc.,IOR,P/89/37,27 June 1792.
100 IbId.,P/89/36,5 July 1790.
101 BRC,IOR P/52/16,9 July 1790.
102 Taylor,1840: 203; BR MIsc.,IOR P/89/37,27 July
1791; MartIn,1976,vol.5: Appendix M;
Martin, 1976,vol.3:Appendlx 0.
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District Year No.of Markets Year No.of markets
Dhaka	 ca.1765	 536
	 1791	 650
Rangpur ca.1770 321	 Ca. 1807	 591
Dinajpur ca.1770 206	 ca. 1807	 635
Agricultural prices and the economy
Figure 1 (P. 41) shows the movement of food prices
in Calcutta between 1754 and 1800 and indicates an apparent
stability of rice prices when compared to the rapid
oscillation in the prices of other agricultural
commodities. But an inference that rice prices were stable
or they rose at a gentle pace during our period would be
dubious for three reasons. First, fi gure 1 relates rice
prices to the prices of the most costly items of food.
Therefore it is bound to reflect a certain degree of
stability by comparison. Second, it does not consider the
impact of bad harvests on the price situation. This fact
(discussed in chapter 2) is vital to our comprehension of
the state of agricultural production. Third, the graph does
not indicate the price-differentials between town and
country and this aspect has to be established if we are to
understand the logic behind the local trade in food-grains.
Figure 2 (p. 42) shows the movement of rice prices in
Calcutta between 1754 and 1800. What we get from this is a
picture of a fairly secular price upswing interspersed with
numerous crests and troughs during this period. The price
crests reflect unfavourable agricultural seasons. The
question is: do the prices in Calcutta indicate the state
of prices in the rest of the province? Fi gures 3 and 4 (pp.
43 and 44) represent polynomial and linear trends of coarse
rice and sugar prices between 1700 and 1800, and both
41
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FIGURE 1
Source: W.B.Bayly, 1816: 560-61.
reveal an unmistakably upward linear trend. What these two
figures also reveal Is the almost uniform price escalation
in two of the most diverse types of food-items: ordinary
rice (obviously the central component of a poor person's
diet) and sugar (coveted by the poor but consumed by the
rich).
Finally, Figure 5 (p. 45) compares the prices of
winter (aman)rice In Calcutta with those prevailing in four
districts situated in different regions of the province for
years when comparable price figures are available. One of
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Calcutta, Chittagong is to the south-east, Purnea lies
north-west and Dlnajpur to the north of that city
Figure 5 reveals three symptoms about the behaviour of
agricultural prices. First, It shows a that the rise In
prices was differentially distributed within a generally
upward trend. Second, prices in each of these areas show
sharp fluctuations caused, in all likelihood, by the nature
of the current harvest. Third, there was a fairly
continuous rise in the rural prices of rice and this
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FIGURE 3
Source: A.S.M.Akhtar Hussain, "A Quantitative Study of
Price Movements in Bengal During Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries", Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, London University,
1977 [hereafter, "A Quantitative Study"], pp. 277-78.
developments in the provincial economy 103 . It is perhaps
for the first time in Bengal's history that we can speak of
an economy integrated by provincially uniform price-trends.
The preceding discussion perhaps establishes two
aspects crucial to the behaviour of prices, harvests and
people's lives in our period. First, harvests and
103 The phenomenal price rise in 1788 was due to a
famine in that year;but what is notable is the rapidity of
the increase of rural prices in 1787 (a year of a massive
flood) and the amazing price rise in Calcutta in 1788.1
shall return to the significance of famine and dearth
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FIGURE 4
Source: Hussain, "A Quantitative Study", pp. 277-78.
agricultural prices were related in a regionally integrated
network. Second, the economy was price sensitive since a
rise in the price in some districts would immediately raise
the prices in far-flung areas. The second aspect of the
price situation can be seen in sharper relief during times
of dearth and famine. This I discuss in Chapter 2.
That there was an integrated regional market for grain
in Bengal, and that demand of food in different parts of
the province had a palpable impact on the state of prices
as well as upon the intra-regional flow of food has been
45
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FIGURE 5
Legend: 1: Calcutta;	 2:Midnapur;	 3: Chittagonp;
4:Purnea; 5:Dina-jpur.
Source: For Calcutta, W.B.Bayly, 1816: 560-61; for
Midnapur, Chittagong, Purnea and Dinajpur, BRC, IOR P/49/42
to P/52/40; WBSA, Grain, vol.1, 17 October 1794 and WBSA,
PCR, Dinajpur, vol.4 and 6, Appendix to Proceedings.
brought into focus'° 4 . It is also important to bear in mind
that artisans, townspeople, boatmen and even the rural poor
had to purchase their food from a specialized community of
grain merchants who dominated over the entire gamut of this
104 Also see Marshall,1987: 13-14; D.H.Curly,"Rulers
and	 Merchants	 in	 Late	 Eighteenth-century
Bengal" ,unpublished	 D.Phil.thesis,Chicago	 Univer-
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RI CE AND SALT PRI CES, 1765- 1775
RUPEES PER NAUND
0	 RICE PRICES	 +	 SALT PRICES
FIGURE 6
Source: for rice, W.B.Bayly, 1816:560; for salt, BRC, IOR
P/49/64, 24 September 1776.
trade'°5 . Finally, agricultural prices exerted a grave
influence on the prices of other commodities and on the
living standards of both the agricultural and non-
agricultural population, a point which requires further
elucidation.
An inter-sectoral interdependency of price whereby the
oscillation in one sector influenced prices in another
seems to have been a well-established feature of Bengal's
agrarian economy.This fact is clearly evident from Figure
6 (p. 46) which compares the prices of rice and salt in
105 See Datta,1986 and Chapter 6 below.
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Calcutta between 1765 and 1775106.
Naturally, therefore, price movements influenced
incomes in the different sectors of production. A rise in
the price of rice or paddy meant that "the ryotts are
obliged to sell the produce of their lands dearer than
formerly" while the manufacturer "paying more than formerly
for the materials & for the necessaries of life are unable
to subsist without increasing the price of their goods"'°7.
H.T.Colebrooke (writing circa 1793) observed that the price
of grain had the greatest influence on the prices of other
commodities in the market'°8 . The high price of cotton in
1789 was being blamed "upon the famine [1788] which
increased the value of corn"'09 . "Should a degree of
scarcity raise the price of grain above the average rate,
it falls heavily on the manufacturer""°, and an
"exorbitant encrease [sic] on the rate of the necessaries
of life renders the ordinary allowances for labour
insufficient"" are statements which clearly indicate the
economic influence exerted by the state of agricultural
prices on the conditions of practically every harvest-
dependent social strata in Bengal. The people who were most
affected by the state of agricultural prices were pres-
umably the poorer-peasants having Insufficient lands at
their disposal, the rural and urban labourers and those
artisans who depended exclusively on the market for their
subsistence. A recent study of the weavers in the
employment of the East India Company shows that a rise in
106 The steep rise in salt prices between 1766 and 1767
was due to the monopoly practiced by the short-lived
Society of Trade.Once this monopoly was abollshed,salt
prices reverted to their market levels.
107 IOR,Home Misc.,vol.206,p.149.
108 Remarks, p.67.
109 BRP,IOR P/71/9,15 May 1789.
110 BRC,IOR P/51/22,15 August 1788.
" IOR Home Misc.,vol.393,6 November 1788,p.121.
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food prices was fraught with severe consequences since
these artisans had to pay more to buy food for their
subsistence, but were themselves unable to raise the prices
of their products112.
High food prices over a long-term could theoretically
prove beneficial to the peasants and to the agricultural
sector but only under three conditions (a) the rise in food
prices was not due to a shortfall in the harvest, (b) the
real burden of state taxation remained below the rise in
price and (c) there was no corresponding increase in the
prices of non-agricultural products. The situation in
Bengal was apparently contrary on all three counts. First,
a sharp increases in prices were almost invariably signs of
a shrunken produce caused by failures of harvest (see
chapter 2)113. Second, state taxation under the regime of
the East India Company was essentially regressive, and
there was very little effort made by the state to reduce
the burden of taxation, or provide relief, even during
famine-stricken conditions" 4 . Third, that the prices of
112 Hamida Hossain,1988: 9-11..
113 On the contrary,low agricultural prices were
synonymous with abundant harvests which "invariably hurt
the ryott as in such an event they want purchasers for
their grain" (BRC,IOR P/50/68,20 November 1783).The
peasant's plight during abundant harvests was described by
Colebrooke in the following words:
When the crops of corn are very abundant, it
is not only cheap,but wants a ready
market.As the payments of rents are
regulated by the season of the harvest,the
revenue is due and must be paid,whether
there be or not be a vent for the produce...
.Thus the eagerness of the vendors reduces
the price [Remarks,p.67].
114 The classic case of regressive state taxation in
the midst of an acute crisis of subsistence is the
financial behaviour of the Company during the famine of
1769/7O.In a situation when harvests fell short by as much
as 50 percent,the Company actually collected a revenue of
14.74 million rupees in 1769/70 and 13.82 million rupees in
1770/71,both sums being higher than the collections
(continued...)
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non-agricultural products had risen prodigiously during the
course of the late eighteenth century appears an undeniable
fact. For instance the market price of silk-cocoons
apparently increased by more than 50 percent within the
space of one year between 1770 and l77l", while there was
a short-run slump in the prices of paddy and other
"inferior variety of grains" in many districts between 1771
and 1773116. Whatever relief this may have provided for the
artisans was clearly to be short-lived, as 1773/74 and 1775
were once again years of dearth caused by bad harvests. As
rice prices rose, the prices of raw materials and of the
finished-good tended to rise proportionately. Thus by 1789:
The unusual rise in the prices of the
two principal articles so necessary to
the weavers, Rice and Cotton, has
created an encrease [sic] in the price
114( . . . continued)
actually made (13.59 million rupees) in 1765/66,the year
when it was given the Diwani of the province [PP.Fourt.h
Report , l783 , pp. 99- 10 1 ]. Even Warren Hastings was forced to
admit that the pitch of the Company's revenue demand was
"violently kept up to its former standard" during the
famine (vide.G.W.Forrest,1910: 265].In fact the collections
in the worst affected districts of western Bengal (where
the epicentre of the famine was actually located) was 34.72
percent higher in 1770/71 than in 1769/70 (cf.,FR,Mursh-
idabad,IOR G/27/1,4 April 1771 for figures).
The tax burden during the famine of 1786/87 is not
documented In the sources.Nevertheless some figures
provided by N.K.Sinha [1968: 105] show that the the Company
actually collected more revenue during the dearths of
1773/74,1775,1779 and 1783 than what was collected in the
years before these occurrences.
115 IOR,Home Misc.,vol.769,22 August 1771,p.36l.
116 See WBSA,CCRM,vol.3,25 January l771;WBSA,Circuit
at Purnea,2 February to 9 February 1771,p.8;BRC,IOR
P/49/40,26 June 1773;ibid.,P/49/46,31 May 1774.
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of cloths at the Markets beyond what
was ever known, and introduced a
practice of reducing the number of
threads of the warp, which has debased
the cloths in their texture"7.
Another aspect, vital to the structure of local trade
in food-grains, was the nature of the price differential
prevailing between town and country. Table 1.1 sets the
widely scattered evidence regarding this in a somewhat
comprehensible fashion.
Table 1.1
Price differentials between town and country
(rupees per maund)




















































"Report Of Commercial Occurrences",6 August
1789,IOR,Home Misc.,vol.393,pp.254-55.
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Source for Table 1.1: BRC, IOR P/49/44, 11 December 1773,
10 January 1774; P149/47, 22 August 1774; P/49/50, 28
January 1775; P/51/21, 4 June 1788; P/51/50, 28 October
1789; P/52/37, 23 November 1791; P/52/42, 9 March 1792;
P/52/44, 4 May 1792; P/52/45, 1 June 1792; Datta, 1986:389.
Figure 7 (p. 52), which shows the state of rice prices
in Calcutta, Burdwan and Birbhum between 1784 and 1813,
perhaps amply demonstrates the existence of significant
price-differentials between town and country in our period.
Thus Bengal prices show an integrated economy under-
going a fairly noticeable rise in the rural prices of food.
We have also seen that prices tended to oscillate from year
to year, and this fact was important in shaping merchant-
peasant linkages: a point which will be discussed at length
subsequently. Finally, the nature of price differentials
between town and country, coupled with the rise in country
prices had significant socio-economic implications. As will
be discussed subsequently (chapter 6), they provided a new
direction to local trade in agricultural produce, not just
In terms of movement of food, but also with regard to the
social relationships which emerged In the countryside In
this period.
State taxation and the economy
Reconstructing the revenue history of post-Diwani
Bengal Is a difficult task, the main reason for which Is
that revenue is mainly lInked to the problem of the "drain"
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FIGURE 7
Source: W.B.Bayly, 1816: 560-64.
with this connection, often reiterated by Marxist
writings' 18, has resulted in a major gap in our
comprehension of Bengal's economy in the late eighteenth
century.
Figure 8 (p. 53) represents the data of assessed
revenue (jama)of Bengal between 1700 and 1790. What this
graph shows is a steady rise in the revenue assessment of
the province after 1765. The fact that the figure includes
Bihar's janza after 1765 does not reduce the importance of
the trend because it was Bengal's jama which was, at least
in this period, the crucial indicator of the Company's
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JAMA OF BENGAL,1700•84
INCLUDES II NAN NEVENUE AFTEN 1751
FIGURE 8
Source: BRC, IOR P151/lB 1 2 April 1788, Appendix no. 7;
ICR, Home Misc., vol.122, p.753; Verelst Papers, IOL,
Mss.Eur.F.218/15, ff.30-31; Sinha,1968: 105; Brit.
Mus.,Add.Ms., 29205, f.258.
revenue"9 . It is in the context of this rise that Figure
9 (p. 54), showing hasil figures between 1761 and 1784
becomes significant.What strikes in figure 9 is the
increasing parity between the pitch of assessment and the
amount actually collected by the Company after its
acquisition of the Diwani despite raising the levels of
both to a degree largely unprecedented in the history of
" For instance,the jama of 1790 was 25.926 million
rupees.Of this Bengal's share was 21.743 million rupees
(83.86 %) while Bihar's share was 4.182 million rupees
(16.14 %) [Brit.Mus.,Add.Ms.,29205, f.258].
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COMPANY COLLECTIONS,1761-84
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FIGURE 9
Source: As cited in Figure 8.
the province120, thereby justifying (from the Company's
120 Unfortunately,the amounts actually collected by the
Nawabs of Bengal are not known.Allvardi Khan was credited
with collecting nearly one and a half crores (15,000,000)
from his assessment of 16.62 million rupees
[compare,Verelst Manuscripts, IOL,Mss.Eur. F.218/15,f.30 and
ibid.,F.218/9,f.23].Mir Qasim raised the jama to nearly
20.47 million rupees [IOR,Home Misc.,vol.382,p.291],but
could actually collect a lot less.The only available





[SCC, ICR P/A/9, 13 September 1769;Sinha, 1968:29].
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perspective) Warren Hastings's statement that "Bengal wants
only a little respite [sic] to retrieve its own
affairs"'21.
How do we explain this striking increase in state
appropriation within such a short time of the political
transition? A partial explanation may lie in the rise in
agricultural prices throughout the eighteenth century.
Nevertheless, the extent to which the Jama of post-Diwani
Bengal reflected an inflation of price is debatable. It
certainly appeared so to Philip Francis who ascribed the
rise in prices in the late eighteenth century to the
"insupportable taxation which racks the landholder... since
the acceptance of the Dewanny"' 22 , thus indicating that
revenue demand rose faster than actual prices.
Some answers perhaps exist in the inherent
inefficiency of the previous regime's (the Nizamat's)
appropriating mechanism, and in the political necessities
of that state to strike a workable balance of power with
the zamindars who were crucial for its very survival. The
revenue administration of the Company would therefore seem
to have been qualitatively different than its
predecessor's' 23 . This is borne out by the differences in
the revenue administration of the two regimes. Under the
Nizamat, the abiding principle of revenue administration
was to adhere to the assul jama bandobust (original assess-
ment) established by Akbar. Subsequent increases were made
from time to time by ahwab and mathot (additional imposts)
which were then added to this assul to provide new jama
figures124 . The Company's administration was different
because, not only did it retain the previous policy of
121 G.W.Forrest (ed.),1910: 21.
122 BRC,IOR P/49/56,Minute dated 21 February 1777.




using a.bwrab and mathot to revise assessments, it introduced
the previously unheard policy of taxing districts in
relation to their actual productive resources. The detailed
investigation of the "Aumeen Commission" in 1778 bear
adequate testimony of the Company's desire to get at the
productive capacities of different districts. The papers of
that Commission conclusively show that after 1765, the
Company's revenue increments were based on four sources:
Talaash Beshee: Increases made by searching for
secreted land
Beroopher Beshee: Increases made from identifying
lands sown with high quality crops
Comar Utpan Beshee: Increases made from grain
producing lands
Abwab and Mathot: Additional taxes and imposts levied
on the assu.l'25
The ease with which Bengal was subjugated and the
Company's commercial necessities ("territorial revenue" was
used to fund "investments" and pay for the upkeep of its
military establishment after 1765) enabled the post-1765
state to establish a tighter control over its revenue than
what had been possible before. Loopholes remained. Charity
grants continued to pose tremendous problems for the
administrators throughout this period (see chapter 3), but
the central thrust of the Company's policies made it a
qualitatively different regime than its predecessor.
These considerations are vital for understanding the
economic role of the Company and to contextualize Bengal's
revenue history in this period. I have already drawn
attention to the state's intervention in the market as a
device to free it of its major internal restrictions
imposed by zamndari control. The available evidence
125 See Brit.Mus.,Add.Ms.,28086 to 29088,esp.29088 for
figures.
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indicates that the steps taken to this effect were
substantially forceful and met with very little effective
opposition from the local landed proprietors. A
proliferation in market-places was its most immediate
outcome. The increase in their numbers, or their
establishment in previously deficient areas enabled the
peasantry to relate more easily to wider commercial
networks and facilitated the creation of a pervasive gamut
of mercantile functions ( discussed in chapter 6). It
therefore appears that a greater degree of appropriation
was accompanied by increasing the facilities for
circulation of commodities.
The other important aspect of revenue was the manner
of its assessment and collection. Irfan Habib has shown
the existence of a fairly extensive system of collecting
revenue in cash in pre-colonial India; but revenue-in-cash
was one form in which the surplus was appropriated. Myriad
forms of non-monetized appropriation (like batai, kankut,
ghalla-bakshi) existed along with the Mughal zabt, and the
state allowed the cultivator the option of paying revenue
in kind even in the zabti regions126 . There was undoubtedly
a fairly extensive cash-nexus in Medieval India, but a
multitude of non-cash forms of taxation perhaps indicate
that such a nexus was perhaps unevenly developed in the
major portion of the empire. For instance Bengal was not a
zabt area during Mughal rule'27.
The distinctive feature of revenue in the eighteenth
century is that there was a continuous tendency to
appropriate revenue only in cash. While various types of
126 Habib: 1963.
127 See the information on Mughal and Nizamat land-
revenue assessment in Bengal in BRC,IOR P/49/70,4 April
1777.For information on how these worked in different
districts,BRP,IOR P/70/16,7 June 1786 for
Birbhum;Ibid.,P/70/37,8 May 1787 for Rangpur and BRC,IOR
P/51/22,23 July 1788 for Jessore.
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crop-sharing persisted in Bihar'28 , the Nawabs of Bengal
collected their revenue in cash, which meant that the
portion of the crop earmarked as revenue was sold in the
bazaar by the producers at prevailing prices. This is borne
out by a number of later inquiries made by the Company on
the revenue administration during the reign of the
"soubahs" (Nawabs) of Bengal. According to the Board of
Revenue's estimate (made in 1788), the total silver
currency in stock in the first half of the century amounted
to more than 12 crore (120,000,000) rupees 129 , of which 60,
000,000 rupees seems to have been the money in annual
circulation (each sicca rupee "can not be issued and
received more than once in two years") 130 . Comparing this
estimate with Jama figures available suggest that the gross
assessment levied by Murshid Quli Khan (in 1722) of 14.11
million rupees 13' amounted to 23.52 percent of the
circulating medium, whereas Alivardi Khan's jama (in 1756)
of 18.684 million rupees'32 represented 31.14 percent of
the currency in circulation. Thus the fact that there was
hard currency available facilitated the collection of
revenue in cash. It is therefore no accident that the
silver sicca had become the "general currency" of Bengal,
which was "13 oz. 15 devts or 13 devts better than the
English standard", and whose purity was maintained by
"recoinage after every three years"; it is also not
surprising that this sicca had "become the standard of
weight throughout Bengal; the seer is composed of so many
128 BRC,IOR P/52/40,13 January 1792.
129 BRP,IOR P/70/40,25 April 1788.
'° Ibid.,18 April 1788.
131 BRC,IOR P/51/18,2 April 1788.
132 IOR Home Misc.,vol.122,22 January l776,pp.771-
73.Perhaps this was the reason why Alivardi Khan could
collect his assessments in full.
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siccas, and the maund at forty seers"133.
Thus the Company's rule occurred at a time when the
collection of revenue in cash had already become a
"general" phenomenon and took this process a step further
by adding to the pitch of the revenue demand and by
ensuring parity with the hasil. This meant that nearly 40
percent of Bengal's agricultural output taken as revenue134
was annually converted into cash. The chief indicator of
the connection between revenue and cash is the influence of
agricultural prices (discussed above) on the province's
peasant economy. The state also persistently refused all
suggestions to revert to revenue in kind during periods of
price slumps in order to reduce the pressure on the
peasants'35 , which implies a major departure from one of
the abiding principles of Mughal land-revenue
administration. The obvious rationale of such a refusal was
the state's financial necessity. Thus by 1769, even
sharecroppers in an extensive zamlndari of Burdwan were
being made to sell the crop and then pay the zm1rM1ar in
cash, a process which seems to have intensified in
subsequent years'36.
The connection between revenue and commercialized
agricultural production can be seen from the connection
between revenue, crops and agricultural seasons. Peasants
in Bengal paid revenue in three installments (kists)
coinciding with the three harvest seasons: aman (winter or
kharif), aus (spring or raM) and boro (an intermediate
harvest). In general amrn rice was commercially the most
John Shore's Minute on The Coinage of Bengal,28
October 1789,in BRC,P/51/50,28 October 1789.
134 John Shore's Minute of 18 June 1789,in FR 2,p.192.
135 See the suggestion of George Bogle to collect
revenue in grain during the massive price slump of 1771 and
1772 in D.C.Ganguly,1958: 90.
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Source: Jessore, BRC, IOR P/51/13, part 2, 10 February
1788; Rangpur, BRP, IOR P/70/27, 8 may 1787; Dhaka,
Ibid., P/70/38, 4 February 1788; Midnapur, Ibid., P/70/37,
11 February 1787.
valuable, being produced mainly for sale. "The Khureef
(kharif) crop is undoubtedly more productive than that of
Rubee" were the words used by the Board of Revenue to
describe the value of the former harvest in Bengal'37 . It
was this harvest which determined the major amount of
revenue collected because most of the important "cash"
crops like cotton, mulberry, tobacco and sugarcane were
either sown or harvested during this principal agricultural
BRP,P/70/27,8 May 1787.
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season'38 . Aus rice was relatively inferior and was
essentially consumed by the "lowest and poorer classes of
people". Boro produced the coarsest quality rice and was
grown in "low marshy ground after the waters have
subsided"'39 . The proportion which each bore to revenue in
different districts is outlined in Fi gure 10 (p. 60) which
is based on evidence available from the districts of Dhaka,
Rangpur, Jessore and Midnapur.
The connection between revenue and commercial
agriculture (as revealed by figure 10) is perhaps self-
explanatory.
Taking stock of the discussion so far, it is perhaps
reasonable to say that the economic context of the late
eighteenth century becomes explicable by looking at it from
the perspective of rapid commercialization engendered by a
conjuncture of demand, prices and state action. I had
remarked at the outset of this discussion that one of the
important elements in the late eighteenth century
conjuncture was the fortuitous cluster of dearth and famine
years beginning with the famine of 1769/70. I now turn to
analyze the causes and socio-economic significance of
these events.
138 See Chapter 5 below for details.
139 WBSA,CCRM,vol.5,30 April 1771;BRP,IOR P/70/38,4
February 1788;WBSA Grain,vol.1,l7 October 1794.
Chapter 2
Dearth and Famine in Late Eighteenth Century Bengal
Practically everyone in late eighteenth century Bengal
was keenly aware of the dangers to society from famines and
dearth. The state (i.e. the East India Company's state) was
a veritable barometer, registering each and every little
change in the economic atmosphere caused by scarcities or
bad harvests as they jeopardized the collection of revenue.
The local landed-proprietors (zamindars and talluqdars) saw
such situations as an inevitable evil which they had to
endure even though these meant falling incomes and
desertion by their peasants. For the producers, the
peasants and the artisans, famine and dearth was a bitter
fact of life. For them such events were nothing short of
God's own scourge on earth:not only were their enterprises
severely shaken; not only did they die in large numbers;
they were also left with the crippling burdens of making
good the losses suffered by the state and by their landed-
superiors. For the producers, dearth and famines were more
than just "bad" agricultural years. Such years were sheer
crises of survival. The following sections attempt to
analyze the causation, symptoms and nature of such crises
in late eighteenth century Bengal.
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Dearth and famine:some conceptual formulations
Recent studies by Sen, Alamgir and Arnold 1 have made
major contributions towards the theoretical
conceptualization of famines. Alamgir's study is
particularly important as he provides a rigorous definition
of a famine as:
A general state of prolonged foodgrain
intake deficiency per capita giving
rise to a number of accompanying sub-
states (symptoms) involving individuals
and the community that ultimately lead,
directly or indirectly, to excess
deaths in a region or a country as a
whole2
Alamgir also establishes a typology of famine
according to its severity and its social ramifications. He
provides us with three types of famine "(1) general famine,
(2) local/regional famine and (3) class famine". In a
general famine, the entire nation is affected "although the
time sequence may differ between regions and between
different classes of people"; "in a local/regional famine
only a part of the country, but all groups of people within
it, is affected"; and in a class famine "the burden of
foodgrain deficiency per capita and excess mortality falls
primarily on the weaker sections of the population with
little staying power". The impact of famines on a country,
region or class (or classes) depends upon "their initial
condition and the particular causal sequences leading to
l A.Sen,1982; M.Alamgir,1980; D.Arnold,1988. Also see
Lance Brennan,Les Heathcote and Anton Lucas,1984 for an





Whereas Alamgir locates a shortfall in food
availability as a crucial variable in famine causation4,
A.K.Sen specifically rejects this variable as being the
crucial one in causing famines. The problem during a famine
is not an absolute decline in food for all, but the severe
deprivation of some. Famine starvation is "the
characteristic of some people not having enough to eat. It
is not the characteristic of there being not enough to
eat". For Sen, famines are essentially economic disasters,
rather than primarily crises of food. He views famines as
economic dislocations where people are faced with
"entitlement/endowment"crises. Under famine situations the
poor lose their "entitlement" which, under normal
circumstances, are an individual's access to material
resources which are then exchanged for food. EntitlementS
fail because the famine-stricken lose control of their
"endowments" (i.e., what they own); or large scale shifts
occur in what they can exchange for their endowments; or
there is a failure of institutional (mainly state) help in
alleviating the crisis5.
Arnold's essential position falls closer to that taken
by Alamgir in so far as Arnold disagrees with Sen on the
issue of food shortage as one of the important variables in
famine causation. Arguing that food-shortages caused by
climatic or other disasters provide the proximate cause of
a famine, Arnold defines a famine as a "multiple crisis of
subsistence, survival and order". For Arnold, famine
"signifies an exceptional (if periodically recurring)
event, a collective crisis of such magnitude as to cause






agrees with Alamgir's notion of "substates" 7 generated by
a famine).
The differences between Alamgir and Sen, or Arnold's
critique of Sen on the question of decline in per capita
availability of food, are basically formal. All agree that
essentially a famine is a crisis in the very structure of
a society which leads to excess deaths, long-term social
and physical debilitation and severe dislocations in its
economic life. They also agree that famines do not affect
all social strata equally or at the same time. Sen's
"crisis of entitlement" and Alamgir's typology of a "class
famine" are two different expressions to convey the same
meaning, i.e., the differential impact of famines on the
most vulnerable ranks in society. Arnold, by providing a
historian's perspective, has focussed upon the hierarchy of
causes which lead to immense social crises like famines;
proximate causes (like climatic failures or wars) are
located along with the basic (or structural) causes (for
example, long-term trends in production and prices,
standards of living, systems and incidence of taxation, and
stratification) which allow a causal reconstruction of a
famine and its consequences. For Sen poverty breeds
famines; for Alamgir, famine creates conditions for
increasing the intensity of poverty and deprivation; and
for Arnold famines and poverty are related in a
cause/effect syndrome.
There is however one issue which is not central to the
discussions of these scholars, and that is the problem, and
impact, of dearth. Historical evidence from Western Europe
provides a distinction between such occurrences and
famines. Demographic patterns in pre-industrial Europe show
These substates are "increase in interregional
migration, increase in crime,increase in incidence of fatal
disease, loss of body weight,change in nutritional
status,eating of "famine foods",mental disorientation
disorientation, "wandering" ,uprooting of families, transfer
of assets,and breakdown of traditional social bonds"
(Alamgir,1980: 7).
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that a famine was both a crisis of subsistence and crisis
of mortality; two other situations which could create
severe crises of mortality were epidemics and war8 . On the
other hand, dearth were occasioned by "bad" agricultural
years. These could cause crises of subsistence but the
actual scale of misery "was both regionally and socially
selective" 9 . The extent to which dearth could become a
crisis of mortality depended upon the stored-up or
alternative supplies of food, or whether there was an
epidemic or war in the offing. In the absence of the latter
variables, a season of dearth tended to create a short-run
crisis of subsistence as it tended to "shift the schedule
of demand of the poor from industrial products to food
products"; and the intensity of such crises depended upon
the temporal spread of such bad agricultural years "especi-
ally if the victims had to resort to the consumption of
their seed corn"10.
From the point of view of the present chapter, the
terms famine and dearth are used to denote two distinct
types of crises of survival. Famine typifies a situation
when a subsistence and mortality crisis become combined in
a critical conjuncture. A famine is a one-off event of
calamitous proportions". Dearth, on the other hand,
represents a more continuous saga of scarcities; and
although they have a lesser impact than famines, they are
nevertheless important since their periodic incursions lead
to a prolonged crisis of subsistence among the harvest
sensitive strata (the artisans, labourers and the town
8 M.W.Flinn, 1981: 53.Interestingly,the perennial
litany of the seventeenth century French peasant was "From
plague,famine and Fronde,O Lord deliver us" [Le Roy
Ladurie,1977: 270].
John Walter and Keith Wrightson,1976: 23.
b0 J.D.Chambers,1972: 13.
Arnold also sees famine as "an exceptional
event...of such magnitude as to cause social and economic
dislocation" [1988: 6].
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poor) as well as among the peasants, especially those (like
the peasants in Bengal) working their lands with inadequate
resources.
The other aspect which needs detailed analysis is what
do these subsistence crises actually reflect? One of the
most common assumptions is to see famines in eighteenth
century Bengal as some kind of shock to traditional
patterns of subsistence security; once the worst was over
these "traditional" patterns would once again assert them-
selves, and it was not till the late nineteenth century
that "the traditional Bengali system of subsistence
security was threatened by new attitudes, new risks, and
unprecedented scarcities" 12 . The obvious question which
comes to mind is whether there was ever a "traditional"
subsistence security in Bengal? Our evidence (discussed in
chapter 1) strongly indicates a highly commercialized
economy where access to food (or denial of it) was
determined by markets, prices and the purchasing capacity
of the purchasers. It is therefore pertinent to see whether
famine and dearth in our period were the results of
commercialized agriculture.
The changing context of food-shortages in the eighteenth
century
As Table 2 shows, Bengal was no stranger to acute food
shortages, caused either by insufficient or excessive
rains.
12 Paul Greenough,1982: 84.This argument is very much
in consonance with the ones provided by N.K.Sinha [1968:
64] and B.B.Chaudhury [1983: 299-300].
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Table 2
Food shortages and natural calamities in Bengal,
1700-1768.





































































Source: Relevant volumes of BPC, IOR P/1/2 to
P/1/49; Letters Received, IOR E/4/20 to
E/4/30; Letters from Coast and Bay, IOR
E/4/1 to E/4/6; bR, Home Misc., vol.804, 20
November 1752, p.237; BDR:Midnapur, vol.1,
18 July 1767 and 10 November 1767, pp.171,
191; ibid., vol.4, 30 January 1771, p.47;
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Robert Orme, Historical Fragments of the
Mogul Empire, London , 1805 (original 1782),
p.405.
An agricultural economy, like the one in Bengal, which
depended almost exclusively on the monsoons for irrigating
its fields, or for nourishing the soil by the silt deposits
left by the seasonal flooding of its rivers was perhaps
naturally vulnerable to periodic cycles of droughts or
floods. It is also significant that of the fifteen
documented cases of scarcity listed in table 2, there were
only three years (1711, 1752 and 1763) in which people
actually died, presumably due to starvation. In 1711
"several thousands have famished for want of rice" 13 . The
year 1752 was described as the worst famine in the past
sixty years and "many inhabitants have perished in the town
[Calcutta], a truth well known to every one"4 . In 1763
"many thousands are continually perishing thro' want" 15 and
"many thousands of walking skeletons" flooded on to the
streets of Calcutta' 6 . 1738 may also have been a year of
famine mortality since in 1769 the people of Purnea
apparently considered it to be the worst calamity to have
befallen that district "for thirty years past"'7.
In a large sense, therefore, the scarcities and
famines which struck the province in the late eighteenth
century (and with which this thesis is centrally concerned)
would appear to be part of a saga of recurring food-
' BPC,IOR P/1/2,9 July 1711.
'	 IOR,Home Misc.,vol.804,from Govindaram Mitra to
Roger Drake,20 November l752,p.237.
' Luke Scrafton,Reflectioris on the Government & ca.of
Indostan, London 1763,p.27.
16 J.Z.Holwell,India Tracts,London l764,p.165.
17 SCC,IOR P/A/10,16 February 1770.
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shortages. Yet, there appears to be a strong case for
arguing that the ones in the late eighteenth century were
more intense and had more pervasive social consequences. It
is certainly undeniable that the scale of mortality in
1769/70 far exceeded the deaths described in the worst
scarcities in the early part of the century. Even if one
questions, as this thesis does, the general consensus that
10 million people actually died in that famine (discussed
below), that fact nevertheless remains that nothing like
1769/70 had ever occurred in the province. Similarly, the
cyclone and flood of 1787 was particularly disastrous in
eastern Bengal since they apparently coincided with the
changes in the course of the river Teesta. Therefore, the
effects of the famine in 1788 were quite disastrous even
though the mortality was considerably less than what seems
to have occurred in 1769/70. All these issues will be
discussed at length during the course of this chapter.
Historical reconstructions of dearth and famine in late
eighteenth century Bengal:weather as a factor
The question is: how do we differentiate between
dearth and famine in the context of eighteenth century
Bengal? Obviously, social perceptions classified various
food-crises according to their scale and magnitude. Abhah
and durbhikshya are Bengali terms to differentiate between
situations of scarcity (abhab) and situations of full-blown
famines. Paul Greenough is correct in stating that the
cultural perception of prosperity, and conversely of
adversity, in traditional Bengali society depended on the
nature of the current paddy harvest and the ways in which
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different social groups were allowed access to it 18 . Yet
dearth and famines were more than rude shocks to
established cultural constructs of plenitude ("society's
conception of the good life") 19 and scarcity. They caused
severe economic dislocations. Production faltered, prices
soared and people died. "Traditional" means of support
within the community no longer sufficed to maintain social
bonds, or to alleviate the sufferings of the famine
stricken. Table 2.1 provides a brief outline of the number
of times Bengal suffered from such occurrences between 1769
and 1800.
18 Greenough, 1982: pp.42-52.Perhaps such constructs
were not unique to traditional Bengali society alone.Did
traditional European societies differ substantially in
their conceptions of dearth and plenty? It would be dif f-
icult to argue that they did on two grounds.First,these
societies were predominantly agricultural and therefore
survival was essentially harvest-dependent
[Hoskins, 1968;Meuvret, 1988] .Second,each society has its own
hierarchical arrangements which arranged society into
prescribed slots (for instance,lord-vassal-serf) whose
interdependencies were regulated by "traditional" customs
and mores.The elites were culturally enjoined to be just
and benign;the lower orders obedient.A "good king" who
ruled with even-handedness was as much a part of the
European ethos as it was Asian (or Bengali).The Bengali
peasants expected to see their superiors come to their aid
during times of crisis;so did their European counterparts:
"it was of crucial importance for the maintenance of the
social order that dearth was not only met,but was seen to
be met by action on the part of the authorities" [Walter
and Wrightson,1976: 41].It is also true that such received
notions seldom worked in real life in Europe;they also
failed in Bengal.Greenough's analysis suffers from
labouring the assumption that they actually worked in
traditional Bengali (and by extension in Asian) society.
19 Greenough,1982: 12.
Table 2.1













































Source:	 SCC, IOR P/A/b; relevant volumes of
BRC, IOR P/49/38 to P154/6; relevant
volumes of BRP, IOR P170/b to P172/37;
S.Islam(ed.), Bangladesh District
Records, Dacca District, vol. 1, 1784-
87 for floods in 1783.
The significance of table 2.1 lies in the fact that
it shows the recurrence of severe bouts of dearth in
between two major famines. Taken together these events show
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an economy particularly vulnerable to periodic cycles of
scarcity occasioned by adverse cycles of weather. The
connection between weather and subsistence crises therefore
requires some explanation.
Under normal circumstances, Bengal produced three rice
harvests, am.n, boro and aim. man was the winter harvest
which was universally sown in the Bengali month of Assar
(June-July) and harvested in Agra1han (November-December).
This harvest was generally considered of great market value
"bearing a higher price and sought after by all" 20 . The
other major crop was that of aim (spring), sown in BaiSaICh
(April-May) and reaped in Bhadro (August-September).
Compared to the winter crop, the spring harvest was
intrinsically inferior, being consumed overwhelmingly by
the "lowest and poorest classes" 21 . Boro rice was an
intermediate crop producing the coarsest quality rice which
was sown in Chaitra (March-April) on extremely low lands22
and reaped in either Assar (June-July) or Srawan (July-
August). Therefore unlike the two major crops which
required a gestation period of six months, the horo was a
quick-ripening crop, capable of providing a harvest in four
months23 . Moreover this crop was not produced in all areas
of Bengal. For instance, it was not grown in Burdwan,
Purnea and Midnapur 24 , which perhaps indicates its relative
insignificance in the overall supply of food in the
province.
20 WBSA,Proceedings of the Board of Revenue,Grain
Branch,vol.1,17 October 1794.
21 Ibid.
22 In Rajshahi it was cultivated "chiefly in beds of
lakes and in the nullahs" (small water courses)"
[WBSA,CCRM,vol.5,30 April 1771].
23 See,BRP,IOR P/70/40,Appendix to Proceedings of
April 1788 for a detailed description of types of rice
produced in different districts of Bengal.
24 Ibid.
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Then there were those crops which were grown by the
peasants purely for sale in the market, or for their
conversion into artisanal Prc?duce. Table 2.2 illustrates
the cropping patterns of somelthe principal wcashu crops in
eighteenth century Bengal.
Table 2.2
Cropping patterns of some "cash crops" in
the eighteenth century
Crop	Month sown	 Month harvested
Cotton	 October-November	 May-June
Betel	 All year through
Mulberry April -May 25 	 August-September
Tobacco July-August	 January-February or
February-March
Various types Between April-May 	 January-February
of lentils	 and August-September	 and March-April
Source: BRP, IOR P/70/40, Appendix to Proceedings
of April 1788
Bengal also depended almost exclusively on the
monsoons for irrigating its fields, or for nourishing the
soil by the silt deposits left by the seasonal flooding of
its rivers 26 . For obvious reasons droughts caused immediate
25 The berries sprouted in April-May (Baisakh).
26 The silt "which on the waters subsiding settles on
the lands,fertilizes them, and affords the Ryots
[cultivators] a very great
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problems for agriculture 27 but the scale of the subsequent
scarcity depended upon the intensity of the drought. A
temporary delay in the monsoon was easily accommodated with
the minimum of difficulty. Each village had its own tanks
and ponds, dug by the local landed-proprietors or by
individual peasant families, "from religious or other
motives" which were used to irrigate the adjoining fields
in the "event of the rains ceasing before the crops
approach maturity" 28 . These tanks were used to irrigate
those fields which were sown with crops considered most
valuable to the peasants. Such fields were known as the
colla (high) lands which were utilized to cultivate the
commercially valuable crops (lentils, onions, mustard and
flax for oil) along with mulberry for silk worms, tobacco
and raw cotton 29 . Relatively lower lands were meant for the
cultivation of aman rice. The jala lands (literally water
prone), so-called because of their situation in close
proximity to river banks or streams, were primarily used
26( . . 
. continued)
paddy] ,turcaree [vegetables] and pulse" [BRC, IOR P/52/38,19
November 1791].
27 Writing in 1776,Philip Francis had the following to
say about the connection between climate and agricultural
production in Bengal:
The proportionate value of lands
fluctuate in all countries according to
the immediate industry and ability of
the owners.In Bengal more particularly
it	 depends	 on	 accidents	 of
drought,inundation or favourable
season,of which no general calculation
can be formed.
Minute dated,5 November 1776 in BRC,IOR P/49/65,5 November
1776.
28 BRC,IOR P/52/36,21 October 1791.
29 Brit.Mus.,Add.Ms.,19286,f.2. Colla lands were
usually divided into three categories,(i) colla bast
bari,homesteads,(ii) colla do-fasli,lands producing two
harvests a year and (iii) colla sili-fasli,lands producing
three harvests a year [see WBSA,PCR:Burdwan,vol.1,23 May
1774].
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for the cultivation of the lower grade grains of the spring
(aus) and boro3° crops of rice31 , and for the cultivation
of various edible farinaceous-roots (kochu) which were used
as essential food-supplements especially by the poor32.
30 An intermediate rice crop between the winter and
spring harvests.
' ibid.in Jessore and Rajshahi,part of the aus and
the whole of the boro paddy was cultivated "chiefly in beds
of lakes and in the nullahs and jheels" (WBSA,CCRM,vol.5,30
April 1771].
32 Interestingly,potatoes were not an integral part of
the Bengali diet in the eighteenth century,partly because
of the high costs of cultivating them and partly because of
the numerous tubers which were easily available [see
chapter 5].
77
Weather and dearth, the case of drought
When a drought hit, the colla land was immediately
affected. This had two implications for the life of the
inhabitants. First, some of the finest quality rice grown
in the amn harvest were immediately threatened. Next in
line were the "cash" crops of tobacco, mulberry and cotton.
A short-fall in both the sectors meant that both peasant
and artisanal incomes were jeopardized. Second, droughts
also impinged on the water stocks necessary for the
physical survival of the rural population. Ponds (dighi)
dried-up and the water levels in wells receded. The former
affected the amount of water which cultivators could give
to their standing crops, whereas the latter reduced the
availability of potable water. Thus during the drought of
1791, the Board of Revenue instructed the collectors of
revenue "to enjoin their officers to be careful to leave in
the tanks and reservoirs in question a quantity of water
sufficient for the consumption of the inhabitants of those
villages which have usually been supplied from them"33.
Obviously the magnitude of the crisis depended upon
the intensity of the drought. The worst recorded case of
this type was in 1769, when a drought, lasting for six
months from August 1769 to January 1770, created havoc in
the economy of western Bengal. This drought was
unprecedented "insomuch as the oldest inhabitants never
remember anything like it" 34 . The rice lands had "so
harden'd for want of water, that the ryotts have found a
difficulty in ploughing and preparing it for the next
crop"", and the fields of rice "parched by the heat of the
BRC,IOR P/52/36,Minute of the Board of Revenue,21
October 1791.
IOR Home Misc.,vol.102,p.94.
SCC,IOR P/A/8,29 November 1769.
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sun are become like fields of straw" 36 . Water resources
were critically hit. The intensity of the drought meant
that the cultivators desperately tapped their ponds etc.
for supplies which soon dried up: "water in lakes &
reservoirs.., was soon exhausted by the Ryotts in watering
their rice grounds. Yet notwithstanding their industrious
endeavours, no crop was produced but the water was
expended", and these tanks "from the extreme drought have
become parched and barren"37.
The drought also damaged those crops which were
crucial to Bengal's artisanal production. Thus by November
1769:
The Ryotts find themselves totally
incapacitated to cultivate the valuable
crops of Cotton and Mulberries and the
inferior ones of Gram, Pease, Barley,
Tobacco, Betel leaf & Ca. which
succeed the rice harvest38.
It is quite obvious from looking at table 2.2 that the
drought of 1769 ruined the produce from the highly-valued
sectors of Bengal's economy 39 and this perhaps explains the
subsequent misery faced by the artisans.
Fortunately, Bengal did not face another drought of a
similar magnitude during the remaining years of the
eighteenth century. Yet droughts did occur and exerted
their influence on the state of harvests. There was a
threat of a scarcity in 1773, but it was apparently short-
36 Ibid.,P/A/lO,28 April 1770.
Ibid.,28 April 1770,pp.192,l97.
38 BPC,IOR P/1/44,20 November l769;emphasis added.
Thus in April 1770,Asad-ul-Zaman Khan, the zamindar
of Birbhum wrote to the Select Committee that "the
cultivation is render'd fruitless by the dryness of the
season and no Hope is left of the Cotton Harvest" [SCC,IOR
P/A/10,28 April 1770].
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lived. According to Warren Hastings, "vigorous and early
measures were taken for its removal and succeeded" 40 . The
monsoon of 1774 failed, and by August the Company's
administrators had begun worrying about "the late unusual
drought (and] the damage which the grain crops have already
sustained by the want of rain" 41 . Parallels with the 1769
situation were raised when the rice withered and peasants
"turned their cows into the rice fields to graze upon
it" 42 . The winter and spring rice harvests of 1775 were
said to be in a "sorry state" owing to another drought, and
the peasants "find it very difficult to fulfil their kists
[payment of revenue]"43. In 1777 western Bengal "hath so
little rain fallen here this season, that there are the
most alarming appearances... and both farmers and
inhabitants of all ranks are under great apprehensions"44
A drought in 1779 had jeopardized the cultivation of the
winter rice: "the sowing lands are waste, the arable not
ploughed" in western Bengal, whereas in the east crops of
cotton, sugarcane and rice had suffered extensive damage45.
The drought in 1783 had raised "the present apprehension of
a public scarcity arising from the deficiencies of a late
harvest and the appearances of a similar failure in the
present crop" 46 . In 1791 the "unpromising appearance of
crops, and little prospect of a speedy fall of rain" had
raised the spectre of "an impending calamity" in the
40 BRC,IOR P/50/68,20 November 1783.
41 BRC,IOR P/49/46,23 August 1774.
42 Ibid.,P/49/47,30 August 1774.
WBSA, PCR,Murshidabad,vol.7, 4 December 1775.
BRC,IOR P/49/48,22 December 1775.
Ibid.,vol.21, 23 May 1779,25 May 1779 and 30 May
1779.
46 BRC,IOR P/50/68,20 November 1783;also see
ibid.,P/50/46,1 July 1783 and P/50/51,26 March 1784 for




Droughts therefore took their toll of harvests and
seriously affected food supplies; but the degree to which
both were affected depended upon the intensity and the
duration of these phenomena. Thus 1769 became a year of a
major famine whereas the other years of drought were
limited to being years of dearth. Another feature of
droughts, perhaps peculiar to Bengal, was the geographical
asymmetry of such occurrences. For example, the intense
drought of 1769 ravaged with its greatest severity in seven
districts of west and north-east Bengal48 , the rest of the
province (especially the south-western and south-eastern
parts) were relatively unaffected49 . The latter areas did
receive copious amounts of rain and "the rivers have over-
flown & fertilized the lands, even in this remarkably dry
season" 50 : a feature which is noticeable from the relative
state of rice prices in lower (i. e., southern) Bengal as
revealed in Ficure 11 (p. 93). A study of later droughts
also confirms this regional picture.
The drought of 1773 was characterized by a similar
geographical asymmetry. While the Council of Revenue
worried about an "approaching scarcity", and some districts
did report an estimated shortfall of "one third of the
Ibid.,P/52/36,21 October 1791.
48 These were the districts of Rangpur,Birbhum,Nadia,
Murshidabad, Dinaj pur, Jessore and Raj shahi.
BRC,IOR	 P/49/52,7	 April	 1775;
BDR,Midnapur,vol.4,no.91,7 March 1771; FR,Murshidabad,IOR
G/27/1,28 September 1770 and G/27/2,22 February 1771 and 25
March 1771; WBSA,CCRM,vol.6,29 September 1771; BPC,IOR
P11/44 , 14 November 1769 and 20 November 1769; SCC,IOR
P/A/1O,30 March 1770 for statements of the spatial
asymmetry of the drought of 1769.
50 SCC,IOR P/A/10,30 March 1770;emphasis added.In
general droughts were never considered a major barrier to
agricultural production in east Bengal,"these being
pernicious to the crops of the upper or northern pergunnahs
[districts]" of the province (IOR Home
Misc. ,vol.206,pp.212-13].
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usual produce" 51 , the food and price situation in other
areas was strikingly different. The districts of Bishnupur
and Burdwan (in west Bengal) were said to be in the throes
of a "great cheapness of grain" owing to good harvests52.
In the east, the districts of Rangpur and Dinajpur had such
plentiful harvests that in 1773 there was an "extraordinary
cheapness of the necessaries of life (which] has been of
great disservice to the collections (of revenue]"53. The
cheapness (caused by available stocks) of grain in these
districts carried on into l774, at a time when western
Bengal was said to be suffering a "late unusual drought"55.
Here the crops had withered to such an extent that the
cultivators, for instance of Purnea, "daily complain
loudly.., that great part of their crop is scorched up, and
is daily spoiling more and more" 56; others (in Birbhum) had
given up their hopes of reaping the winter harvest of rice
and had "turned their cows into their fields to graze upon
them" 57 . The situation in 1775 was characterized by a
delayed monsoon. The rains not having arrived up to the end
of July caused "the most alarming appearances" of scarcity,
but by early August "a very plentiful fall of rain" had
"relieved the minds of the people" 58 . Finally the failure
of the rains in 1779, which jeopardized the winter harvest
and ruined the cash crops in some regions of west and east
Bengal paradoxically occurred, amidst " a great plenty of
51 Ibid.,P/49/42,21 December 1773.
52 Ibid.,P/49/39,27 March 1773 for Bishnupur,and 6
April 1773 for Burdwan.
Ibid.,P/49/40,14 and 26 June 1773.
Ibid.,P/49/46,31 May 1774.
Ibid.,P/49/46,23 August 1774.
56 Ibid.,19 August 1774.
Ibid.,P/49/47,30 August 1774.
58 Ibid.,IOR P/49/58,27 July 1775 and 3 August 1775
contained in appendix to consultations of 22 December 1775.
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grain" in southern Bengal and a price situation so low that
the "Ryotts cannot dispose of their crops"59.
The role of the jala lands was also of particular
importance during droughts. Situated in close proximity to
water-channels, these lands retained their intrinsic
moisture for a longer duration than the colla lands, and
were therefore capable of producing the quick-ripening crop
of boro paddy even in the middle of a drought. Eastern and
southern Bengal were the most favoured in this respect.
Such areas, being prone to seasonal water-logging, managed
to retain crucial supplies of water during a dry season in
the rest of the province'0 . Thus during the drought-induced
famine of 1769-70, the low-lying districts of Dhaka and
Bakarganj continued to furnish the "greatest supplies of
grain to the [Bengal] Presidency" 61 . Further west, rice was
produced in adequate quantities in the jala lands of
Midnapur'2 during that famine, so did the district of 24-
Parganas which was situated in close proximity to Calcutta:
Owing entirely to [its] situation,
which being low [it] retained what
rainfall and enabled the people to
water and preserve their crops (and]
this aided so much to moderating the
price of grain63.
The spatial asymmetry of such droughts had a very
significant effect on the flow of food, and on the
activities of grain-merchants, in situations of famine and
Ibid.,P/50/18,20 April 1779 and the districts
mentioned as having such low prices were those of Burdwan
and Bishnupur.
60 See Ibid.,P/51/17,20 December 1787 for a statement
of such lands in the active delta of eastern Bengal.
61 Ibid.,P/49/52,7 April 1775.
62 BDR.Midnapur,vol.4,no.91,7 March 1771.
63 Ibid.,P/49/52,7 April 1775.
83
dearth, whose implications will be discussed below.
Weather and dearth, the case of floods
Unlike western Bengal, which was prone to periodic
incursions of droughts, floods were an endemic problem in
eastern and southern Bengal64 . Here one has to distinguish
between seasonal overflowing of its rivers and floods.
Normally floods between three and six feet on low lands did
not endanger the standing winter crop of rice as the grain
naturally grew to keep its ear above water; but floods
above six feet in height destroyed the crop 65 . Such
seasonal floods were a part of the agricultural life in
eastern Bengal, as James Rennell's description shows:
By the latter end of July, all the
lower parts of Bengal, contiguous to
the Ganges and the Berrampooter are
overflowed and form an inundation of
more than a hundred miles in width66.
The natural ingredients of a favourable agricultural
season in the district of Dhaka were described by James
Taylor as
A high inundation in the preceding
year, followed in the cold season by a
moderate fall of rain which enables the
husbandman to plough his land. This
succeeded by frequent, but not heavy
showers, in the spring months, and
subsequently by a gradual rise of the
rivers, constitutes the most favourable
64 Ibid.,P/49/52,7 April 1775.
65 Alamgir,1980: 109; P.J.Marshall,1987: 25.
66 Memoir Of A Map Of Indostan,London 1793,p.349.
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weather for the growth of rice'7.
Flood waters had to rise above six feet to be able to
damage standing crops. A flood of this magnitude occurred
in 1786-87 (discussed below). There are other recorded
cases of floods but these were more localized in nature,
caused by rivers which either overflowed their embankments
or breached them in places. Such seems to have occurred in
the districts of Jessore and Rajshahi in 1770 and 1771,
when some crops were reportedly destroyed'8 ; but the damage
actually caused appears to have been quickly recouped as
the month of September 1771 did see an "extraordinary
cheapness of grain" in Rajshahi' 9 . Some damage to crops
were also reported by inundations in 1773, when the river
Damodar overflowed its banks in some low-lying areas in the
district of Burdwan70 . In 1773, the district of Laskarpur
suffered from the floods of the Padma and Burril rivers
which:
Not only operated to this pergunnahs
prejudice by destroying the harvest on the
ground and sweeping away whole villages,
ruining the Ryotts & occasioning great
desertion; but when the water subsided, they
left large tracts of land which was before
cultivated, entirely choaked up with sand &
so impoverished as to preclude all hopes of
bringing it again into cultivation71.
Crops were also partially damaged in Midnapur because
67 Taylor,1840: 295.
68 FR,Murshidabad,IOR G/27/l,28 September 1770 and 25
March 1771.
69 WBSA,CCRM,vol.6,29 September 1771.
° BRC,IOR P/49/41,23 September 1773; ibid.,P/49/42,2
November 1773.
71 Ibid.,P/49/44,29 December 1773.
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"of the inundations in the beginning of September l77372.
It is certainly true that the inundations of 1773-74
destroyed the standing crops in some areas and therefore
"impoverished the Ryotts" 73 . Yet the impression which also
appears inescapable is that the damage done was partial and
limited to those lands having the lowest topographical
situation. In Burdwan the worst affected were "those
pergunnahs situated on the banks of the Damoodah
[Damodar]", other pargana were only marginally
affected74 . The fact that the "extraordinary cheapness of
grain" said to be prevailing in 1773 (discussed above)
would strongly suggest that the floods were relatively
localized.
The flood of 1787 was entirely different from these
instances. Two reasons made this event so different. First
there was a freak monsoon in that year which began from the
month of March 1787. The rains continued without let-up
till July, by which time "nothing but a sheet of water" was
to be seen in most areas of eastern Bengal 75 . Second, there
was a major cyclone in the east which commenced from 30
October 1787 and lasted with undiminished intensity till 2
November. The cyclone was the proverbial last straw on the
province's back. Practically the whole of eastern Bengal
was devastated76 . Villages were under "7, 8 & 9 feet under
water" 77 . A flood of such magnitude was accompanied by
72 Ibid., p/49/4624 May 1774.
" Ibid.,P/49/42,2 November 1773.
Ibid.,P/49/41,1 October 1773.
The districts of Dinajpur,Mymensing and Chittagong
were said to be "in absolute state of
inundation" ,ibid. ,P/51/9, 9 August 1787.
76 There is much material on the cyclone of 1787 in
BRC,IOR P/51/9 to P/51/15.
" Ibid.,P/51/22,25 June l788.Villages were invariably
situated on relatively higher ground,and this evidence
(continued...)
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"destruction of cattle, the blowing down of vast number of
trees and levelling the houses of the poorer people and
unthaching and unroof ing of others... "". People drowned
and died as entire villages were swept away79 , standing
crops were destroyed by as much as 50 percent in some
areas80 , and the flood-afflicted streamed in large numbers
to Calcutta and Murshidabad81 . The spectre of a full-blown
famine once again stalked the province. Yet it must be
emphasized that the combined effects of the unusually heavy
monsoon and the cyclone were largely concentrated in
eastern and south-western Bengal 82 . Elsewhere, for instance
in Burdwan and Nadia, floods caused by rivers overflowing
their banks (or breaching enthankments) destroyed
habitations and damaged the standing crop 83 . Therefore the
famine which followed was concentrated primarily in those
areas where floods and the cyclone had wreaked the worst
damage. Elsewhere there were problems created by the spill-
over effects from the famine hit districts which manifested
(as will be discussed below) in high prices and dearth, but
not in any excess mortality.
77( . . . continued)
indicates the height to which the flood waters may have
attained in low-lying areas.
78 Ibid.,P/51/13,24 November 1787.
" Ibid.,P/51/13,25 November 1787.
80 Ibid.,P/51/22,25 June 1788. s
81 Ibid.,P/51/25,1 October 1788; WBSA,BRFW,vol.3,part
2,29 August 1787.
82 Memoir of Sir George Campbell in J.C.Geddes, 1874:
426-27.
83 BRC,IOR P/51/12,16 October 1787 for damage to crops
in Nadia,and ibid.,P/51/13,25 October 1787 for floods in
Burdwan.
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Weather, dearth, famine and food availability
The preceding discussion has perhaps shown the crucial
influence exerted by vagaries of weather on the state of
harvests, and on the food situation in the province.
Droughts meant that either standing crops withered, or that
the lands were rendered unfit for sowing the next crop. It
is a fact that the droughts which came after the one of
1769 (a year of a major famine) were not particularly
severe as to cause a famine on a provincial scale. Yet they
were serious enough to cause food-shortages at localized
levels, and such shortages, this chapter suggests,
characterizes a situation of dearth as short-run and local-
ized crises of subsistence. But the events of 1769-70 had
deeply influenced the province's psyche, and this fact
meant that even partial scarcities raised fears of an
impending famine. Thus the drought in 1773 was enough to
"alarm the inhabitants with apprehension of a renewal of
their recent sufferings from famine"".
Floods also caused similar situations and fears. The
important aspect to be borne in mind regarding floods is
the distinction between seasonal inundations and floods
which destroyed crops and livestock, thereby creating
dearth or, as in 1788, a famine. It seems that a proper
monsoon, characterized by regular rainfall between the
months of July and September, was ideally suited for such
inundations85 , but unseasonal (post-monsoon) rains tended
to cause floods and destroyed crops. Even a severe monsoon
could cause a devastating flood: "the annual inundations if
sudden in the month of Assar [June-July] are extremely
84 Ibid.,P/49/42,7 December 1773.
85 James Rennell considered the rain during this
period ideal for the cultivation of rice as it "saves them
[the peasants] the trouble of watering their lands,and
keeping them in the state required for the production of
that grain" [IOR,Home Misc.,vol.765,31 August l765,p.147].
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destructive, for the Aumun [winter rice] is at that time
growing and tender & the Ous (spring rice] is ready to
cut"86
The questions which emerge at this juncture are: what
portion of the crops were actually destroyed by adversities
of weather? What implications did such shrinkages have for
the net availability of food? What (from the perspective of
food-availability decline) was a dearth-warning, as
distinct from a famine-warning?
Table 2.3 outlines the connection between harvest
failures and their outcome for some years for which data
are available.
Table 2.3
















50 percent to 28 percent	 Famine
33.3 to 37.5 percent	 Dearth
25 percent	 Dearth
37.5 to 50 percent	 Famine
33 percent	 Dearth
Source: WBSA, Proceedings of the Select
Committee, vol.4, proceedings of July
1770, p.444; BDR. chittagong, vol.1,
30 November 1769; WBSA, Murshidabad,
vol.6, 11 September 1775; Ibid.,
vol.11, 25 May 1779, 30 May 1779 and 7
June 1779; BRC, IOR P/51/22, 25 June
1788; BRP, IOR P/71/45, 16 November
1791.
86 IOR,Home Misc.,vol.385,l5 July 1789,p.327
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It is perhaps clear from table 2.3 that dearth and
famines did occur when harvests fell short; and the scale
of this shrinkage determined the boundaries between the two
types of crises. Interestingly, both years when famines
were recorded show an agricultural output reduced by a
maximum of 50 percent; whereas instances of dearth were
caused by a smaller reduction of output. Therefore a clear
correlation does seem to exist between decline in per
capita availability of food (caused by harvests falling
short) and the scale, or nature, of the subsequent crisis
of subsistence.
The case for the real decline in the availability of
food comes into sharper relief from the state's perception
of what happened to food-supplies during years of scarcity.
In a Minute, dated 21 October 1791, the Board of Revenue
noted that in a famine, or even in case of a serious
dearth, it was very difficult to meet the shortfall by
imports since "the Bengal monsoon prevailing throughout the
inland countries with which we have any communication, they
are generally involved in the same calamity, and instead of
being able to afford assistance, depend upon us for the
supplies of their own wants". Therefore overland supplies
of food were obviously inadequate in meeting any part of
the provincial demand. Supplies by sea was seen as a
feasible, though expensive, option but the difficulty with
this was that "no judgment can be formed of the harvests
until the month of October87 " and the possibility of a
scarcity at that stage meant that "a considerable time must
elapse before the ships which may happen to be lying in the
river unemployed can be fitted out, as the owners ascertain
from what countries the rice can be procured at a price
that will render it worth their while to import it". The
other problem with the importation of rice was the
apparently fluctuating prices of agricultural produce in
the province: "as the failure of the crops in one season
87 The reference obviously is to the most important
rice of the winter harvest.
go
occasions the price of grain to rise to an exorbitant
height, so an abundant harvest in the next reduces it to a
very low value; unless therefore the rice is imported
before the next crops come to maturity the importer is
liable to sustain a considerable loss". Provision of food
at affordable prices by imports was not feasible under such
conditions, and as the Board noted any relief by this mech-
anism was insignificant, and that the province had "only
its internal resources to depend upon"88.
Also crucial to the question of food-availability
decline was the manner of its internal distribution89
during seasons of scarcity (discussed in chapter 6). Two
features were of central importance here:(i) the spatial
asymmetry of adverse weather meant that stocks of food
could be procured elsewhere in the province, albeit at high
prices, and (ii) the entire range of local trade in
agricultural produce was handled by a specialized community
of grain-merchants90 . As soon as there was even a semblance
of scarcity, these merchants purchased grain from areas
with relatively greater surpluses and moved their stocks to
the deficient places, especially to the cities, to be sold
at high prices. Their strategies were facilitated because
they owned, or controlled the means of bulk transportation,
and they possessed store-houses (golahs) where rice and
paddy could be stored for up to ten years without damage91.
Producers in relatively unaffected districts had no choice
but to sell their surpluses as they were almost without
exception tied to these merchants through an elaborate
system of production and consumption loans, which meant
88 For the Board's Minute,BRC,IOR P/52/36,21 October
1791.
Here the term distribution is being used to denote
the movement of foodgrain in bulk from one area to another
by merchants and not to the charitable distribution of
relief during famines.
90 See R.Datta,1986: 379-403.
' Ibid. ,pp.399-401.
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that their end produce was already hypothecated to the
grain trader even before they actually sowed their lands92.
The net results of all these schemes were that spot prices
in less deficient places also rose, thereby hitting the
harvest-dependent non-agricultural population there, and
the food which came in to the deficit regions was sold at
such high prices that the most vulnerable could barely
purchase it. The following description of the dearth of
1791 shows the connection between harvest failures and a
noticeable decline in the availability of food:
The bazars have hitherto been
sufficiently well supplied to answer
the immediate wants of the inhabitants,
but the alarm of an approaching
scarcity is now become so universal
that the poorer sort of people will
shortly experience considerable
distress, as the price of grain and the
difficulty of procuring it, even for
money, is daily increasing93.
Starvation by the poor was clearly the inevitable
outcome of any kind of harvest failure. They were made "at
once bereft of present subsistence and future
occupation"94.
Price as a factor in famine and dearth
Central to this discussion is the notion that both
famines and dearth were crises of subsistence of differing
intensities whose initial conditions were created by a
shortage in the quantity of the harvest. The other factor
92 Ibid.,p.395-97; R.Datta,1989;also chapter 6 below.
BRC,IOR P/52/37,23 November 1791.
Ibid,P/50/58,22 April 1785.
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which was equally crucial in both cases (famine or dearth)
was the state of agricultural prices because food-shortages
are occasions of high prices, and the extent to which
prices climb, and the damage they cause, depends on the
temporal spread of such shortages.
In a later study of famines in Bengal W. W. Hunter
pointed to the critically small dividing line between a
famine warning and a famine point in the province, the
central indicator of which was the price situation. "In
Bengal", wrote Hunter, "even the slightest rise in the
prices of agricultural produce makes a whole difference
between a famine warning and famine point. The few
farthings which signify little to the European consumer
mean actual famine to the population of Bengal" 95 . This
statement suggests a clear connection between supplies of
food and prices and between purchasing power and
subsistence, and there is ample evidence to show the
existence of such connections on a widespread basis in
Bengal's economy of the eighteenth century96.
At what price-point did a dearth arise, and at what
point did a famine occur? Fi gures 11 and 12 (pp. 93 and 94)
show the extent to which winter rice prices rose during the
famines of 1769/70 and 1788. Figure 13 (p. 95) reflects the
state of prices in Midnapur in the former famine, whereas
Figure 14 (p. 97) reveals a comparative picture of rice
prices in seven Bengal districts during the famine of 1788.
Some other evidence for 1769/70 also suggest an extremely
steep rise in price. For instance rice prices had gone up
500 percent in a season in Purnea during that famine. In
Murshidabad prices climbed from 1. 14 rupees a maund (in
July 1770) to 2. 5 rupees in August. At Calcutta prices
" W.W.Hunter,1869: 16-17.














1770 FAMI NE PRI CES
ODI NAIY NP C!
I	 I	 I	 I	 I
1711	 ITSS	 1771	 1771	 1771	 177$
0	 LOWEN IENQAL PRICEs	 +	 PROVINCIAL AVENASE
FIGURE 11
Source: Gleanings in Science, volume 1, January 1829;
Hussain, "A Quantitative Study", pp. 271-72.
ranged from 1 rupee a maund in 1769 to 0. 77 rupee in
1770. The relative cheapness of rice in Calcutta was
mainly due to the Company's strategy of stocking provisions
to feed the city, notwithstanding which 76,000 people
reportedly died on its streets between July and September
177098. But the price rise in 1788 suggests that the
Company failed to take adequate measures to alleviate the
crisis in the city.
" See SCC,IOR P/A/10,16 February 1770; WBSA,Select
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Source: As cited in Figure 11.
Table 2.4 makes an attempt to present the largely
scattered price data of dearth in a somewhat comprehensible
fashion.
Table 2.4
Rice Prices under Dearth in the late eighteenth
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March 1791	 Rangpur	 0.66
June 1791	 Rangpur	 1.05
96
January 1791 Murshidabad	 1.14
February 1792 Murshidabad	 1.49
: The previous price is not known, but 1784 was
a localized famine in Dhaka.
Source:	 for prices between 1773 and 1775, BRC, IOR
P149/42 , P/49/44, P/49/47 , P/49/54 ; WBSA,
PCR, Murshidabad, vol.3, 18 August 1774 and
vol.6, 11 September 1775; S.Islam, Bangla-
desh District Records, op.cit., p.98; BRC,
IOR P/52/32, 30 May 1791; Ibid., P/52/40, 6
January 1791 and 24 February 1792
These price data show that typically famine prices
were characterized by a sudden steep rise; prices in dearth
also rose sharply but not to the same extent. The other
important aspect of price behaviour during a famine is the
uniformity with which prices rose throughout the province.
Thus in the famine of 1788, the average selling price of
rice in the cities of Calcutta, Murshidabad and Dhaka was
1.84 rupees per maund; in Bakarganj (which was recognized
as one of Bengal's granaries and had continued to supply
rice to Calcutta during the height of the 1769/70 famine)
rice prices had shot up to an all-time high of 1.05
rupees 99 . The intensity with which prices rose during a
famine provides an important insight into the probable
cause of the starvation deaths which occurred. Obviously
when the price of basic staples rose by as much as 500 per-
cent (for instance in Purnea in 1769/70), deaths by
starvation were bound to follow. Moreover high prices in
the epicentre of the famine had a spill-over impact on the
Compare BRC,IOR P/51/l6 and P/51/17,23 January
1788,1 February 1788 and 19 March 1788.
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Legend: 1:Calcutta; 2:Midnapur; 3: Dinajpur; 4:Mymensing;
5:Birbhum.
Source: Calcutta, BRC, IOR P/51/17 and P151/34; Midnapur,
Dinajpur and Mymensing, BRC, IOR P/51/12, P/51/16, P/51/17,
P/51/19 and P/51/34; Birbhum, W.B.Bayly, 1816.
prices in relatively unaffected areas100 . What we are not
sure is whether these spill-over effects actually caused
starvation deaths in these latter areas.
100 Thus during the famine of 1769/70,grain-merchants
flooded to Midnapur,where some stocks of rice were still
available,and forced an escalation in price [Price,1876:
83).Similarly,Mymensing which had food-stocks during the
crisis of 1787/88 was invaded by merchants eager to pur-
chase rice and paddy; consequently prices rose sharply in
April 1788 [BRC,IOR P/51/17,1 February 1788].
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Certainly therefore the price situation was an
important factor in causing famine deaths. People died
because they could not purchase their subsistence the
prevailing prices. Yet foodgrain shortage did not
automatically lead to excess mortality. A dearth was
relatively free from such deaths. "Foodgrain shortage",
says Alamgir, "only when translated into prolonged
foodgrain Intake decline, causes death"'°', and it is this
phenomenon which perhaps explains the massive deaths
reported in western Bengal in 1769/70, when the drought,
which lasted for six months, presumably forced the famine-
vulnerable to starve for the same period. Many apparently
also died in 1787/88, but there are no contemporary
estimates to go by. One estimate however says that 152
households, out of a total number of 287 households in a
village of Rangpur perished during the flood of 1787 and
the famine which followed'02 . The question of famine
mortality will be discussed shortly.
Famine and dearth prices thus provide an important
insight into the nature of subsistence crises in a
commercialized economy. Harvest failures were only
proximate causes for triggering these events. Their real
magnitude can be comprehended only by looking at them as
severe dislocations in the food-market caused by sharp rise
in prices. Subsistence was obviously now a function of an
individual's purchasing power, and this fact must clearly
indicate the virtual absence of "traditional" forms of
subsistence "security".
101 Alamgir,1980: 6;emphasis added.
102 Estimate of D.H.MacDowall,collector of Rangpur in
BRC,IOR P/51/45,28 June 1789.
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Famine, dearth and their social victims
How many, or what kind of people, did such shortages
immediately affect? The people most severely affected
during the famine of 1769/70 were said to be "the workmen,
manufactures and people employed in the river (boatmen]",
and this was so because they "were without the same means
of laying by stores of grain as the husbandmen" 103 . The
highest concentration of famine-deaths in 1769/70 were
recorded amongst the rural artisans, the urban poor and
among those who had migrated to the towns after being
uprooted from their lands (presumably the poorer peasants).
Contemporary descriptions suggest that nearly 50 percent of
rural artisans perished in the worst affected districts104,
and more than 500 uprooted migrants died daily in the city
of Murshidabad during the peak of the famine' 05 . That
famine had caused unprecedented "distress to the poor" and
threw-up "large numbers of deplorable objects (sic]" at the
mercy of whatever relief was available in the towns 106 . The
flood of 1786/87 took a heavy toll of the poorest in the
villages. 7000 died and 12000 people were forced to migrate
from Chittagong within a fortnight of August 178607. As
the water-level increased, even the colla lands became
submerged'°8 and the rural poor of southern Bengal "either
wandered to Calcutta to receive support from the charity,
103 Memoir of Sir George Campbell,in J.C.Geddes,1874:
18.
104 WBSA, CCRM, vol.2,5 December 1771; FR, Murshidabad, IOR
G/27/4,20 December 1771.
105	 WBSA,Proceedings	 of	 the	 Select
Committee,vol.4,proceedings of July 1770,p.444.
106 FR,Murshidabad,IOR G/27/1,26 September 1770.
b07 WBSA,BRFW,vol.3,part 2,29 August 1786.
108 BRC, IOR P/51/2,20 September 1787; ibid., P/50/67,11
July 1787.
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or went into other districts in hopes of employment, or
simply resigned their lives"'09 . In eastern Bengal "great
number of ryotts (cultivators] have been drowned by the
inundations, and others being destitute of food for their
support, and reduced to the greatest distress, have
deserted from the districts"110.
A dearth did not occasion misery of similar magnitude
as famines did. Nevertheless the first to be affected were
invariably the "poor class of natives"" 1 who comprised the
"large proportion of the lower and most useful class of
people""2 . The essential problem during a dearth was not
so much an absolute reduction in the quantity of food at
the provincial level, but the severe food-availability
decline at local levels which consequently raised the spot-
prices of rice and paddy up to a point where the local poor
were unable to purchase their subsistence. The tenuous
balance between weather, output, prices and incomes meant
that even the slightest variation in the first two
variables (weather and output) immediately affected the
state of prices, which, in turn, put severe strains on the
income of producers. The reasons that they did not die in
large numbers during dearth were mainly because of the
short duration of such phenomenon and that food-supplies
came in from the unaffected areas, albeit at high prices.
But dearth5 were nevertheless serious crises of subsistence.
The vulnerable sections of society were exposed to the
problems of not having enough to eat despite their already
109 Ibid.,P/52/14,petition (arzi) of the zamLndars of
24-Parganas regarding the impact of the flood of 1787,7
July 1790.
110 Ibid.,P/51/12,4 September 1787.
hhi Ibid.,P/51/22,15 August 1788.
112 Ibid.,P/52/36,21 October 1791.
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low-levels of subsistence" 3 . Almost invariably the
producers complained that a dearth meant that "we cannot
procure food even with money" though "there is grain in the
hands of the merchants""4 . Dearth meant that the producers
were "at once bereft of present subsistence and future
occupation" which left them with no choice but to "abandon
their habitations to escape the horrors of a famine"' 15 . It
was this constriction in the availability of food under a
dearth situation which explains why "the bulk of the
people" at Rajshahi" 6 in 1788 "have barely fed themselves
and not with their usual food""7.
It is therefore possible to posit the existence of
fairly numerous harvest-sensitive people in the province of
Bengal whose very lives were at risk during famines and
whose subsistence was jeopardized in a dearth. These people
were obviously those who were "without the same means of
laying by stores of grain as the husbandmen": people who
suffered the greatest number of deaths during the famine of
1769/70. These were the artisans, poor peasants and
113 Francis Buchanan noted that the "common fare" of
the poor of Rangpur consisted of "boiled rice,or other
grain,which is seasoned with pot ashes and capsicum,and it
is only that such persons can procure oil or fish"
["Ronggoppur",vol.1,book 2,IOL,Mss.Eur.D.74,f.24].The diet
of the poor in Calcutta was equally indifferent,being
composed of "...salt and a little oil,and one or two other
prime necessities;though the vast multitudes.., obtain only
from day to day boiled rice,green pepper pods,and boiled
herbs;the step above this is is a little oil with rice.The
lowest class often want betle and salt,and in place of the
latter use the ashes of various plants containing different
saline substances" [Mitra,1951: 50].
" BRC,IOR P/49/47, arzi of producers of Burdwan,30
August 1774.
" Ibid.,P/50/58,22 April 1785.The reference is to the
impact of the partial drought of 1783 in western Bengal.
116 This district was described as the "heart of the
rice country" of eastern Bengal in 1771 (WBSA,CCRM,vol.2,3l
December 1770].
" BRP,IOR P/70/40,25 April 1788;emphasis in text.
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labourers who either possessed insufficient land or
depended exclusively on the current harvest for their
sustenance and did not have alternative or stored-up
supplies of food. In the towns these were the labourers and
the town-poor who depended entirely on the wages they could
earn and whose existence was severely threatened by any
reduction in food-supplies from centres of supply as any
such contraction forced prices to spiral while their wages
remained constant118 , or even declined in real terms as for
instance in the cases of textile producers 119 and salt
manufacturers'20.
Famine Mortality:some formulations repardinQ 1769/70 and
1788
Obviously the scale of the misery of these harvest-
sensitive strata depended on the magnitude, measured in
terms of the spatial and temporal spread, of these
118 See P.J.Marshall [1988: 28] for the connection
between food-prices and wages among the coolies of
eighteenth century Calcutta.
119 See S.Bhattacharya,1983: 288.
120 By the 1780s it was realized even among the
Company's salt department that the workers involved in the
manufacture of salt "formerly received greater wages than
at present" since
The tuffalies (men who attend the fire)
received for six months labour 12 rupees
each now [receive] but seven.The koolaries
(woodcutters) received 11 rupees,now
[receive] but 6;the muzzoors [labourers] who
collect the earth and fetch water received
9 & 10 rupees,at present (receive] only from
4 to 5 [rupees]
"Manufacture of Salt in Bengal,a Report Compiled by
Messrs.Burrowes and Brookes",in BRC,IOR P/51/24,24
September 1788.
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subsistence crises. Famines were occasions when a subsis-
tence and mortality crisis came together in a critical
conjuncture. This happened in 1769/70 and to a relatively
lesser extent in 1788 as a carry-over from the massive
floods of 1786/87. It is therefore pertinent to address the
question of demographic crises caused by famines as it has
a close bearing on the state of the agrarian order.
The most written about catastrophe in the history of
eighteenth century Bengal is the famine of 1769-70, an
event whose demographic consequences have almost become an
orthodoxy in provincial historiography. Ever since Warren
Hastings wrote about this aspect in 1772, subsequent most
historians have accepted his estimate of 10 million deaths
causing a decimation of one-third of the population without
any questions'21 . Others who have questioned these
mortality estimates have, nevertheless, left the issue
unresolved owing to the paucity of evidence122.
There are numerous problems with the mortality figure
of 10 million as deaths during the famine. First the peak
intensity of the famine was located between the months of
January and August 1770 when the highest concentration of
deaths and desertion were reported from the most affected
districts in western and north-eastern Bengal. In effect
this gives us a peak mortality period of six months. Ten
million deaths in the space of six months would make the
case of Bengal unique in the history of global demographic
catastrophes' 23 . The implausibility of so many deaths
121 Slnha,1968: 65; Chaudhury,1983: 299-300.
122 For instance,Marshall,1987: 18.
123 Even the Black Death,which is said to have
decimated 25 million people of a total European population
of 80 million,and destroyed 40 or 50 percent of England's
population,raged for nearly three years on the continent
after its initial visitation in May 1348.In England the
Death seems to have been most severe in the eighteen months
after May 1348.Moreover, these deaths were caused primarily
by a pandemic (bubonic plague) on a scale which was never
to be repeated on the European continent (Carlo M.
(continued...)
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happening in so short a time becomes more apparent when it
is remembered that the famine was not accompanied by a
general epidemic. The only recorded case of an epidemic
comes from Purnea, where in April 1770 we are told of the
"Horror of Pestilence being added to those of Famine"'24.
It is interesting that a "great fever epidemic" (presumably
malaria) was recorded in 1762 leading to the deaths of 50,
000 people' 25 , but no such descriptions exist for the 1769-
70 situation126.
Second, there is an unresolved problem with the death
toll itself. It tells us nothing about excess aortality
during the famine. It is generally recognized that in
practically all pre-modern societies there was a clear
distinction, though often rendered tenuous, between normal
and excess mortality. Normal mortality were regular deaths
which occurred in the absence of a mortality crisis
occasioned by war, famine or an epidemic. Excess mortality
were the additional deaths caused in a crisis year and the
case of pre-industrial Europe shows that these deaths could
rise up to 6 or 10 percent over and above the "normal"
deaths of roughly 3 percent a year' 27 . The estimate of 10
million dead for Bengal in 1769-70 conceals the proportion
between normal and excess deaths, though the scale of the
crisis in that year would probably point to a fairly high
123( . . .continued)
Cipolla,1981:	 160-61;M.M.Postan,1972:	 41-42;	 Michael
W.Flinn,1981: 51-52).
124 SCC,IOR P/A/10,28 April 1770.
125 Marshall,1987: 19.
126 And the absence of a general epidemic in 1769-70
is all the more convincing because of the fact that a lot
more documentation exists for the analysis of this famine
than what is available for any of the previous ones.Surely
an epidemic of provincial proportions would have been
reported in the numerous,and graphic,descriptions of the




concentration in the latter category. Once again however
one has to bear in mind that such a concentration would
apply in the worst affected districts. Elsewhere the
proportion between normal and excess mortality was much
smaller precisely because the catastrophe was less severe
in those parts.
The question is: how many people actually died during
the course of the famine? All answers must remain
provisional and absolutely tentative because of the paucity
of quantitative data.
The descriptions contained in the sources suggest a
famine misery on a calamitous scale. Deserted villages
stretching over vast areas, large tracts of uncultivated
land turning Into jungles and abandoned homes both in the
towns and in the villages -- these are some of the main
features of the devastation in rural Bengal recorded by eye
witnesses during and after the famine. Evidence available
from nine villages "contiguous to Nattore" in Rajshahi
suggests that these were reduced to 212 "dilapidated
houses" in 1771 from 1267 households in 1769 128 . Rangpur
suffered "a great scarcity of inhabitants" 129 . In Birbhum
"many hundreds of villages are entirely depopulated & even
in the large towns here are not a fourth part of the houses
inhabited"'30 . Later inquiries revealed that Pachet and
"northern parts of Burdwan suffered a great loss of
inhabitants during the famine"'31 . The famine had taken a
daily toll of "more than five hundred people" in the city
of Murshidabad and "In the villages and country adjacent
the numbers said to have perished exceed all belief"132.
128 WBSA,CCRM,vol.5,11 May 1771.
129 Ibid.,IOR G/27/1,26 September 1770.
130 FR,Murshidabad,IOR G/27/2,22 February 1771.
'' BRC,IOR P/49/50,27 January 1775.
132	 WBSA,Proceedings	 of	 the	 Select
CommIttee,vol.4,proceedings of July 1770,p.444.
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By February 1770 it was feared that "one half of those who
were about to pay revenues & cultivate the lands will
unavoidably perish" in Purnea 133 . It was later estimated
that one-half "the labouring and working people" had
actually died in Purnea between 1769 and 1770'. The
villages of Rajmahal were "for the most part totally
abandoned (because] of a want of hands to follow the
employment of tillage"'35 . The number of looms "employed in
the Company's investment" at its factory in Malda
"decreased during that calamity by near one half"' 36, and
there was "a universal scarcity of Ryotts" in Hughli in the
immediate aftermath of the famine'". What we cannot be
sure is whether the descriptions given in the preceding
paragraph refer to depopulation actually caused by
fatalities or to desertion caused by the flight of peasants
and artisans. The fact that the producers actually migrated
during this event, and also during subsequent episodes of
dearth and famine, is indicated in the sources, whose
implications will be examined shortly.
Regarding deaths, the situation in Purnea and
Murshidabad may perhaps permit the following
reconstruction, keeping in mind that the peak period of
famine devastation was a maximum of six months and that the
worst affected were the six districts of western and north-
eastern Bengal' 38 . Purnea seems to have lost a total of
2,00,000 people during the course of the famine' 39 . The
estimate of 500 deaths per day in Murshidabad gives us a
133 SCC,IOR P/A/10,16 February 1770.
134 WBSA,Circuit at Purnea,25 January 1773.
135 WBSA,CCRM,vol.5,31 May 1771.
136 FR,Murshidabad,IOR G/27/4,20 December 1771.
CCR,IOR P/67/53,20 May 1771.
138	 Those of Birbhum, Nadia, Murshidabad, Purnea, Raj -
shahi,Dinajpur and Rangpur.
139 FR,Murshidabad,IOR G/27/1,3 December 1770,p.538.
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total of 90,000 dead during the peak of famine mortality in
that city. Even if we take the death-toll in Purnea as the
representative figure of famine fatalities in the affected
districts and apply that to the six districts which are
described as having the highest rates of famine deaths, we
get a figure of 1. 2 million dead. It is perhaps reasonable
to say that the famine of 1769-70 could at best have
accounted for a azimum of 2 million deaths in the entire
province of Bengal. This seems a fairly reasonable estimate
because (i) south-western and south-eastern Bengal had
practically no excess deaths and (ii) the famine had a
clearly asymmetrical geographical sweep. The latter aspect
has been discussed at various places in this chapter. The
former point (that of the absence of excess deaths in
south-eastern Bengal) is apparent from the figures
regarding deaths and desertions in four contiguous villages
of Rajshahi and Chittagong between 1769 and 1772 which are
set out in Figure 15 ( p. 108). This evidence further
reinforces the point made in this chapter about the
geographical asymmetry of the famine on 1769/70.
Nevertheless the depopulation in the districts most




Rajshahi	 33 to 50 percent
Malda	 50 percent14°
There is therefore some justification in the
statements of Sinha and Chaudhuri that the famine caused
unprecedented mortality; but these deaths were limited only
to the worst affected districts. The previously accepted
estimate of 10 million deaths now appears a largely
140 This estimate pertains only to the loss suffered
by the artisanal population under the Company's
manufactories (aurangs).
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DEATH AND DESERTI ON, 1769/ 70
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FIGURE 15
Legend: 1:Deaths Rajshahi;	 2:Deaths Chittagong; 	 3:
Desertions Rajshahi; 4:Desertions Chittagong.
	
Source: Brit. Mus., Add. Ms., 29076, f.140;	 BDR.
Chittagong. vol. 1, no.202.
inflated number. Nevertheless two million dead in the
space of six or seven months still remains a very high
number of famine deaths, and must therefore substantiate
the definition, in this discussion, of a famine as
subsistence and mortality crisis in a critical conjuncture.
The death-toll during the flood-induced famine of 1788
is less detailed though one still gets the distinct
impression that it was quite high in eastern Bengal. 7000
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people died in Chittagong in a fortnight in August 1786141.
Massive deaths were reported from practically all over
Bengal. At Burdwan "almost every house in the town and
every village contiguous to it fell down" by the onslaught
of the flood waters and "large number of people died and a
prodigious quantity of cattle destroyed" 142 . The flood and
the havoc it caused to the standing crops had killed a
"great number of ryotts" in Rangpur while the survivors had
been rendered "destitute of food for their support"143.
Dhaka also suffered large-scale mortality and desertion by
the surviving rural population 144 . The district of the 24-
Parganas, which had largely escaped from the devastating
drought of 1769/70', seems to have been rudely shaken by
the flood. Here the problem caused by the flood was
aggravated by an outbreak of small-pox causing multitudes
of people to "resign their lives" 146 . The crisis in north
Bengal (Malda, Rangpur and Dinajpur) was compounded by a
change in the course of the Teesta river in the 1780s. The
Teesta deserted its previous course and "now (1788] runs
through... an infinite variety of different streams, many
of which are entirely new, & have been formed by the water
penetrating thro' the cultivated fields; whilst others
which before were insignificant Nullahs [streams] have from
the above event become considerable rivers" 147 . When the
flood struck it damaged lives, livestock and property to
such an extent that "there does not remain a vestige of the
Ryotts houses nor even a mark of the places where they had
141 WBSA,BRFW,vol.3,part 2,29 August 1786.
142 BRC,IOR P/51/13,25 October 1787.
143 Ibid.,P/51/12,4 September 1787.
144 Ibid.,P/51/51,9 December 1789.
145 Ibid.,P/49/52,7 April 1775.
146 Ibid.,P/52/14,7 July 1790.
147 BRP,IOR P/70/47,arzi of zamindars of Rangpur to
D.H.MacDowall the collector,25 June 1788.
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formerly been"' 48 . Flood-waters destroyed standing crops in
Purnea and Nadia and caused peasants to flee from their
lands, but there were relatively fewer deaths in these
places'49, which indicates the lesser severity of the
subsistence crisis in western Bengal.
Worst conditions were still to follow in eastern
Bengal. The first wave of mortality was caused by people
drowning during the course of the floods in August-
September 1787 and then by the cyclone which struck
immediately afterwards. But it was the famine in the east,
which lasted during the major part of 1788, which caused
the greatest misery. Between 37.5 and 50 percent of the
standing crops were destroyed in 1787 and the harvests of
1788 were affected because the lands had soaked up moisture
in excess of what was considered good for proper
cultivation and so could not be ploughed' 50 . Like the
previous famine in 1769/70, supplies of food were reduced
among the harvest sensitive strata of the population,
prices rose sharply and remained so "for a period of above
eight months" in 1788' s'. Starvation deaths were reported
from all over Bengal, "many destitute and miserable"
looking for some form of relief entered the "skirts of the
town" of Calcutta, thereby causing a disruption in the
supplies of rice there' 52, and the general debilitation of
the people elsewhere was "too lamentable a proof of the
excessive dearness of the provisions in the distressed
situation of the inhabitants, who sell their children to
148 BRC,IOR P/51/12,4 September 1787.
'	 Ibid.,P/51/12,20 September 1787 and 16 October
1787.
150 
"Remarks on the Several Collectorships in Bengal
in the years 1788 and 1789",IOR Home Misc.,vol.385,p.68.
151 John Haldane,Robert Kennaway, Charles Grant and John
Bristow, "Report Of The Commercial Occurrences of 1788",in
IOR Home Misc.,vol.393,p.113.
152 BRC,IOR P/51/25,1 October 1788.
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enable them to purchase a few meals to prolong their
miserable existence" 153 . The surviving population:
Are greatly reduced in bodily strength from want
of food, and have neither cattle nor other
effects. The few who have anything left cannot
cultivate their old possessions for want of seed
and enhanced price of cattle; hence much of the
old cultivated lands are lying fallow... 154
Unfortunately we are not in a position to account for
the number of people who actually died during the flood of
1786/87 and the famine which followed. Some evidence from
Jessore and Dhaka suggests that this catastrophe had
resulted in as much as 75 percent of the cultivated land in
some parganas falling out of cultivation as "many of the
Ryotts are dead from the famine that has prevailed the
whole year while others have left their habitations and
gone to other parts of the country" 155 . Another estimate of
a village in Rangpur tells us that 152 out of a total
number of 287 households (recorded in 1786) perished during
the flood of 1787 and the famine which followed 156 . What we
cannot be sure is whether the estimates of lands falling
into decay were caused by the physical decimation of the
producers or by the temporary out-migration of a harassed
peasantry and artisans under extremely trying circum-
stances. There is a strong possibility that both may have
occurred, though the proportion of one to the other must
remain an enigma. Moreover, the fact that the famine (which
followed the flood and cyclone of 1786/87) was concentrated
primarily in eastern and south-western Bengal must (like
153 IOR Home Misc.,vol.393,pp.113-114,120.
154 BRC,IOR P/51/29,22 December 1788.
155	 Ibid.,P/51/29,22 December 1788 for Dhaka,and
ibid.,P/51/22,25 June 1788 for Jessore.
156 Estimate of D.H.MacDowall,collector of Rangpur in
BRC,IOR P/51/45,28 June 1789.
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the famine of 1769/70) point to a spatial asymmetry in the
crisis of mortality; but the paucity of evidence compels
the issue of deaths during 1787/88 to be left wide open.
Famine, dearth and migration
The preceding sections have perhaps indicated that
people migrated from their established bases of production
during famines, or even dearths. Migration has historically
been one of the most important strategies of survival
adopted by the famine-stricken157 . In 1769/70 the producers
did desert in large numbers as "under this hardship, to
forsake his [the producer's] profession and country has
been the easiest and speediest means of relief" 158 , which
must indirectly reflect the fact that the such people
actually viewed migration as a strategy of survival under
crises.
There is some indication in our sources that migration
for survival indeed happened in Bengal during 1769/70.
Around 1770 Dhaka division was described as having a
"remarkably luxuriant" soil but thinly populated owing to
its "low situation"; floods were a problem in a topography
of this type but droughts were relatively unknown, these
being "pernicious only to the crops of the upper or
northern pergunnahs"' 59 . Circumstantial evidence indicates
that the famine of 1770 saw a movement of people from the
west to the east as by 1775 "the Balance of trade is in
favour of this province [as] its southern districts furnish
157 Arnold,1988: 91 ff.
158 ICR Home Misc.,vol.206,p.205
159 ICR Home Misc.,vol.206,p.212-13.
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the greatest supplies of grain to the presidency"160.
Midnapur certainly received large numbers of uprooted
migrants from Burdwan, Birbhum and "other parts of Bengal"
who came "in a very starving condition in hopes of finding
the scarcity less here than in their own country"; many
travelled to Orissa' 61 . The district of the 24-Parganas was
not only free from the demographic consequences of the
famine, it also received an influx of peasants and artisans
from other districts which explains its relative prosperity
during the height of the famine and later162 . Sinha states
that Rangpur "gained an accession of population by the
calamity"63 but this is in the teeth of overwhelmingly
contradictory evidence which is available to show a
substantial depopulation in that district by flight of the
peasantry even though actual deaths here were relatively
insignificant'64.
Both the facts, that able-bodied peasants survived the
famine and that they migrated in large numbers, are also
supported by the statements of peasants being asked to
return to their abandoned homesteads by various
zamiridars' 65 , by the reports of a fairly rapid reclamation
of deserted (palataka) land, even in a badly affected
district like Birbhum after 1771166 and by the accounts of
petty-landholders (talluqdars) in Rangpur "enticing the
ryotts from other parts" to settle in their lands on
160 BRC,IOR P/49/52,7 April 1775.
161 J.C.Price,1876: 82.
162 BRC,IOR P/49/52,7 April 1775.
163 Sinha,1968: 54.
164 See WBSA,LCB,vol.1,20 August 1770; FR, Murshi-
dabad,IOR G/27/1,26 September 1770.
165 WBSA,CCR,vol.1,20 May 1771.
166 For estimates of lands under cultivation in
different parganas of Birbhum after the famine see BRC,IOR
P/49/42,25 October 1773,and ibid.,P/49/47,23 April 1774.
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concessional terms of revenue' 67 . By 1773, those who had
fled from their lands in Purnea had started to return "to
their fields, except a few who have no calling" who had
chosen to remain in Murshidabad "to seek employment""8.
Thus the famine of 1769/70 appears to have caused a cross-
migration of people from north and west Bengal to the
districts situated to the south-west and the south-east.
The famine in 1787/88 saw another large-scale movement
of the uprooted all over southern-western, south-eastern
and northern Bengal from those places which had been worst
affected by the floods and the cyclone. The first reaction
of the afflicted was to move to higher grounds and wait for
the flood-waters to subside. Thus in Burdwan, where the
rivers Damodar and Ajoy breached embankments, "nothing but
the banks of tanks remained for the reception of every
living animal""9 ; and in Rangpur, villagers fled to "high
spots of land, and lived with those, whose houses were
above the reaches of the waters", others "took up their
abodes on trees and so saved their lives"'70. But the
waters did not recede and the cyclone in the east added to
their problems. Thus began the long, and debilitating,
process of out-migration as the survivors were forced to
"quit their habitations and (go] to other parts of the
country"171.
Where precisely were these "other parts"? There is
some evidence to show that some people moved to the
district headquarters in the hope of some relief' 72 . The
167 BDR,Rangpur,vol.1,no.5,23 June 1770.
168 WBSA,Circuit at Purnea,2 February to 9 February
1773,p.43.
169 BRC,IOR P/51/13,25 October 1787.
170 Ibid.,P/51/12,4 September 1787.
'7' Ibid.,P/51/29,22 December 1788.
172	 See Ibid.,P/51/12,4 September 1787 for such
migrations in Rangpur;ibid., P/51/13,9 October 1787 for the
(continued...)
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uprooted from the district of 24-Parganas moved in large
numbers to Calcutta "in hopes of employment"' 73. Migrants
from Rajshahi, Dinajpur and Rangpur also entered the town
of Murshidabad, thereby causing immense strains on the
stocks of food already under pressure and forcing a further
escalation of price' 74 . An unspecified number of people of
Burdwan, in south-western Bengal, who seem to have been
displaced by the floods of 1787 (though not to the same
extent or numbers as the people in the east) were
nevertheless forced to move to districts situated further
westward (for instance to Birbhum and Bishnupur) where the
floods had caused practically no damage and where grain,
and presumably work, was available'75 . Cultivators from
Rajshahi also trekked to Birbhum, where they were able to
acquire land for cultivation as non-resident (pahi-kashta)
peasants176 . Some inter-district migration seems to have
occurred in eastern Bengal too, where people moved from the
worst affected areas to those which were somewhat better
situated, though the difference between better and worst
was only a matter of degree given the massive problems
172( . . 
. continued)
situation in Burdwan;and ibid.,P/51/20,18 April 1788 for
Raj shahi.
173 Ibid.,P/52/14,7 July 1790.
174 BRP,IOR P/70/40,1 April 1788.
175 BRC,IOR P/51/21,4 June 1788.Interestingly the
flight of peasants from Burdwan to Birbhum became a source
of friction between the zRmIi'wlars of these two
districts.The zm1mdar of Burdwan subsequently demanded the
return of these cultivators on grounds that they were the
settled resident-cultivators (khud-kashta raiyat) of his
zamlndari and were therefore obliged to cultivate land and
pay revenue in Burdwan.The counter-claim proffered by the
zmIridar of Birbhum was that these migrants had acquired
the legal status of non-resident peasants (pahi-kashta
raigat) in his lands,and were therefore entitled to stay
and cultivate land in his zamindari [see Ibid.,P/51/34,8
April 1789].
176 Ibid.,P/52/2,part 1,10 February 1790.
116
caused by floods and cyclone all over eastern Bengal in
1787. Thus people from Tipperah and Syihet, where large-
scale devastation had taken place' 77 , appear to have moved
to Mymensing where crops had only been partially
damaged178 . In Dhaka, the uprooted "deserted their old
habitations, and (have] gone to different places; and many
are in the city of Dacca, (others] to Gunges (large market
towns], Golahs [granaries] &ca. begging their bread with
sighs and tears"'79.
Even cases of dearth could cause a temporary out-
migration of people so affected. Thus the partial drought
in 1773/74 caused the cultivators to desert. In Birbhum
such desertions had reduced the number of cultivators in
some parganas "upwards of a third & in many places a much
larger proportion"' 80 . Similar flights were reported in
1784 when Tippera was apparently flooded; an estimated
12000 "souls have left this country" since "the labour of
the cultivators was totally lost and the calamities of
famine succeeded their disappointment"' 81 . Dhaka district
also suffered a flood in 1784, "causing a real and great
scarcity of Grain"' 82 ; some parganas were almost entirely
washed away "by the inundation from the northern
mountains", forcing the producers to leave their
habitations; in pargana Dawoodpur "there are only 11
Families remaining.., and these from the difficulty in
177 For the flood induced havoc in Tipperah and Syihet
see WBSA,BRFW,vol.3,part 2,29 August 1786 and BRC,IOR
P/50/67,11 July 1786 respectively.
178 BRC,IOR P/51/19,18 April 1788.
179 BRC,IOR P/51/29,22 December 1788.
180 Ibid.,P/49/46,21 June 1774.
181 Ibid.,P/50/59,1 July 1785.It was the fear of a
famine,rather than the fact of famine,which seems to have
forced people to move out of this district in 1784.
182	 Bangladesh	 Districts
Records,vol. 1, Dacca, no.25,p.77.
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procuring provisions and the inhanced [sic] price of these
are in the greatest distress"83 . The Damodar river flooded
Burdwan twice more after 1787, in 1791 and 1794, causing
extensive damage to crops, cattle and houses'. 1791 was
also a year when Midnapur was visited by another flood
which destroyed between 31 percent and 37. 5 percent
("between five-sixteenths and six-sixteenths of the total")
of the standing crop, caused a dearth-like situation and
forced peasants to flee their lands185 . In 1791, 1005 out
of a total of 8049 peasant households in Mymensing were
said to have "deserted their lands & taken refuge else-
where" 186 . In 1794, the peasants in some parganas of Nadia
"have deserted owing to the water overflowing their
lands"'87.
It must however be pointed out that the extent,
direction and nature of such migration differed in
accordance to the magnitude of the subsistence-crisis.
Famines were occasions when the displaced were forced to
migrate over long distances in search of survival. The most
obvious places were the towns. Large numbers migrated to
the town of Murshidabad during the famine of 1769/70 and to
Calcutta during the famine of 1788. Those who survived such
arduous journeys under conditions of abject debilitation
183 Ibid.,no.42,4 October l794,p.95.
184 BRC,IOR P/52/36,7 October 1791,and ibid.,P/53/21,30
September 1793.
185 Ibid.,P/53/36,21 October l791.While floods
destroyed crops in places like Burdwan and Midnapur,1791
was a year of an apparently severe drought in 24-
Parganas."I am sorry" wrote Edward Colebrooke collector
Calcutta Cutcherry (kachahri) "to be obliged to report to
you [Board of Revenue] that the Rice crops have totally
failed in the extensive Plains from Bernagore to Russapugla
[where] whole maaths [fields] of many thousand Begas (1
higha - 0.33 acres approximately] are totally destroyed by
the droughts" (BRP,IOR P/71/45,15 November 1791].
186 BRP,IOR P/71/42,1 August 1791.
187 BRP,IOR P/72/3O,3O May 1794.
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returned to their villages once a semblance of normality
reappeared, but there were also those (said to have "no
calling") who stayed back "to seek employment" 188 . The
proportion between those who returned and those who stayed
back is unclear, because of the paucity of information.
P.J.Marshall suggests a high rate of return to land in the
late eighteenth century for two reasons (i) even the
poorest migrants had tiny plots of land in the village to
which they naturally reverted and (ii) prices of food were
generally lower in the countryside than in towns'89.
Moreover, given the low potential of towns in the
eighteenth century (including Calcutta) to absorb surplus
labour, the possibilities of long-term productive employ-
ment for sucl people, on wages high enough to beat. the
higher costs of living in towns appears largely improbable.
Famines therefore were occurrences when migrations caused
a re-distribution of population within the countryside in
the midst of a severe crisis of subsistence and of
mortality.
188 WBSA,Circuit at Purnea,p.43.
189 Marshall,l988: 33-35.
Chapter 3
The Structure of Landed Property: ZamfrvTars. Talluqdars and
La-kharaji Holders
One of the central concerns of the East India Company
after 1765 was to comprehend the structure of landed
property in Bengal. This task was understandably enormous
as it entailed sifting through the often confusing welter
of rights and perquisites over land and its produce which
constituted the core of such property. The fact that
revenue-collecting structures and property-rights were
combined almost inseparably added to the confusion of the
early Company administrators, who were also under immense
pressures to formulate a workable revenue regime after the
initially disastrous revenue experiments and the famine of
1769/70. Naturally opinions differed, and the question of
landed property became the source of one of the most
enduring, and acrimonious, debates of that time.
The aim of this chapter is to establish the contours
of the various rights and privileges which jointly
constituted the structure of landed property in late
eighteenth century Bengal. Another objective is to point to
some imbalances which exist in Bengal's historiography.
While the nature and organization of the zami.ndari system
have been subjected to detailed scrutiny 1 , there are no
definite studies of the other elements which comprised
these proprietors:talluqdars and holders of la-kharaj
(revenue-free) lands have not been properly analyzed. What
exist are essentially short notices to describe these
1 See Shirin Akhtar, 1972; Ratnalekha Ray, 1979: chapter
1.
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rights just before the Permanent Settlement2 which do not
tell us anything either of their evolution or of their
roles in rural society. The other historical concern has
been to see the zmndari in Bengal in relation to the
revenue policies of the East India Company in order to
highlight the disastrous consequences which such practices
had upon them. Extant discussions have therefore focussed
upon this aspect from the point of revenue administration
and not from the social position of the zamirwTari in the
context of rural stratification or their economic role in
the processes of agricultural production. A nuanced
analysis of the positions and roles of the talluqdars and
the revenue-free land-holders in rural society and economy
is also virtually non-existent. The subsequent discussion
will endeavour to redress these imbalances by focussing
attention on the close intermeshing of landed property with
the agricultural economy and social stratification. Special
emphasis will be placed on reconstructing the nature of the
talluqdari and la-kharaji property-rights in order to
attempt a more cogent analysis of the complex nature of
landed property in Bengal.
The landed proprietors in eighteenth century Bengal
were those who enjoyed an intrinsically superior status in
rural society by virtue of the lands personally held by
them and by the power vested in them by the state to
collect revenue, a part of which they themselves retained.
As will be discussed subsequently, these financial
perquisites comprised the major proportion of their income
which were supplemented by the sale of produce from their
personal lands in markets, which were often established by
them (see chapter 1). Therefore, what these proprietors
owned were assets, both moveable or fixed, which could be
used to provide them with an income, or, if necessary,
could be sold for a lump sum. The latter occurred when
these proprietors sold their rights of taxation and their
2 See Sinha,1968; Islam,1979.
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personal lands, and the Company's testimony indicates that
such sales had increased substantially after 1765. They
also possessed the right to claim shares in the economic
output, i.e., over the surplus produced by the peasant or
the artisan4.
Nevertheless, not all landed proprietors had the right
to levy or collect taxes on behalf of the state. Our
sources indicate the widespread existence of a social
category who held fairly extensive lands called the la-
kharaji or baz-i-zamln. These lands were donated by other
landed proprietors or the state on a permanent and heredit-
ary basis. These lands were free of all revenue assess-
ments, thus providing the incumbents with a secure, and
often lucrative, source of monetary income. Additionally
such lands were often sold, thereby making them a distinct
form of landed property.
The zamfndari in Bengal: a brief overview
A zamindar, stated the Amini Report in 1778:
Whatsoever right his tenure or office
may convey is the Superior of a
District of which, unless his authority
is suspended, he collects the Rent, and
"Purchasers of zemindarry land are become very
numerous since the acquisition of the Dewanny" wrote
Cornwallis about the pace of such sales (BRP,IOR P/70/23,18
January 1787].
The right to a share of the produce and possibly
over labour are the criteria Irfan Habib has used to define
landed-property in Mughal India (Habib: 1965). My
definition differs from Habib's in so far as I see such
rights as existing in addition to the ownership of material
assets,both in land and money.
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for which he pays a Revenue to
Government. He is the First in point
amongst the several Landholders5.
The superiority of the zia1ndarf was partly because of
the factor of caste. Most zamlndars were Kayasthas,
Brahznins and Kshatriyas; but caste alone is inadequate in
explaining the social prestige of the zamlrwiars. So-called
"lower caste" Kaivarta, Bagdi, Tili and Sadgop zamlndaris
co-existed, and expanded, during the course of the
century6 . A trading caste (Khatri) from northern India was
able to establish the Burdwan Raj, one of the largest of
the eighteenth century zRmirwlari's7 , while that of Birbhum
belonged to a Muslim family who founded the zamlr,dari by
dispossessing the previous Rajput family some time in the
late seventeenth century8 . In general the larger zamiridaris
belonged to the upper-caste Hindus, while the smaller ones
were in the hands of the lower castes. With the exception
of the Pathan family of Birbhum, most Muslim zmindaris
were of a much smaller scale9.
The suggestion that the term zm1r,dar in pre-British
Bengal denoted a revenue collector and incorporated the
semi-independent potentates (including the bara bhuiyas)
who had usurped large territories during the period of
transition from Afghan to Mughal rule 1° provides only a
partial explanation of the formation and expansion of such
rights in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
IOR,Home Misc.,vol.206,p.344.
6 S.Akhtar,1982: 23; also H.Sanyal,1971.
IOR,BRC P/50/66,7 April 1786.
B Ibid.,P/50/11,21 July 1778.
IOR,BRC P/50/63,11 February 1786;ibid.,P/51/25,1
October 1788;ibid.,P/52/2,lO February 1790.
10 Tapan Raychaudhuri,1969: 63.
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Usurpation of territories was only one of the many ways in
which these landed-properties evolved. The history of some
of the larger zam.iridaris compiled by the Company in the
1780s shows that collaboration with the state in matters
pertaining to revenue settlements or the subjugation of
local rebellions provided the initial opening into the
world of territorial acquisitions 11 . It is perhaps
significant that lands usurped by individuals and later
added to their zamfndarfs by payments of nazrana (gifts) to
the state were in theory only to be held as long as the
state willed; they could be resumed if a rightful heir
could make a just claim'2 . Therefore neither usurpation nor
collaboration are adequate enough to explain the
establishment of an elaborate system of landed property
encapsulated under the generic term zamlndari, a form of
property which came to prevail all over the province in a
variety of sizes.
The assertion that the zamindars were essentially
revenue-administrators who had no control over land or its
operation, and who had virtually no role in agricultural
production' 3 is difficult to sustain, at least for the
eighteenth century. There is evidence (discussed below) to
show that their participation in agricultural production
was closer than what has been proposed by historians. More-
over, the manner in which such properties were formed does
show a fairly close connection with the agricultural
economy, particularly with the extension of cultivated
land: a point which needs elucidation.
According to Rai-Rayan Rajvallabh:
" John Shore's Minute of 2 April 1788 in BRC,IOR
P/51/28; ibid.,P/51/66,7 April 1786;also FR,Murshidabad,IOR
G/27/1,16 October 1770.
12 Muhammad Reza Khan to Board,WBSA,Miscellaneous
Proceedings of the Board of Revenue,vol.1,1772-1776,pp.338-
39.
13 Ray and Ray, 1977.
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Zemmindarries are of various kinds,
some are obtained by inheritance, some
by clearing the country of wood, some
by the ejection of the possessor for
ill-behaviour, some by purchase and
some in trust'4.
This description, though rather cryptic, does indicate
that the formation of zim1ridaris in Mughal and Nawabi
Bengal was by a combination of state action and individual
initiative. One of the earliest English writers to focus on
this combination was Boughton-Rouse who, in 1791, saw the
origins of ml.lkiyat (right of property) in Bengal in three
sources: (a) Jangal-hari ( clearance of waste-land for
cultivation), (b) inteqali (transfer of right) and (c) a-
hukami (by order of authority). A-hukami operated when the
state removed a zamiridar and settled another in his place;
but the other two sources clearly indicate the connection
between agricultural reclamation and the creation of
zamindari. Jangal-bari referred to those zamindaris created
by reclaiming land for the first time, whereas lnteqali
occurred where:
The land is in a good state of
cultivation, and productive to the
amount of revenue; yet, on account of
the neglect of the incumbent, or for
want of heirs to the land, another
person has with the permission of the
Emperor, or the Government delegated by
him, obtained a sunnud (order] for his
office in his own name15
Muhammad Reza Khan also made a clear distinction
between zamindaris created by jangal-hari or purchase
14 BRC,IOR P/51/18,2 April 1788.
' Dissertation Concerning the Landed Property in
Bengal, London, 1791, IOL,TractS,vol.168,p.57, (hereafter,Dis
sertation].
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(Jcharida), and those who had been established by the state
whom he called the sanadi za__IM!ars. Included in these
sanad.t z1ridars were also people who had been empowered by
the ruler to bring spots of waste land into cultivation.
These were not janga1-arf zm1ridars in the strict sense,
but functioned on a similar footing. He further added that
the relationship between the state and the zallMIar varied
according to the specific nature of each one's origin.
Jangal-bari and kharida zamlrw5ars enjoyed permanent and
inviolable rights of property, and the state had no further
right "other than receiving rents". Sanadi zm1rwYars were
subject to closer state control; some of them were more in
the nature of temporary offices to be bestowed, and
revoked, by the rulers at their discretion 16 . These
descriptions by experienced revenue officials and John
Shore's opinion (in 1788) that "most of the considerable
zemindars in Bengal may be traced within the last century
and a half" and that "the extent of their jurisdictions has
been considerably augmented during the time of Jaffier
(Murshid Quli] Khan and since" through a mixed process of
"purchases, acquisitions and confiscations" 17 indicate that
a zamindari in pre-British Bengal could emerge from a
number of directions, not all of them were related to the
will of the state. What appears crucial is the creation of
zaml.ndaris from below when individuals became z.mIndars
either by reclaiming or by purchasing land: in the former
case what obviously occurred was the extension of
agricultural land and in the latter situation one can
perhaps speak of the creation of an extensive land-market
in the province.
These zamindars from below constituted, what James
Grant called, "small, or single pergunnah zemmindarries
(in] districts and petty mahls, dispersed throughout
16 WBSA,Miscellaneous Proceedings of the Board of
Revenue,volume 1, 1772-1776,p.350.
17 BRC,IOR P/51/18,2 April 1788.
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Bengal" whose numbers had "so prodigiously increased" since
the administration of Murshid Quli Khan, and whose
composition was constantly changing "in denomination,
extent or possessory rights (so] as to become now (in 1789]
a work of considerable labour to trace their revolutional
[sic] progress"'8 . A reason for this growth appears to lie
in the concessions given by the state to such proprietors
to manage their internal affairs with very little
interference.
One of the most important devices of political
intervention adopted by the Mughals was that the z.mIndars
were obliged to acquire the state's sanction in cases of
inheritance and alienation of the zamiridari by division or
sale. These sanctions were apparently strictly enforced in
the case of the "superior zemindars" (such as those of
Burdwan, Nadia, Rajshahi and Dinajpur), who, in case of
inheritance or succession, were "accustomed to receive on
payment of nuzerranah, paishkash & Ca. a Dewanny Sunnud
from Government", whereas "the zemindars of a middle and
inferior rank... and the talookdars... at large have held
their lands to this day by virtue of inheritance alone"'9.
Such non-interference allowed the evolution of a whole
range of such zamindaris. Some, like the chaudhurls, of
Jalasor sub-divided the pargana into a number of portions
by a process of internal fragmentation. Each chaudhuri
enjoyed a share in the rast (perquisites) allowed to the
landed proprietors and managed the affairs, including the
payment of revenue, in their separate portions 20 . Others,
like the ones in Jalalpur (in eastern Bengal) held
zamindaris which were "not contiguous to each other but
intersected and divided by other districts"; though the
18 FR 2,pp.199-200.
19 BRC,IOR P/51/18,2 April 1788,reply of Rai Ragan
Rajvallabh to Council,2 April 1788.
20 IOR,Coiittee of New Lands,P/98/lO,26 July 1761.
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state realized that such "separation makes it extremely
difficult for one man to superintend the collection of the
whole (revenue]"21, there was very little done to prevent
such spatially dispersed rights from developing in pre-
British Bengal.
The zimlndarf was the dominant form of landed
property, but as a social organization it was remarkably
stratified. At the apex were those who were, in the
parlance of the East India Company, the "principal" or
"capital" zamindars. These were the zaindars who had been
able to carve out near-principalities and ruled over
extensive territories. Positioned below them in the social
hierarchy were the smaller zamlndars with territorial
jurisdictions over a few parganas and even over a few
villages. Districts such as Midnapur and Chittagong had
between 1500 and 3000 zamlndars in the 1780s22 . This
stratification notwithstanding, the zmIndars were the most
powerful social class in the countryside, and also the most
affluent. This affluence arose from their rights to tax
and, as I will discuss, from their participation in
agricultural production, which made these people much more
than mere state functionaries. They also had a privileged
social standing based on a combination of caste,
prescriptive status and local power. In fact the social
prestige of a zamindar in Bengal was measured by an
inseparable mix of territorial jurisdiction, amount of the
assessed revenue (jama) and by the extent of patronage
which an individual zamindar could provide to the local
temples, mosques and other religious orders who sought his
21 IOR,BRC,P/51/51,9 December 1789.
22 Sinha,1968: 165.Even single pargarias could have up
to 300 zamindars paying revenue ranging from 25000 to 50
rupees (WBSA,PCR:Murshidabad,vol.12, 5 May 1777].
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help23 . This latter function not only bestowed upon these
z.iwfridars a great degree of local prestige and power, it
also allowed the formation of another kind of landed
property, the la-kharaji, whose nature and social
implications will be discussed subsequently.
The tallucydari: evolution and nature in the eighteenth
century
Positioned below the zamlndars in the hierarchy of
landed property were the talluqdars. In the revenue
terminology of the eighteenth century, a talluqdar, in the
words of John Shore, "literally means a holder or possessor
of a dependency" 24 of two major types:the huzuri (or kh8s)
and mazkuri. The huzuri talluqdars held their rights under,
and paid revenue, directly to the state, whereas the
mazkuri "hold their tenures under a zemindar or chaudhuri
to whom they pay their rents" 25 . In the complex network of
landed-rights the talluqdar was recognized as one specific
form, but ascribed an inferior social position relative to
the zrnnindari. Its recognition as a specific landed
property is in evidence from Muhammad Reza Khan's statement
that both in zamindari and talluqdari " laws of inheritance,
property, sale, purchase and donation have been observed in
this country from the dawn of civilization"; but on the
23 See J.Harrington to Board,BRP,IOR P/71/36,4
February 1791;T.Henckel]. to Council,BRC,IOR P/52/20,27
Oct.l790; L.Mercer to Council,BRC, IOR P/52/30;Amini
Report,IOR,Home Misc.,vol.206,p.346.
24 FR 2,p.749.
25	 Brit.Mus.,Add.Ms.29086 	 IOR	 Home
Misc. ,vol.206,p.345;also 	 Risala-i-Zira'at,IOR 	 Home
Misc. ,vol.68,p.732-33.
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other hand, its relatively inferior status can also be seen
from his note that "a big zemindar is called a Raja, while
petty zemindars are called zemindars and chaudhuris (and]
in a zemindarri there are several talookdars" 26 . Reza
Khan's description is also corroborated by the one provided
by Rai Rayan Rajvallabh for whom talluqdars:
In regard to the rights of property and
inheritance are the same (as the
zm1ndars], but there is a difference
[between the two] in point of revenues,
dignities & privileges arising from a
difference in extent of territory"27.
In general, a talluqdar was recognized as "inferior in
rank and title" to the zamindar. Nevertheless it was a
distinct from of property and the proprietors possessed
"their little territories on a tenure full as secure [as
the zamindari], and at a revenue generally more fixed"28.
Talluqdari differed from the zamindari on four
specific aspects. First, as has been noted, there was the
basic difference between social standing of these
rights:the zamindari being considered the superior right
and the talluqdari the subordinate one. Second, the act of
zam.thdari lay in the payment of revenue (iialguzari) to the
state which included the payment of tall uqdari revenue
within the their jurisdictions. In other words, a zmindar
was at the khidmat of the state, whereas the talluqdar had
no such service obligation29 . Even huzuri talluqas, which
in theory were entitled to pay directly to the state, were
26 CPC,vol.8,1788-89,Delhi,1953,2 February 1788,p.42O.
27 BRC,IOR P/51/18,2 April 1788.
28	 IOR, Home Misc. ,vol.206,p.345;also Boughton-
Rouse, DissertatiOn, p.25.
29 Risala-i-Zira'at,Home Misc. ,vol.68,p.733;Boughton-
Rouse,DissertatiOfl,p.86alSO see B.R.Grover,1965: 270.
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nevertheless placed by it under a larger za1mdar who
collected and paid revenue on their behalf. This was
considered an administratively convenient arrangement and
was in vogue, for instance, in the chakia ( revenue circle)
of Murshidabad 30 . Third, as has been discussed, the
ailkiyat of a zai.ndar in Bengal could grow out of three
major sources: jangal-barf, Lnteqali and a-hukami, but the
talluqdari right, as will be seen, was primarily limited to
jangal-bari. Finally, a zamImdari was an inherited right
which was, at least in theory, dependent upon the sanction
of the state, whereas talluqdari arose by purchases or
grants. One would consider this to be a crucial difference
between these two rights for reasons which will be
enumerated shortly. When purchased, a talluqa was known as
kharida and those formed by grants, made either by the
state or the zamindar, were known as pattai31.
The crucial fact about talluqdari was that it was
essentially purchased, either from the state or from the
32
zawindar , or granted by either of these two agencies on
some specific considerations". Regarding the formation of
huzuri talluqas John Shore expressed the opinion that these
"appear to have been originally portions of Zemindarries,
sold or given by the Zemindars; and to have been separated
from their jurisdiction, either with their consent, or by
° WBSA, PCR Murshidabad,vol. 8,18 February 1776.
' IOR,BRP P/71/25,24 May l790;ibid.,P/71/25,4 June
1790; Westland,1871: 84.
32 It is interesting to note that a zamindar could
also be a talluqdar by purchase:the zam1rtar of tappa
Jaffarnagar was also talluqdar by purchase of auza
(village) Salia in tappa Alinagar and part of auza Gonya
in tappa Haveli,pargana Jahangirnagar in 1774 [WBSA,PCR
Dacca,vol.3,20 June 1774].
Sometimes,as in Tippera and Mymensing,jangal-bari
could become kharlda talluqdars by purchasing the land
cleared by them from the zamindar (BRP,IOR P/71/51,9 April
1792;BRC,IOR P/52/13,11 June 1790].
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the interest of the Talookdar with the Governing power"34.
What John Shore describes seem to be talluqas which were
initially azkuri and then converted into huzuri by the
authorities; and this may have been one way in which such
talluqas were formed during Mughal Bengal. But this could
not have been the most prevalent form for two reasons. In
the first place, it was widely recognized that the
zm1ridars resisted any act of converting azkuri in to
huzuri (or has) talluqas, and sometimes this resistance
could turn violent as, for example in Dhaka, where a
mazkuri talluqa could not be "released" (i.e., made huzuri)
without "proving the violence of the Zemindars"35.
Zamindari opposition was natural as these talluqas were
important in the former's financial structure, first,
because they were generally purchased for ready cash, and,
second, as noted by the Amini Commission:
A talook comprehends only a few
villages, or a small tract of ground,
and the possessor is able to attend to
the cultivation of every part of It. It
improves by his care; the rents of it
increases & it becomes populous and
valuable,
which meant that a zamIndar could look upon it as a steady
source of income, even if It some times amounted to
plundering the resources of these talluqdars36 . The fear
that "the separation of the talookdars would reduce many of
the (zamindars] from affluent circumstances, to a state of
indigence, and the titles of Rajah & Zemindar, which they
enjoy, will become mere empty names" 37 provided the crux of
FR 2, p.749.
WBSA,PCR,Dacca,vol.13,16 January 1776;also FR
2, p. 750.
36 Brit.Mus.,Add.Ms.29086.
BRP,IOR P/71/26,4 June 1790.
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their opposition to all attempts to convert aazkurf in to
huzurl talluqas: a fact which must indicate the importance
of these talluqas in za1mdari finances.
The second reason why the pattern of described by
Shore can not be ubiquitously applied to the formation of
huzuri talluqas in Bengal stems from the fact that the kind
of talluqdars Shore was describing formed a tiny portion of
the social category called huzuri talluqdars. Shore's
description pertains only to those people who were given
such rights (also called kha) by virtue of being "some
favourite or underling of Government" 38 . These grants were
limited to the main administrative centres, they "comprised
small mehauls "[mahls ], and were "generally given to the
dependents of the court" 39 . According to James Grant such
people:
Were all rich, or favourite individuals in
the neighbourhood of the principal
Mussuilman Capitals, who having obtained
small territorial grants... were then to be
rated at a fixed annual assessment, subject
to no future increase; and as they had
probably made some pecuniary compensation by
way of purchase of possession, so with the
privilege of being exempted from zeminindarry
jurisdictions40.
The bulk of the evidence pertaining to huzuri talluqas
indicates that these were formed either by the government
with specific administrative and financial considerations
in mind, or that they arose from the state's attempt to
incorporate a number of "ancient" talluqdars (i.e. talluqas
which were older than the established zamindarls in certain
38 IOR,SCC,P/A/1O,16 August 1769.
BRC,IOR P/49/52,13 June 1775.
40 Ibid.,P/51/33,8 March 1788.
133
areas) 41 , and who were subsequently brought under the
direct administration in order to facilitate the collection
of revenue.
One of the best examples of the creation of huzur
talluga by incorporating such "ancient proprietors" comes
from the Naibat of Dhaka which was sub-divided, at an early
stage of Mughal rule, into a number of small talluqas given
by the subandars to persons employed in defending the
frontiers of the province. The greater number of these were
given for the maintenance of the flotilla (nowarrah). These
lands were then specified in the jama-i-tiiar (revenue-
roll) of Todar Mall in 1588, and the holders were confirmed
as proprietors and afterwards made huzuri by the Nawabs of
Bengal42 . In Mymensing, jangal-bari talluqdars were establ-
ished much before the establishment of Mughal rule in
Bengal; these people acquired lands from "the Bhuyas (bara
bhuiyas], or before the [Mughal] King got possession of
Bengal" and subsequently became huzurl43 . Elsewhere these
huzuri talluqdars were placed under the supervision of the
local zamLndar, but the state made sure of placing a number
of restrictions on the latter's power. Thus in Bakarganj
the connections between the state, zamiridars and talluqdars
were shaped in the following fashion:
Previous to the division of the country
into Pergunnahs & Tuppas & fixing what
is called the Tuxeembundy, many persons
undertook to cultivate jungle and waste
lands; and when the Tuxeembundy was
made, these new lands (called jangal-
41 According to John Shore,"the ancestors of many
[talluqdars] were in possession of their talooks before the
zemindarry jurisdictions in which they are now included
were formed,or the families of the zemindars were known"
[BRC,IOR P/52/10,12 May 1790].
42 BRC,IOR P/52/4,10 February 1790;also Taylor,1840:
153-54.
BRC,IOR P/52/13,11 June 1790.
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ban] were constituted Talooks &
included in the Jummabundy [revenue-
roll] of the nearest Zemindar by the
Government of that time & if any
increase or remission was granted (to]
the Zemindar, a proportional part fell
to the Talookdar. If the Zemindar with
held from the Talookdar any part of
this, he was at liberty to complain to
the Government who ccipe11ed the
Zemindar to allow the Talookdar his
proportion of the remission.
If the Talookdar died leaving heirs,
they got possession of the lands in the
same manner as their predecessor & the
Zemindar had nothing to do with them
but receive his Malguzary (revenue]
agreeably to Kistbundy [installments];
but if there happened to be no heirs,
the Zemindar was the .anager on behalf
of the Government44.
Similar strategies were adopted by the state in
western Bengal too. A statement from Birbhum (an extensive
zamindari) mentions three huzur talluqas. First, there were
"talookdars whose talooks were formed before the zemindar,
to whom they now pay their rents, or his ancestors
succeeded to the zemindarry"; second, "talookdars the lands
comprised in whose talooks were never the property of the
zemindar, to whom they now pay their rents, or his
ancestors"; and third were "talookdars who held land under
a special grant from government" 45 . In Midnapur, where
talluqdari rights had developed extensively in the course
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, huzuni
talluqdars were "the purchasers of small portions of lands.
They are clearly independent and answer the native terms of
Khauridge (free] Talookdars. The same independence as they
now possess [in 1792], they possessed previous to the
Company's accession of the Dewanny"; these talluqdars dealt




46directly with government officials, called tebsildars
who were "stationed to collect the Revenue, recorded them
as separate renters (sic] and fixed separate assessments
for their talooks, judging them more responsible for their
revenue
These instances show that huzuri ta11ua rights were
sanctioned by the state because of a number of
considerations, these being: administrative convenience (as
in Dhaka), easier collection of revenue (in Birbhum) and
extension of cultivated land (as in Bakarganj). The case of
Bakarganj also shows that great care was taken, or sought
to be taken, by the government in order to protect the
rights of these talluqdars from the zamindars; and this was
apparently motivated, additionally, by the official
objective of recognizing the talluqdari as a form of landed
property completely distinct from the zmfixYari though
occupying a social position inferior to the latter in the
landed-hierarchy.
The other type of talluqa, the mazkuri, existed in one
from or another in all areas of the province. Muhammad Reza
Khan described the formation of izazkuri talluqa in the
following words:
A zemindar procures a sanad from the
sovereign for waste and uncultivated
land, which is not included in the
jummah and of which there is no owner.
He then grants a pottas of talookdari
to several persons who exert themselves
in improving the condition of the land,
spend money over it and bring it under
cultivation. They pay revenue to the
zemindar who is entitled to receive it.
Another way is when a zemindar sells...a
village in his zemindarri. (Then] the
purchaser becomes the proprietor of the
lands and enjoys the privileges of selling
46 rehsildars were also used to collect revenue from
some talluqdars in Bakarganj (BRP,IOR P/71/26,4 June 1790].
Ibid.,P/72/2,25 May 1792.
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and donating them. The zemindar and the
sovereign are to receive the revenue
only48.
Our sources mention four ways in which aazkuri rights
could be formed within any particular zamfndarf: (i)
persons could take jangal-hari pattas, and after
successfully cultivating these lands, they assumed
talluqdari rights; (ii) others purchased waste lands from
the zamindars and were then recognized as talluqdars; (iii)
others acquired cultivated lands directly by purchase as
talluqas; and (iv) some procured, or purchased, la-kharaj
lands and agreed to pay a stipulated revenue to the
zamthdar49 . Examples of such talluqa.s in different areas
indicate that these were generally created by the zamfrw.Yars
either to bring about an extension of cultivation, or to
acquire ready cash by selling portions of their zmndarf
to those who could afford, or were willing to buy.
Bakarganj had pattai and kharida talluqdars 50; similar
rights existed in Jessore 51 . In Birbhum, mazkuri talluqdars
were those who "purchased their lands by private or publick
[sic] sale, or who obtained them by grant from the zemindar
to whom they pay their rents" 52 In Midnapur, "many have
obtained talooks, either in former [i.e,. Mughal] times by
private purchase or in these latter times by public
purchase by auction"53.
48 cPC,vol.8,op.cit.,pp.421-22.
WBSA,Khalsa,vol.l,4 January 1775;BRP,IOR P/71/26,25
May 1790.
50 BRP,IOR P/71/26,4 June 1790.
51 Ibid.,P/71/25,24 May 1790;IOR,BRC P/52/17,2 August
1790.
52 WBDR,n.s. ,Birbhum.op.cit. , p.85.
BRC,IOR P/51/50,23 October 1789;also see BRP,IOR
P/72/2,25 May 1792.
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Pattai talluqas were specifically established by the
zamindars to bring about an extension of cultivation. Such
talluqdars were apparently responsible for "improving the
condition of the land" by spending money and bringing it
under cultivation54 . While doing so, the ta11uras were held
free of revenue for the first two or three years and
afterwards made to pay their share of the "general rent" of
the pargana, along with certain taxes fixed on a customary
basis (virkh-i-dastur) payable to the zamlvvYar; these
talluqas were inheritable by the family of the holder, but
could not be sold, or alienated, without the consent of the
zamindar, who also had the first right of rejection 55 . In
Bakarganj, for instance, these talluqdars were not meant to
pay revenue for the first two three years, but after that
time there was to be a progressive increase (rasad) until
the stipulated rate of revenue (pura dastur) was obtained--
the entire process usually took about five years 56 . In
Dhaka, a zamindar would take a contract (taahud) from a
talluqdar for a stipulated sum of money to be paid after
five years on a progressive rate of increase57.
When izazkurl talluqas were created by sale of
zamindaris they closely approximated landed property of a
private kind since these talluqdars were empowered by the
cPc,vol.8,op.cit.,p.421.
WBSA,Khalsa,vol.1,14 December 1775.
56 BRP,IOR P/71/26,4 June 1790;also Beveridge,1876:
194.
For example a tahUUd of Rs.4294-5 annas taken by a
talluqdar in Buzurgumedpur (in 1779) shows the following
rates of payment to be made to the zamfndar:
Payment in the first year
Payment in the second year
Payment in the third year
Payment in the fourth year






WBSA,PCR Dacca,vol.25,29 September 1779.
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act of purchase to sell, alienate and mortgage their
properties without any restrictions 58. They were also
entitled to fragment their rights among members of the
family. In this event, and if the talluqa happened to be
held by the collateral branches of a family, the
descendants of the "original founder" was to be given an
extra share59 . In Birbhum, talliijdars of this type could be
found "succeeding" to others' talluqas "by right of
purchase, gift or irtheritance" 60 , and in Bakarganj, these
people, called zer-kharid talluqdars, were at "liberty to
sell with or without the permission of the zemindar"61.
In fact the sale of these rights had created certain
sub-talluqdars in the Naibat of Dhaka. In Bakarganj we come
across the ausat62 talluqdars, who were described as a
"talookdar within a talookdar" 63 . In pargana Bikrampur we
are told of the existence of hwaladars ( holders of
property by transfer) in the following description:
In the pergunnah of Bekrampore a custom
prevails that if any talookdar sells
any part of his talook to another
person, upon receiving the purchase
price he calls him a Howalladar of so
much land, who pays his rents to the
talookdar; but if any dispute arises
between the talookdar and the
howalladar, he can get his howallah
separated from his talookdar & included
in some other talookdar's lands. [The
howaladar] is subject to increase or
58 Beverigde, 1876: 416; cPC, vol.8, p. 422;WBSA, PCR
Murshidabad,vol.23,17 February 1780 and 3 April 1780 for a
list of mortgaged talluqas in Murshidabad.
WBSA,PCR Dhaka,vol.3,25 July 1774.
60 WBDR,n.s. ,Birbhum	 6012,op.cit. ,p.85.
61 BRP,IOR P/71/26,4 June 1790.
62	 Literally one holding or occupying a middle
position.
63 BRP,IOR P/71/26,4 June 1790.
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decrease of Revenue along with the
other renters (sic] & the property is
hereditary & transferable"
One cannot be certain whether sale of talluqas in
other areas of the province created such specifically
demarcated sub-talluqdaris as in Bakarganj and Bikrampur in
eastern Bengal. In Midnapur, we are told, there existed a
sub-category called the gutch-fnI talluqdar who "were
taxed with the charge of insolvent talookdars and made
responsible for the revenue, and the original proprietors
remaining unable to answer their Revenue, they continued in
other's hands" 65 . This category corresponds closely to the
system followed in Dhaka where a number of small talluqdars
were placed under a bigger one who collected and paid their
revenue; this talluqdar was called zimmadar, his own
talluqa was called neez (personal) and comprised the only
real property belonging to him 66. What we can not be sure
of is whether these intermediary rights were actually
purchased.
Nevertheless, the fact that these azkuri talluqas
were created by purchase and then were saleable is
indisputable. "All talookdars" noted Shore in 1788, "unless
restricted by the terms of their grants under which they
hold, have a right to dispose of their lands by sale, gift
or otherwise; ... and indeed this practice prevails in
opposition to the condition of their pottahs" 67 . A bill of
sale had to be signed by the seller and witnessed by "his
partners, and by the zemindar (along with] the people of
the neighbourhood [and then] attested by the seal of the
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.,P/72/2,25 May 1792.
66 Taylor,1840: 154.
67 FR 2,p.750;emphasis added.
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Kazi [Qazi] and the signature of the Canongoes"68.
To the extent, however, that aazkuri was a purchased
right, it implied that the zaindars were under no formal
obligation to create such talluqas within their
territories. The extent of such sales appears to have
depended upon the capacity, or willingness, of the local
people to purchase such tallurjas, as well as upon the
immediate financial requirements of a za.thdar. In
Midnapur, for instance, almost all talluqas were
established by the sale of zamIndari lands as the following
description shows:
Zemindars were originally proprietors of the
whole of some of the Mehals which are now
Talookdarry. From extravagance, indolence or
neglect of their lands, from badness of
season or other causes, being unable to pay
their Revenue, or support their
extravagance, they were constrained to sell
portions of their lands as they were pressed
by either one or other of these necessities.
In this manner sometimes the whole Mehal was
disposed of69
Financial considerations were also accompanied by the
desire to bring about an extension in cultivated land. In
the latter case, aazkuri talluqas were granted by pattas.
A survey of the history of 34 such talluqdars in pargana
Jalalpur (in 1791) revealed that 14 talluqas were created
by purchases, whereas the rest, 20, were established by the
zamthdars through grants70 . In Muhammad Aminpur, chakla
Hughli, there were 62 azkuri talltxjas in 1778'. The
proportion of azkuri talluqas, in terms of jama, in some
68 WBSA,Khalsa,vol.1,4 January 1775.
69 BRP,IOR P/72/2,25 May 1792.

































zamindaris is outlined in table 3 below.
Table 3






Z.indari	 Gross Jasa	 Mazkuri Ja	 4 as of 3
(Rupees)	 (Rupees)
Source: BSA, CCRM, Appendix to Proceedings, vol.5; F12, pp.333, 415, 480; Rainsbothain,
1926: 132.
The nature of la-kaharajl property
La-kharaj, or charity lands were created by the
Mughals, and later the Nawabs by:
Grants [of land] with certain privileges and
exemptions annexed to the tenure, whether
flowing from the favour of the Prince, or
granted as a reward for services, or yielded
as the condition upon which the original
grantees engaged to reclaim or improve the
lands; or finally as pious donations from
the respective Princes to the Ministers of
the established religion, or for other
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charitable purposes72.
Once again, like the talluqdari, we find the need to
extend the land under cultivation emerging as one of the
major considerations behind the creation of la-)haraji
rights in pre-British Bengal. The major difference between
such rights and those of the zm1rari or ta11idari was
that lands held la-kharajl did not have to pay any revenue
since they were initially given as charity or in lieu of
service. Thus these grants embraced two social groups. The
first were service-grants (called chakeran) which comprised
territorial assignments made for meeting the expenses of
servants and employees. The second category, called baz-i-
zm1n, signified all kinds of charitable support to
"religious edifices and colledges [sic]" since the support
of such institutions was "deemed sacred under the feudal
Mogul Government" 73 . Such grants were also known as kharij-
jama (revenue free), and in the revenue records of the
Company this term is often used interchangeably with la-
kharaji.
The pressing need to extend cultivation and its
connection with the creation of various types of landed-
properties is nicely borne out by the spread of la-kharaj
lands in the frontier regions of the province in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The reason why the
best spots of land in Chittagong were held la-kharaji in
1788 was ascribed to the need to pacify that area after
Aurangzeb defeated the Maghs in 1666. The upheaval caused
by the Mughal invasion had caused "persons having the means
of subsistence to live elsewhere"; the district "thus
became the resource of needy persons who on applying to men
in office under the Government found no difficulty in
72 BRC,IOR P/49/50,7 February 1775.
BRP,IOR P/70/48,11 November 1788;also FR 2,pp.268-
70.
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procuring charity grant for such lands as they were
disposed to reduce to a state of cultivation"74.
Sylhet provides another example. Here the state's need
was to prevent the "incursions of the hill people" in to
Bengal, for which a faujdar was appointed from "the Nabob's
nearest relations, or confidential friends, to whom it was
in fact a jaghier, and little more was expected by
government than a few elephants, some chunam, oranges and
birds of handsome plumage". The task of settling such
tracts of land was entrusted to the faujdar who,
Being followed by a multitude of needy
dependents was liberal in his gifts without
expense to himself, and never failed to
bestow upon them large tracts of land upon
a charity tenure under his own seal75.
As in the case of talluqdari, the zam.thdars were quick
to follow the example set by the state. Large chunks of
revenue-paying (hasil) and waste (patft) land were given
out by the zamthdars and, to a lesser extent, by the
talluqdars as chakeran and haz-i-zamln "in the names of
their friends, relations and dependents" 76 . Such grants
were apparently made with the approval of the state before
l765. For instance, the zamirMlars of Bisnupur were
apparently assessed at a very small peshkash (tribute)
under the Mughals on grounds of the zamlndarl "being a
frontier of the Province" which "enabled [them] to lay by
considerable sums of money from the revenues of the Country
[Bishnupur], which for the major part appear to have been
BRC,IOR P152/2, 10 February 1790.
Ibid.,P/52/5,24 November 1787.
76 BRP,IOR P/70/27,8 May 1787.
" WBSA,CCRM,vol.8,5 December 1771.
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expended for religious purposes"". The Company was deeply
suspicious of all such grants on the grounds that these
were detrimental to the state's financial interests since
they did not pay revenue79 and that zamT1dars:
Have carried this practice (i.e.
granting la-kharaji] so far as to have
the malguzarry (revenue paying] land
totally incapable of yielding the
jummah and suffered (sic] the nominal
zemindarry to be sold for the balance,
retaining the bazee zemin, a profitable
estate, for their supporteo.
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of baz-i-z m1n in
some zam.indars before and after 1765, for which comparable
estimates are available.
Table 3.1
Grants of baz-i-zin by some v.v1ars,
before and after 1765
(in bighas)





















" BRC,IOR P/52/21,1 December 1790.
FR 2,p.28.





': The figures for Birbhui are for the year 1770.
Source: Rangpur: BRC, IOR P152/li, 6 August 1790; 24-Parganas: ibid., P/52/il, 1 December 1790;
Nadia: BRP, IOR P/il/li, 13 August 1789; Burdwan: BRC, IOR P152/il, 1 Decesher 1789;
Bishnupur: ibid., 1 Decanber 1790; Muhaadshahi: BRP, IOR P/71/13, 27 August 1789;
Birbhu: Factory Records, Murshidabad, IOR G/27/1, 5 October 1770.
The baz-i-jama lands were meant for the upkeep of a
whole range of dependents ranging from, as in Rajshahi,
"Bramins, Mohunts, Sannasies, Gungabassies [widows],
Fakirs, Pirs & ca" 81 to (in Coch Behar) "servants and
muttassudies (revenue officials].., poor Bramins, Rajahs &
the Kitmutgars (khidmatgar, or servant] & Bearers"82.
Unfortunately, there is very little evidence to compare
these lands to raigati (land held independently by the
peasants). Nevertheless, the evidence collected by J.
Sherburne, the collector of Muhammadshahi in 1787 is
extremely significant in this respect. A list of the
registered baz-i-zamin holders there shows the following
picture83:
Land (bigha) Number of holders	 Total land (bighal
81 BRC,IOR P/52/20,10 October 1790.
82 Ibid.,P/49/42,16 November 1773;emphasis added.The
term Raja here obviously refers to the petty za1iwars in
Coch Behar which was an autonomous chieftainship under the
Mughals.
83 BRP,IOR P/70/24,6 February 1787.The term registered
was used to denote those people who had valid sanads and
had these registered in the sadr daftar.There were others
who held lands without any sanads,and the Company always

















This list also provides a very rare comparison of baz-
i-z mIn with the raiyati or a1guzari lands in four



























Another estimate of such lands made in two pargarlAs
















85 BRC,IOR P/49/46,3 November 1775.
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Pargana Apole in the zamindari of Dinajpur had its











A statement regarding the distribution of lands in seven
villages in Jalasor in 1792 contains the following
information (in Mghas)87:
Total land	 Baz-i-zin	 Waste land	 RaIyati land
6150.75	 859.90	 1109.95	 4180.90
1433.50	 165.25	 76.00	 1192.25
7977.70	 1178.90	 2170.70	 4628.10
2007.40	 305.40	 22.70	 1679.30
2320.45	 334.90	 1985.50
1123.50	 211.65	 40.05	 871.80
1628.35	 185.01	 1443.34
Land given as chakeran constituted the other component
of these revenue-free properties. Table 3.2 gives a
comparative picture of chakeran lands in some zamlndaris
for which data are available. It must be borne in mind that
the data in table 3.2 pertain to z.mfridaris after they had
been quite extensively de-militarized by the Company's
regime, which means that the extent of land alienated as
chakeran, or the number of officials who held such lands,
must have been far greater under the Nizamat.
86 Testimony of Sibprasad Tagore,chaiThury of the
pargana in BRC,IOR P/50/1,1 August 1777.
87 BRC,IOR P/52/43,20 April 1792.
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Table 3.2
aiakeran-zin in some zindarii (biias)












3, 58, 516. 00
1,54,629.35
1,55,681.96









1, 21, 198. 45
Source: For Burdwan, VBSA, Proceedings of the Select Coittee, vol.2,
28 October 1766; for Muhamadshahi, Bishnupur and Dinajpur, VBSA,
CCRII, Appendix to Proceedings, voluies, 1 and 7; for Birbhui,
Factory Records, Murshidabad, IOR G/27/1, 10 October 1770.
It was a recognized fact that most eighteenth century
zamLndars had large establishments of officials and other
servants, including a sizeable militia, who were maintained
by grants of extensive tax-free lands in lieu of pay. These
persons were
The Zeniindar 's own particular servants,
paid by him in land and not in
specie... . Only a small part of them
are at fixed stations, such as are
appointed to guard and protect the
Cutcherries and Gunges and those placed
over the Zemindars Kummar (khamarJ and
his fruit trees. The far greater number
are employed under the mandals (village
headmen] and other officials in the
mofussil [country] to collect Rents
from the Ryotts, and in measuring lands
and a variety of occasional duties. It
is the business of some to carry orders
from the Head Cutcherry (zamthdari
courts] and circulate them throughout
the country [i.e. the zamindari],
whilst others escort treasure going
from and coming from the Sudder
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(zalrwiari headquarters]. In fine they
are 1ntiate1y conneçed with every
branch of the Revenues
The arrival of the Company meant a substantial
reduction in the number of z_iridari troopers89 , but what
vexed the Company greatly was that this de-militarization
was not accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the
quantity of land alienated as chakeran in various
zainthdaris. In fact one of the major suspicions harboured
by Company officials was that lands "secreted" under this
denomination had actually increased after 1765. Thus in the
seven years between 1777 and 1783, 44975 bighas "of all
most good land" were alienated as kharij-jama in 24-
Parganas, whereas between 1769 and 1776 such grants had
totalled 9972 bighas90 . In Rajshahi, 39,280 bighas had been
added to the existing chakeran lands between 1778 and 1789;
baz-i-zmin had increased by 23,205 bighas in the same
period91 . In Birbhum the additions to chakeran lands
totalled 90,790 bigha.s between 1777 and 178792. Between
1773 and 1787 the estimated value of lands alienated as
baz-i-zamln in Midnapur and Jalasor had gone up
substantially, as the following figures show93:
88 BRC,IOR P/50/25,9 June 1780;emphasis added.
89 Evidence of the reduction in the numbers of
zamindari troopers is available in WBSA,Proceedings of the
Select Committee,vol.2,28 October 1766 for Burdwan;
FR,Murshidabad,IOR G/27/1,10 October 1770 (for Birbhum) and
16 October 1770 for Dinajpur.
° BRP,IOR P/70/27,8 May 1787.
91 Ibid.,P/71/12,30 July 1789.
92 Compare FR 2,p.335 and Sinha,1968: 272.
Compare BRC,IOR P/49/38,17 March 1773 and
ibid.,P/51/19,11 April 1788.
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Year	 Value of haz-i-zmfn (rupees)
	
Midnapur 1773	 42, 821
	
1787	 1, 000, 85
	
Jalasor 1773	 10, 738
	
1787	 20, 920
The supposedly phenomenal increase in such lands after
1765 was ascribed as one of the major difficulties in the
collection of revenue from Dinajpur as "the management of
these alienated articles- - the collection and expenditure--
are placed under separate and distined (sic, distinct?]
officers, the business transacted privately and secreted
from inspection"94.
Unfortunately, the proportions of chakeran and baz-i-
zamin in lands alienated as la-kharajl cannot be worked out
for all zamindaris. Evidence from the zamlndaris of
Dinajpur and Rajshahi show the following distribution of
such lands (in bighas)95:
L-ar.1i	 Iaz-i-zin
Dinajpur (1770)	 419.436.85	 1.66.635.70	 2.52.801.15
Raj.h.hi (1789)	 7.26.324.00	 4.52.354.00	 2,73.970.00
One feature of such grants is certainly quite
apparent.These grants definitely allowed small numbers of
people, whether officials or militia, to take control of
large tracts of land.Thus in Dinajpur, 266 zmfridari
horsemen jointly held 26, 478 highas of land in 177096,
WBSA,BRFW,vol.6,6 November 1786.
For	 Dinajpur,WBSA,CCRM,Appendix 	 to
Proceedings,vol.2,13	 to	 30	 December	 1770;for
Rajshahi,BRP,IOR P/71/12,30 July 1789.
96 WBSA,CCRM,Appendix to Proceedings,vol.2.
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which gives us a grant of 99.54 blghas per capita. In
Burdwan, 710 huzuri servants (those attending to the person
of the Raja) held 81, 240 b.ighas (or 114.42 bighas per
head) in 1766, and in Birbhum, 204 thn.dars held 16, 385
blghas (80.32 bighas per person) in 177098. In Burdwan, 438
persons were given 19, 000 bighas as baz-i-z m1n after
1765, which gives us a grant of 43.38 bighas per person.
The fact that the generic term la-kharaj amounted to giving
extensive territorial control to a privileged few in rural
society is revealed in table 3.3 which represents the state
of la-kharaji in 1778 according to the findings of the
Amini Commission.
Table 3.3
Thari1-1	 in eleven di.trict.. 1778
1	 2	 3
Di.trict	 Gro.. '-- Thari1-1	 3 a. * of 2
(rupee.)	 (rupee.)
Nadia	 1.585.498	 4.78.731	 30.19
Rughli	 276.062	 1.16.548	 42.21
Je..or.	 483.388	 1.19.304	 24.47
Bi.hnupur	 518.731	 2.43.548	 46.95
Jahangirpur	 363.750	 38.542	 10.06
R.j.hahi	 2.964.631	 6.63.839	 22.38
Birbhua	 1.144.825	 2.35.888	 20.06
puma.	 1.909.214	 7.34.907	 38.49
Pachet.	 154.423	 20.481	 13.26
Rangpur	 1.650.655	 1.84.503	 11.11
Dhaka	 5.463.561	 8,01.572	 18.59
Source: Brit.Mu... Add.N..29086. 29087. 29088.
According to the Commission about 5,600,942 blghas of
land were held as la-kharajl in the areas surveyed by it in
WBSA,Proceedings of the Select Committee,vol.2128
October 1768.
98 FR,Murshidabad,G/27/1,10 October 1770.
Sinha,1968: 272.
152
1778 100. John Shore added another 2,775,000 bighas
alienated as khrij-jaa in areas not surveyed by the Amini
Commission, and adopting a standardized revenue rate of 1
rupee 8 annas per bigha, Shore calculated that the holders
of such lands jointly held revenue-lands worth nearly
Rs.12,563,913 in 1789101. If, as Shore reported, the
revenue rate of 1 rupee 8 annas per bigha represented about
40 per cent of the produce in the 1780s 102 , then the
material assets actually controlled by the 1a-khraji
holders could easily be in the range of 31,409,782 rupees.
This made them effective controllers of at least 9.54 per
cent of the province's gross agricultural product circa
1790'°, for which they paid no revenue. It is therefore
not surprising that it was difficult, both for the state
and the zamthdar, to dispossess such people from their
grants which, over the years, had come to assume distinct
features of private property.
First, these lands had become inheritable by the
successors of the original grantees as a matter of
right'04 . Second, like all things privately owned, these
lands were bought and sold. Since they did not pay revenue,
la-kharaji land-values were ot expressed as a ratio of the
assessed revenue (jama) as was done in the case of
zamindari and talluqdari. Thus la-kharaji lands were sold
as privately owned properties having independent monetary
values. Scattered evidence from Midnapur indicates that the




103 According to Colebrooke,the gross agricultural
output per year was 329,130,000 rupees circa 1790
(Remarks, pp. 15-16]
104 BRC,IOR P/52/20,27 October 1790.
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bigha in 1732 to 5.01 rupees in 1759'°; unfortunately the
state of prices for such lands after 1759 are not known. In
eastern Bengal such lands were valued at prices ranging
from 13 to 3 rupees per bigha depending on their
location106 . In 1786 Charles Grant purchased 1194.45 bighas
of adad-i-ma'ash land in pargana Rokunpur, chakla
Akbarnagar for 7000 rupees 107 . In Nadia such lands could be
purchased at a "fair price" of 8 rupees a bigha108.
The paucity of evidence does not allow us to make
exact estimates regarding the frequency of such sales. It
is nevertheless, though tentatively, possible to posit that
the sale of la-kharaji had become pervasive in the late
eighteenth century. This period was certainly marked by a
fairly rapid and increasing sales of all kinds of landed
property, in which la-kharaji, being another such property,
in all likelihood formed an important part. It is perhaps
extremely significant that la-kharaji, when sold, fetched
a higher price when compared to the sale values of zamin-
daris or talluqdaris. In Dhaka, "an alienated, or Rent free
land of 100 r[upee]s produce is valued at 10 years produce
when purchased & consequently is equal to 1000
[ rupees]"'°9 , whereas the sale prices of zindaris seldom
exceeded five times their Jama110 . It is therefore entirely
feasible that the landed proprietors all over Bengal
replicated the example of the 24-Parganas where zamlndars,
105 BRC,IOR P/50/41,26 July 1782.
106 WBSA,PCR,Dacca,vol.3,1 July 1774.
107 BRC,IOR P/51/1,9 September 1786.
108 BRP,IOR P/71/37,30 March 1791.
109 WBSA,PCR,Dacca,vol.1,9 December 1773.
110 G.C.Meyer, Preparer of Reports,Department of
Khalsa,in BRC, ICR P/51/33,25 March 1789.John Shore believed
that,apart from Calcutta,"the price of revenue land sold(never]
	
exceeded	 the	 revenue	 for	 two
years", Ibid. ,P/51/27,26 November 1788.
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and even ijaradars, were happy to put up their revenue-
paying (alguzari) lands for sale, though they secretly
purchased, or acquired, 1a-khraji which was deemed "a
profitable estate for their support"". The collector of
Birbhum was convinced that by the "annual secret
appropriation of ma].guzzary lands under the head of neez-
talooks and bazee zemin" the zaafndar had actually cornered
nearly 67,035 bighas of land between 1770 and 1787 to his
"private advantage""2 . In fact one of the most perceptive
of the Company's observers, Sir John Shore, was quite
definitive that "proprietors and possessors of Rent free
lands" made "considerable additions to the quantity
originally held by them & so as in several instances have
doubled the property founded in just title""3.
Landed proprietors and the economy: the case of zamindars
That the zamindari was not a unit of production is
certainly an acknowledged fact, but to say that the
zamindars had practically no role in the production
process"4 cannot easily be accepted. Unlike the feudal
demesne, the zamlndars did not actually organize production
in all the territories under their jurisdiction, but a
zamindari was an agglomeration of otherwise dispersed
production units centred in the villages, and this being
so a certain interaction between the landholder and
BRP,IOR P/70/27,8 May 1787.
112 BRC,IOR P151/20, from J.Sherburne,14 May 1788.
113 BRC,IOR P/50/40,3 May 1782;emphasis added.
" As argued for instance by Ray and Ray (1975].
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production was bound to take place. The provision of "soft"
agricultural loans (taqavi) and the maintenance of
irrigational and flood controlling embankments (puLbandi)
were recognized as the traditional functions of the
zamlndars. These functions were most pronounced in case of
the jangal-bari z m1ndars, who were given snads "on
condition that within the Boundaries the jungles should be
cleared, embankments and water courses made, inhabitants
brought fm other places and land put in to a state of
cultivation" 115 . Reclamation in Chittagong was "often
assisted by the Zemeendar... with money as a temporary
support" to the peasants 116 . The crucial position occupied
by the zamthdars in the entire network of reclamation of
land and the extension of cultivation will be discussed
further in chapters 4 and 5, but their importance can be
seen in the fact that in the extensive zamindar.i of Nadia,
pat eet lands of intrinsically good quality could not be
reclaimed because of the financially distressed situation
of the zam1ndar'7.
These zamindars also had the responsibility of over-
seeing the maintenance of flood-controlling embankments and
the construction of local irrigation networks. There were
two forms in which this task was traditionally undertaken:
khas pulbandi, or embankments made by the government and
zamindari pulhartdi, or the embankments constructed by the
zamthdar. The costs of the former task were defrayed either
by remission of revenue or by levying athot (imposts),
while those of the latter were the responsibility of the
115 BRP,IOR P/72/32,7 July 1794,arzi of Debnarain
Roy,Sadr Qanungo of Huh outlining the history of his
zamLndari since circa 1720.
116 Brit.Mus.,Add.Ms.,19286,f.19.
117 CCR,IOR P/67/62,13 June 1776.
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zm1ridar "in whose countries the works are carried on"118.
The other job, that of irrigation, was another za1rirari
duty which was of local importance since as we have seen
(chapter 2) these tanks and wells could become crucial for
the survival of high-value crops during dry seasons. In
fact the drought of 1769/70 became particularly severe
because these devices of subsidiary irrigation dried up
owing to a protracted failure of the monsoon in that year.
Most areas had "public.., and private tanks.., dug at
the expense of individuals from religious and other
purposes, the waters of which are more than sufficient for
the preservation of the crops of the proprietors of them";
these tanks were located in aalguzari, la-Irharaji and
khamar lands"9. Designed essentially as back-up
irrigational facilities and as sources of drinking water,
these tanks were nevertheless important for a number of
reasons. First, the very act of digging these tanks meant
the clearing of waste lands and certain financial gains for
the zamindar: if the tank owner was the zamlndar it became
his private property, if it belonged to somebody else then
the zawindar received a salami ranging from 50 to 100
rupees per tank. In Birbhum, "it is the custom, added to
the salamy, for the person to pay immediately 9 years rent
for the lands occupied by the tanks, after which he holds
it rent free". Second, "the tanks are a source of great
profit to the zemindar, from the fish bred in them; and the
produce of Tall (tal, or palm] trees planted on the banks;
and as they are situated on eminences they supply water for
the plantations around them"' 20 . Provision of agricultural
118 WBSA,Proceedings of the Controlling Committee of
Revenue,vol.1,16 March 1771;BRC,IOR P/49/51,14 March 1775.
119 BRC,IOR P/52/36,21 October 1791;emphasis added.
120 BRP,IOR P/71/13,24 August 1789.The tal (palm) trees
gave them an additional income because they were usually
leased to the toddy tappers to manufacture liquor (BR
Misc.,IOR P/89/36,29 October 1790).
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credit and flood control or irrigational duties could not
have been far removed from production, at least in the
hamar or nij-jote lands. Additionally, the clearance of
forests and reclamation of cultivable waste (patitabad)
were rights entrenched with the zaaindars, as were those of
pasturage (gauc1iree or gop aha7) which provided them with
a supplementary income'21.
The sphere in which the zamlrwiars participated
directly in agricultural production was in the cultivation
of their personal lands. It is generally recognized that a
zaml.ndar's income arose from the financial perquisites
sanctioned by the state (nanlcar)'22, but there were other
sources of their financial survival and these have not been
placed in a proper perspective in the existing
historiography of the province. Briefly stated, a zm1n-
dar's income arose from a combination of state sanctioned
perquisites, a plethora of agricultural and non-
agricultural taxes levied from the peasants and artisans,
duties collected from market places and local trade and
from "the profits of neez talooks p123 and their hamy
lands'24 . It is with the latter, the neez-ta11uqa and
khamar, that this section is concerned.
121 In the zm1ndari of Coch Behar,gaucharee was farmed
out to others (BRP,IOR P/71/35,25 November 1790].In Birbhum
access to pasturage was taxed by the landholder at the rate
of 0.063 rupee (1 anna] per cow and 0.125 rupee [2 anna]
per buffalo (BR Misc.,IOR P/89/36,5 July 1790].
122 Nankar was usually rated as 10 per cent of the
assessed revenue,which could be paid either as a separate
deduction from the revenue in cash or as portions of rent-
free lands.I have discussed the importance of nankar in
zamindari incomes in "Aspects of the Agrarian System of
Bengal during the Late Eighteenth Century",M.Phil.
dissertation, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 1980, chapter
1.Nanka.r lands in Jahangirpur (in 1772) were stated at
42,695.70 highas (see Proceedings of the Committee of
Circuit,IOR P/70/15,8 October 1772].
123 BRC,IOR P/49/45,16 March 1774.
124 FR,IOR G/27/1,16 October 1770.
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Historians acknowledge the existence of these lands in
the framework of the zairidari, but they underemphasize
their importance on the grounds that these constituted only
a small portion of the gross cultivated area125 . True as
this may have been in the overall context of agricultural
production, nij-jot and )har lands were certainly
significant both in extent and in terms of their social
importance at the local levels. Estimates of )hamar lands
available suggest that these were substantial. The zm1ridar
of Bishnupur held nearly 21,000 acres as kliamar, that of
Dinajpur occupied 3885 acres and the lands held by the
zm1ridar of Birbhum were 12,887 acres; smaller zm1ridars in
eastern Bengal had personal lands ranging from 750 to 400
acres126 , though in Jahangirpur these khamar lands were a
hefty 23,616 acres' 27 . These lands were given over to the
cultivation of fruits and other products of a superior
quality, which were then sold at the local market places'28
often established by the zamindars themselves (see chapter
1).
Profits from the sale of such produce contributed to
a zamindar's income over and above the customary
perquisites allotted to him by the state 129 . The average
yearly earnings from such lands of the zmrw3ar of Birbhum
constituted 28.97% of his annual income between 1766 and
125 See,B.B.Chaudhuri,1984: 104; R.Ray,1979.
126 WBSA,CCRM,appendix to proceedings,vol.1,3 December
to 10 December 1770,p.32;Ibid,vol.2,13 December to 30
December 1770,p.170;BRC,IOR P/49/40,4 June 1773,p.1981;
WBSA,PCR Dacca,vol 14,dt.28 February 1777;Ibid,28 February
1777.
127 Proceedings of the Committee of Circuit,Dacca,IOR
P/70/15,8 October 1772.
128	 WBSA,CCRM,Appendix	 to
proceedings,vol.1,p.32;BRC, IOR P/49/39,26 March 1773.
129	 BRC,IOR P/49/45,16 March 1774.
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1771'°. In Dinajpur, "the Rajas Profits, exclusive of his
allowances in ready money, arise principally from the Comar
lands and the farms in his hands"; the income from such
lands was estimated at 30,000 rupees a year in 1770, which
was considered "uch s-aller than what most of the [other]
Zemindars enjoy"'31 ; but by 1786 "profits" from these lands
were bringing in 58, 889 rupees a year to the zm1n1ar of
Dinajpur, thereby constituting nearly 14.78 percent of the
Raja's income of 3,98,423.75 rupees in that year' 32 . For
others, such lands contributed between 34.8% and 6.9% of
their gross annual income'".
There were other ways in which these lands were of
importance in the working of the zamlrwlari in Bengal. It
was a universally acknowledged fact that they were held
free from any governmental interference in matters of
assessment'34 . Therefore these were the lands where a zami-
ndar could hope to make improvements without inviting the
financial attentions of the state. The situation seems to
have changed somewhat under the closer interest taken by
the East India Company in zm1ndari affairs, but there is
not enough evidence to say that the privileges enjoyed by
the landholders in their personal lands had been severely
eroded in the second half of the century'35 . Moreover there
were no fixed rules about the division of the produce
'° BRC,IOR P/49/40,4 June 1773.
131 FR,IOR G/27/1,16 October 1770;emphasis added.
132 BRC,IOR P/50/66,7 April 1786.
For estimates see Sinha,1968: 328-45.
134 Even as late as the 1770s these lands were said to
be paying revenue at the original rates established by the
Mughals in 1582 [WBSA,CCRM,30 March to 28 August
l772,appendix to proceedings].
135 For the continuation of such privileges in Burdwan
see BRC,IOR P/49/42,10 December 1773;for Midnapur,see
Ibid,P/51/20,5 February 1773;and for Birbhum,see
Ibid,P/51/20,14 May 1788.
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between the zmin1ar and the cultivator in these lands.
This often resulted in an arbitrary division of the crop by
which the zamfndars raised their share at the expense of
the peasants136 . In terms of appropriation, these were the
lands in which the zaairidars' claim to the surplus was
highest when compared to those arising from the lands
cultivated by the independent peasants'37.
Of greater significance to this discussion is the
organization of production on these khamr or nij-jot
lands. Here we find the zamthdars not only organizing
production but also acting in a fashion was closely
replicated by the jotedars on their lands (discussed in
chapter 4). The zamindars worked their lands by share-
croppers, the basis of which was a combined use of economic
levers and non-economic coercion:the economic mechanism
assumed the form of capital invested, whereas the non-
economic dimension was the use of force. The Amini
CommissIon (1778) noted the widespread prevalence of share-
138
croppers and their use by the zamlndars . In Burdwan, a
zamindar's khamar was "cultivated by the ryotts under
engagement of receiving a share of the crop according to
the sort of land they stipulate... or by taking a share
after gathering in the crop" 139 . In Rangpur, where there
were a multitude of petty zam.thdars, the common practice
was to let a sharecropper (proja, or adhiar) work on the
zamLndar's lands at a third of the produce plus small plots
of land given by the landholders to enable the atmlar to
construct homesteads and to grow some essential food supp-
136	 WBSA,PCR Burdwan,1 March to 29 Dec.1775,29
Dec. 1775.
137 For a similar situation In Mughal north India see
Habib,1963: 141-43.
138 See IOR Home Misc.vol.201,pp.335-401.
'39 WBSA,PCR Burdwan,3 June to 31 July 1776,22 June
1776.
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lements140 . Force often entered into this relationship:
physical confinement and flogging were the landholders'
stock in trade in order to tilt the balance in their favour
in cases of disputed shares141.
The use of force was vital in the economics of the
zamfridari. Discussing the agrarian structure in pre-
industrial west Europe, Robert Brenner suggests that force
was a vital element in the dynamics of income distribution,
because not only did it decide the rent relationship, it
also established the distribution of landed property
between lord and peasant prior to the actual division of
the immediate product of the land between the two 142 . The
actions of Bengal zmindars in the late eighteenth century
do not appear to have differed substantially from their
contemporaries in most of Europe. The full implications of
sharecropping and the kind of exploitation these
cultivators were subjected to will be discussed in chapter
4.
Significantly, the zamthdars of Bengal do not appear
to have used unpaid labour (begar) for production on their
lands. The only recorded case of such labour comes from
Birbhum where under the denomination of sa'ir silpa khana
(tax on artisans), the zamlndar
Could demand the attendance and labour of the
Blacksmiths, Carpenters, Goldsmiths and Florists,
and each artificer of this description when
called was obliged to attend and work for the
space of ten or fifteen days in the year, so that
no one attended twice in the same year, and
assist in the zamindari buildings and other works
receiving only a small daily allowance and diet
money. Such as did not attend from distance or
other cause paid a consideration or fine
agreeable to their circumstances, which money was
140 BRC,IOR P/52/10,20 March 1790.
141 BRP,IOR P/71/33, 13 September 1787.
142 R.Brenner,1988: 16.
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brought to the zemindar's private account143.
The above example shows that unpaid utilization of
labour was not a salient feature of agricultural
production, though the zimntar perhaps was vested with the
right to call in the services of artisans for his domestic
requirements. Some payments, no matter how small, were made
for these services and the artisans had the choice to get
their services commuted by paying a "consideration or
fine". In any case the practice in Birbhum was abolished by
the government in May 1790 which, according to the
collector, "diffused the greatest satisfaction" in the
district' 44 . Customary labour or service claims by the
zamindars were practically absent in the rest of the prov-
ince. For the Company, these zamindars were notorious for
taxing "everything that is carried on a Road or embarked on
a River or purchased in a market or brought in a private
house"' 45, but they were never accused of using corvee
labour for production in their lands.
This absence was in striking contrast to the situation
in the neighbouring province of Bihar where the Company's
officials recorded an apparently widespread use of slave
labour in the cultivation of zamindari lands. In Bihar, the
terms mullazadah and kahar were used to differentiate
between Muslim and Hindu slaves. In either case these
people were "considered in the same light as any other
property & [were] transferable by the owner or [descended]
at his demise to his heirs"; though the practice of selling
and buying of slaves had apparently declined in the
eighteenth century, slaves, for whom slavery had descended
143	 BRC,IOR P/52/14,7 July 1790,and BR Misc.,IOR
P/89/36,5 July 1790;emphasis added.
144 Ibid.
145 
"State of Bengal in 1786: A Report Compiled by
Mr.Beaufoy	 on	 12	 April	 1786"	 in	 IOR,Home
Misc. ,vol.382,p.81.
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through generations, nevertheless remained, and the al-
tamgha (permanent and hereditary) lands of the zafntars
were actually cultivated "by the hands of these slaves who
also (performed] the menial offices of the (z1rwar's]
house"' 46 . The fact that the estimated annual produce from
these al-tamgha lands was worth 8, 45, 150 rupees in the
178Og' must surely indicate the fairly extensive use of
unfree labour in production by the Bihar zaw1rars.
The zamIndars of Bengal organized agricultural
production on their personal lands by striking a specific
social relationship with the peasantry. The use of a
sharecroppers on their )hamar lands was a device to
commercially exploit the small-holding and resource-
constrained cultivators, the details of which will be
examined in chapter 4. Through sharecropping zamiridars
invested capital in agricultural production and attempted
to maximize the appropriation of the surplus, the principal
mechanisms of which were interest rates and the
distribution of the product in their favour (see chapter 4
for details). In essence, sharecropping involved remun-
eration for labour, a notional wage, determined by the
distribution of the agricultural product, the terms of
which were regressive and biased against the cultivator.
Landed proprietors and the economy: the tallurjdars
Data regarding the actual operation of a talluqdari,
its internal management and relations with the peasantry
are scarce, thereby making a detailed study of its
productive significance very difficult. The evidence of the
146 BRC,IOR P/49/46,16 August 1774.
147	 Ibid.,P/50/51,12	 March	 1784;also
ibid. ,P/50/54,Appendix to Consultations.
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growth of this form of landed property (discussed above)
indicates quite forcefully that in both its forms
talluqdari was a product of two specific requirements of
the agrarian economy. It was, at one level, a direct
manifestation of the desire of the xw1ndars, and of the
provincial government, to effect an extension of
cultivation. At another level, it was one way in which the
zRmfndars could get hold of ready cash by selling such
rights. Both suggest that these tallixidars possessed the
finances necessary for the development of agricultural
production. Moreover, a talluqa being a small territorial
unit, and therefore easily manageable, lessened the
administrative workload in a relatively larger zamlndarl
and this was probably another consideration in a zm1radars
willingness to establish talluqas in his territory. In any
case these talluqdars were financially important for the
zamiridars. One reason why the zamindars in eastern Bengal
were violently opposed to all plans of separating azkuri
talluqas from their authority was because such talluqas
were used by them as security to get loans from money-
lenders, and they feared that "when the moneylenders will
see that the talooks are to be separated from us, they will
distress us so much for our loans that life itself will not
be worth holding"148
The most important function of these talluqdars,
especially those held mazkuri, was to organize and oversee
an improvement of cultivation. In Jessore azkurl talluqa
pattas were given to those people "who appear to have done
something in the way of improving their lands"' 49 . In
Birbhum when crops failed, or the peasants deserted owing
to a succession of bad harvests, these talluqdars
reportedly encouraged them to "come back in their season of
148	 BRC,IOR P/52/14,arzi of the za-lndars of
Jalalpur,23 June 1790.
149 Westland,1871: 80;also BRP,IOR P/71/25,24 May 1790.
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cultivation, their lands being granted to them at something
lower than the usual rate [of revenue]"50. The talluqdars
in the zamfndari of Buzurgumedpur often borrowed
"considerable sums of money from the merchants and made
advances to the ryotts" in order to get their lands
cultivated151 . In Jalalpur "the expectation of having the
lands cultivated and the revenues improved and their own
advantages" were three considerations which shaped the
nature of azkuri talluqas as "possessors of hereditary
properties"' 52 . It is interesting to note that while
zamthdars in the late eighteenth century universally
pleaded their inability to encourage agricultural
production because of largely fictitious financial
constraints, the talluqdars were specifically required to
improve and extend cultivation as one of their primary
duties. These talluqdars uniformly claimed that they "spend
a great effort in improving their lands & in extending
cultivation at a great expense, in advancing money to the
Ryotts to clear the lands for cultivation and in devoting
their time and attention to superintend & direct the
improvement of them"' 53 . In the 24-Parganas, the talluqdars
were said to be regularly advancing "Tuccavy to their
Ryotts, to enable them to commence and continue the
Cultivation of the current year, [re]payable around the
month of Poos [December-January]"' 54 , i.e., after the major
aman (winter) harvest.
In this respect a talluqdari perhaps represented an
enterprise with close links with the agrarian economy,
perhaps a lot closer than the zamindars. The inadequacy of
150 WBSA,PCR Burdwan,vol.5,9 January 1776.
151 WBSA,PCR Murshidabad,vol.23,21 January 1779.
152 BRC,IOR P/52/14,7 June 1790.
'" WBSA,CCRM,vol.8,30 December 1771.
'	 BRP,IOR P/72/6,1 August 1792.
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evidence does not allow us to reconstruct the exact
relationship between them and the cultivators. The
impression that we get from contemporary accounts is that
the peasants in the tall uqas were treated more leniently
than their counterparts in a zafndar1. According to
Richard Becher:
The Tenants of Talouks are possessed of so many
indulgences & taxed with such evident partiality &
tenderness in proportion to the rest, that the Talouks
generally swarm with inhabitants, while other parts
are deserted. In addition to the natural desire of
changing from a worse to a better condition, entice-
ments are frequently employed by the Taloukdars to
augment the concourse to their lands'55.
Becher's statement is also supported by the Amini Report
which says:
A Talook comprehends only a few villages, or a small
tract of ground, and the possessor is able to attend
to the cultivation of every part of it. It improves
with his care; the rents of it increase & it becomes
more populous & valuable than those parts of the
District which remain under the management of the
Zemindar or his of ficers'56.
Such descriptions suggesting that the cultivators
enjoyed greater security in talluqas than elsewhere is also
substantiated by an account of ta11uqdar-raiyat relations
in Dhaka. This account states that peasants in a talluqa
enjoyed greater security, this being seen in the fact that
"they often remain in the same spot, son after father,
cultivating the same piece of land" owing to:
The perfect agreement between them and the
talookdar. The Ryott being the immediate
cultivator of the land, the talookdar's interest
'" SCC,IOR P/A/9,16 August 1769.
156	 IOR,Home Misc.,vol.206,p.347.
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is intimately connected with his, since if he is
oppressed he will immediately desert. (Hence] the
talookdar... is most concerned in the cultivation
(sic] of them (and] is under a necessity of
permitting him to enjoy his small right'57.
Nevertheless, and despite these descriptions, there is
no hard evidence to show that the position of the peasantry
actually improved in these talluqas. Not all talluqdars
actually lived up to the Company's dream of finding a
coterie of benevolent landed proprietors in Bengal in the
run-up to the Permanent Settlement. Even in the 24-Parganas
where some talluqdars provided taqavi to fund the winter
harvest (see above), they were amply matched by those who
were "not guided by a similar liberal principle" and from
whose territories "the Ryotts actually fled, ... or were
obliged to borrow money at exorbitant interest payable
from the produce of the first crop" 158 . Taqavi was not
always available as "the talookdars, from their extreme
poverty can afford the Ryotts no assistance to the
improvement or extension of their cultivation"'59.
Bankruptcies were common among talluqdars as they were
among the zamindars. Talluqas could "daily go to ruin and
(talluqdars] not be able to pay malguzarry and cultivate
them" 160 , at which point they were sold, often at largely
deflated prices, a process in which the zaindar had the
first right of rejection. Impoverished talluqdars in
pargana Laskarpur, "immediately abscond when pressed for
rents" 161 , and in Dhaka they were often forced to
"relinquish their lands by Istuffa (istifa or resignation]
157 WBSA,PCR Dacca,vol.16,21 July 1777.
158 BRP,IOR P/72/6,1 August 1792.
159 BRC,IOR P/51/4,29 January 1787.
160 WBSA,PCR Murshidabad,vol.23,17 February 1780.
161 WBSA,PCR Murshidabad,vol.6,24 July 1775.
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from a total inability to discharge their rents""2, in
which case these ta11ixas naturally reverted to the
z.nvlridar who usually sold them again163 . Thus the
possibilities of peasants actually improving their
positions in these talluqas, or the extent to which these
proprietors could provide the cultivators with a way out
from the zamiridars exploitative control, appears remote.
It is perhaps significant that the report from Dhaka (cited
above) which suggests that talluqdars and peasants operated
on a "perfect agreement" also says that these peasants "can
be scarce considered in any other light than as day
labourers, earning little more than is necessary for the
maintenance of themselves and (their] families""4.
La-Itharafl and the agrarian economy
Proprietors of la-lcharaji lands were also closely
associated with the agrarian economy for, as has been
discussed, their origins and future existence (especially
for those held as baz-i-zamln) depended almost exclusively
on their capacity to extend cultivation. Baz-i-zmn lands
initially comprised both revenue paying cultivated (liasil
or malguzari) and waste (patit) lands"5 . In pargana
Muhammadshahi 12,516.30 bigha were given as baz-i-zmfn
between 1770 and 1789; of these 2877.10 bighas comprised
162 BRC,IOR P/50/10,10 July 1778.
163 BRP,IOR P/71/26,4 June 1790.
164 WBSA,PCR,Dacca,vol.16,21 July 1777.
165 In Bengal waste lands denoted "land that has not
been in cultivation for the last four or five years"
(BRC,IOR P/52/9,7 May 1790].Since chakeran zmIn was given
to officials in lieu of pay,it is quite likely that these
lands were situated mostly in cultivated areas.
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hasil lands while the rest (9639.20 bighas) were situated
in patit lands"6 . Of 1738.04 bfghas of baz-i-z1n granted
in pargana Mahisadal in 1790, 930.48 bighas were
distributed in hasil, and the remaining 807.56 bighas were
located in patit lands167 . Such data do indicate the close
connection between la-kharaji and agricultural production.
In Syihet, for instance, "the property of these waste
lands" was fixed on the grantee and the "quantity [of waste
land] contained in each pergunnah (was] divided among the
several parties in the same proportion as they enjoy the
cultivated land": a practice which was traditionally recog-
nized as one of the best means of inducing an extension of
cultivation'68.
The greatest advantage enjoyed by la-kharaji property
was that it did not have to pay any revenue or taxes either
to the state or to the local zm1r1ar "however it may be
cultivated""9 . This provided the proprietors with extra
funds to invest in extending the land under cultivation.
Moreover, these lands were mostly given to individuals
"independent of any partnership" in order to prevent
disputes or fragmentation'7° of the type which plagued the
zamindars and the talluqdars. A la-kharaji was also
exempted from defraying "any charge for the repair of Bunds
(embankments] and other publick (sic] works necessary for
their preservation"'71 , which meant that overheads were
substantially reduced. The Company did not look upon the
holders of such lands as being conducive to an efficient
revenue administration, but the continuation of such
166 BRP,IOR P/71/13,27 August 1789.
167 BRC,IOR P/52/21,1 December 1790.
" BRC,IOR P/50/24,28 March 1780.
169 BRP,IOR P/71/15,5 October 1789.
170 BRC,IOR P/50/24,28 March 1780.
'' BRP,IOR P/70/24,6 February 1787.
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financial privileges despite the state's disapproval would
appear to be in contravention to its attempt to enforce
rigorous collections of revenue. This fact is striking and
must therefore indicate the continuing importance of such
properties in the agrarian milieu of the late eighteenth
century.
There is unfortunately no evidence to show the
patterns of cultivation or the nature of labour use on
these lands. Evidence from Muhammadshahi shows that 12,
516.30 bighas were given as baz-i-z.imIn between 1765 and
1789; of these 9639.15 bighas were patit and 2877.15 were
hash lands. The hasil lands were cultivated in the
following fashion172:













The absence of comparative data from other areas does
not allow generalizations regarding the economic content of
these la-kharaji lands, but it would perhaps be true to say
that these lands, and the proprietors, had a significant
role in the agrarian economy. Crops like mulberry and
lentils were surely cultivated for commerce; so were rice
and the other "inferior crops". Given the rising demand for
food in our period (see chapter 1) it is inconceivable that
the output of rice and paddy from these lands was designed
for a purpose other than sale. The fact that baz-i-zin
holders were also instrumental in establishing a whole
172 BRP,IOR P/71/13,27 August 1789.
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range of markets, from ganjs to hats, "solely for their own
prof it"'73 must surely indicate that these people combined
a number of functions which were significant in furthering
the pace of commercialization.
As a composite social group possessing substantial
resources, these people were crucial to the local
economies. The role of the chakeran zamln holders was
particularly important in generating demand for rural
produce and in speeding the processes of commercial
exchange. They were given revenue from land in lieu of
income. These lands were large, so were the resources. They
consumed, which meant that "many of the poorer classes
subsisted by providing them with food, clothing and
furniture"174.
Their influence on agricultural production was also
significant. Baz-i-zmfn holders were entrusted with the
task of extending the land under cultivation on extremely
lucrative financial terms. After all no concession could be
more lucrative than the freedom from taxation in the late
eighteenth century. Given this privilege, it is entirely
feasible that their lands were cultivated more efficiently
than normal raiyati or even zam.thdari lands. At least John
Shore thought that this indeed was the case which:
Was effected by withdrawing the Ryotts from the
Revenue Lands, and inducing them to settle on the
Bazee Zemin, which the Proprietors can afford to rent
to them on easier terms then a [revenue] Farmer or
Zemindar who pay an assessment for the lands held by
(them]'".
Such indeed was the case in Muhammadshahi where:
173 BRC,IOR P/52/9,9 April 1790 for Burdwan;ibid.,28
April 1790 and 8 April 1790 for Mymensing and Jessore
respectively.
Tennant, Indian Recreations,1,p.264.
175 BRC,IOR P/50/40,3 May 1782.
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The Bazee Zemin is so extensive that the
possessors of it are competitors with Government
for the Ryotts; and as they enjoy the Rents of
their lands without participation.., they can
afford to let them at a considerable reduced rate
[of revenue]; and those [lands] of Government
[i.e. a1guzari] are consequently deserted, while
theirs are stocked with numerous inhabitants'76.
In Birbhum some peasants from aalguzari lands would move to
baz-i-zmfn as:
They are encouraged to do so from the low terms
which the possessors of these places grant to
Ryotts..., which they can afford as the rents
arising from the increase in the cultivation of
their lands is clear profit to them, and it is
certainly a great inducement for a Ryott to
desert and cultivate these grounds'77.
This report also says that the cultivators of baz-i-
zamln paid 12 annas (0.75 rupee) per higha to the holder in
comparison to "a rupee and a half for malguzarry lands". In
Birbhum such lands totalled 1,09,861.40 highas in 1770 (see
table 3.1 above) which means that the "clear profit" from
cultivation for these proprietors was at the very least in
the range of 82,396.05 rupees per annum in our period.
176 BRP,IOR P/70/24,9 October 1786.
BRC,IOR P/49/54,11 July 1775.
Chapter 4
The Peasantry in Late Eighteenth Century Bengal
Peasants constituted the keystone of Bengal's agrarian
life, but their history in the late eighteenth century is
yet to be comprehensively analyzed. Some scholars who have
ostensibly sought to study the structure of peasant
society have succeeded only in describing the various
peasant rights and categories, catalogued by the revenue
officials of the Company on the eve of the Permanent
Settlement'. Others have attempted to demonstrate the
existence of a "rich" peasant "class" lording over the
zamindars on the one hand and a mass of low-caste landless
peasants on the other. They have additionally attempted to
show the creation, in our period, of a "class" of peasants
who were subsequently to become widespread in Bengal under
the generic appellation of jot edars. These jot edars are
variously described as "the village oligarchy" and/or the
"village landlords" of the eighteenth century, and their
origins are located their origins in the economic impact of
the Company's revenue regime and the agrarian dislocation
caused by the disastrous famine of 1769/702. This
interpretation is interesting but difficult to accept, at
least for the eighteenth century, the reasons for which I
will discuss subsequently.
If Ray and Ray have erred on the side of
overstatements, B.B.Chaudhuri has discussed the changing
1 N.K.Sinha,1968; S.Islam,1979.
2 Ray and Ray,1975; R Ray, 1979
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context of agrarian relations in post-1765 Bengal without
addressing himself to the specifics of the province's
peasant society, or analyzing the nature of stratification,
if any, in it3 . Moreover, Chaudhuri has very little to say
on the state of the peasants as a distinct social category
in the agrarian system. His focus is therefore limited to
landed property which (as pointed out in chapter 1)
represents the dominant trend in Bengal's historiography
where revenue history is equated with econoiic history.
Additionally, the agrarian developments in the period
between 1765 to 1793 have been insufficiently studied by
Chaudhuri since almost the entire range of his evidence
pertains to the nineteenth century. Elsewhere, where
Chaudhuri discusses the connections between control over
production and agrarian power over the long-term (1757-
l947), we are placed in a similar difficulty, viz., that
of seeing the developments in the nineteenth century in
order to understand those in the eighteenth. Though
Chaudhuri disagrees with Ray and Ray on the domination of
the so-called jot edars in rural society before the late
nineteenth century, he does not provide us with a viable
alternative analysis of peasant stratification in our
period.
There is therefore an urgent need to reconstruct the
major features of Bengal's peasant society in the
eighteenth century. This chapter aims to do that in order
(a) to establish the social position of different peasant
rights and categories which constituted the core of
agrarian Bengal, and (b) to see whether the label "rich"
peasant "class" has any relevance for the kind of strati-.
fication specific to Bengal in the late eighteenth century.
See B.B.Chaudhurj,1983: 86 ff. and 295-301.
B.B.Chaudhuri, 1984.
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Peasants in late eighteenth century Bengal:	 a
historiograDhical overview
The revenue records of the East India Company are full
of terms like "ryott", "reiatt" and "ruatt" which, in
continuation of the Mughal tradition, were generically used
to denote the status of an individual as a cultivator and
a revenue-payer. These terms were essentially corrupted
usages of the Persian term raiyat which, in Bengal, meant
"the immediate occupant of the soil, whether... a
proprietor or tenant" who tilled the land and paid a
"rent". These raiyats were "a numerous & inferior class of
people, who (held] and cultivate(d] small spots of land on
their own account"5.
Agricultural production was overwhelmingly organized
on small peasant farms which were operated by individual
peasant families depending on their domestic labour. It was
generally accepted that a plough being worked by a pair of
draught animals was capable of cultivating between 15
highas (5 acres) 6 and a maximum of 25 bighas (8 acres)7.
The extent cultivable by a plough obviously depended on the
nature of the soil. Where the soil was hard the land
cultivated by a plough and a pair of bullocks was less.
Thus in pargana Swaruppur "the usual quantity of land
cultivated by one plough requiring two oxen, a man and a
boy may be fairly computed on an average of 8 bighas (2.6
acres)..." 8
Scanty area statistics for the eighteenth century make
it difficult to present statistical profiles of peasant
Final Report of the Amini Commission,1778,IOR Home
Misc.,vol.206,pp.345-46; Brit.Mus.,Add.Ms.,29086.
6 Colebrooke, Remarks, p.64.
' James Grant in FR 2, p.276.
8	 J.H.Harrington to Council of Revenue,BRC,IOR
P/52/10,12 May 1790
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holdings for the entire province. In Dinajpur there were
peasants who held up to 165 bigha (55 acres) of land, but
such landholdings were generally not replicated elsewhere9.
Peasants having 7 to 10 acres of land were categorized as
the "influential ryott" in eastern Bengal'° whereas in
western Bengal a peasant could be classified as such with
lands ranging from 20 to 10 bighas (6.6 to 3.3 acres),
depending on the geographical location of the individual's
holding and its commercial importance' 1 . Thus in Midnapur,
"influential ryotts" were those who held 20 bighas or more.
In contrast were their compatriots in villages around the
city of Murshidabad (a centre of urban consumption and the
capital of the province before 1757), who could still be
influential and relatively affluent with 10 bighas (3.3
acres) of land at their disposal. It must however be
stressed that peasants having 10 bighas or less were the
poorer peasants (the "inferior ryott") in the rest of the
province. The situation in Dinajpur was therefore unique
and does not reflect the state of peasant holdings at the
provincial level. The reasons why this was so will be
analyzed later in this chapter.
Positioned below these "influential ryotts" were those
peasants who are identif led in our sources as the "poorer"
or the "inferior class" of raiyats. They held less than 5
acres of land, possessed only a pair of bullocks and a
single plough, cultivated with the use of their family
A peasant category called principal farmers' by
Buchanan-Hamilton held between 60 and 165 highas of land in
Dinajpur in the early nineteenth century and they
constituted about 6 percent of the cultivating population
(Martin,1976,vol.3: 906]
'° For Rangpur,(IOR,BRC P/52/10,20 March 1790] and for
Jessore [BRC,IOR P/51/22,23 July 1788,p.131;also
W.W.Hunter, 1894,vol.1: 52]. Interestingly, a person holding
10 acres in Dinajpur was categorized as a "poor farmer" in
DinaJ pur.
11	 WBSA,PCR:Burdwan,vol.1,6 June 1774; IOR,BRC
P/51/32, 4 February 1789.
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labour alone and had no reserve stocks to tide over even
one season of scarcity' 2 . These comprised 80 percent of the
rural population in the villages of pargana Swarooppur
surveyed in 1790 by the Company"s revenue off icials13 . They
formed nearly 70 percent of the cultivating population of
Dinajpur in the beginning of the nineteenth century14.
J.H.Paterson, commissioner at Commilla, was convinced that
"this class of ryotts are by far the most numerous", 15 and
in Rangpur even those peasants who had not incurred major
debts had practically no reserves "even of a stock
sufficient for their subsistence..."16.
There is another social group whose existence in the
eighteenth century needs to be explained. These were the
sharecroppers (the hargadar or the adhiar) whose existence
is relatively well documented in our period (see below).
The existence of a group of people providing their labour
to cultivate another's land for a share in the produce may
at first glance appear paradoxical in a society where land
was so easily available. Yet examples of sharecroppers
being viciously exploited by zmIndars, merchants and
revenue-farmers (ijaradars and qutqul.nadar) on zamndari
lands are numerous, and this needs an explanation. It is
also necessary to examine the historical validity of the
view which identifies sharecroppers as the "untouchable
landless groups" working the lands of a "rich" peasant
"class"'7 . It is perhaps extremely significant that in the
extensive zamindari of Burdwan, the village headman
12 Datta,1986: 391-94.
13 BRC,IOR P/57/50,from J.Harrington to Council,20
March l790,pp.842-46.
14 Buchanan-Hamilton, 1833.
15 BRC,IOR P/51/40,3 April 1789.
16	 Francis	 Buchanan,"Account	 of
Ronggoppur",IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75, volume.3,book 4.
17 Ray and Ray,1975: 84; Ray,1979: 52.
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was sufficiently happy to limit his activities
to giving periodic agricultural loans to the peasants in
need "to purchase implements of husbandry and for their
immediate subsistence" 19 , but it was the zaImar who used
sharecroppers (sanjhadars) to cultivate his personal
(Irhamar) lands on terms which were highly oppressive20.
Rural inequalities in land distribution and the need felt
by the richer peasantry to reduce supervision costs21 may
not be adequate in explaining the prevalence of a sharecr-
opping peasantry in a situation of land abundance ( as in
eighteenth century Bengal). Their existence in our period
perhaps becomes explicable only where persons wanting to
use them had more land than could be cultivated by family
labour alone, or where merchants required lands to be cul-
tivated for purposes of trade. In Bengal the former
occurred in the case of the zamindars and the jotedars, but
the latter (i.e. merchants getting lands cultivated for
trade) does not seem to have developed to an extensive
degree. Merchants created separate instruments for
exploiting the small-peasants. This I discuss in Chapter 6.
The other peasant group which requires detailed
analysis is the jotedar. Discussions of the jot edari in
Bengal centre around the extent to which it was a specific
peasant relation of production and rural power. These are
concerned also with analyzing the connection between the
jotedars and the evolution of a type of tenurial arrange-
ment which subsequently became most prevalent all over
The role of the mandal occupies a central position
in Ray's [1979,chapter 2] analysis of the so-called
village oligarchy'.
'9 WBSA,PCR Burdwan,vol 18,17 January 1777.
20 Ibid;also BR?, IOR P/72/4,6 July 1792.
21 Rashid Pertev (1986: 46-47] explains sharecropping
as a device adopted by the richer peasantry to cut costs of
supervision in a situation dominated by small land holdings
and rural inequalities in land distribution.
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eastern India viz., the sharecropping (bargadari) system.
The term jotedar has been used to express social relations
ranging from kulak-landlordism22 to a "masterserf
relationship" between peasants themselves". The jotedars
have been treated as a social group "synonymous with the
village landlord" 24 . The specific class nature of the jote-
dan in the nineteenth century (when it apparently became
widespread) is beyond the scope of this chapter, but (as
will be discussed below) it was far from either of the two
classifications (i.e kulak-landlord or village landlord) in
the eighteenth. Ray's attempt to restate his thesis 25 on
the basis of the descriptions of rural stratification
provided by Colebrooke, Sir John Shore (discussed below)
and Buchanan-Hamilton's descriptions of the districts of
Dinajpur and Rangpur circa 180726, seems to equate the
existence of a rudimentary form of differentiation within
the peasantry with the jotedars. With the possible except-
ion of Buchanan-Hamilton 27 , all other contemporary comme-
ntators on agrarian matters almost invariably referred to
the "influential ryotts" or to the "superior ryotts", the
social implications of these strata I will discuss shortly.
22 A.Ghosh and K.Dutt, 1977.
23 Ray and Ray, 1975.
24 Ray,1979: 54.
25 Rajat Ray, 1988.
26	 Also	 Buchanan,	 "Account	 of	 Ronggo-
ppur", IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75.
27 Even Buchanan-Hamilton's descriptions of tenurial
arrangements in the districts of Dinajpur and Rangpur circa
1808 do not refer to jotedars as a specific term apparently
in widespread prevalence.For Dinajpur,the term used is
"principal farmers" to describe agriculturists who held
more than more than 55 acres [165 bighaJ of land,possessed
capital assets ranging from 5000 to 20000 rupees and
cultivated with the use of sharecroppers.In the case of
Rangpur,he describes a variety of such tenures without once
using the term jotedar (see "Account of Ronggopur",
vol.2,Book 4,IOL Ms.Eur.D 75,ff.102-104,ll1-113].
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The definition of the Jotedar as a kulak-landlord or
even as a village landlord is difficult to sustain before
the nineteenth century. The term landlord implies that
these jotedars sned the lands they cultivated. This would
be untrue, even as an implication. The jotedars took lands
on long-term leases from the zam.thdars and then had them
cultivated either by contracting, on a sharecropping basis,
with the "ryots of the villages most contiguous for their
cultivation" 28 or by recalling an "absconding ryott or
settling a deserter from some other place to cultivate for
his benefit" 29 . Established peasant rights in the jotes
were recognized by a set of customary codes, the workings
of which will be examined subsequently. The use of the term
"kulak" to describe the jotedars is also misleading. In the
classical sense a "kulak" was a semi-capitalist or a small
capitalist farmer in the Russian countryside 30. As
Bernstein points out a "kulak" is an "all-round agent of
the extension of commodity relations"; a "kulak" combines
a number of economic functions: he is a commercial farmer
who employs labour power, rents out the necessary means of
production, provides local "merchant's and money-lending
capital" and invests in trade and small-scale processing
and manufacturing enterprises 31 . Ray's model seeks to find
these features in the jotedarl of eighteenth century
Bengal: a model which, I propose, is not substantiated by
the available historical evidence
The other concern in discussions of jot edari is the
question of timing its dominance in rural society. While
Chaudhuri sees such jot edars as an established fact in
28 This prevailed in Burdwan [BRC,IOR P/51/21,16 July
1788].
29	 This was the situation in Purnea,see BRP,IOR
P/71/28,7 July 1790.
30 Terry Cox, 1984: 48.
31 Henry Bernstein,1979: 43;emphasis added.
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rural Bengal only after 185932, others tend to push the
timing further into the century, even as late as 1885, in
the midst of a growing agricultural depression in the
province33 . One point about the emergence of these jotedars
seems to be clear:their increasing dominance is seen to be
closely connected with a growing pressure on land, rising
food prices detrimental to the cultivators, a noticeable
shift towards cultivating lands of marginal productivity
and increased sale and transfer of peasant lands, often as
a result of distress sales34 . In other words the rise of
the jotedar is linked, not with the expansion of cultivated
land, as in the late eighteenth century, but with a
noticeable halt in the process of reclamation and the onset
of an economic recession. Regarding the geographical spread
of this tenure Chaudhuri tends to view its prevalence in
those regions where "a few resourceful persons organized
large-scale reclamation", thereby making it an all-Bengal
phenomenon35 , whereas Bose sees it mainly limited to the
northern parts of the province 36; in either case jotedari
is not seen as a major production/power relation before the
mid-nineteenth century. In this chapter the nature of the
jot edari in the late eighteenth century will receive
detailed scrutiny.
While opinions differ on the nature of the jot edari
before the late nineteenth century, there is a strong
consensus among historians about the nature and role of
another peasant right, that of the pahikashta (non-
resident) raiyat after the famine of 1769/70. It is
32 B.B.Chaudhuri,1984: 119.









generally accepted in existing historiography that the
famine of 1769/70 fundamentally altered the existing
structure of peasant society and strengthened the
previously nascent position of a rich peasant strata. For
instance, N.K.Siriha saw in the famine a fundamental rupture
of "the old social life" in rural Bengal. Depopulation
meant that lands fell out of cultivation which in turn
fostered a competition for labour among the landlords. In
this situation, the relative advantages shifted in favour
of the non-resident (pahikashta) cultivator at the expense
of the surviving resident (khudkashta) peasant who was
further ruined by the additional impositions (najai) which
were levied by the landlords in order to recoup their
losses suffered during the famine". Sirtha's view regarding
the post-famine situation closely follows those developed
by W.W.Hunter who argued that agricultural recovery was
henceforth only possible by attracting the labour of the
"vagrant peasants" (those who had been uprooted from their
lands) by offering them under-rated leases of land".
Ratnalekha Ray has provided an interesting
interpretation of the post-1770 situation. She disagrees
with Hunter and Sinha that the rise of a rich tenantry can
be simply looked at in terms of a favourable land-labour
ratio after the famine. For Ray the significance of the
famine was situated in the fact that it "gave splendid
opportunities to villagers with capital to increase their
holdings by employing their capital to bring waste lands
under their cultivation"; this kind of capital could not
have come from merchants and bankers, or from the
"territorial magnates" for "they were in no position to
engage in the enterprise of reclaiming waste, for it needed
personal and on-the-spot supervision"; agricultural
reclamation was therefore the task "of a class of rich




violent class of villagers who had compelled the zainindars
to give them under-rated tenancies so as to employ their
capital in clearing the waste lands in their own or
neighbouring villages". These were pahfkashta only in name
but represented the combination of the village headman
(nda1) with some rich and turbulent peasant groups 39 . It
is therefore necessary to test the validity of these views
and to examine the nature of the pahlkashta cultivator
after the famine.
The pahikashta peasant after 1770: a rich peasant class?
The evidence regarding the relationship between the
najai tax and the further debilitation of the khudkashta
peasants after 1769/70 is less clear than Sinha and
Chaudhuri have suggested. Undoubtedly the tax was
oppressive, being:
An assessment upon the actual
inhabitants of every Inferior
Description of the Lands; to make up
for the loss sustained in the rents of
their neighbours, who are either dead
or have fled the country; it is a kind
of Security against Desertion, by
making the inhabitants thus mutually
responsible for each other40.
Hastings also suggests that this tax was not a post-
famine phenomenon, since it was "authorized by the antient
[sic] and general usage of the country"; he also says that
this tax was not oppressive in "ordinary cases, and while
Ray,1979: 56-57.
° Warren Hastings,"The State of Bengal in 1784",in
GW.Forrest (ed.),1910: 265.
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the lands were in a state of cultivation" 41 . The existence
of this tax and its apparent regressiveness after the
famine would make the supposed advantage of the "vagrant"
or the pahikashta peasant very difficult to envisage, if
only for the fact that these groups were themselves
resident peasants in some other area and the very logic of
the najai tax was intended to restrict the scale of
migration, or desertion, of precisely such peasants even
under normal circumstances. Under a famine, when the
pressure to restrain existing labour was at its greatest,
the use of the najai operated as the greatest deterrent on
the movement of all categories of peasants since they were
now made "mutually responsible for each other"; and the
intrinsic bias of such a tax was such that it could not
possibly have left any particular category out of its
clutches.
Moreover, najai does not appear to have been levied
with the same effectiveness all over the province.
Interestingly, this tax does not figure in the post-famine
peasant leases (pattas) in Rajshahi, Jessore and Laskar-
pur42, even though they had suffered in varying degrees
during the famine. Therefore, the influence of the najai on
causing greater immiserizatlon of the surviving peasantry
cannot be established as an ascertained fact. Additionally,
the scale of peasant desertion in the districts worst
affected by the famine (see chapter 2) would certainly
indicate that this tax was unable to stop peasants from
fleeing when the pressures on them became unbearable.
The central issue in reconstructing the impact of the
famine of 1769/70 is the state of the surviving peasantry.
Essential to the consensual historiography of that event
41 Ibid.
42 For the absence of najai in the listed taxes of
peasant pattas after the famine in Rajshahi see IOR,Home
Misc. ,vol.122,pp.767-68;in Jessore,see Ibid.,765-66;and in
Laskarpur see CCR,IOR P/67/57,23 June 1773.
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are three elements (a) that the famine had decimated ten
million, or one-third, of Bengal"s population, (b) the
ensuing demand for labour meant that those who survived
were in a position to bargain for better terms and (c)
recovery from the famine required immense amounts of
capital which was available, not from the local landed-.
proprietors and merchants, but from a class of rich
peasants. The discussion (in chapter 2) has shown that the
figures of famine-mortality are greatly exaggerated. The
temporal and spatial sweep of that famine at best allows a
death-toll of 2 million people. This fact must therefore
place serious doubts on the extent to which there was a
real shortage of labour on a provincial scale.
There is nevertheless some evidence to show that there
was a certain movement towards paliikashta cultivation after
the famine. Such peasants could be seen moving from one
talluqa to another in Rangpur obviously in search of a
better financial deal43 . In Rajshahi, the use of pahlkashta
peasants in zaroJ.ndari lands was being actively encouraged
by the state on grounds that such strategies would
"increase industry and population by every possible
encouragement and indulgence" 44 . The fact that these
peasants also enjoyed a slightly better financial position
than the resident ones , at least in Eastern Bengal, is
borne out from table 4 below which shows the comparative
assessment of revenue (jama) on the khikashta and
pahikashta peasants in the zam1iwari of Laskarpur between
1770/71 and 1772/73.
BDR.Rangpur,vol.1,23 June 1770.




Jama of khtJJcashta and pahikashta cultivators in Laskarpur.
1770/71 end 1772/73 (rupees per bipha)
1770/71	 1771/72	 1772/73
Khudkashta jam.a	 4.69	 5.94	 7.59
PaMkashta jama	 4.51	 5.75	 7.36
Source:CCR, IOR P/67/57, 9 July 1773
Table 4 does show that after the famine the pahikashta
cultivators were relatively better of f, but only marginally
so; but this table also shows that these peasants were not
free from subsequent increases made to the jama and this
raises several questions about the existing consensus among
historians regarding such cultivators after the famine. The
common understanding that these pahikashtas were at a
greater advantage after 1770, therefore, no longer appears
feasible, and this is so for a number of reasons.
First, it is not at all clear whether the differential
rates of assessment which supposedly made the pahlkashta
right attractive to the "vagrant" peasant actually
prevailed all over Bengal. Unfortunately, not much is known
about this right in the immediate aftermath of the famine,
but subsequent notices in the sources suggest that this
advantage may not have been as universal as is believed.
The pahikashta raiyat in Burdwan and Birbhum appear to have
enjoyed such privileges45 , but in Murshidabad the position
was absolutely different. Here the term khw5kashta was used
to designate those peasants who cultivated "without a patta
and paid below official rates [of revenue]", and the
zamlndars often had to enforce his traditionally sanctioned
See BRC,IOR P/51/21,20 May 1788 for Burdwan,and
BRP,IOR P/71/24,15 April 1790 for Birbhum.
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right (raj-u1-u1k) to coerce them to pay "the full rates",
or to settle pahikashta on other lands since they not only
paid these "full rates", but also agreed to fulfil whatever
rasad (increases in assessment) which the zaalndar chose to
introduce46 . In Nadia, lands which had fallen out of
cultivation (lok cthan-jote) were "taken possession of
indiscriminately.., by Ryotts of almost every denomination
at the commencement of cultivation" 47 . Obviously, the
pahlkashta were given no advantages there. In Dinajpur, the
pahikashta cultivators were subject to a "double claim",
those from the zamlndar where they held khukashtkar1
rights, and those imposed by the zamindars in their
pahikashta lands; these peasants, therefore, "are seldom
able, or at least willing to pay both", and in matters of
dispute the zamndars in their original villages "have
preference"48.
Moreover, the evidence from Burdwan suggests that the
position of the pahikashta cultivators appear to have
undergone a fairly substantial change between the 1770s and
the 1780s. In the late 1780s these peasants in Burdwan were
considered "the Ryotts of a Superior Rank that neither pay
rent for their dwelling house, nor do they pay so high a
revenue for their lands as the khudkasht" 49 , but in the
mid-1770s they were those who were merely "exempted from
some of the abwabs or additional taxes to which the
Khudkasht are subject"; nor could the non-resident
cultivator move about at will. Like the kln,ikashta, he was
subject to zamindar.i imposed restrictions on peasant
mobility; the only exception was made in the case of those
peasants who had a joteiccha patta (cultivating at will)
46 BRP,IOR P/70/22,21 December 1786.
° Brit.Mus.,Add.Ms,29076,f.3.
WBSA,PCR,Dinajpur,vol.8,17 June 1777.
BRC,IOR P/51/21,16 July 1788.
188
which allowed the peasant "the liberty to relinquish his
ground when he chuses (sic]", and this patta was also
available to the khudkashta cultivator50. It was also a
practice in the l770s for small revenue farmers
(qutq"fnadars) to sub-divide their farms "in small portions
to ryautts [sic] who are generally inhahitants of the
they fara51 , and who thus become In a	 perpetual
proprietors"52.
The second reason for doubting the ubiquity of the
pahikashta right and also its connections with the creation
of a "class" of rich peasants comes from the district of
Birbhum where the thrust of reclamation and of settling
cultivators on deserted lands was guided by a range of
customary codes and regulations which actually favoured the
resident cultivator, even when they had deserted. This
fact is revealed in two such regulations:
1. A deserted ryott on his return shall
be entitled to his lands again, & if
he declines to reengage for the whole,
he shall be entitled to such parts as
he will engage to cultivate at an
adequate jumxnah provided that he takes
a proportion of the bad land with the
good, if any come under the first
denomination.
2. If the lands of a deserted Ryot
having been divided between established
Ryots holding & cultivating other lands
and new Ryots, and should a contest
subsequently arise for the possession
of the whole of the deserted Ryots
land, then the established Ryots
cultivating such lands shall have
preference
° WBSA,PCR Burdwan,vol.l,20 June 1774.
' This was the distinctive feature of khudicashta
cultivation.
52	 WBSA,PCR,Burdwan, vol.15,22 June l776;emphasis
added.
BRP,IOR P/70/41,18 January 1788;emphasis added.
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Ray's suggestion that the pah1ksbta cultivators were
mostly the rich peasants in disguise who used the famine to
usurp the surplus land that was suddenly thrown up
erroneously assumes that all such lands were equally
productive. Quite often the most productive lands were held
by the zamlndars as their personal (nij-jote or khr)
holdings which were extensively cultivated by the use of
sharecroppers54. The distribution of the rest of the
village lands was determined as follows:
In each village are lands of the first,
second, third and fourth sorts. At the
time of the cultivation, the Ryotts
examine the sort of land, agree to a
jummah and take out a pottah. The rates
of the first sort are the largest, of
the second less. This has always been
the custom of the Province55.
The evidence regarding the modes of reclamation in
Birbhum (cited above) also suggests that reclaimers, or
returning peasants, were expected to take "bad" (i.e. less
productive) lands with the "good". It is perhaps more
reasonable to suggest that the extension of pahlkashta
rights after the famine was a device framed by the
zaraindars to improve the state of cultivation by allowing
peasants to have access to lands of varying productivity;
and those who accepted such rights were either the
displaced poor56
 from other districts looking for less
' Datta,1989: 87-89.
" WBSA,PCR Burdwan,vol.15,22 June 1776.
56	 It is perhaps significant that pahiJcashta
cultivators in Dinajpur were used primarily on lands
producing horo rice which was an inferior and intermediate
crop produced between the two of the major (the winter and
spring) harvests (WBSA,PCR,Dinajpur,vol.8,l7 August 1777).
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burdensome taxes57, or they came from the same village
moving laterally from their previously held rights as
klnalkashta. Such indeed was the case in Burdwan where we
are told of a peasant category called nij-gaon palkasht, or
those "who cultivate the land of their own village" as
pahikashta raiyat58 .	 Individual peasants combined
pahikashta and khudJcashta rights in the zaIndari of
Raj shahi59.
Nevertheless these peasants became the source of
friction between different zamlridars, the best example of
which is the tension between the Rajas of Burdwan and
Birbhum after the flood-famine of 1788. As the river Ajoy
breached embankments and flooded Burdwan, large numbers of
peasants fled to the neighbouring zm1rw1ari of Birbhum
which suffered less from the floods in 1787. The zamlndar
of Burdwan subsequently demanded the return of these
cultivators on grounds that they were the settled resident-
cultivators (khudkashta) of his zamlndarl, and were
therefore obliged to cultivate land and pay revenue in
Burdwan. The counter-claim proffered by the zamlndar of
Birbhum was that these migrants had acquired the legal
status of non-resident peasants (pahikashta) in his lands,
and were therefore entitled to stay and cultivate land in
his zamindar160 . This conflict is significant in so far as
it shows the concern of the zamthdars to the flight of
labour from their lands, and indicates the existence of a
favourable land-person ratio in which such flights took
place. Additionally, it also reflects the geographical
" See BRC,IOR P/49/39,26 March 1773 for the situation
in Rangpur where "the poorer riotts" constantly moved about
from "one tallook to another" in search of slightly better
terms.
" BRC,IOR P/51/21,16 July 1788.
BRC,IOR P/49/51,l March 1775.
60 BRC,IOR P/51/21,4 June 1788;and ibid.,P/51/34,8
April 1789.
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mobility of labour in the late eighteenth century.
Yet, there is very little reason to believe that this
mobility served to enhance the economic standards of such
peasants in the long-ter., or that they represented an
improved bargaining power of labour. First, these peasants
moved solely because of their scanty resources. Thus the
pahikashta of Sylhet,
Have no hereditary habitations, nor are
attached to their native home; their
dwelling consists of a wretched hovel
which together with their families they
move at pleasure, and a pergunna
covered with small villages today often
appears depopulated the next61.
Second, in many cases these peasants were only used
seasonally; nor was their use always extensive, even in
those districts which had suffered in 1769/70. In Rokunpur,
pahikashta jama was a mere 11.6 percent of the raiyati jama
in 177862. In Dhaka, pahikashta cultivators were used in
zamindari lands principally for the winter harvest after
which "they return to their own homes" 63 . The evidence from
Dhaka is corroborated by that from Commilla where the
pahikashta cultivators would come and go from the "surro-
unding pergunnas" but did not have any land or homesteads
in Commilla64 . Additionally, there was no guarantee that a
pahikashta would be given the most productive or fertile
land to cultivate. In fact the evidence from Birbhum (cited
above) forcefully indicates that they were a given land of
mixed qualities. In Tirhut, these cultivators were
61 Ibid,P/52/5,Part 4,24 November 1787.
62 Raiyati Jama: 3,65,090 rupees.Pahlkashta jama:
42,359 rupees [Brit.Mus. ,Add.Ms. ,29087, f.136].
63 Ibid.,P/53/58,23 October 1798.
64 BRP,IOR P/70/45,1 August 1788.
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invariably made to "cultivate waste or fallow lands"'5.
Quite often they were given lands of the "second or third
quality" since the most fertile spots were already occupied
by the resident and the "superior" cultivators".
Third, the use of pahikashta even on an extensive
scale did not necessarily lead to the decline in the
position of the resident peasantry. Evidence from western
Bengal suggests that these pah1ashtas cultivated a
fraction of the agricultural land. In Burdwan these
cultivators accounted for the cultivation of "near one
fourth of the pergunah" in 1793'. In Birbhum there numbers
were much less: only 73,000 highas of land were actually
tilled by these peasants there in 179168. Compared to this,
the scale of pahikashta cultivation appears to have been
more extensive in the east. In Cominilla, for instance,
these peasants cultivated "near half the lands" in 178869,
but their utilization was at best seasonal and did not
amount to giving them a privileged position among the
peasants. The description of these peasants from Sylhet
(cited above) does strongly suggest that they were
essentially the poorer peasants trying to supplement their
incomes. In Burdwan, the pahikashta were sub-divided in to
various categories. There were those, called thika
pahikashta who "undertake for a certain quantity of land at
a fixed rate"; in contrast were those, called comar
(khamarJ pahikashta, who were essentially sharecroppers
being used on a zamindar's personal holdings called
65 BRC,IOR P/50/65,10 March 1786.
66 BRP,IOR P/71/48,18 January 1792.
67 BRC,IOR P/53/8, 15 November 1793.
68 BRP/IOR P/71/41,estimate of Asad-ul-Zaman
Khan,zamindar of Birbhum provided to the Collector,25 July
1791.
69 Ibid.,P/70/45,1 August 1788.
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Jrhawar'° Existing agricultural practices and norms also
ensured that the rights of the settled cultivators were
protected, and in many cases pahikahta and khz1kashta
rights were jointly held by individual peasants. Finally,
pahikashtas were also used by the khudkashta peasants on
terms closely resembling those offered to the sharecropper.
Thus in Birbhum, "the Khoodkasht Ryotts do riot plough the
land themselves, but cultivate tlem by means of Kersaans
(peasantsJ from elsewhere (who areJ daily labouring
husbandmen who receive one third share of the crops as
recompense for their labour" 7'. The evidence regarding the
pahikashta strongly suggests that they could at best have
represent a horizontal movement from one peasant category
to another and not the upward mobility of a "rich" peasant
"class" in the making.
Jot edari in the late ei ghteenth century: some emerging
trends
Much of the discussions of jotedari in the eighteenth
century centred around three districts of eastern Bengal
(Jessore, Rangpur and Dinajpur). Interestingly this term is
specifically used almost exclusively in connection with
Jessore where there appears to have been a systematic
attempt to extend cultivation in the late eighteenth
century, and the other term used almost synonymously with
jotedari is ganthidar72. In either case the terms were
used specifically to denote a lease granted by zrniiridars to
individuals to bring stipulated portions of land back into
70 BRC,IOR P/49/63,2 August 1776.
71 BRP,IOR P/71/41,25 July 1791;emphasis added.
72 See,BRC,IOR P/51/22,25 June 1788.
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cultivation at concessional terms of revenue. A jote
"properly so called is granted to a ryott for purposes of
bringing deserted land back into cultivation at rates
usually fixed at half the assessment on such lands"73,
whereas ganthis were pattas (leases] "granted by zamiridars,
and sometimes by farmers (ijaradars) but confirmed by the
zamf radar to... perpetual leaseholders (ganthidars) for
entire villages..." 74 . In either case the grantor was the
zamlndar who did so with the dual purlx,se of raising money
and expanding the long-term productive capacity of the
zamindari, and these tenures often co-existed with other
sub-tenurial arrangements made at the zamindar's discretion
in his personal (khamar or nij-jot) lands.75
The active role of the zamindars in the formation of
such tenures can be seen in the creation of the gutchdari
tenure in Purnea. These gutchdars were lease holders
similar to the jotedars of Jessore and undertook to cul-
tivate stipulated tracts of uncultivated land (gutch)
partly by the use of their own and their families labour,
and the rest by sharecroppers (adhiars). The crucial factor
in determining the gutchdar's tenure was the zamivwlar,
always bargaining for more remunerative terms by procuring
rival offers for gutchdari. Quite frequently "the zemindar
not being satisfied.., requires a higher rent than the
gutchdar is willing to undertake, and the gutchdarry is
relinquished in consequence; the zemindar if unable to
provide another tenant, then engages with his under ryotts
on the gutch...".76
A zamiridar's financial consideration was the prime
BRC,IOR P/53/55,16 Jan.1798.
BRP,IOR P/72/17,12 Jan.1793.
BRC,IOR P/51/22,25 June 1788.
76 BRP,IOR P/71/26,from H.T.Colebrooke to Board 26
April 1790.
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mover in the evolution of the jot edari patta; the other
consideration was the desire of an individual zamlrwlar to
concentrate agricultural production in relatively larger
holdings as a device to ensure better monetary returns in
the face of a rigid revenue demand and falling real incomes
engendered by high prices and periodic harvest failures77.
The creation of jotes and ganthis was deemed to represent
"clear profits to the proprietor" since the lands where
such tenures were created produced nothing before78.
Ganthidars,
hold considerable farms in the villages
and pergunnas... cultivating the major
part of these lands by their own
gauntee [ganthi] ryotts, and by that
means the zemindar collects a7st
much revenue upon these lands thus
united as he would were ItheseJ lands
held by separate persons...79
For the East India Company the creation of jot edaris
on concessional terms of revenue was not an entirely desi-
rable prospect as "the more jotes there are in a cultivated
state the less rent it [sic] af fords" 80 . This viewpoint was
that of a state bent on extracting the maximum possible
from the agrarian economy; it was not necessarily shared by
the zamindars who, regardless of the state"s fears, pers-
isted in creating jotes, ganthis and gut chdaris within
their territories. By the late 1780s, Jessore was said to
have "not a single pergunnah free from lands of this
These considerations seemed to have motivated the
zam.Lndars of Jessore [BRP,IOR P/51/22,25 June 1788] and
Birbhum [Ibid,IOR P/70/41,18 Jan.1788].
78 BRC,IOR P/53/55,16 January 1798.
" IOR,BRC P/51/22,23 July 1788,p.121;emphasis added.
80 BRC,IOR P/53/55,16 January 1798.
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description"8'
The other factors which influenced the shape and size
of such tenures in the eighteenth century were the existing
land-labour ratio, the extent of reclaimable land available
within a zamindari and the nature of the zfivar1 in which
such tenures were patterned. They also influenced the
extent to which such holders could improve their positions
vis a vis the zamlndar at one level and the inferior
cultivators at the other. The suggestion that the jotedars
were powerful in "regions characterized by substantial
landholders owing their landed position largely to their
role in the reclamation process" 82
 needs re-examination. In
24-Parganas83 , which had no substantial landholders 84 , we
find evidence of holders of reclaiming leases (patitabad
patta) undertaking to cultivate 32650 acres (97950 bigha)
of waste land in 177985. Chaudhuri's statement would also
not apply to areas like Rangpur and Purnea which were
generally recognized as being held by a number of small
zamindars86 and where the formation of tenures similar to
81 BRC,IOR P/51/22,25 June 1788.
82 Chaudhury,1984: 118.
83 This area was situated southward of Calcutta and
was therefore in close proximity of its urban pull.After
having undergone what appears to have been a phase of
agricultural contraction during the early eighteenth
century [Letters Received from Bengal,IOR/4/24,31 December
1758] it was experiencing a fairly rapid reclamation during
the latter part of the century.
84 BRC,IOR P/49/70,Minute of Warren Hastings dt.18
April 1777.
85 CCR,IOR P/72/2,30 September 1779.The land taken up
for reclamation in 1779 amounted to nearly 21.53% of the
total cultivated (hasil] land,151601.3 acres [454804 bigha]
in 1758 [Letters Received, bR E/4/24,p.96].
86 The districts of Rangpur and Purnea,lying in the
frontiers of the province, were faujdariL areas under the
Mughals and the Nawabs of Bengal.These were held by a
number of small zamLndars whose affairs were supervised by
(continued...)
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that of the jot edari can be traced in the eighteenth
century. In Purnea, the gutcMar.i expanded in the wake of
the famine of 1770 which is said to have wiped out nearly
one-third of its agricultural population and converted
nearly a similar quantity of agricultural land into
cultivable waste87 . In some pargana of Rangpur (like Bodah
and Patcoom), small zmfndars "permit a reclaimer to culti-
vate as much land as he chuses (sic] upon a large plain,
for which he pays a fixed rent per annum...".
In a large zam.indari, where the estate belonged to a
single and traditionally powerful zamlrM!ar, the extent to
which such reclaimers could go to was determined not only
by the financial necessities of the landholder, but also by
the customary sanctions regulating the cultivation of waste
or deserted lands. For instance in the zamlndari of
Birbhum, the nature of reclamation and therefore the hold
of the reclaimers appear to have been influenced by two
customary practices, the details of which have been
provided earlier in this discussion. The first was the
stipulation that reclaimers paying concessional rates had
to forego their lands on the original holder's return, who
was then to have the lands restored at the "former jummah"
(original rate of assessment) which he paid prior to his
desertion. The second was the enduring rule that the estab-
lished peasants were to have preference in cases of
disputes between them and "new ryotts' coming from
86( . . 
. continued)
a military-bureaucratic official (faujdar] who was also
responsible for pacifying the frontiers of the province.In
striking contrast were the districts like Birbhum,Bu-
rdwan,Nadia (in western Bengal) Dinajpur and Rajshahi (in
the eastern parts) which were recognized as substantial
zamindari areas where the state had to pattern different
administrative arrangements (cf.James Grant "Historical
Analysis of the Finances of Bengal,1789"in FR 2 1.
87 WBSA,CCRM,5 December 1771,p.109;BRP,IOR P/71/26,18
June 1790.
88 BRP,IOR P/70/27,8 May 1787.
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elsewhere.
Such customary codes were not typical of the larger
zmfndaris alone, nor where they limited of Birbhuni. It was
natural for all categories of landholders to attempt to
protect the interests of peasants who had settled to cul-
tivate on long-term leases 89 . The Amini Commission (1778]
clearly stated that the khudJcashta's "right of possession
whether it arises from an actual property in the soil, or
from length of occupancy, is considered stronger Than of
the other ryotts [even though] they generally pay the
highest Rent for the Lands they hold" 90 . The tendency to
have resident peasants cultivating on uqarrari (permanent)
tenures was a norm closely followed in zamfndaris all over
the province91 . The case of Rangpur provides a revealing
example of this tendency. Here the muqarrari tenure seems
to have achieved greater stability between the 1770s and
the l780s. In 1778, these tenures were made to "pay the
rent of no more land than the Ryott cultivates [but] a
measurement is made by the zemindar once a year, and the
land found to be In cultivation is re-assessed"; by 1787,
the same tenure was paying "a fixed rent pr. annum, subject
to no taxes whatsoever.., nor will [the peasant] suffer the
zemindar to measure his land" 92 . By 1807, a azuqarrari
raiyat had become vested not only with perpetual
89 See for instance,BRP,IOR P/71/25,28 May 1790;Robert
Kyd,"Some Remarks on the Soil and Cultivation on the
Western Side of the River Hooghly" MS.Eur.F.95,f.58;
F.Buchanan "Account of Ronggopur",IOL
MS.Eur.D.75,vol.4,book 2,ff.98-100;"State of Bengal in
1786:A Report Compiled by Mr.Beaufoy" IOL Home Misc.
vol.382,p.78.
90 IOR,Home Misc. ,vol. 206,p.350;emphasis added.
91 For wuqarrari raiyat in Bengal see,Amini
Report, IOR,Home Misc.,vol.206,p.350;IOR,BRC,P/50/10,3 July
1778;IOR,BRP,P/70/26,13 April 1787;Ibid.,P/70/30,22 June
1787;Ibid.,P/70/4l,6 May 1788;Ibid.,P/72/17,19 June 1793.
92 Compare,BRC,IOR P/50/10,3 July 1778 and BRP,IOR
P/70/27,8 May 1787.
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possession, but also with the right to sell and transfer
the lease, though the previous (1778] zalnfIari power to
measure and re-assess such lands had once again been
restored93.
The obvious rationale behind the establishment of such
permanent peasant tenures was the z.amirviars need for steady
incomes which was possible only by ensuring a definite
permanency of agricultural production. This need became
more pressing because of the two severe famines (and a
number of dearth years) which Bengal suffered after 1765.
In such situations reclaimers could only hold on to the
lands of their choice, or increase their holdings, not by
their intrinsic economic or social power, but by conniving
with zarriiridari officials at the village level 94 , or by app-
ealing to the zamiridar to apply his discretionary powers on
their behalf.95
The jotedari, therefore, far from being a relation of
power and economic domination from its very inception was,
on the contrary, a mutually acceptable arrangement between
two classes in agrarian society to improve their respective
economic positions, and in which it was the zm1ndar who
really determined the pace, and the extent, of the
jotedars' development. There is very little evidence to
suggest significant alterations in this arrangement at
least up to the first half of the nineteenth century.
Turning to the economic side of these reclaimed lands
we find the following picture. Since reclamation involved
Hamilton,"Ronggoppur",IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75,vol.2,book
4,f.100.The reason for zamindari laxity in 1787 may lie in
the massive flood in that year which perhaps forced them to
make temporary concessions.
Thus in Rajshahi,reclaimers operated by paying
"bribes to the Putwaree,Halsanah & Cutwals of the villages
(all zamindari revenue of ficials],the connivance of all of
whom is differently necessary for them" (BRP,IOR P/70/26,31
March 1787).
" This was a marked feature of the gutchdari tenure
in Purriea,see Ibid.,P/71/26,18 June 1790.
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relatively large amounts of capital and a substantial
deployment of labour, a jotedari had to ensure fair returns
on both to be a viable enterprise. A part of the capital
costs involved were reimbursed by the nature of such
tenures. They were initially given at nominal rates of
assessment (usually fixed at half the normal jama on lands
of comparable qualities) and the reclaimers always
attempted to get these originally favourable terms frozen
for as long as possible96 . The organization of production
was predominantly sharecropping, with the reclaimer provi-
ding the necessary financial investment and the
sharecropper contributing the necessary labour. The divi-
sion of the crop was the sphere where the jotedar used his
superior bargaining position in order to take more than the
agreed proportion of the harvest, usually half, as his
share. This was achieved by the coercive strategy of
counting the advances of seed or money to the sharecropper,
not as an advance of capital but as a loan on which a high
rate of interest was charged". When paid in cash, the
sharecropper faced the following situation:
The usual money advanced is 6 rupees;
and this is called a year's wages...;
but in fact the term for which he
labours is always extended beyond a
year, and from 1 to 10 months are added
for interest, according to the
proportion between the number of empl-
oyers and those who consent to take
service"98.
Control over labour was also maintained by another
device, mainly administrative in nature, which was dele-
96	 For Rajshahi,BRP,IOR P/70/26,31 March 1787;for
Jessore,BRC,IOR	 P/70/26,16	 January	 1798;for
Bakarganj , Beveridge, 1876: 194.
" BRP,IOR P/71/26,26 April 1790.
98 Buchanan, "Ronggoppur",f.112.
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gated by the zalndar to the reclaimer as another incentive
for extending cultivation. This was the right to grant
pattas to the subordinate raiyat. In Jessore, for instance,
the pat tas granted by the ganthidars to the cultivators
were adhered to by the zamlndar and the revenue-farmer
(ijaradar) even when the gantbidar had vacated his lease99.
But the jot edars were not alone in shaping the first
forms of bargadari in Bengal. The zamindars used
sharecroppers with equally exploitative zeal on their own
lands. Nor did the modes of coercion used by the jotedars
lead to their ubiquitous domination over all cultivators
within the lands they reclaimed. In Jessore, peasants
described as khas raiyat were not subject to the jotedar or
the ganthidar; they dealt directly with the zamlndar, a
privilege they enjoyed because of their being the "ancient
Ryotts" of the zamindari who paid "unchanging rents for
many generations"' 00 . In Rajshahi, a peasant category
called khush bash (residing at pleasure) were allowed
easier terms and permitted to pay a mutually negotiated
amount both by the zamindar and by the reclaiming lease-
holder'0'. In Bakarganj the original reclaimers (abadkars),
the first phase of reclamation being over, seldom
interfered with the way in which the subordinate holders
managed their cultivation. This resulted in a proliferation
of sub-tenurial rights engineered by the cultivators them-
selves'02 . Finally in Birbhum where the pahikashta had to
compete with the resident cultivators for better terms of
revenue, reclaimers were often hard hit in their efforts to
maintain a close control over labour in their enter-
" BRP,IOR P/72/17,12 January 1793.
'°° Ibid.




The jot edar of the eighteenth century was not a
"village landlord", nor was he a "kulak-landlord". It was
a recognized fact that even those holding less than 10
bighas (3.3 acres) of land could get jotedari pattas from
the zamfndar'°4. This would make the jotedars of the eight-
eenth century at best "middling" peasants who had been able
to collect sufficient resources to enable them to invest in
reclamation using the labour of those who were less favou-
red. The resources they had may have arisen from their
being able to save during favourable agricultural seasons
or from profitable sales of their produce. These could also
emerge from colluding with the zm1rMJari official in order
juggle their own revenue accounts. The overwhelming portion
of these resources however came from the "profits" they
made during the distribution of the product between them
and the sharecroppers. But "accumulation" of such resources
should however not be taken to imply that an individual
jotedar could manage to extend his jotedari unchecked, or
that he could create a new power configuration in society.
It was the zamlridar's interest which determined the
boundaries of the jotedari in the last instance. Moreover,
none of the jotes were extensive enough to conjure visions
of "large farms" being managed by a "kulak"-type farmer.
Very rarely did individual jotedars take leases of farms
beyond the supervisory capacity of one person'° 5 . This
limitation would tend to make the eighteenth century jote-
dan an agglomeration of small or medium sized leases,
103 BRP,IOR P/70/41,18 January 1788.
104 This tendency was noticed in Jessore [BRC,IOR
P/51/22,23 July 1788,p.133].Ray also noted that "even a
poor peasant holding five acres on a direct lease from the
zamindar could describe himself as a jotedar" [1979: 54]
but failed to note the contradiction between this and the




designed by the zamiTMlars to bring about an extension of
cultivation, and to concentrate production in the hands of
those people who had relatively larger funds at their
disposal when compared to the poor peasants and the arti-
sans. This is not to say that the jotedar-bargadar
relationship was not viciously exploitative; but it was not
a mode of exploitation which differed substantially from
those prevailing in zamlridari areas or the ones shaped by
the merchants in their dealings with the poor peasant. Nor
had the jot edars been able to create the necessary
conditions for the displacement of the zamlridar's power
from the matrix of rural society. Such displacements, and
the techniques of replacement had to wait till the middle
of the nineteenth century before being realized.
Sharecropping in the eighteenth century
The use of sharecroppers by jotedars and zamindars
necessitates an explanation of this tenure in the
eighteenth century. I have shown that it is difficult to
interpret bargadari or adhiari in this period either in
terms of "untouchability" or of "landlessness". My
suggestion is that sharecropping in the eighteenth century
arose from the needs of the poorer peasants to ensure the
reproduction of their household-based economies in the face
of scanty resources, famines (and other crises of subsis-
tence) and the state"s revenue demand. Nor can the exi-
stence of sharecropping justify the use of the term "semi-
feudal"'°6
 to describe a social formation in which share-
croppers are used, even if the use is on an extensive
scale. Martinez-Alier's study of labour-contracts and
labour arrangements on the Spanish latlfundia shows that
106 As used by Ray and Ray, 1975.
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sharecropping is not necessarily incompatible even with
capitalist relations of production and appropriation107.
Sharecropping was one of the tenurial arrangements which
evolved during the transition from feudalism to capitalism
in West Europe108 , and (as in Spain, Italy and France) it
co-existed with the capitalist-farmer and peasant-"prole-
tariat"109.
I am not suggesting that sharecropping in eighteenth
century Bengal was a sign of the growth of agrarian
capitalism in Bengal. It was neverthelesss an arrangement
for the appropriation of absolute surplus-product in a
small-peasant, petty-commodity producing economy. The
extent to which bargadari or adhiari was a new tenurial
relation in the eighteenth century is a point which cannot
be resolved owing to the scarcity of information of the
situation in previous centuries; but as a relation of
appropriation"0
 it certainly contained the features which
were to become generalized in the nineteenth century.
As a relation of production, sharecropping entailed a
specific relation between investment and labour, and
between investment and redistribution. It required the
investment of the necessary productive resources by a
107 Martinez-Alier, 1971.
108 Marx,1981: 939.
109 Carlo M.Cipolla, 1981: 114.Kautsky saw no
contradiction between the economic concentration in the
latifundium,the existence of tenant-farming (and share-
cropping) and the emergence of capitalist relations in
agriculture: the latifundium,not the enormous growth of the
individual farm,is the form in which the modern giant
enterprise develops in agriculture:and like the centr-
alization of capital this form also acknowledges no
limits' (Kautsky,1988: 153-58,esp.156;emphasis added].
h1O Pertev [1986: 47] sees in sharecropping a better
system of surplus .aximization from small peasant-
proprietors than a wage system in agricultural production.
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social group and the labour power by another 111 . " The
ryotts who cultivate these lands are generally supplied
with money by the zamindars to provide seed. i.p1eents of
husbandry and for the immediate atntenance of their
fimf lies..." 112 . The division of the crop was based on a
previously negotiated arrangement between the investor and
the labourer. In Bengal the share appears to have ranged
from one-third to one-half of the produce which remained
after the costs of investment had been deducted 113 whereas
in Bihar the proportion seems to have been 22.5 shares for
the zamindar and 17.5 shares for the adhiar of the net
produce notionally divided into 40 shares of equal quan-
tities114 . Other forms of division also prevailed.	 For
instance in Burdwan and Bishnupur the zui1ndar or the
"farmer (retained] the whole produce and (paid] a certain
amount in money [to the sharecropper] calculated upon the
price which the same article may bear in the adjacent
markets" 115 . In this case the division of the crop was more
than a physical parcellization of the produce after the
harvest; it also entailed the conversion of the produce
into cash which perhaps indicates the commercial dimension
of sharecropping.
The documentation of the relations of appropriation in
the sharecropping system is significant. In a situation
where the share of the crop was not done "by an estimation
of the crop valued at the market price, but by the actual
division of the crop" the terms faced by the sharecropper
were as follows:
111 BRC,P/52/10,12 May 1790;BRP,IOR P/71/22,20 March
1790.
112 BRC,IOR P/52/40,15 December 1792;emphasis added.
113 Select Committee Consultations, IOR P/A/9,16 August
1769,p.493;Buchanan,"Account of Ronggopur"
IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75,vol.2,book 4, f. 109.
114 BRC,IOR P/52/40,13 January 1792.
115 BRC,IOR P/51/21,20 May 1788,p.l021.
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1. No lease or written document was granted to the
aiThfar. He cultivated on a verbal agreement.
2. There were a number of deductions made from the
produce previous to the division of the crop between
the aiThIar and the zimfndar or the gutchilar. These
were (a) "the quantity of seed sown returned two-fold
to the person who furnished it", and (b) deductions to
defray the costs of employing watchmen to "prevent the
ryots from privately reaping the crops", for paying
blacksmiths "for work done on the ploughs", for paying
the weighnian (kayal) for "measuring off the crop" and
other incidental expenses to meet the costs of
bringing in priests for making ritual sacrifices "for
the mutual benefit of the tenant and the cultivator".
3. The costs of meeting the expenses in the category
2(b) ranged from 7.6 seers to 5.75 seers for every two
maunds of grain produced (or between 9.5 and 7.18
percent of every two maunds)
4. "When the foregoing deductions have been made, the
remainder of the produce is equally divided between
the Gutchdar and the Addhea Ryott..."'
The act of treating the advances of working capital as
a loan on which a two-fold rate of return was charged117
made sharecropping an extension of the general prevalence
of usury in the countryside. In situations where the
largadar was paid after the produce had been converted into
cash, the farmer made sure of a profit from the seasonal
variation in prices. The produce was sold immediately after
the harvest when prices were at their lowest, while the
116 BRP,IOR P/71/26,from Henry Colebrooke in Purnea to
Board of Revenue,26 April 1790.
117 In Rangpur the "head ryot give as much grain as may
be necessary for the perja [sharecropper] for seed,and
receive from him double the quantity when the crop is cut"
[BRC,IOR P/52/10,20 March 1790].
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"contracts" were negotiated before the land was sown at
prices which were at their peak in the seasonal swing118.
The sharecropper invariably got a lot less in real terms
owing to the seasonal shift in agricultural prices: "at the
reaping of the harvest a very small part of it falls to the
addhea ryott; but by the division the zemindars become
possessors of the greater part of the produce of these
lands"'9 . In Purnea the zamrYar could "by these means
draw without risque (sic] and expense on labour, four
rupees from a bega (of land] for which he paid only a few
annas n120
This type of appropriation can partly be explained by
the economics of interest-bearing capital' 21 . But the
element of non-economic coercion was ever present; it even
dominated where sharecroppers were used by the zm1ndars to
cultivate their neez-talluqas. In these lands the zfndar
used his prescriptive social status to arbitrarily "tax the
advances with an heavy interest" and/or "fraudulently"
devalued "the market price of goods, or products of the
land in which" the sharecropper was paid 122 . The following
description of sharecropping in a zamlndar's khamar is
perhaps a revealing example of the modes of non-economic
coercion which went into the making of sharecropping. The
description comes from pargana Mandaighat, one of the
revenue divisions in the extensive zamLridari of Burdwan.
The zamiridar had farmed the khamar lands in this pargana to
a small revenue-farmer (qutquinadar, also called kutke-
'	 BRP,IOR P/71/26,18 June 1790.
" BRC,IOR P/52/40,13 January 1792.
120 Ibid,IOR P/51/6,19 February 1790.
121 As capital which is invested in the form of loans
and which appropriates the surplus-product in the form of
interest:"as value [possessing] the use-value of creating
surplus-value or profit" [Marx,1981: 464-65].
122 SCC,IOR P/A/9,16 August 1769.
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nadar) and the situation was as follows:
In the kummar (khmar] lands it is the
custom of the pergunnah for the Ryot to
receive his share in the proportion of
9 in 20. With this equitable (sic] mode
of distribution the Ryot would well be
contented if it was faithfully adhered
to, but the kutkennadar usually over-
rates the produce by which means the
Ryot is left with a very inadequate re-
compense for his labour. In addition to
this imposition the Ryot is obliged to
pay In ready money such proportion of
the crops as belong to the zemi ndar and
kutkennadar. He suffers another violent
oppression by an arbitrary valuation.
For example, if a Ryot has to pay for
100 maunds of rice & if agreeable to
the price at which he sells it at the
Bazaar (market] it produces 100
r (upee]s, the kutkennadar enhances the
value of Rice by making the Ryot pay
him back at the rate of 1 (rupee] for
32 seers by which the Ryot sustains a
loss of 8 seers in every maund & is
compelled to pay 125 (rupees] for rice
which he could only sell for 100
Rupees'23.
Additionally, physical force (confinement and flogg-
ing) was used by the zamindars to tilt the balance in their
favour in case of disputed shares' 24 . In essence,
sharecropping in eighteenth century Bengal was the
commercial exploitation of a small-holding peasantry having
inadequate resources at their disposal. Also the fact that
sharecroppers had to sell their produce in the bazars prior
to paying the zamindar is a clear example of the commercial
environment in which such tenures operated.
The existence of large numbers of sharecroppers in a
situation of land abundance, and in a context where
123 BRP,IOR P/72/4,6 July 1792;emphasis added.
124 Ibid.,P/70/33,13 September 1787.
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absolute landlessness did not exist appears paradoxical.
Yet the evidence from Rangpur and Dinajpur where 52 percent
(in Rangpur) and 77 percent (in Dinajpur) of the agricul-
tural population were sharecroppers circa 1807125, and the
information cited above indicates that sharecropping was
not only a major relation of agricultural production, it
was almost certainly on the increase in our period. Who
were these sharecroppers? Why did sharecropping become so
prevalent in agricultural production?
As discussed above, the existence and increase of
sharecropping in our period can not be explained either in
terms of landlessness or in terms of the caste. The
decision of a person to engage as a sharecropper was
dictated entirely by the constraint of resources. The
general insufficiency of land in individual peasant-
households was the central resource constraint. The other
pressure was the acute shortage of working capital. A good
description of a peasant family in eastern Bengal in such
circumstances was provided by J.H.Paterson from Commilla in
1789:
A poor riatt during the time he can
spare from his field hires himself out
as a labourer while his wife employs
herself at home spinning cotton. A
Riatt of this description can not
afford to cultivate above 2 Cannees
[5.5 acres]'26 of land at the farthest
and to do that he must be allowed
tuccavy [as] the produce of his lands
without the above occasional resources
could not maintain him especially if he
has a family. He resides generally upon
the lands of some other riatt as a part
of his family by which he secures an
exemption from the payment of any
Bhitee Jama [tax on house]; and by
125 Buchanan,"Statistical Tables of
Ronggopur",IOL,Ms.Eur., G.11,Table 30; Martin,1976,vol.3:
906.
126	 1 kani of landz 8 bigha,vide.,WBSA,PCR
Dacca,vol.15,p.360.
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these aids he makes a shift from hand
to mouth and pay the rent of his two
Connies. This class of riatts are by
far the most numerous127
This statement, in association with the state of the
adhiars of Purnea and the sanjhadars of Burdwan (discussed
above) must surely indicate large numbers of resource-
constrained cultivators engaged as sharecroppers as a
device to delay the prospects of protracted immiserization.
Sharecropping, in other words, was a strategy of survival
and of coping with continuous adversity by a majority of
the small-peasants. The other important reason for
necessitating such strategies was the cluster of famine and
dearth years in the late eighteenth century. The impact of
these years on agricultural production will be discussed in
chapter 4. Briefly, a famine or a dearth put immense
strains on the already meagre resources at the disposal of
these peasants. Additionally, each cycle of adverse
weather, or harvest failure, threw up a fresh crop of
uprooted peasants. Land was abundantly available but the
main problem was that of productive resources. The urban
sector was unable to fruitfully absorb even a fraction of
the displaced, thereby giving them no alternative but to
stick to land as sharecroppers or agricultural labourers.
Even though absolute landlessness was not a major agrarian
problem of the late eighteenth century, the objective
constraints on agricultural production nevertheless led to
the creation of a sharecropping peasantry on a scale which
can only be described as extensive.
The problem of sharecropping in our period can not
therefore be explained in terms of unequal landholding and
caste-based exploitation of a destitute peasantry.
Sharecropping in the eighteenth century emerged out of the
poor peasant's need to ensure the reproduction of their
127 BRC,IOR P/51/40,3 April 1789;emphasis added.
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household-based economies in the face of scanty resources,
crises of subsistence and the financial demands of the
state. It is no accident that the "inferior ryotts"in
Purnea, holding insufficient land, were also the adhfars
there'28 . It is also significant that za1nYars in Rangpur
enticed these peasants to work as sharecroppers by provi-
ding the necessary advances of seed and implements in
addition to small pieces of land "on which to reside and
cultivate pulse" and vegetables "at a rent paid in
money"'29.
Peasant society and the village mandal (headman)
Historians who argue the existence of a "village
oligarchy" in this period point to the increasing influence
of the mandal in rural affairs as constituting the core of
that oligarchy. These headmen are seen as the vehicles
through which the "rich" peasants controlled the politics
and external affairs of the village communities, often with
violence, in order to increase their economic power inside
the village. This "rich" peasant-mandal combination, it is
argued, was thus able to get major financial concessions
both from the local zamthdar and from the state'30 . There
are essentially two objections to this view. First, it
argues that these headmen had become powerful all over the
province. Second, this view does not consider the potent
role of zamindari officials in the countryside. As will be
discussed shortly, these officials were crucial in
128 BRP,IOR P/72/22,22 March 1789.
129 BRC,IOR P/52/10, 12 May 1790.
130 These are in essence the principal arguments of
Ratnalekha Ray,1979: chapter 2; also Ray and Ray, 1975.
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mediating the relations between the zm1ndars' sadr
(headquarter) and the uffassal, and used their positions
for their own advantage. The nature of the village aandal
therefore needs to be analyzed.
According to the Amini Commission, the aTvTal in
Mughal and Nawabi Bengal was also known as uqaddaa. Though
that Report described the andal as the "chief ryott of the
village", it is now well known that the uqadddas in north
India were more like petty zimindars than peasants in the
strict sense of persons who actually tilled the land by
their own, and their domestic, labour131 . In Bengal, the
izandal's duties were:
To act as mediator between the Ryots
and the petty collectors of revenue, to
assist them (the cultivators] in
selling their crops, and in raising
money to pay their Rents, and to settle
or accommodate the little disputes
which arise in the neighbourhood.
These duties give a distinct impression that anda1s
of Bengal were village officials set up by the peasants
themselves to manage their day to day affairs with the
wider world. In fact they were "chosen from amongst the
oldest or most intelligent inhabitants" and their
"influence and services" depended "solely on the good
opinion of the Ryotts". They could be removed by the zami-
ndar in case they lost the "confidence" of the
villagers132 . The report of the Amini Commission (formed to
survey the agrarian conditions in the aftermath of the
famine of 1769/70, and submitted in 1778), must surely
indicate that the principles initially established in the
131	 IOR,Home	 Misc.,vol.206,p.35; 	 Hasan,1964;
Grover, 1965; Habib, 1963.
132 IOR,Home Misc.,vol.206,p.35;emphasis added.
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seventeenth century, still guided the late eighteenth
century andal, at least in the twenty districts of the
province actually visited by the members of that
Commission1".
The notion that these -arwlals were essentially the
richer peasants rests on the assumption that their holdings
were larger than those held by the other cultivators.
Unfortunately, there is very little evidence to support
that. The following figures pertain to the lands held by 16
iiandals in pargana Anwarpur, zilla Nadia in 1794. Here a
total of 16 mandals possessed 289.45 bighas of land in the
following fashion' 34
 :
Amount of land (bigha)	 Number of andals
Below 10 bigha	 1
From 10 to 20 bigha	 9
From 20 to 30 bigha	 4
Above 30 bigha	 2
These figures are revealing in so far as they show a
striking conformity to the general pattern of peasant land-
holdings in the province. The fact that 10 out of 16
mandals held lands similar to those possessed by the
"poorer ryotts" does not support the view which sees these
people as the "rich" peasant in action.
Nevertheless, there is evidence to show that in
certain districts these andals had apparently become
powerful. In 1788 the anda1s of Rajshahi,
By making themselves the pretended guardians
of the Ryotts have obtained an irregular and
133	 Brit.Mus.,Add.Ms.,29086 	 to	 29088;	 also
Ramsbotham, 1926: 131-33;Chaudhuri, 1983: 300.
BRC,IOR P/53/19,14 May 1794.
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very dangerous power, destructive of
subordination, the remedy of the evils of
which is very difficult. They can incite the
Ryotts to commotion in an instant at
pleasure, without appearing themselves, and
by that means compel even the zeinindaree
power to bend to them135.
In Dinajpur, these people, along with the "principal
inhabitants of the villages, under plea of real or
fictitious desertions of the Riauts, have got into their
possession considerable tracts of ground at an under-rated
assessment... and the established rates or Nirk has become
obsolete"'36 . In Birbhum, "the munduls derive from their
number and mutual support such influence, that a success of
a settlement in general measure.., depends entirely on
their pleasure"'37 . These descriptions form the crux for
the historians who argue the formation of a "village
oligarchy" and "powerful tenantry" in this period. The
question is: do these descriptions actually support such
formulations?. It is difficult to say that they do for the
following reasons.
First, the timing of these descriptions is crucial.
These depictions are without exception for the year 1788
which, as discussed in chapter 2, was a year of a major
famine. Massive floods had ruined agricultural production
in southern, northern and eastern Bengal. Peasants had been
uprooted from land leading to a pressure on the landed-
proprietors to make concessions.It is likely that a part of
the pressure was created by the peasants bargaining for
better terms, at least in the short-term. There is very
little reason to believe that such pressures were due to
the concerted actions of the "village oligarchy", or that
they were necessarily a persistent feature of peasant
135 BRC,IOR P/51/29,28 November 1788.
136 BRP,IOR P/70/40,11 April 1788.
'	 BRC,IOR P/51/20, 14 May 1788.
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society. The evidence we have of the pahikashta cultivators
certainly shows a picture quite contrary to the creation of
"rich" peasantry in the long-term.
Second, these descriptions are spatially selective and
are not confirmed by similar statements for other districts
either before or after the famine of 1788. This is
significant because it shows that the so-called "power" of
the mandals was not a feature common in all areas, whether
famine-stricken or famine-free. Third, the districts where
the iiandals had apparently managed to make good display
certain similarities. As discussed above (and chapters 1
and 2) Birbhum, Rajshahi and Dinajpur had clearly moved
downwards in economic terms during the late eighteenth
century. They had declined from stable (and surplus)
economic centres to areas of chronic instability and decli-
ning production during the course of the century. This may
have caused some realignments in rural society in favour of
the village headmen, though all indications show that these
shifts were unlikely to effect major changes in social
structure.
In general the mandals in the late eighteenth century
continued to remain as "a kind of civil superior elected by
the tribe over whom they respectively preside"'38 : a
description which confirms the one provided by the Amini
Commission in 1778. It is also significant that the power
to dismiss them rested with the villagers and with the
zamindar. The latter also had the right to confirm (or
reject) the villagers' choice of a mandal who had to pay a
"fixed tribute to the zemindars" to acquire the necessary
confirmation. Apart from assisting the villagers in their
day to day affairs, the mandal had to oversee "the conduct
of the inferior members, chiefly to prevent any offence
against their caste" and to be "present at all marriages
and other civil or religious ceremonies", for which he
138 BRC,IOR P/52/16,28 July 1790;emphasis added.
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received a stipulated fee 139 . The exact amounts of such
fees are not known, but revenue-free (baz-1-zaIn) lands
were sometimes given to meet the arwa1s' services. But
these lands were not extensive enough to conjure up visions
of a powerful village oligarchy in operation. In Birbhum,
for instance, such lands amounted to 38.40 Mghas, which
constituted a mere 0.04 per cent of the total baz-i-z.m1n
lands (96032.57 highas) in 1789'°.
Peasant stratification in Bengal and the elusive "rich"
peasant
Peasant stratification in eighteenth century Bengal
cannot therefore be explained in terms of massive
differences in landholdings alone. The gap between the
relatively rich and the comparatively poor was very small
and any major calamity (like a flood or famine) could
easily reduce the former into the ranks of the rural poor.
The situation in Dinajpur, where Buchanan-Hamilton noted
the existence of peasants holding 165 bighas of land was
clearly an aberration and should not be taken as the
crucial indicator of peasant stratification for the entire
province, as has been done by Ray 141 . In the adjacent
district of Rangpur peasants with 30 bighas of land were
identified as the "superior ryotts" of that district in
1790142 ; in Dinajpur 30 bighas would classify a peasant as
139 Ibid.;BR Misc.,P/89/37,1 April 1791.
140 BRP,IOR P/71/13,12 February 1788.
141 Ray,1979: 64.
142 BRC,IOR P/52/10, 20 March 1790.
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a "poor farmer"'43 . The peculiarity of Dinajpur can be
explained by the silting up of its major riverain systems
and the apparent economic contraction which this
engendered'44 . Large "farms" may have been a device by
people with resources to extend cultivation either at the
behest of the zmfndars, or by small peasants leasing out
to their larger counterparts and then working their lands
on a sharecropping basis. It must also be borne in mind
that Buchanan-Hamilton's survey was undertaken around 1807,
nearly fifteen years after the Permanent Settlement of
revenue by the East India Company and the impact of this
Act on land-relations has to be accounted for before
accepting the situation there as representative of pre-Per-
manent Settlement Bengal.
Given the favourable land-labour ratio and the general
smallness of peasant plots, it becomes almost difficult to
find a connection between peasant stratification on the
basis of unequal landholdings alone in the eighteenth
century. The degree of wealth was associated more with the
amount of resources at an individual's disposal and even
the slightest variation in resources seems to have made the
major difference between relative affluence and relative
poverty in rural society. Peasant resources traditionally
were measured in terms of draught animals and ploughs (and
not by the amount of land held), and it is perhaps sign-
ificant that persons having one or two ploughs were consi-
dered "poor" peasants whereas those possessing between 3
and 5 ploughs employed sharecroppers145 . In Jessore, people
with a mere 10 blghas (3.3 acres) could take jote from the
zamindars and get them cultivated by adhiars'46 . "The circ-
143 M.Martin,l976,vol.3: 906.
144 See BRP, ICR P/70/42,30 May 1788;WBSA,Grain,vol.1,15
October 1794,p.202; BDR:Dlnajpur,vol.2,n.367,p.23l.
145 Buchanan "Ronggopur" IOL Ms.Eur.D.75,vol.2,book
4, ff.1O1-3.
146	 BRC,IOR P/51/22,23 July 1788.
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uinstances of a Ruatt (raiyat) are known by the number of
ploughs he employs.., but there are those who have no oxen,
and who are obliged to hire a plough, either by money or
work. Two ruatts who have two oxen are enabled to cultivate
a doon (6.6 acres) by joining their cattle and using th
alternately..." is a revealing description of small peas-
ants working under a shortage of resources147.
The seemingly negative correlation between the
formation of a richer peasantry and the concentration of
land in a few hands makes the analysis of the rural poor
extremely difficult. Ray and Ray attempt to resolve this
problem by classifying the bulk of the agrarian population
as the "untouchable landless groups in the villages"148,
thereby equating poverty with caste and landlessness. There
are a number of reservations against an explanation of this
type. How would a caste-oriented explanation of rural
poverty reconcile the existence of the Mus1i poor in the
eighteenth century? Similarly, the explanation of the upper
strata in Bengal as a "high-caste local gentry" fails to
resolve the issue of non-Hindu zamindars or that of the
relatively affluent Muslim agriculturists of Bakarganj who
sometimes held three or four separate rights on different
lands in the village' 49 . Caste cannot explain the activi-
ties of the Muslim peasants of Commilla who (in 1789) were
said to be dictating the appointment of Qazis (religious
leaders) in the village mosques and also looking after
their maintenance'50. Untouchability and landlessness are
inadequate in explaining social stratification even among
the Hindu peasants. Sanyal's study15' of "lower" caste
147 BRC,IOR P151/40,15 July 1789,p.39;emphasis added.
148 Ray and Ray,1975: 84.
149 Beveridge,1876: 197.
'° BRP,IOR P/71/14,24 July 1789.
'5' H.Sanyal,1981.Also O'Malley,1911: 58,60.
219
peasant groups like the Sodgops in Burdwan and Kaivartas of
Midnapur indicates the manner in which these castes were
stratified through a process of internal differentiation
leading on the one hand to the formation of £aivarta and
Sodgop zamlridaris in Midnapur and of poor peasants of the
same caste on the other'52.
Moreover, landlessness in absolute terms does not
appear to have been a major agrarian problem in the
eighteenth century. The picture of an uprooted peasantry
roaming through the countryside in the wake of the famine
of 1769-70 "in search of employment" 153 is largely over-
drawn and certainly would not apply to eastern Bengal which
did not suffer its ravages to the extent endured by the
districts in western Bengal'54 . The major cleavage in rural
society was not between the landowner and the landless (nor
was it between the high-caste and the untouchable) but bet-
ween the owners of adequate and inadequate land, or
resources'". The distinction between adequate and
inadequate was often rendered tenuous by the smallness of
peasant holdings in general and the uncertainties created
by periodic crises of subsistence.
Therefore the picture of the eighteenth century
peasantry as one polarized between a "rich peasant class"
and "untouchable landless groups" tends to provide a false
image of rural stratification. Given the general smallness
152 See Lal Behari Day,Bengal Peasant Life
(ed.M.Saha,Calcutta 1969) for a good account of intra-caste
stratification among the Sodgop peasants in Burdwan in the
late nineteenth century.
153 Ray,1979: 56;also Nagchaudhury-Zilly,1982.
154 See the descriptions of the famine in Select
Committee Consultations, IOR P/A/b, from Richard
Becher,Resident at the Darbar,31 May 1770;a].so chapter 2
above.The famines and food shortages which struck the
province after 1770 did not have demographic consequences
as severe as that of the former year.
For a similar point see Marshall,1987: 7.
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of peasant holdings, the virtual absence of absolute
landlessness and a seemingly widespread shortage of
resources we can perhaps only speak of two broad strata in
the peasantry: the "poor" and the "middling"' 56 . The "poor"
were those peasants unable to reproduce themselves through
household production because of insufficient land and/or
other means of production. The "middling" peasants had
lands which were considered adequate for their social and
economic reproduction as well as for the generation of a
small surplus which they presumably invested for some
improvements in their lands or for the cultivation of
better grade crops' 57 , or both depending upon the nature of
the current agricultural season. They may also have used
their surpluses to give loans to their poorer counterparts
in times of need'58.
Yet our sources do give the impression that a "rich"
peasant "class" did exist and that their activities were
causing concern both to the local zamlndar and to the
state. John Shore described these peasants as those who
cultivate land, of which there is no
account, and hold them in greater
quantities than they engage for;
they hold lands at reduced rates by
collusion, obtain grant of land fit for
immediate cultivation, on the reduced
156 have extended the distinction between the poor
and middle peasants as provided by Bernstein (1979: 431] in
order to classify these peasants in eighteenth century
Bengal.
' These were the peasants who could afford to
cultivate crops like mulberry,hemp and tobacco along with
high quality rice so that in case of failure of one,from
casualties of weather,the whole together may yield a
profit' [Correspondence & ca. Relative to the Cultivation of
Hemp and Flax in Bengal from 1791 to 1799,IOR Home Misc.




terms of waste land; ... their power
and influence over the inferior ryotta
is great and extensive [and] if any
attempt is made to check their abuses,
they urge the ryots to complain and
resist...'59
Henry Co]ebrooke describes three types of peasants in
Bengal (1) those "applying the labour which they give to
husbandry, solely to ground used on their account", (ii)
those who were "monopolizing land to re-let it to the
actual cultivator at an advanced rent, or for half the
produce" and (iii) those who "call in the assistance of
hired labour to assist their own""°.
These descriptions have influenced historians into
reconstructing Bengal"s peasant society as elaborately
stratified into a "very powerful tenantry" and poor
peasants. The former are also seen as a "village oligarchy"
on grounds that they combined superior economic power with
political clout. These formulations are questionable for a
number of reasons. First, one has to consider the geog-
raphical location of this so-called "powerful tenantry".
John Shore based his arguments on the situation prevailing
in Dinajpur and Rajshahi in eastern Bengal and on Birbhum
and Purnea in the west'61 . I have already drawn attention
to the peculiarity of Dinajpur's rural society. The three
remaining districts were those which had suffered extensive
depopulation during the famine of 1769/70 and had
subsequently become areas of unstable production" 2 . The
FR 2,pp.56-57.
160 Remarks,p.60.
161 Incidentally even Henry Colebrooke's assessment was
heavily influenced by the situation in Purnea having served
there as the government's collector in the 1780s.
162 By the mid-1770s Purnea was said to be an
"impoverished country" with a "lowered value of lands and
their produce".The corresponding decline of Rajshahi was
(continued...)
222
famine took its greatest toll from the poor peasants and
the artisans thereby reducing large tracts of cultivated
land into wastes (pateet), a situation which seems to have
persisted even when the worst had passed and other
districts had managed to make post-famine recoveries163.
Moreover the modes of reclamation were governed by a number
of traditional customs which clearly favoured the customary
rights of the established peasants even when they had been
forced to desert. These facts leave nagging doubts about
the validity of the argument of a large-scale takeover of
land by the "superior ryotts"or by a "powerful tenantry".
Second, the reasons for characterizing these so-
called "village oligarchs" as peasants are unclear.
Reclaimers in Chittagong were quite often the zmindar1
diwan or faujdar'64 . From the point of view of the zm1n-
dars the problem does not appear to have been one of peas-
ants colluding among themselves as much as it was the
collaboration between the zamlndari officials and the so-
called "superior ryott". It is no accident that in almost
all types of zamindaris, the universal complaint was the
collusion of the zamindari amfl with the "influential
ryotts"in frauds pertaining to land or revenue. Such cases
are numerous and need not be listed in all their details.
There is however one complaint which is most representative
of the entire genre of such complaints and therefore needs
162( . . .continued)
"too evident a melancholy truth" (for Purnea BRC,IOR
P/49/54,18 July 1775,p.1232; for Rajshahi,ibid,P/49/52,5
February 1775,pp.34-35].For the economic decline of Birbhum
[R.K.Gupta, 1977].
163 According to the findings of the Amini Commission
[1778] pateet lands constituted 35.95 percent of cultivable
land in Birbhum and 25.98 percent in Purnea.These were the
two districts with the biggest areas of cultivable wastes
when compared with the rest of the province (for the




to be cited. This is the grievance expressed by the
ziiindar of Rajshahi(one of the largest and most famous of
the eighteenth century zimfndaris) to the Board of Revenue
in May 1790 and needs to be quoted in full:
Many ryotts in this district, thro'
collusion with the moffussul karmachari
[official in the village] have caused
a considerable part of their jummah
[assessed] lands to be set down in the
accounts as pulotoka or forsaken
[lands] & fresh leases at the lowest
rate of assessment have been granted
for lands to their own dependents,
which is fact to themselves. When they
are called on for the payment of their
original jumniah, they produce these
fictitious leases & thereby evade pay-
ment of a just demand.
The karmachari... in my zemmindarry
have annually obtained considerable
remissions from the fixed jummah of
their lands [and] these lands [when]
brought into cultivation yield a vast
profit to them. Many persons holding
leases of joat [cultivation] have
possessed themselves of more lands than
specified in their pottahs [leases].
Several Individuals of substance have
by collusive means obtained remissions
of revenue, which the lower class of
ryotts are obliged to make up for by
contributions. The consequence of which
oppression is the desertion of
numbers.. 165
This indicates the anxiety of one of the most powerful
of the eighteenth century zmfi'dars and shows the overt
influence of the zamindari officials in matters pertaining
to the distribution of lands in the villages and the grant
165 BRP, IOR P/71/25,28 May 1790;emphasis added.
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of leases of cultivation (pattas) to all categories of
peasants. I have classified these officials as non-peasants
because there is no evidence to show that they actually
tilled the land with their own, or with their families
labour, and they largely belonged to the non-agricultural
castes, like the kayastha166.
Positioned below the Brahmins in the caste hierarchy,
these kayastha corresponded more closely to (what Ray sees
as) "a high-caste rural gentry" than with the agricultu-
rists. The description provided by Colebrooke of the use of
hired labour in agricultural production does not
necessarily demonstrate the existence of a coterie of
improving peasants "cultivating lands by using share-
croppers and agricultural labourers"'67 . As Colebrooke
himself noticed, such practices were resorted to by those
who "are restrained by (caste] prejudice from personal
labour", these being the Brahniin 168 and presumably the
kayastha castes. Nor does (what could only have been a very
restricted) use of hired labour automatically indicate the
166 have attempted to analyze the caste composition
of the zamindari karmachari and iial-i-zamln.q in "Aspects of
the Agrarian System of Bengal During the Second Half of the
Eighteenth Century" (M. Phil. dissertation, Jawaharlal Nehru
University,1980].My evidence shows the overwhelming
predominance of the kayastha at all levels of the
zamindari "bureaucracy".The important positions occupied by
the kayasthas in zamindari administration was noticed by
Ray [1979: 31 ff.] but the connection between their of f i-
cial position and their power was not established.These
kayasthas were influential in Bihar for precisely the same
reasons [Marshall,1987: 37,49,173; Yang,1989: 44-46].They
occupied similar positions practically all over North India
and in many cases established their own equations of power
in rural society at the expense of the zm1ndar and the




"richness" of the employer' 69 . These high-caste "gentry"
would, for instance, include the indigent Brahmins of
Rajshahi and Burdwan who had to eke out supplementary
incomes by allowing the women in their households to spin
cotton thread'7° in a society where spinning of thread and
weaving of cloth were generally recognized to be the
occupations of "the lower class of people..."171.
The participation of the indigent Brahmins in
agricultural production, short of actually holding the
plough, has been noted by Ray172 but the case for the use
of hired agricultural labour for production purposes has
been largely overstated by her. The case of the kagasthas
may perhaps have been different than that of the Brahmins.
They had the necessary social and political authority by
virtue of their place in the zrnilndari administration and
it is likely that their lands were cultivated with a
greater degree of economic efficiency, but there is prac-
tically no evidence to press this point further. On the
contrary the data of the activities of these people suggest
a minimal degree of direct participation in agricultural
production. These were the paid employees of the zamindars
who used their official positions to put pressures on the
poorer peasantry in order to elicit bribes, and
collaborated with those peasants with better resources by
juggling their revenue accounts in order to acquire certain
financial advantages. The link between the officials and
169 Even those peasants who had some surplus resources
did not employ hired agricultural labour.For
instance,cotton (a relatively capital intensive commodity)
was grown by "ryots [who] employ no labour but manage the
cultivation themselves" [BRP,IOR P/71/10,15 June 1789].
170	 BRP,IOR	 P/71/17,21	 December	 1789;also
ibid,P/71/1O,15 June 1789.
171 See for instance the proceedings in BRP,IOR P/71/10
and P/71/17 for descriptions of spinning and weaving as
lower class occupations.Here the term "class" was used to
point to the caste status of the artisans.
172 Ray,1979: 30.
226
the economy was located more in the realms of economic and
political corruption than in the sphere of agricultural
production.
The search of a "rich" peasant "class" in eighteenth
century Bengal is therefore fraught with a number of
difficulties:some empirical and some conceptual. The
available evidence does not allow a division of peasant
society into rich, middle, and poor-peasants. What we do
get is a picture of a rural society where peasants were
roughly divided into two strata:those who could reproduce
their domestic economies and those who could not, and for
the sake of analytical convenience I have divided them into
"poor" and "middling" categories. "Rich" peasants, defined
as the people with enough accumulated surpluses to invest
in production "through the purchase of superior means of
production and/or labour power"and who could "initiate and
maintain a cycle of extended reproduction" 173 were largely
absent in society.
The "richness" of a peasant could perhaps be explained
if one is able to show that they cultivated "cash" crops
(like mulberry or cotton) almost exclusively on their own,
and that the surplus which accrued was accumulated
independently by them and subsequently used for expanded
reproduction. But this was not so. The cultivation of
mulberry trees (and the production of silk), closely ass-
ociated with the economic interests of the state, was
financed by the East India Company. Cotton was grown in
small quantities in tiny plots of land subsidiary to the
cultivation of rice and other food-crops and the difference
between the "rich" peasant and the "poor" in terms of the
portion of an individual's land each could devote to its
cultivation was minimal: "the richer class of ryotts may
possess a begah [0.3 acre] each of cotton & the poorer sort
from 8 to 10 cuttahs [0.16 to 0.20 acres], the produce of
which is generally converted to family consumption" states
173 Bernstein,1979: 431.
227
a report on the state of cotton cultivation of western
Bengal in 1789 174w Sugarcane and tobacco were seldom grown
by peasants with their own resources. They were (as I will
discuss in chapters 5 and 6) cultivated by a wide variety
of advances taken by the cultivator from the merchant. This
is not to suggest a general scarcity of resources or a
shortage of accumulated surplus in the hands of the rural
rich; but these were not the "rich" peasants. One has to
look to the non-peasant strata (the z.imlr'dar and the
byapari) to understand the dynamics of social
differentiation in rural Bengal. The role of the z1radars
was discussed in chapter 3. The interaction between the
merchants and agricultural production will be discussed in
chapter 6. Obviously, to comprehend the social relations in
production, it is necessary to analyze the material milieu
in which agricultural production was organized and
undertaken.
BRP,IOR P/71/10,15 June 1789;emphasis added.
Chapter 5
Peasant Production: Agriculture and the State of the
Agrarian Economy
Agricultural production in the late eighteenth century
was much more than the use of land and labour to produce a
variety of crops. It was the central point of the agrarian
economy around which various other social relations were
articulated. Thus the state of the entire agrarian economy,
defined as the intermeshing of natural factors, social
relations and institutional networks in the countryside,
was determined by the fluctuations in the domain of
agricultural production and peasant enterprise. The primacy
of agriculture in the economy was all the more vital
because even non-agricultural, or artisanal, production was
largely a part of agriculture as the artisans, in most
cases, were primarily peasants (i.e. they cultivated land
by the use of their own or their domestic labour) who
entered non-agricultural production as an extension of
their main enterprise as cultivators. Salt was manufactured
by the "tillers of the land" who used the slack
agricultural season to eke out supplementary incomes by
working in the salt-pans (khalaries) 1 , while the weavers
had the "double resource of tilling the lands"2.
1 See,BRC,IOR P/49/52,29 May 1775; and ibid.,P/50/3,12
August 1777;Ibid.,P/51/45,5 August 1789 for statements
regarding the combination of agriculture and artisanal
production in the salt sector.
2 WBSA,CCRM,vol.8,5 December 1771.
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The salient features of agricultural production and the
agrarian economy in the late eighteenth century
At first glance, the agrarian economy of Bengal in the
late eighteenth century seems to have operated under an
apparent paradox. On the one hand there was, as almost all
contemporary observers and officials remarked, the
remarkable natural fertility of the soil. For Warren
Hastings, the wealth of Bengal was due to the soil's
"fertility and the number and industry of its
inhabitants" 3 . James Rennell saw the province as possessing
some "of the most fertile lands in the Universe" 4 . William
Tennant observed, in 1797, that Bengal had "an excellent
soil and climate, and possessed of almost every variety of
cultivated grains, and competent number of hands to raise
them.. One of the most revealing descriptions of such
intrinsic fertility of land comes from the district of 24-
Parganas in 1762. Here "the fertility and goodness of the
soil is proved by its producing everything, almost
spontaneously. Here:
You have the Cocoanut, Date, Palmeira,
Serepul, Tamarind, Plantain and several
other trees not known to me. We passed
through fields of Mustard, Melons,
Gram, Flax, Pease, Cotton & Ca. and yet
the Inhabitants are far from being
either industrious or skilful. They
scarcely scratch the Superfices of the
Earth to make it yield this increase in
many things; and in others they sow
without any previous preparation at
all... The country every where abounds
"State of Bengal in 1784",in Forrest (ed.),191O: 21.





Ploughing is indeed by no means
intended to turn the Ground. It merely
scratches the Surface, divides the
Sward; and gives access to the teeth of
the Harrow, or rather the Bullock rake
to lay hold of the weeds7.
On the other hand the producers actually worked under
the most resource constrained circumstances. It was
generally recognized that almost without exception these
poor peasants were unable even to coience agricultural
operations without outside financial aid 8 . "The lower
Ruatts [raiyats] live from hand to mouth and without tacavi
or advances cannot afford to cultivate a piece of ground"9.
"The want of capital employed in agriculture and
manufactures, cripples every enterprise" was how Reverend
William Tennant described the state of production in the
province10 . James Rennell believed that "the labourers
suffer[ed] such great oppressions" that they were rendered
unable to work their lands to full capacity". Later
estimates made by Buchanan-Hamilton in the districts of
Rangpur and Dinajpur (circa 1807) reveals that nearly 52
6 Hugh Cameron to Council,IOR Home Misc.,vol.47,5
September 1762,pp.43-44;emphasis added.
F.Buchanan,"An Account of a Journey Through the
Provinces of Chittagong and
Tipperah, 1798" ,Brit.Mus. ,Add.Ms. ,19286, f.2.
8 WBSA,CCRI1,vol.5,23 May 1771;BRC,IOR P/51/19,21 March
1788;Ibid,P/51/21,14 June 1788;also Datta,1986: 393.




percent of the agricultural population in Rangpur 12 and 77
percent in Dinajpur'3 were sharecroppers, agricultural
labourers or "needy farmers".
With regard to its organization, Bengal's agriculture
was overwhelmingly undertaken on small peasant farms
operated by individual peasant families with the use of
domestic labour. It was a therefore a classic example of
petty production: household centred and labour intensive,
as well as perennially constrained by the lack of
resources. The other major aspect of Bengal's agricultural
production was the apparent predominance of the so-called
"subsistence" sector, rice and paddy, in overall
production. The so-called "cash crop" sector was subsidiary
to this major productive enterprise. The data pertaining to
patterns of cultivation will be discussed shortly.
The combination of small peasant-holdings and the
predominance of the primary staples in agricultural
production may perhaps give the impression of a natural
economy producing only use-values meant for immediate
consumption. Such an impression would be misleading as
there were other factors of decisive influence in the
economy. These were (a) a rising demand for food in the
province and the creation of a regionally integrated grain
market and (b) the apparently persistent incursions of
famines and severe crop failures'4 . Moreover, as Francesca
Bray points out, the predominance of grain production in
small-peasant holdings has historically been the major form
in which agricultural production has been organized in wet-
rice growing societies, which have not prevented such
societies from undergoing significant degrees of
commercialization15.
12	 Francis Buchanan, "Statistical Tables of
Ronggoppur",IOL, Ms.Eur.G.11,Table 30.
13	 M.Martin,1976,vol.3: 906.
14 Discussed in chapters 1 and 2.
15 Francesca Bray,1983: 3-34.
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The discussion in chapter 3 has shown that positioned
above these producers were a whole range of landed-
proprietors who combined various administrative functions
with active roles in the maintenance and furtherance of
agricultural production. They, especially the zaairidars,
personally held fairly large tracts of land (variously
called khamar. nij-jote or nij-talluqa) which were cult-
ivated by sharecroppers on an extensive scale, and the
produce from such lands was sold in the markets often
established by the landed proprietors themselves. The other
social strata who had a keen interest in production and who
played an active part in its processes were the grain-mer-
chants (byaparis). They did not participate in production
directly, but provided a variety of consumption and prod-
uction loans to the peasants; and the records suggest that
most cultivators depended heavily on such loans. The nature
of mercantile penetration in agricultural production will
be discussed at length in chapter 6.
Thus we tend to get a picture of an agrarian society
in which severe shortage of resources were faced by most of
the producers but these were concentrated in a few hands
who were also willing to part with such resources to the
needy, albeit at a heavy price. A rising demand for food
and the existence of an integrated market influenced the
decision of these largely non-peasant strata to invest in
agricultural production, but the scarcity of resources in
the hands of the small peasants and the economic
vulnerability created by famines were instrumental in
shaping the social relations in production, particularly
those of domination and subordination; they were also
significant in determining the state of the agrarian
economy.
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Agricultural production: cultivation, land use and output
Agricultural production- - the utilization of land to
procure various crops-- was organized around three harvest
seasons: aman (winter), aus (spring) and horo (summer). Of
the three, aman and aus were considered the most important,
both in terms of output and their share in the payment of
revenue (chapter 1, figure 10) since all the major cash
crops were grown in these two seasons. The winter rice was
commercially the most valuable as it was grown principally
for sale.
The evidence available (table 5.2, p. 261) certainly
suggests that the grand purpose of agricultural production
was the cultivation of paddy (dhan) for rice. For Tennant:
The culture of almost every plant, and
particularly of the gramina, in proportion
as it has long been diffused, induces
numerous varieties. The several seasons of
cultivation, added to the influence of soil
and climate, have multiplied the different
species of rice, into endless variety. From
the awned and unawned, from that growing on
the mountains to that produced in humid
situations, there are various diversities
adapted to every circumstance of soil,
climate and season... •16
Land-use for the cultivation of rice was a complex
process. The first priority was obviously access to water,
and here the central concern was to grow the maximum
permissible on lands within the range of the seasonal
overflow of the various rivers and streams. "The annual
inundation, to which the soil is principally indebted for
its fertility, regulates the sites of cultivation, and in
some measure the time of sowing and reaping" was how Taylor
described the principal considerations behind the
16 Indian Recreations, 2, p. 9;emphasis original.
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cultivation of rice in Dhaka' 7 . In Midnapur, rice was grown
on jala (low-lying) lands for reasons of their close access
to water: the jala was further sub-divided into eight
different types depending on each one's elevation, and
different types of rice were grown on each. Kyd's survey
of cultivation on the western banks of the Hughli river
shows that the broadcast summer rice was sown on the lands
of the lowest elevation (called drah), while the
transplanted winter rice was planted on lands called
caddurie which were "a little elevated, not more than five
or six inches, above the common level of the [dowrah]"'9.
Under normal circumstances, the entire agricultural
output, as well as the payment of revenue k.tsts
[installments], was concentrated in the nine months
between Baisakh (April-May) and Pous (December-January),
"no crops of any consequence are cut after the month of
Poose [Pous], and the intervening months of Maug, Phagun
and Choite [January-April] are taken up in cultivating
those lands from which the resources of the ensuing year
are derived" 20 . The preparation of land for rice was as
follows:
Pous to Phal gun	 (January to March)	 for aman rice
Pous and Magh	 (December to February) for aus rice
Pous
	 (December-January)	 for boro rice
The number of times the land had to be ploughed
obviously depended on topography. In the western parts of
Dhaka, where the soil "consisted of red Kunkur [gravel] and
of different strata of clay", the aman rice land required
17 Taylor,1840: 124.
18 See BRC,IOR P/51/15,28 January 1787 for details.
19 IOL,Ms.Eur.F.95,ff.30-31.
20 BRP,IOR P/71/14,7 September 1789.
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to be ploughed sixteen times 21 , whereas the soil on the
western banks of the Hughli was rendered fit for this
harvest by ploughing it twice 22 . In the 24-Parganas, the
rice land was prepared by barely "scratching the superfices
of the earth" 23 . The boro harvest did not require the land
to be ploughed more than once. In eastern Bengal it was
grown "on churs, or low marshy ground after the waters have
subsided, consequently it (was] not sown till late in the
season" 24 . In western Bengal, boro rice land was "the
lowest admitting of cultivation", which:
Require no manure, produces a constant
succession of rice ad Infinitum, without any
discernible decrease of vegetative power,
requiring only [to be] annually sown with
successive varieties of grain25.
In the largely flat alluvial plains of southern and
south-eastern Bengal, the same land was used to procure
multiple crops of rice in succession. Thus in Midnapur,
jala land of the "l' kind.., produces two crops of rice at
the same time, the first called ause... and the other
aumeen" 26 . In eastern Bengal:
The aumun crop being cut in Aughun
[November-December], the Reapers
scatter Khassarie [vetch] amongst the
stubble, while the soil is yet moist
and soft from the inundation, which
springs up without any trouble, and is




24 BRP,IOR P/70/38,4 February 1788.
25 IOL,Ms.Eur.F.95,f.30;emphasis original.
26 BRC,IOR P/51/15,28 January 1787.
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The stubble and stalk of the khassarie
are then set on fire and the ashes
ploughed in with the soil. The boro
dhan (paddy] mixed with aumun is then
sown; this (boro] being of very quick
growth is ripe in Jeyte or Assar (May
to July]; it is then cut and the aumun
which is of slower growth rises with
the water [i.e.the seasonal inundation]
and is cut in Aughun [November-
December] 27
Naturally, the cultivation of rice was labour
intensive, though in the small peasant-holdings the entire
exercise was perhaps undertaken by using the labour
available in individual households. Apart from ploughing,
labour was required most in "1' s for clearing the grounds
from roots of grass, 2' for weeding and 3d for reaping"28.
Transplanted winter rice entailed the further task of
preparing the nursery for rearing the seedlings, which were
then re-planted in the main field once they had attained a
height of about 18 inches29 . The costs of cultivating a
bigha of land with rice of this kind was 3.875 rupees
during Kyd's survey of the western Banks of the Hughli in
1791°; in Commilla (eastern Bengal) the comparative costs
were 2.30 rupees in l789'. The seed yield ratio appears to
have ranged from 1:24 in parts of western Bengal 32 to 1:20
in Dhaka33 . Data available from parganas in Commilla,
27 Ibid.,P/51/40,15 July 1789.




' BRC,IOR P/51/40,15 July 1789.
32 IOL,Ms.Eur.F.95,f.31.
Taylor,1840: 125.The provincial average according
to Colebrooke was 1:15 circa 1794 [Remarks,p.63].
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Rangpur, Midnapur and Burdwan show the following output of











Various leguminous plants were grown in close
association with rice, often on the same land. As discussed
earlier, the rotation of khassari on rice lands, and then
using the stubble to fertilize the land for the next rice
harvest seems to have been well developed in eastern
Bengal. While vetches would grow in flooded soil, other
lentils, especially those called kalai, iioog and mussoor,
"much eaten by the natives, and particularly when split, is
called dall" required just the right amount of moisture for
"if sown on [land] too wet, [lentils] will not vegetate, if
on too dry, will never thrive, nor make any adequate return
for labour" 35 . Therefore lentils and vetches depended on
proper timing, and this is why kalai in western Bengal was
planted on the rice ground "in the intervals unoccupied by
the tufts of rice.., in the intermediate month of Cautic
[October-November] on the taking off of the rains, before
cutting down the 2 crop [aman] of rice, (the land now]
being no longer overflowed but drenched in moisture"; once
harvested in Phalgim [February-March], "the ground is then
prepared three or four times in readiness for the Baisak
BRC,IOR P/51/40,15 July 1789;Ibid.,P/52/42,9 March
1792;ibid. ,P/52/50,19 October 1790,and BRP,IOR P/71/22,20
March 1790.
" BRC,IOR P/51/22,23 July 1788.
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[aus] sowing of the ensuing season" 36 . In Midnapur, kalai
was considered valuable enough to share the land
alternately with sugar cane; it was grown on cola
(elevated) land of the n4th kind [which] yields Ook, sugar-
cane, one year and Kalai the next"". In eastern Bengal,
jute (paat) lands, after the harvest, were made "ready to
receive... pease and pulses of various descriptions [whose]
harvest is reaped a short time before it is expedient to
recommence the culture of the (jute], and the land bears a
succession of [such] crops for many years"38.
The output of these leguminous plants from different
districts is not known, but the evidence from Commilla and
Rangpur indicates that the produce from one bigha of land,










36 IOL,Ms.Eur.D. 95, f.32.
BRC,IOR P/51/15,28 January 1787.
38 IOR,Home Misc.,vol.375,p.318.
BRC,IOR P/51/40,15 July 1787.




It is necessary to bear in mind that these lentils and
vetches had an important position in the provincial demand
for food, as they were crucial ingredients in the daily
diet of the people. Thus this crop was essentially designed
for sale, and a substantial part of the intra-regional
trade in food products, particularly from western in to
eastern Bengal, was in split pulses or da142.
Tennant considered the "universal use and vast
consumption of vegetable oils" in Bengal as "prejudicial to
agriculture" because "much land and a great proportion of
the cultivated land" was used by such cultivation, which
Tennant thought "trench deeply upon the productive ground
for human sustenance" 43 . Obviously his reservations were
not well founded for, as Figure 16 (p. 258) shows, oil
seeds constituted a mere 3.5 per cent of the gross
agricultural output circa 1794. Nevertheless, its
cultivation was important for local production and trade.
In Jessore, for instance, til (sesame) was considered a
crop of the "first class" which bore "a proportion of four
annas [i.e. 25 per cent] to the jumma" 44 . Among the main
oil producing plants were those of sesame, mustard [sarson]
and teesy (linseed]45; some oil was also extracted from
poppy seeds: in Rangpur, "the poppy seed is used solely for
making oil [and] the Ryotts sell the poppy seed to the
Pikars [traders' middlemen] and Oilmen in the Mofussil"46.
Among the vegetable oil plants most coveted for its
culinary and commercial importance was mustard. In the flat
42 Taylor,1840: 129.
Indian Recreations,2,p.11.
" BRC,IOR P/51/22,23 July 1788.
BRP,IOR P170/40,3 April 1788.
46 Ibid.,P/72/15,19 April 1793.
240
alluvial plains of Gangetic west Bengal, mustard was often
sown on the banks of the river after the monsoonal overflow
of its water had subsided. Here the chief resource was the
sediments deposited by the seasonal inundation which
Tennant considered "the richest of all soils". The mustard
seed was sown broadcast "and gently covered with a harrow,
or by scratching the mould with a branch of a tree", after
which "the crop makes its appearance seemingly in great
abundance, and one of the most beautiful to the eye which
the country af fords" 47 . In his survey of the western banks
of the Hughli, Robert Kyd noticed that both mustard and
sesame were grown on a category of land called "dangeah",
this being the most elevated land where production was
principally dependent on "artificial labour", manuring and
water-retention "by means of artificial ledges of about 8
or 10 inches high"; the "dangeah" was primarily meant for
the cultivation of sugar cane, but it simultaneously
yielded two crops of "sersong and teel", i.e., mustard and
sesame48 . In general, the mustard plant was sown on
relatively higher ground in order to prevent an excessive
penetration of water in the month of Kartic (October-
November) and reaped in Nagh or Phagwi (January to
March )49
Teesy was grown on rice lands, preferably upon those
which "have lain fallow for 3 or 4 years". The ground was
ploughed three times and the seed sown in Agrahan
[November-December]. The crop was harvested "four months
after the seed is sown or about the month of Faugun and
Choite [February-April]... & oxen employed to tread the
seed from which the oil is extracted"; "the treading of
oxen [also] destroys the plants and bark adhering to them
Indian Recreations,2,pp.136-37.Tennant's
description of the mustard plant was from Chandernagar in
1797.
48 IOL,Ms.Eur.F.95,ff.33-35.
BRC,IOR P/51/15,28 January 1787.
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[the seeds]"50. The output of these various oilseeds per
bigha in different areas was as follows51:










There was a general consensus among contemporaries
that the cultivation of sugar cane and the manufacture of
refined sugar had declined substantially during the course
of the late eighteenth century. "Formerly sugar was one of
the staple articles of Bengal", but by 1776 "the sugar
trade of Bengal (had] in fact (become] annihilated" because
of "the increase in the price of raw material & of
labour" 52 ; but by the time of the Permanent Settlement the
exports of sugar from Bengal had once again become
"considerable" in relation to those from rice and other
food grains53 . What these descriptions indicate is perhaps
a relative decline in the export of sugar from Bengal which
should not be taken to imply a reduction in the importance
of sugar cane as a valuable cash-crop or a comparable
50 IOR,Home Misc.,vol.375,pp.305-7.
51 BRC,IOR P/51/40,15 July 1789;BRP,IOR P/71/22,20
March 1790 and 22 March 1790;Ior Home
Misc.,vol.375,p.305;IOL,Ms.Eur.F.95,f.35.
52	 BRC,IOR P/49/62,5 June 1776.Also see James
Prinsep,Bengal Sugar, London, 1794 (IOL Tracts,vol.436 a].
Minute of the Board of Trade,23 October
1793,IOR,Home Misc.,vol.375,p.41.
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reduction in the importance of sugar in dosestic consum-
ption or internal trade. Peasants in Chittagong cultivated
"a good deal of Sugar Cane about [their] houses", and
during his journey through this district, Buchanan "heard
the creaking of mills employed in expressing the juice"54.
As will be discussed subsequently, the cultivation of sugar
cane was based on investments made by the local merchants
who, in turn, directed the produce, especially of refined
sugar, to feed the large and intermediate towns 55. The
history of sugar in our period offers a good example of the
re-direction of agricultural commodities from export to
internal consumption under the influence of a rising demand
for food in the province, whose main features have been
discussed in chapter 1.
By nature the cultivation of sugar cane was an
expensive business, and the shortage of resources in among
the majority of peasants meant that the land actually under
its cultivation at any point in time, or in any particular
district, was bound to be relatively small. This can be
seen from the district-wise output of sugar in table 5.
Table 5
Estimates of land under suparcane in some districts in
the 1790s




Brit.Mus. ,Add.Ms. ,19286, f.8.
See BRP,IOR P/72/10,26 December 1792 for such
merchants in Birbhum;also see IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75,vol.2,book










Source: BRP, IOR P172/B, 29 October 1792; ibid.,
P/72/10, 26 December 1792.
Nevertheless this was a valuable crop, and great care
was taken to ensure its success wherever it was sown. In
Birbhum, "lands appropriated to the cultivation of
sugarcane [were] of various qualities distinguished in to
first, second and third agreeable to the quantity & quality
they produce[d]"56. The cane was universally planted in
high (colla) of the best kind in Baisakh [April-May] and
cut over the months of Magh [January-February] and Phal gun
[February-March] 57 . The sugar cane ground:
Being previously manured with rich soil
taken from low bottoms at the rate of
one basket load p[er] square fathom,
mixed with the expressed old seed of
Sersong [mustard]... in the proportion
of two and a half maunds per biggah and
trenched one span deep forming ridges
one and a half cubits [30 inches]
broad; the sugarcane is planted in
Bysaac [Baisakh] by slips taken from
the preceding years stock in two lines
or rows on each ridge at the distance
of one cubit. One biggah contains 6500
slips. • 58
In Chittagong:
56 BRP,IOR P/72/10,26 December 1792.
Ibid.,P/70/40,appendix to proceedings of April
1788;BRC,IOR P/51/15,28 January 1787.
58 IOL,Ms.Eur.F.95,ff.33-34.
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The leaves of the preceding crop... are
burned, and the ashes with cowdung
serve for manure. The field is then
well laboured, and levelled, and
afterwards divided into beds, 20 feet
long and 2 broad. These beds are
separated by ridges, about half a foot
high, and as much broad, which serve to
confine the water bestowed on the young
plants. In these beds, the joints of
the sugarcane are placed obliquely with
one end projecting about three inches
above the surface. The joints are
placed in the bed sometime in one Row,
sometime in two, and one distant from
another about one foot. The joints are
carefully watered, till they push out
young shoots. The earth is then
gathered up about them in ridges and
this operation serves for weeding59
Sugarcane also required extensive manuring in three
stages. The first manuring was done while ploughing with "a
compost made of soil or mud taken from the bottom of tanks,
rotten vegetables and cows dung"; the second stage was when
"oil cake broken to dust" was mixed in the soil "when the
plants are put in the ground"; and finally "when they [the
cane] attain a height of one cubit [the cultivators] strew
the ground over with the dust of oil cake in the proportion
of 2 maunds per Begah" 60 . Sugar cane also involved a fairly
high intensive use of labour in its production. In east
Bengal, the number of labourers needed were61:
Brit.Mus.,Add.Ms.,19286,f.13.
60 "Substance of a Conversation with Codadur Mundel,of
the Village of Deca,in the Purgunnah of Renalty,and
Province of Burdwan,distance 24 Coss (50 Miles) from
Calcutta",in Prinsep,Bengal Sugar,p.77-78;also
Buchanan, "Ronggoppur"[IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75,vol.2,book 4,f.82]
for the use of oil cake for manure in lands producing
sugar,tobacco and betel-leaf.










4 labourers for a month
2 labourers for a month
4 labourers for a month
2 labourers per month
10 labourers for 8 days
3 labourers for 8 days
The amount of labour-time socially necessary for
cultivating 5 bighas in the "environs of Calcutta" was
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62 BRP,IOR P/72/8,29 October 1792.
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The costs involved in an operation of this magnitude
were certainly beyond the capacity of ordinary cultivators.
For instance, the district of Purnea, where there was
apparently no "deficiency of land fit for the cultivation
of sugar cane", very little of the cultivated land was
actually utilized for its production because:
The produce is so small in proportion
to the first expense added to that of
cultivation, that the cultivator is not
reimbursed in the first year & does not
gain his profit until the end of the
second year. The Ryots therefore prefer
the cultivation of articles which yield
an early profit63.
Additionally sugar cane sapped the vitality of the
soil in three years, after which it needed to be kept
fallow for more than four years "before it recovers its
vegetative powers" 64 . Peasants tried to replenish the soil
by planting legumes (kalai and ussoor) in the intervening
spaces between the cane-stems65 , but it was still an
expensive proposition both in terms of labour and capital
costs. Thus in Mymensing, "the ground prepared for planting
the [sugar] cane must be raised and manured at a great
expence, and the labour of cultivating it is not
compensated in the same proportion with the cultivation of
other productions better suited to the species of Land it
occupies 66
The connection between scarce resources and choice of
crops by the peasants will be discussed below, but it was
precisely this constraint which allowed the sugar-merchant
to become instrumental in maintaining and furthering its
63 BRP,IOR P/72/8,29 October 1792.
64 Ibid.,P/72/lO,26 December 1792.
65	 BRC,IOR	 P/51/15,28	 January	 1787;also
Buchanan, "Ronggoppur", IOL,Ms.Eur. D.75,f.46.
66 BRP,IOR P/72/10,26 November 1792.
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cultivation. Advance contracts taken by the cultivators
from the merchants for the cultivation of sugar cane were
widely prevalent in west Bengal; it was certainly the major
form of cultivation in Birbhum 67 . Prinsep's testimony
regarding the cultivation of cane and sugar (in 1793) shows
that the main financial source for the peasant cultivating
sugar cane was the "mahagen", who levied an interest of
"one anna monthly for every rupees advanced, which is equal
to 75 per cent.per annum, and never less than 6 pice" or
37.5 per cent68.
The available evidence for the output of sugar cane
from a bigha of land, and the amount of refined sugar
(cheeni) or molasses (gur) which could be procured from a
maund of sugar cane juice is outlined in table 5.1.
Table 5.1
Output of sugar cane, sugar and molasses (maunds)


























Source: IOL, Ms. Eur. F.95, f.34; BRP, IOR P/72/10;
Prinsep, Bengal Sugar, op.cit., p.26.
67 BRP,P/72/10,26 December 1792.
68 Bengal Sugar,op.cit.,p.54-55.
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Though the cultivation of betel-leaf (paan) did not
find adequate emphasis in Colebrooke's Rearks on the
Husbandry and Internal Commerce of Bengal, it was neverthe-
less an important item of agricultural production. As
discussed earlier (chapter 1) local merchants had
established near-monopolies in the internal trade in betel-
leaf during the Nizamat and this seems to have continued in
our period too 69 . The chief reasons behind these localized
monopolies were (a) that trade in betel-leaf was extremely
profitable despite the perishable nature of this commodity,
(b)there was an extensive and growing demand for this leaf:
as Buchanan noted, its internal demand for consumption was
"enormous" 7° and (c) the cultivation of betel-leaf was
expensive and peasants were extensively funded by betel-
merchants who made "advances to the Ryots many months
before they (the leaves] were fit for reaping" 71 . Thus
betel-leaf production provides another good example of the
inter-relationship between peasant enterprise and
commercialization of agricultural production in the late
eighteenth century.
The leaf grown entirely for commercial purposes was
reared in specially constructed gardens called voroj, and
these were completely distinct, and required a different
kind of cultivation, than the leaves which most villagers
grew in their own kitchen-gardens. The latter was called
gachhoya paan (literally touching the tree) because they
were grown as creepers planted to the roots of trees. The
betel-vine was then naturally allowed to climb along the
trunk in order to produce an inferior quality leaf for
domestic consumption, and none of it was sold72 . In
69 For instance the sole trader In betel-leaf for the
whole of Dhaka city in 1789 was Ganesh Das Tiwari (BRC,IOR
P/51/50,24 October 1789].
70 IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75,vol.2,book 4, f.48.
71 BRC,IOR P/51/17, 17 March 1788.
72 IOL,Ms.Eur.G.75,vol.2,book 4, f. 51.
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contrast were the leaves grown in special sites whose
entire output was designed for sale. The vine-slips were
planted in Kartic [October-November] but there were no
specific reaping seasons as these vines, once matured,
would bear leaves for 9 to 10 years in west Bengal 73
 and up
to 6 or 7 years in the east74 , and the leaves were "taken
away from time to time as they ripen" 75 . The betel-vine:
The leaf of which forms part of the
composition of the article of luxury
among the natives... is raised on
artificial eminences from 3 to 5 feet
above the common level under a kind of
shed composed of the stems of the
Dooncha [?], the roof and walls loosely
compacted so as to be pervious to the
air and rain, and to afford a cover
only against the violence of the solar
rays76.
Buchanan gives the following description of betel-leaf
cultivation in Chittagong:
The betel leaf is a very delicate
plant, and requires vast attention in
the cultivation. The ground on which it
is raised must be high. After it has
been well wrought, and cleared of weed,
in order to completely carry off the
water it is, by narrow trenches,
divided into beds two cubits wide. Upon
these the earth from the trenches is
thrown, and in the middle of each row
a Row of betel slips is planted, at a
distance of two spans. Sticks about 8
feet long are then stuck up in the form
of the St.Andrew's Cross, in order to
support the pLixnt which is a creeper.
Other sticks are laid, horizontally





over the crosses, and on them is spread
straw or grass to keep off the Sun...
The wind must also be excluded from
this delicate vegetable by covering the
sides of the Garden with palm leaves or
straw77
To construct such gardens, the earth had first to be
dug to the depth of 10 inches, then filled with soft mud
mixed with a manure of mustard oil-cakes which remained
after the oil had been extracted. The entire garden had to
be enclosed by a bamboo wall and the roof was made of
bamboos mixed with mud and straw. The outer wall was tied
with rattan canes. The vines were planted in straight beds
and rows, manured with the same mixture of mud and oil-
cakes and then constantly watered and weeded and watched
for worms. The vine-stems were never allowed to rise to the
roof-level. The stem was constantly shortened, not by
cutting from the top but by holding the stalk from near the
root, drawing it out and then making a fold in the stalk
which was covered with mud and manure. This process was
repeated each time the stalk grew beyond the maximum
permissible height78.
Such activities were undoubtedly both labour and
capital intensive. In west Bengal the average cost of
planting a higha with paan was estimated at 30 rupees in
1791, but in the east it was higher:in Commilla the costs
were 81.94 rupees a bigha in 178980, while in Dinajpur they
were 168 rupees circa 180781. Returns also differed between
the west and the east:in Hughil a bigha of betel-leaf would
give a return of 475 rupees a year, in Commilla the return
Brit.Mus.,Add.Ms.,19286,f.22.
78 BRC,IOR P/51/40,15 July 1789.
IOL,MS.Eur.F.95,f.42.




According to Colebrooke, "tobacco (is] a very
profitable culture [and] it is eagerly pursued" in
Bengal83 . We have some evidence regarding the estimated





















These figures show that the cultivation of tobacco was
unevenly disseminated in the province. While Rangpur
produced the largest quantities of tobacco, its
neighbouring district of Dinajpur produced practically
none, its land being considered "not favourable for the
culture of it" 85 . Nevertheless tobacco was one of the
principal items of non-food consumption and its internal
demand was substantial: in most districts the local leaf
was "not equal to the consumption". There was apparently a
fairly well-marked social difference in the use of tobacco:
the "lower class of natives" stuck to the local, and often
82 Compare, IOL,MS.Eur.F. 95, f. 42 and BRC, IOR P/51.40,15
July 1789.
83 Remarks,p.76.
84 IOR,BRP P/72/10,15 June 1789.
85 Ibid.,26 May 1789.
252
insipid, product, while the "more opulent natives" tended
to consume finer quality tobaccos regularly imported from
Chunar, Patna and Rajmahal86.
"The culture of tobacco is laborious, as it requires
the ground to be broken up by repeated ploughings. The
tobacco, though transplanted, needs one or two weedings and
a hand-hoeing. It is frequently visited by the labourer to
nip the heads of young plants, and afterwards to pick off
the decayed leaves" 87 . Tobacco,
Succeeds best in strong soil, is sowed in
Bhadun [August], transplanted in Assiri
[September-October] at the distance of one-
fourth cubits and is ripe and cut down in
Poose and Maug [December to February]. The
plants as they rise to maturity (when about
a cubit in height) are stript [sic] of their
menus shoots and top allowing only from 10
to 15 leaves to remain as the state of the
soil admits. The leaves are dried in the sun
and then packed up for use88.
By nature tobacco required the richest, as well as the
highest, soil in the village. In Rangpur, tobacco was
invariably grown
"contiguous to the Ryotts houses where
they can avail themselves of the
assistance their families, in paying
constant attention to the preparation
of the Ground and the cleaning of the
plants which is indispensably
necessary"89.
Additionally,
86 Ibid.,30 May 1789.
87 Colebrooke, Remarks, p.75.
88 IOL,Ms.Eur.F.95,f.37.
89 IOR,BRP P/71/10,1 June 1789.
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"the goodness or badness of tobacco
depends entirely on the care and
attention paid to the cultivation of it
& the time & labour & the expence of
manure requisite to bring the ground in
to a proper state of producing the
greatest quantity of the best tobacco
are very great"90.
This meant that many peasants did not undertake its
cultivation. Thus in the 24-Parganas, "the ryott finds
greater advantage by the culture of grain [as] tobacco
grounds require much pains to be taken with them" 91 . The
question here was those of resources and returns, and (like
the cultivation of sugar cane and betel-leaf) merchants had
a strong influence in production. Almost the entire tobacco
output from Nadia was "produced by means of money supplied
to the Ryotts by the Mahajans" 92 . Rangpur's tobacco was
either directly financed, or was contracted for in advance,
by the merchants of "Dacca, Moorshedabad, Jungypoor,
Cutwah, Bogwongola, Chandernagore [and] Calcutta through
their Gomasthas"93.
The output of tobacco leaves per bigha was as follows:
In Hughli	 4 maunds
In Jessore	 3
In Rangpur	 3.41
While detailed historical studies exist on the
production of cotton textiles in our period94 , very little
is known about the state of the cultivation of copass, raw
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.,29 May 1789.




cotton, by the cultivators. According to Colebrooke, cotton
was cultivated throughout Bengal, but the quantity produced
was not enough to sustain the demand for cloth which had
"given rise to a very large importation from the banks of
the Jamuna and the Dakhin", and the reason was "[either]
the increase of manufactures or decline of cultivation"95.
There can be no doubt that there was an immense domestic
and foreign demand for Bengal's cotton piecegoods in our
period. More than 61 per cent of the Company's investments
in 1788 were for cotton piecegoods96 . The ratio of the





There was furthermore the Internal demand for cotton
textiles. Colebrooke computed an annual production of
cotton textiles worth 60 million rupees cIrca 1794 which
was 10.21 times greater than the Company's investment for
cotton piecegoods in 1788 and 9.15 times greater than the
investment made in 179398. These influences provide the
reason for explaining the increasing imports of raw cotton
from north and western India. In a survey of the cotton
industry undertaken by the Company in 1789, the proportion
Remarks,p.84.
96 Total investment 9,596,698 rupees.Investment for
piecegoods, 5,875,567 rupees [BRP, IOR P170/49, 12 December
1788] .N.B.1788 was a famine year.
" I am grateful to P.J.Marshall for providing the
figures of investments in 1787.For other years see BRP,IOR
P/70/49,12 December 1788; N.K.Sinha,1970: 1-3.
" The Company's investment for cotton in 1793 was
6,553,763 rupees [Sinha,1965: 178-79].
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The imports were principally via Patna, Mirzapur, and
Surat'°°.
Such data must also Indicate the unwillingness of the
cultivators to increase the production of copass In order
to meet the rising provincial demand. In fact, some areas
(like the 24-Parganas, Tamluk Syihet) practically grew no
cotton at all'°', in others (like Purnea) cotton production
had actually declined'02 , while elsewhere (Dinajpur and
Rangpur) the quality of cotton was at best of an
"indifferent" kind'03 . Two sets of Issues appear to have
been of decisive importance to the peasants. First, there
were the problems associated with limited resources and
There is much material relating to the imports of
raw cotton in to Bengal in the proceedings of BRP,IOR
P/71/10 and P/71/16.The evidence of imports in to
Blrbhum,Jessore,Rangpur and Nadia are from BRP,P/72/l0,15
June, 31 May, 1 June 1789.
100 Ibid.,1 June 1789.
101 BRP,IOR P/71/10,20 May 1789,29 May 1789,31 May
1789.
102 IbId.,26 May 1789.
103 Ibid.,1 June and 15 June 1789.
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returns, as well of local soil conditions which influenced
peasants not to extend the cultivated area for cotton
despite the existing demand. The full implications of such
considerations will be discussed below. Second, the prices
of locally grown cotton were apparently much higher
than for cotton which was imported. Cotton in the Deccan
and northern India was "raised more cheaply than in Bengal,
that it (supported] a successful competition,
notwithstanding the heavy expenses of distant transport by
land and water..."'°4. In fact one of the major reasons for
the decline of cotton cultivation in Purnea was the
relative cheapness of the cotton imported from Mirzapur and
Patna "which undersells the cotton in Purnea"105.
The cultivation of copass show distinct intra-regional
differences. Cotton produced In Dhaka was primarily of a
superior variety called nurmah In order to feed the
production of fine muslins ther&°6 , other districts tended
to grow relatively inferior varieties, variously called
hhoga and muhree, in order to meet the requirements of a
largely indigenous demand'° 7 . The pull of production
centres also Influenced the cultivation of cotton in other
districts. Thus in Sylhet, where cotton was only grown in
small quantities "on the small hills", the peasants tried
to cultivate nurmah cotton in order to supply Dhaka108,
while in Burdwan, which supplied raw cotton to Birbhum,
Rangpur, Nadia and Murshidabad, the emphasis was on the
cultivation of hhoga and muhree cotton for manufacturing
coarser cloths'09.
104 Colebrooke, Remarks, p.84.
105	 BRP,IOR P/71/10,26 May 1789.
106	 IOR,BRP,P/71/16,22	 June	 1789;
Colebrooke,Remarks,p.32; Marshall,1987: 22.
107 Ibid.,P/71/l0,26 May and 15 June 1789.
'o Ibid.,31 May 1789.
109 Ibid.,15 June 1789.
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Despite its commercial importance, cotton occupied
only a tiny fraction of individual peasant plots. A common
expectation that richer peasants would tend to give a
greater percentage of their lands to a an important cash
crop like cotton is not fulfilled from Bengal's case. In
their surveys the Company officials, to their surprise,
found that peasants with relatively larger resources would
devote at most one bigha of their land to it while the so-
called "poorer class of ryotts" cultivated half or a
quarter higha"°. Moreover cotton was seldom grown alone.
Since the usual distance between each cotton plant was
about two feet, the cultivator would plant the intervening
spaces with "different kinds of grain, which being of a
quicker growth is always reaped before"". The cotton
ground was also sown with turmeric or vegetables" 2 . In
Rangpur cotton and ginger were simultaneously grown on the
same piece of land"3.
At first sight such behaviour appears inexplicable.
Here was a crop with an extensive, and increasing, demand,
but there was no matching effort to increase the area under
its cultivation. The reasons must therefore lie in
considerations other than an purely commercial
considerations. Soil was obviously a very important
consideration. By nature cotton required a thick loamy soil
"in a situation high and dry to admit of the water running
easily of f""4 . The initial costs were high since:
The care required in its cultivation,
the number of people employed in
clearing the ground [and] keeping it
continually free from weeds, destroying
110 Ibid.,15 June 1789.
" Ibid.
112 BRC,IOR P/51/15,28 January 1787.
113 IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75,vol.2,book 4, f.41-42.
114 BRP,IOR P/71/10,1 June 1789.
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the insects which some quality in the
plant breeds makes it not only
expensive but equally laborious115.
Additionally, cotton was a precarious crop:
The plant itself being liable to many
accidents, the culture of it is attended
with much risk. A superfluity of rain rots
& decays it & a drought kills it. And of so
very delicate and tender nature it is, that
even a few days of unseasonable weather so
much hurts the growth & reduces the quantity
of cotton, that the same number of plants
which yield in one year 10 maunds will at
another produce only 4h16•
Very little is known about the output of copass from
a higha of land. Fragmentary information suggests that a
bigha of land could yield crops ranging from 0.5 maunds (in
Jessore), 2.5 maunds (in Midnapur) and about 5 maunds in
Raj shahi"7.
The rationality of peasant production
Figure 16 (p. 258) represents the sectoral
contribution of different crops in the total agricultural
output of the province circa 1794118. Food grains (rice,
paddy and millet) comprised 45.5 percent of the output,
whereas the cash crops (cotton, mulberry and tobacco)
115 Ibid.,P/71/16,3 July 1789.
116 Ibid.
117	 Ibid.,P/71/10,15 June 1789;ibid.,P/71/17,21
December 1789.
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FIGURE 16
Source: Colebrooke, Remarks, pp.15-16.
contributed 20.5 per cent. Pulses and oil seeds, comprising
about 20 per cent of total production, were certainly
designed for sale, but they were not at par, in terms of
exportable and commercial importance to crops like cotton
and mulberry, and therefore may be seen as part of the
overall production of food. The features of agricultural
production as revealed by Colebrooke's estimates are also
confirmed by some other contemporary observers 119 and from
119 William Tennant,circa 1797,gave a much smaller
proportion of the cultivated lands occupied by these cash
crops: "most valuable crops" like
"tobacco,sugar,indigo,cotton,mulberry and poppy" did not
occupy more than "twentieth part of the land" under culti-
vation [Indian Recreations.2,p.11].
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scattered evidence available from specific districts.
Fragmentary data available for this seem to suggest
that more than 60 percent of the cultivated land in central
Bengal in the late 1770s was given over to the cultivation
of the primary staples, rice and paddy' 20 . Pargana Lashkar-
pur, in eastern Bengal, had a total agri-cultural output
estimated at 324, 000 atmd in 1773, of this paddy
constituted 272,000 aaundc'2j . In 1787 Birbhum's gross
agricultural output was valued at 32,78,156 rupees, of this
7,00,000 rupees was considered the value of crops for
"manufacture produce", while the rest, 25,78,156 rupees,
belonged to the out-turn from the lands producing rice and
other grains'22 . Buchanan-Hamilton's surveys (circa 1807)
suggest that nearly 90 percent of the arable land, yielding
about 93 percent of the agricultural output, was given over
to primary sector in Dinajpur, whereas in Rangpur, the
turnover from this sector was 90.8 percent of the value of
the gross produce'23.
Unfortunately, the absence of measured area statistics
for this period does not allow us to study the actual
distribution of different crops on the cultivated land.
Some data are nevertheless available. These are outlined in
table 5.2 below.
120 Datta,l986: 391-92.
121 BRC,IOR P/49/44,21 Dec.1773.
122 BRP,IOR P/70/40,18 April 1788.




Patterns of Cultivation in Bengal
(selected areas, in biqhas)
Year	 Village/District 	 Total landa	 Food grainb	 Cash cropsc








































168.5	 112	 45.55	 10.95
': Land actually under cultivation
b: Rice, paddy, wheat and millet
C: Mulberry, tobacco, cotton, lentils, opium, orchards
Source: WBSA, PCR Burdwan, vol.2, 26 September 1774; Ibid., Murshidabad, vol.8, 15 February
1776; BRC, IOR P/51/50, 4 September 1789; Ibid., P/52/3, 10 February 1794.
Such data certainly suggest that the agricultural
landscape in eighteenth century Bengal was one where oceans
of paddy fields were dotted with a few islands of
commercial crops. This situation did not differ
substantially even in those areas which constituted the
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core suppliers for Bengal's textile industry. Thus in the
major silk producing district of Rajshahi "there is no
Ryott that does not hold Grain lands & in greater
proportion than Mulberry ones"' 24 . Peasant production near
Qasimbazar was similarly structured as the following
figures detailing the patterns of cultivation in the lands
of eight peasants near that town show125:
Total lands held by eight raigats: 67.26 bighas of which:




The following evidence pertains to the land-use of Han Das
a raiyat of mauza Srirampur, pargana Muragatcha in the 24-
Parganas in 1786126:





Pond & tank	 0.01
Such evidence from a province which supplied more than
80 percent of the Company's annual trade in cotton
piecegoods and silk textiles'27 must appear paradoxical. It
124 BRP,IOR P/71/10,25 June 1789.
125 BRC,IOR P/51/27,28 November 1788.
126 BRC,IOR P/50/66,7 April 1786.
127 See IOR Home Misc.,vol.401,pp.138-141 for figures.
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certainly appeared so to contemporary observers. The almost
monotonous complaints regarding the "indolence" of the
"native" peasant as a barrier to raising the productive
capacity of the land and introducing "new" (i.e. European)
methods of cultivation were essentially designed to show
the intrinsic agricultural backwardness and technological
deficiency of the average Indian peasant and to counterpose
the supposedly superior European (specifically British)
methods of cultivation and land-use. Central to this entire
exercise was the assumption that the British cultivator was
a rational economic agent who responded to the stimulus of
the market, whereas the Indian ( or Bengal's) peasant was
not128 . This raises the question of the rationality of
peasant production in late eighteenth century Bengal.
Robert Kyd, the superintendent of the Company's
Botanical Gardens on the outskirts of Calcutta (Sibpur) had
the following to say about the possibilities of introducing
new horticultural techniques in Bengal:
I can give the most positive assurances of this
climate [of Bengal] admitting the resource
derivable from the cultivation of Peach, Plumb,
Apricot, Cherry; with the Chinese fruits Sytchy,
Vampeen, Singeen, which succeed in perfection [in
Bengal] and may in the process of a few years be
disseminated throughout the Company 's possessions
if the Factory at Canton execute the Commission,
lately sent, in furnishing a proper supply...
I may further add that the culture of the
English Melon and grapes of every kind, may be
introduced with great success, altho' the latter
will succeed better within the precincts of the
Town [Calcutta], than in the neighbourhood of
Calcutta, which from the lowness of the soil
intense moisture and heat of the atmosphere in
gendering innumerable insects which destroy the
foliage in such a degree as to prevent their
bearing. Add to this, the defect of the soil,
128 See for instance, Colebrooke,Remarks, pp.27-
30;Tennant, Indian Recreations,2,pp. 8 ff.; Francis Gladwin
to Council,BRC,IOR P/53/55,31 January 1798;W.Roxburgh,"An
Account of the Hindoo Method of Cultivating the Sugar Cane
and Manufacturing the Sugar and Jagary in the Rajahmundry
Sircar",in IOR Home Misc.,vol.210,p.150.
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which bears testimony of the element from which
it has apparently emerged, apparently at no
distant period of time, being strongly
impregnated with salt129.
Kyd's remarks reveal that there were no deeply
structured "cultural" barriers to the introduction of new
products among the cultivators; after all the principal
vehicle of Kyd's "positive assurances" of disseminating the
new horticultural products "throughout the Company's
possessions" would have been the peasant. Kyd additionally
demonstrated that the receptiveness, or otherwise, to new
products depended mainly on climatic and soil conditions,
two vital elements in the rationale of peasant production.
To the European eye, the average peasant in Bengal
appeared extremely cautious in choosing the crops to be
sown and the extent of the land which was to be under a
particular crop at any point in time. Cultivators "seldom
engage in extraordinary speculations" was how their initial
response to indigo cultivation was described in 179O'°.
From the cultivator's point of view this cautious approach
to indigo was entirely justified for, apart from the
coercion which its cultivation entailed, the production and
marketing of this commodity was far from efficient, at
least in our period: capital invested in indigo was often
precarious, the interest rates were too high to be
attractive, there was an absence of a ready market for
indigo within Bengal and the sales of this commodity in
European markets often suffered from excessive delays'31.
129 BRC,IOR P/51/7,8 June 1787;emphasis added.
130 C.Blume,"Short Sketch of the Measures Adopted for
the Introduction of Indigo and Promotion of Agriculture in
Bengal Between 1779 and 1790",IOR,Home Misc. ,vol.443,p.600.
'' Ibid.The cultivation of poppy for opium was also
largely unattractive to the average peasant in our period
because poppy was an extremely precarious crop: "the poppy
is of so delicate a texture before it arrives at maturity
that an accident of the weather such as too dry a season,or
(continued...)
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Such cautiousness originated from the peasants perception
of the risks involved in production, and their response was
either an extremely slow acceptance132 or an overt
antipathy, and the latter was misconstrued as their
"indolence" in official circles.
An antipathy of this type was demonstrated by the
peasants to the Company's efforts of finding an Irish
solution to problem of famine and dearth in Bengal, viz.
by the cultivation of potatoes on an extensive scale after
the famine of 1788. Despite the apparently strenuous
efforts made by officials to encourage the peasants to take
to its culture by "offering seeds to any who would engage
to cultivate them", they clearly failed "to prevail upon
the Ryots to assist Government in its kind intentions [sic]
in their favour". The fact that the peasants did not take
to potatoes with the speed the Company desired immediately
brought forth the charge of "native ignorance" and their
"natural" unwillingness "to lend their aid to the cultiv-
ation of it". The real reasons of peasant antipathy were
entirely different.
First, the potato seeds were extremely expensive: a
maund of seed potatoes was priced at 4 rupees in October
1798. Second, the cultivators were not convinced of the
suitability of potatoes to local soils. Those of Birbhum
clearly stated that the soil there was "unfavourable of the
plant thriving, and being brought to maturity in this
district; the soil in general being formed of a hard
131( . . . continued)
a tempest of wind and hail coming on before the plant has
gathered sufficient strength to resist its force may
utterly destroy the produce of a whole pergunnah" [BRC,IOR
P/49/55,11 August 1775].
132 Thus according to William Roxburgh,"amongst the
natives of India,the transitions from one stage of
improvement to another are so exceedingly slow,as scarce to
deserve the name... however when they see a certain
prospect of gain,with little additional trouble,they have
been frequently known to adopt our practices" [IOR,Home
Misc. ,vol.210,p. 150]
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substance, and mixed with small stones or conker (kankar or
gravel] renders it uncongenial for the culture of
potatoes". The peasants of Dhaka objected to this item on
grounds that "the soil is in general unfit for it and that
in Bowal the only part of the district where good potatoes
might be raised, the number of wild hogs is so great that
their potato fields would be continually liable to the
devastation of those destructive animals". Third, Bengal
abounded in a number of:
Esculent roots of a farinaceous and
nutritive quantity which are a common
food among the lower class of people
(such] as yams, the Spanish potatoes
and the numerous varieties of Caychoo
[kochu]... all extremely productive
and... capable of being stored and
preserved for a greater length of time
by due attention to prevent the access
of humidity.
These local tubers were naturally considered "more
congenial and better adapted to the soil, and climate, and
[therefore] less precarious in point of produce than
potatoes". Yet some peasants did express their willingness
to cultivate potatoes. In Coch Behar the raiyat appeared
"extremely willing to extend the cultivation of potatoes,
provided they are supplied with a sufficient quantity of
seed in the first year"133.
Thus one of the key components of peasant production
was their perception of risks. This attitude was entirely
reasonable in the context of the late eighteenth century
because of the almost continuous threats from famine and
'" The discussion of potatoes in eighteenth century
is based on the evidence in BRC,IOR P/53/55,29 January
1798,12 February 1798,and 23 March 1798;ibid.,P/53/58,28
September 1798.In Midnapur the cultivation of shakkarkand
(sweet potatoes) was an important part of agriculture.The
seeds for this tuber were sown in the month of Kartic
(October-November),the tuber was reaped in Pous (December-
January) (Ibid.,P/51/15,28 January 1788].
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dearth to their subsistence and production. Risk avoidance
was certainly one important reason behind the preponderance
of rice and paddy in cultivated lands. Corn (i.e. rice and
paddy), noted Colebrooke:
Though not equally profitable with
dearer articles (i.e.cash crops] serves
to alleviate the risk attending the
cultivation of them; for they (the
"dearer" articles] seem precarious in
exact proportion to the greatness of
the profit which they are expected to
afford. On the failure of his mulberry
or his sugar cane, the peasant, had he
no corn, must suffer the extremities of
want; but raising in that and other
grain a sufficiency for mere
subsistence, he can wait the supply of
his other wants from the success of
other cultures; or, he can reserve a
hoard from the crop of a successful
year to meet the difficulties of one
that is calamitous'34
Nevertheless it would be wrong to assume that Bengal's
agriculture was entirely a risk-prevention enterprise.
Under conditions of relative normality, average peasants
could be seen attempting to try their hands at cultivating
the "dearer" and "precarious articles" of production. In
Jangipur for instance, cultivators often strove to strike
a workable balance, on their lands, between cash-crops and
the cultivation of essential staples. Here a strain of jute
known as cooch mardun paat and paddy were sown on the same
lands "adjoining to each other" because paat "will bear a
length of Drought which would destroy the Grain, nor does
it suffer from excessive rains", so that "in case of the
failure of one, from casualties of weather, the whole
together may yield him a profit". Interestingly, there was
very little mulberry grown in Jangipur despite the soil
being "well adapted to the Mulberry plant"; and the reasons
134 Remarks,p.67.
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for this were that mulberry required relatively larger
amounts of capital, and that its cultivation was
susceptible to frequent losses caused by weather or by
"disasters to the silk worms"135.
In a highly commercialized economy as that of Bengal
in our period, it was natural for peasants to realize the
commercial potential of different crops and, circumstances
permitting, to attempt to cultivate for a market.
Conducting an enquiry in to the agricultural conditions of
pargana Baldakhal in eastern Bengal, J.Patterson had the
following to say about the peasant's choice of crops:
Cotton in this district is an article
of universal cultivation, for the Ryot
whose land is not favourable to the
produce, provides himself with cotton
land in some other place more proper
for its growth'36.
In 1788-89, the Company made enquiries about the
cultivation of plants yielding a yellow dye "possessing the
Quality of Madder". The description of this dye from
Birbhum Is revealing:
From the small fibre of the root of the
tree cultivated in this district,
called Auch, a yellow dye is extracted;
and of which should it be found to
answer the purpose of Madder, large
quantities may be obtained, as on its
becoming an Article of Demand, the
Ryotts will not fail to Increase the
cultivation of it'37
In September 1792 the Board of Revenue ordered the
135 M. Atkinson, Resident, Jangipur Factory, 21 November
1792,IOR Home Misc.,vol.375,p.318.
136 15 June 1789,IOR Home Misc.,vol.385,p.325.
137 BRP,P/71/1O,15 June 1789;emphasis added.
269
district collectors to make the peasants and merchants
become more aware of the advantages of this crop since "in
future the demand for this commodity will be such as to
yield to them an ample profit on any quantity that may be
brought to the market". A positive response to the stimulus
of a market was anticipated:
If the profit accruing from this
increased price is in the first
instance secured to the Cultivators,
there can be no doubt of their
extending their plantations to such an
extent as in the course of few years
will enable this country to export
large quantities of sugar not only to
England, but to different parts of
India where the commodity is in
demand'38.
Though the exact details of governmental efforts in
the cultivation of sugar cane are absent, we are reasonably
certain about the expansion in the cultivation of another
cash crop, jute (sona paat), in Rangpur in our period. The
first inquiries regarding the state of jute cultivation in
Rangpur were made in 1794, which were rather imprecise both
about output and lands under cultivation' 39 . For the
greater part of our period at least paat was cultivated
almost entirely by the fishermen on small spots of land for
making nets'40 , but by the first decade of the nineteenth
century the cultivation of jute had doubled in Rangpur
because of the "demand from Europe and the advances given
by the Company"'41.
The case of betel-nut cultivation in Chittagong is
revealing in this regard. Here, and despite being a highly
138 Ibid.,P/72/7,19 September 1792;emphasis added.





taxed crop, its cultivation was spreading rapidly in the
last decades of the century:
Owing probably to the great number of
Burma boats that now come here and
supply themselves.., in place of
importing the betel from Sumatra (and]
every man is planting the (betel-nut]
tree around his house'42.
Thus the average peasant of our period blended an
attitude of extreme caution with a healthy regard for
commercial profit. But these peasants, like all producers,
functioned in a material milieu which was usually beyond
their power to control, and the influence of this
environment was critical in determining the specific
features of agricultural production and its social content.
The so-called "inefficiency" of Ben gal's agriculture
For western observers agricultural production in our
period was extremely inefficient. Bengal's peasants did not
use manure in adequate quantities to raise productivity
from land, they did not practice fallowing in order to
restore the natural vitality of the soil, and had no
knowledge of crop rotation of the type (fodder--cereal--
fodder) which was practiced by the peasants in eighteenth
century Europe. These were listed as . some of the major
"imperfections of husbandry" 143 in order to explain, what
was considered by these observers to be the essential
backwardness of Bengal's (and Asian) agriculture.
142 Brit.Mus.,Add.Ms.,19286,f.4.
143	 See for instance,Colebrooke,Remarks,pp. 22-
25;Tennant,Indian Recreations.2,pp.11 ff.
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The fact that the greatest portion of cultivated land,
under rice, was not extensively manured' 44 , except
naturally, was very much in keeping with the intrinsic
nature of rice. Rice cultivation depends almost exclusively
on adequate water supplies for most of its nutrients, and
the area under wet-rice therefore is not dependent on large
supplies of manure. Additionally, the fertilizing power of
water enables the fields to be cultivated continuously
without fallowing'45 . Our discussion has shown that the
deposits of silt and rotting vegetation (doulc) left by the
seasonal inundations was enough to give successive rice
harvests without the need for any additional, or artif-
icial, manures.
Nevertheless manuring was practiced for those crops
which needed to be manured. Unfortunately, practically
nothing is known about manuring practices in different
districts but a comparison of Robert Kyd's survey of the
western side of the Hughil river with Buchanan's survey of
Rangpur does show certain common features. Leaving the
roots of a previous harvest to rot in the ground was a
commonly used natural manure for the cultivation of the
aman rice. Burning the rooted stubble of one crop and then
ploughing in its ashes for the next was another widespread
form of manuring used for the cultivation of rice and
lentils. More elaborate, and costly, forms of manure were
used for cultivating sugar cane, cotton, tobacco and betel-
leaf. Here expressed oil-seed (especially mustard) cakes
were mixed with the top soil and then evenly distributed
over the beds and rows in order to provide additional
nutrients to the plant and to replenish the soil
'" F.Buchanan,"An Account of a Journey Through the
Provinces of Chittagong and Tipperah, 1798" ,Brit.Mus.Add.Ms.
19286,f.2.
'	 D.H.Grist,1975: 38; Bray,1983: 9.
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subsequently146 . Marling, or dressing lighter soils with
clay or loamy earth in order to enable them to retain water
and manure near the surface, was not in vogue ("the use of
the earth from marshes and ditches is very little, if at
all, practiced") 147, probably because of the costs
involved, which could be prohibitive' 48; and this can
perhaps be ascribed as one likely cause for preventing the
spread of cotton cultivation in our period.
"The Indian allows [the land] a lea, but never a
fallow" was Tennant's way of describing the absence of
fallowing by the peasant of Bengal' 49 . Apart from showing
that lands in Bengal were intensively cultivated, Tennant's
statement also demonstrates the essential divergence
between Bengal's (or South Asia's) agriculture from that of
contemporary Europe. In Europe, fallowing was essential to
restore the fertility of the heavy and wet clay soil after
two or three years of successive cropping. Here fallowing
was more than giving some respite to the land; it also
entailed successive ploughings to break the surface
thoroughly and get rid of weeds' 50 . Obviously this process
tended to raise costs of production and by the end of the
seventeenth century, the rigid rotation of two crops and a
fallow had come to be recognized as one of the major
146	 See	 IOL,Ms.Eur.F.95,f.30-35	 and
IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75,vol.2,book 4,f.82-83.
147 IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75,f.82;see J.D.Chambers and
G.E.Mingay,1966: 62-63 for marling in eighteenth century
English agriculture.
148 Marling as a device to improve the quality of
lighter soils was not an extensive feature of English
agriculture before the mid-eighteenth century because of
the almost prohibitive costs (see C.G.A.Clay, 1984:
112] .Marling seems to have expanded in the late eighteenth
century,and along with manuring,drainage and convertible
husbandry, it constituted one of the four major sources of
agricultural improvement in that period [Chambers and
Mingay,1966: 62].
149 Indian Recreations2,p.16.
150 Chambers and Mingay,1966: 49.
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problems in the way of raising the productivity of land in
Europe151 . In contrast fallowing was not an important
feature of Bengal's agriculture because the soil here was
more amenable, i.e., it could be broken up more easily by
"scratching the superfices of the earth". In such
situations, fallowing would mean an unnecessary loss of
output and unduly high average costs of production152.
Nevertheless, the awareness that lands tend to get
exhausted by repeated cultivation, and that it needs some
rest to recuperate was well developed in Bengal. Crops like
sugar cane, cotton and mulberry sapped the land after three
successive harvests, and lands bearing these crops were
rejuvenated in a four-yearly cycle. In lands bordering upon
the Hughli river, such lands were fallowed for about a year
during which time "the ground is restored with manure and
fresh soil.., and exposed once a month by the plough to the
Influence of the Atmosphere"' 53 . In parts of Rangpur:
4 years fallow are usually allowed
after 2 crops. The first year the
ploughing Is rather difficult, and the
grass roots require to be collected and
burnt; but on the whole the trouble of
cultivation on such lands is
exceedingly small, and the crops are
good. The land is fallow for two or
three years, and produces abundance of
grass, but It is of a wretched
quality'54.
However, compared to Europe, the practice of fallowing
151 W.Abel,1980: 109,208;C.G.A.Clay,1984: 113;Chambers
and Mingay,1966: 49.
152	 Significantly these were precisely the
considerations which were increasingly reducing the
Importance of the fallow In English agriculture from the
late eighteenth century (see Chambers and Mingay,1966:
passim].
153 IOL,Ms.Eur.F.95,ff.36-37.
154 IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75,vol.2,book 4, f.84.
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was undertaken on a much smaller scale in Bengal. Here only
a tiny fraction of lands producing selected crops were
actually fallowed, whereas in Europe fallowing meant that
from a quarter to a third of the arable was made to lie
unused for up to three or even four years'55.
The reasons why some European observers (for instance
Colebrooke and Tennant) noted an absence of crop-rotation
in Bengal are unclear. Contemporary European agricultural
practices appear to have been conducted basically on a
three-course-- cereal, fodder, cereal-- rotation of crops,
though in some parts, for instance in Flanders, twelve-
course rotations had been introduced by 1800; the so-called
Norfolk system of rotation (turnips, barley, clover and
wheat) was being gradually extended in to the rest of
England along with an increasing tendency to cultivate part
of the fallow with fodder crops'56 . Evidence from Bengal do$
suggest a fairly widespread existence of crop rotation. The
simplest form was the rotation of rice and lentils on rela-
tively lower lands, on higher lands rice and mustard were
sown in regular succession. Sih-fasli (three harvest)
lands, usually of the best intrinsic quality, produced rice
with either two crops of oil-seeds or lentils, or they were
used for producing successive crops of mustard, cotton and
lentils in a regular annual rotation' 57 . In fact Buchanan
listed "alternate cropping" as one principal agricultural
practice to prevent soil-exhaustion in parts of Rangpur'58.
Interestingly, alternate cropping, or the sequential use of
fodder crops and corn crops to obviate fallowing (also
called convertible husbandry) had only just started
spreading to the enclosed and fairly large farms of England
'" Chambers and Mingay,1966: 49.
156 w.Abel,1980: 207-8.
157	 BRC,IOR	 P/51/15,28	 January	 1787;also
IOL,Ms.Eur.F.95, ff.30-35.
158 IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75,vol.2,book 4, f.83.
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in the late eighteenth century159.
Agricultural Droduction: the role of sDecif Ic factors
To say that agricultural production in any particular
pre-industrial society depended upon a specific combination
of natural conditions, productive resources and the tax
regime would perhaps be commonplace, but, as will be
discussed, this mixture was crucial in the context of late
eighteenth century Bengal. As pointed to earlier, the
ordinary peasant certainly had an eye for profit, but the
evidence unequivocally shows that cultivation was
essentially geared to the production of food, often at the
expense of other more commercial crops. Such evidence
certainly requires detailed analysis. P. 3. Marshall's
suggestion that for the cultivator the balance of
advantages and disadvantages in the cultivation of various,
particularly cash, crops was more complex than a mere
response to an underlying profit motive' 60 further
highlights the need to place the specific influences on
agricultural production in proper perspective.
One of the important factors in determining the kind
of crops peasants sowed on their lands was revenue. The
fact that lands devoted to the cultivation of cash crops
were subjected to a greater tax squeeze than those sown
with food grains is a commonly known fact. In Midnapur
lands producing three cash crops (mulberry, cotton and
tobacco) a year were assessed at 10.19 rupees higha whereas
rice lands paid only 3.375 rupees bigha in 1774161. The
'" Chambers and Mingay,1966: 61.
160 Marshall,1987: 170.
161 WBSA,PCR Burdwan,vol.l,30 May 1774.
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average rate of revenue for cash crops in Birbhum was 1.35
rupees per bigha, while rice and paddy lands paid no more
than 0.375 rupee in 1787162. In 24-Parganas the difference
in the rates of assessment between rice and lands growing
cash crops could range from 2.4 rupees to 0.50 rupee
depending on the crop being assessed 163 . In Muhammadshahi,
the revenue of the amn (winter) rice land was 2 rupees and
the lands producing tobacco paid 3 rupees per Mgha in
1789 164
. Obviously higher rates of revenue reflected higher
returns which could be anticipated from cash crop, but such
rates nevertheless had a definite impact on patterns of
cultivation.
The prime consideration here was not merely the pitch
of the revenue demand (though that was important) but the
apparent tendency in the late eighteenth century for that
demand to fall regressively on cash crops. Thus while the
Board of Revenue, while observing the potential of
extending the cultivation of sugar cane in the province
(cited above) was equally keen to prevent:
The landholders... from deriving an
advantage by raising the rates of
pottahs of the sugar cane lands instead
of looking to the extension of the
sugar plantations for an increase of
the rents of their Estates [which]
would not only be unjust as well as
repugnant... but entirely counteract
the beneficial effects.
The Board's logic clearly was that if taxes were
regressively raised on the cultivation of cash crops, the
"cultivators will derive no advantage, the quantity of land
[under sugar cane] will diminish, and its price will be
162	 DRns B.Lrbhum op cit. 16 August 1787.
163 BRC,IOR P/50/66,7 April 1786.
164 BRP,IOR P171/10, 15 June 1789;ibld.,P/71/22,22 March
1790.
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exorbitant as it will include the amount of additional tax
on land"'65 . These fears were quite justified as is shown
in the case of some peasants in the 24-Parganas who, in
1780, attempted to plant tobacco on what were previously
rice growing lands. The zalrwlars were quick to seize upon
the financial opportunity opened up by such a move and
refused to "receive the Malguzarry according to the
established Jummah (i.e.for rice land] but insisting on
paying our malguzarry Increased account in tobacco
lands"'66.
The zamindars were not alone in such matters. Though
the Company tended to blame these zamindars for regressive
taxation, its own attitudes towards revenue did not differ
substantially. In fact, the important reasons for the
decline in production of mulberry in Rajshahi in the 1780s
were the high costs of cultivation and the financial
predicament of the "poor Ryott who is allowed no remission
In his rents", to which were added the problems created by
the famine of 1788167. In Burdwan, "the cultivation of the
mulberry plant has of the late years much decreased... &
one principal cause of this decrease has been owing to the
very exorbitant rent demanded from the farmer some of
[whom] pay so high as 14, 16 or even 18 rupees per
Beggah" 168 . A similar position was faced by the chassars of
Midnapur. The revenue squeeze was listed as an important
cause in the decline in mulberry cultivation in the
parganas of Cossijura, Narajol and Midnapur because:
The annual amount of the revenue of
their (chassars] Mulberry lands ought
properly to be paid in installments in
165 BRP,IOR P/72/7,19 September 1792.
166 Arzi of "Sundry Ryotts of 24 Pergunnahs" in CCR,IOR
P/68/3,6 March 1780.
167 BRP,IOR P/71/10,25 June 1789;emphasis added.
168	 Ibid.,25 June 1789.
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no less time than twelve months, but
they are compelled to pay it in
nine169.
The influence of revenue on production is also made
clear from the case of cotton cultivation in Chittagong
during the eighteenth century. Under the Nizamat, the
cultivators of Chittagong had enjoyed concessional terms of
revenue to the extent that "no distinction exist[ed) in
regard to Publick (sic] Revenue between cotton (growing]
lands and such as [were] appropriated to the cultivation of
rice"; the cultivators paid revenue "thro' the channel of
their zemindarries an annual revenue agreeable to the
established rates of assessment throughout the province",
and they were "not subject to any enhanced demands of
revenue in case they [appropriated] their lands to the
cultivation of cotton in lieu of rice". Given such
concessional terms of revenue, the cultivators of
Chittagong shifted from cotton to rice and vice versa "ad
li_bitum as the prospect of an advantageous sale, or more
frequently, their own private wants and emergencies induced
them". The situation seems to have changed during the
course of the second half of the century, when despite "the
profits arising from the cultivation of this article
[cotton] being greater than those arising from the
cultivation of Rice... fitsJ cultivation has not become
iore general n170•
Other factors were the capital costs involved in the
cultivation of cash crops and the critical shortage of
productive resources in the hands of the small-peasants. We
are told that the estimated cost of cultivating mulberry in
Murshidabad varied from five to six rupees per bigha under
normal circumstances in 1771; during unfavourable seasons,
the cost rose to ten and even fifteen rupees. Cultivating
169 Ibid.,P/71/11,25 June 1789.
170 BRP,IOR P171 /1 6,26 November 1789;emphasis added.
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grain was much cheaper: under favourable conditions it
varied from one to two rupees and rose at most to three
rupees per bigha when conditions were not so conducive'71.
In other words, the expenditure on cultivation of grain in
Murshidabad, on an average, was 72.72 per cent less than
the cost of cultivating mulberry during normal years;
during unfavourable seasons it was 76 per cent less. By
1780 the costs of cultivating a higha of land with mulberry
around Murshidabad had gone up to 21 rupees in the first
year, 9 rupees in the second and a further 17 rupees were
required in the third year as recurring expenses to
maintain production. After three successive years of
cultivation the soil would become exhausted and "the whole
process is renewed on fresh ground"72.
In 1789, the comparative costs of cultivation in
pargana Baldakhal were as follows'":




















171 WBSA,CCRM,vol.1,11 November 1771.
172 CCR,IOR P/68/7,4 May 1781.




In Dinajpur, the average cost of cultivating food
grain was two rupees a bigha, that of mulberry was 7.44
rupees, whereas the capital stock required for the
cultivation of a betel-leaf garden (usually half a bigha in
size) was 168 rupees plus a maintenance cost of 73.62
rupees per year'74 . From the figures given by Colebrooke,
the all-Bengal average cost of cultivating a bigha of land
with different crops works out as follows: grain, 2 rupees;
tobacco, 4 rupees; and mulberry, 15.25 rupees'75.
These cost differentials were almost prohibitive for
peasants already suffering from scanty resources and heavy
tax burdens. In Murshidabad, "the extreme poverty of the
Natives induces them to forego the prospect of greater
advantages involving.., the cultivation of cotton than of
rice or other sorts of grain"' 76 . In Rajshahi, "the lands
employed in Mulberry require much labour time and expence
to fit them for the purpose that which the poor Ryott who
lives from hand to mouth can seldom af ford"' 77 . In Rangpur,
"the Mulberry Plant is not cultivated in every Mehal, for
every Ryott does not engage in it. To prepare and bring
into cultivation, land proper for the Mulberry is attended
with an increase of expence to the Ryotts" 178 . "The poverty
of the people is the principal impediment to the culture of
cotton" in Sylhet'79 , and in Dinajpur, "the gain resulting
to the Ryott in rearing this article [cotton], can only be
'	 Martin,1976,vol.3: 831-32,870-71,864-65.
175 Remarks,pp.62,65,75,92.
176 BRP,IOR P/71/16,3 June 1789.
177 Ibid.,P/71/10,25 June 1789.
178 Ibid.,25 June 1789.
'	 Ibid.,15 June 1789.
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judged by comparison & the proportion this culture bears to
that of Grain, leads to a conclusion that the Ryott finds
considerably more advantage in cultivating the latter than
the former"'80 . Finally in Jessore:
The greatest disadvantages under which
the culture of cotton plant labour are
the general unfavourableness of the
sale [i.e marketing] & the want of
means in the Ryots to defray the
charges of cultivation which it appears
are great... . There is land enough to
push the cultivation to a considerable
extent if the Ryots had the necessary
means; but poverty reduces them to the
necessity of raising crops upon them,
less expensive in the process of
culture & (which] afford a more speedy
return18'
In Nadia "the cultivation of sugar cane is very expen-
sive and requires a capital which the generality of Ryots
do not possess"82 . The major barriers to the extension of
sugar cane cultivation were described by James Prinsep in
the following words:
Nothing seems to oppose an immediate
and great increase of sugars here (in
Bengal], but the disinclination of the
Ryots to speculate upon future
contingencies, which they cannot
comprehend [sic], and their individual
poverty, which forbids them to
undertake what they cannot
accomplish183.
These descriptions sum up the constraints upon the
180 Ibid.,26 May 1789.
181 Ibid.,15 June 1789.
182 BRP,P/72/1O,26 December 1792.
183 Bengal Sugar,op.cit.,p.53.
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bulk of the peasantry which were of fundamental importance
to the econcwLcs of small-peasant production in our period.
Finally, one has to consider the impact of dearth and
famine on agricultural production and on the agrarian
economy in general. In fact it would not be wrong to state
that the influence of famine and dearth on the economy was
the most vital factor in determining the state of agrarian
economy and the nature of land-use for agricultural
production. They were also the major factors in shaping
peasant-merchant linkages in the production of food-grains.
Famine, dearth and peasant production
The famine of 1769/70 was, among other things, a
critical blow on the productive resources of all categories
of peasants, and the price situation for the next three
years in the worst affected districts did not recompense
the losses suffered. Agricultural prices came down quite
quickly once the worst had passed. By September 1770 they
had started coming down in Rangpur owing to a "flourishing"
crop there'84 ; a "most plentiful crop" had also eased the
pressure of high prices upon the "surviving inhabitants" in
the entire belt between Burdwan and Murshidabad by November
1770185. Instead of steadying after that, prices of
foodgrains crashed continuously between 1771 and 1773 in
the famine hit districts. At Purnea, prices had plummeted
from 1.33 rupees a maund in 1771 to 0.33 rupees a maund in
1773, whereas the prices of inferior quality grains had
come down from 0.50 maunds in 1772 to 0.14 rupees a maund
184 FR,Murshidabad,IOR G/27/1,26 September 1770.
185 Brit.Mus.,Add.Ms.45438,1 November 1770,f.14.
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in 1773186.
Similar slumps were reported from Rangpur 7
 and
Dinajpur'88 . The reasons for such low prices were ascribed
to excess harvests and "want of purchasers"; for the
Company this at once raised the now familiar prospect of a
delayed payment of revenue. The cheapness of grain was such
that many of the "petty zemindars and ryotta" were ruined,
and large numbers of peasants in Purnea had taken flight to
the neighbouring district of Tirhut "and those who remain
are unwilling to start cultivation" 189 . In Rangpur, the
"excessive cheapness of every article of life" in 1772 had
"proportionably" reduced "the value of the lands"190.
The problems created by the famine of 1769/70 for
Bengal's agrarian economy were compounded by the subsequent
instances of dearth and by the famine of 1788. Dearths were
short-run crises of subsistence caused by localized or
partial harvest failures, and interspersed, as these were,
between two major famines, dearth created unstable
conditions in the productive enterprise of the province's
small-peasant economy. Such conditions were re-enforced
because of the virtual absence of state help in nursing a
crippled economy or to ameliorate the conditions of the
peasantry by providing some form of financial assistance.
The failure of the state either to design a cogent famine-
relief policy or to create state-operated channels of
agricultural credit was accepted by the Company after the
famine of 1788 in the following words
186 Compare WBSA,CCRM,vol.3,25 January 1771 and WBSA,
Circuit at Purnea,2 February to 9 February l773,p.8.
187 BRC,IOR P/49/40,26 June 1773 and ibid.,P/49/46,31
May 1774.
188 Ibid.,P/49/40,l4 January 1773.
189 WBSA,Circuit at Purnea,2 February to 9 February
1773,pp.2, 12
190 From C.Purling to Warren Hastings in IOR P/68/54,10
August 1772.
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The most active temporary interference
of Government in the famines has been
found productive of no other conse-
quence than a slight alteration of the
pressure on the poorer class of
natives191.
The absence of institutional assistance, the
unrelenting influence of weather upon agricultural
production and the almost chronic shortage of resources
meant that the average peasants in Bengal found it
impossible to make a self-induced recovery, on their own
assets, even after one harvest failure. The price situation
during and after such harvest-disasters also worked against
the producers. Bad agricultural seasons were also times of
high food-prices but these prices posed problems of
survival for the peasantry because of the inexorable
revenue squeeze. The fact that cultivators had to buy their
food in such times meant that they were under the double
pressure of meeting the state's financial claims and
finding money for their survival under extremely adverse
conditions and drastically curtailed incomes.
It is true that a dearth was not cataclysmic enough to
cause excess mortality, but it was serious enough to pose
a number of problems. There was the problem of subsistence.
A dearth did not cause an absolute reduction in the
quantity of food at the provincial level, but there was
nevertheless a severe food-availability decline at local
levels which consequently raised the spot prices of rice
and paddy up to a point where the local poor were unable to
purchase their subsistence. Obviously people ate into their
seed reserves. The result was their subsequent inability to
sustain production in the next agricultural season. A
dearth therefore meant severe strains on the "present
subsistence and future occupation" of the cultivators'92,
191 BRC,IOR P/51/22,15 August 1788.
192 BRC,IOR P/50/58,22 April 1785.
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a symptom which was a cause of, and intensified, the
shortage of resources in the hands of the small-peasantry.
The climatic origins of dearth also had a significant
bearing upon the state of agricultural production in the
affected areas. Floods meant that the standing crops were
washed away and arable land was damaged either because the
waters did not recede quickly enough, or the lands became
over-silted' 93 . In either case, and despite their best
efforts, the producers found it extremely difficult to
bring these lands back into cultivation after the worst had
passed. Droughts, on the other hand, made the crops wither.
They also parched the arable, thereby making the act of
ploughing a very difficult task194.
Droughts also meant that water levels in the rivers
receded drastically, thereby throwing-up sand-beds (chars)
to which the cultivators turned in the hope of getting a
crop of low-grade rice' 95 . What is not clear however is the
extent to which these lands could compensate for the losses
193 Thus a partial flood in eastern Bengal (in 1773)
caused by the Padma and Burril rivers:
Not only... destroy[ed] the harvest on the ground
and swe[pt] away whole villages (thereby] ruining
the Ryotts & occasioning great desertion; but
when the waters subsided,they left large tracts
of land which was before cu].tivated,entirely
choked up with sand & so impoverished as to
preclude all hopes of bringing it again into
cultivation (BRC,IOR P/49/44,29 December 1773).
The flood of 1783 caused similar damage to crops and lands
in Dhaka [see Islam (ed.),Bangladesb District
Records,op.cit.,1O July l784,pp.77-81].
194 Droughts invariably meant that "the sowing lands
are waste,the arable not ploughed" (WBSA,PCR
Murshidabad,vol.7,4 December 1775).The drought of 1791 had
rendered,"the whole soil harder & more cracked than it
generally is" (BRP,IOR P/71/45,16 November 1791).
195 See BRC,IOR P/51/40,15 July 1789 for a description
of the types of chars in Bengal.Such lands were invariably
the cause of intense disputes between the zamindars as they
"claim the property thereof as annexed to their respective
lands" (Ibid.).
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suffered in the more productive spots of land, or the
degree to which the output from the chars could alleviate
the prospect of semi-starvation during a drought. On the
whole, the possibilities of easing localized food shortages
by cultivating chars appears remote for a variety of
reasons.
First, chars were not fixed. They shifted from season
to season. These lands were fertile, but production on them
was uncertain as it invariably depended upon "the next
change of the rivers" 196 . Second, the established arable
was severely damaged by a drought, and the chars could
hardly have compensated, In terms of output, for the losses
suffered'97 . Third, cash crops, like cotton, mulberry and
tobacco could not be grown on char lands. Therefore the
problems created by droughts (or by floods) for the rural
artisans remained unrelenting. Such problems were
compounded in those areas which did not produce all three
rice harvests. For instance the district of Huh' 98 did
not produce any aus or boro rice; it depended almost
exclusively on the aman harvest, and upon imports from
other rice producing areas for its domestic consumption199.
196 Buchanan, "Ronggoppur" , IOL,Ms.Eur.D.74,vol.1,book
1,f.109.
197 Chars were also caused by erosion,when rivers
"sweep large tracts of country in some places and deposit
it In others" (BRP,IOR P/70/26,16 March 1787] so "one
persons property is carried away and another's enlarged"
(Buchanan, "Ronggoppur", IOL,Ms.Eur.D.74, f. 109] ,but the net
results of such shifts were fluctuating and often reduced
the lands for arable purposes,reasons which were
instrumental in causing the landed-proprietors to clash
with each other (Ibid.,f.11O; BRP,IOR P/72/6,22 June
1792;BRC,IOR P/53/58,14 December 1798].
198 Hijli was a major salt producing area and therefore
had a sizeable concentration of artisans.
199 BRC,IOR P/52/38,2 December 1791.
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Boro rice was not grown in Purnea, Burdwan and in
Midnapur200 . Thus when unfavourable weather curtailed out-
put, alternative strategies of cultivation were inevitably
inadequate.
Apart from trying to cultivate the chars, droughts
also meant that the peasants tended to concentrate on the
jala (low lying) land as a last ditch effort to procure a
harvest from their established arable 201 . Of course the
degree to which such strategies succeeded depended on the
intensity of the current drought. During the drought of
1791, the water-courses in Hijil dried up; cultivated lands
which depended upon the moisture and sediments (douk) left
on the jala lands by seasonal inundations became parched;
thus the cultivators were unable to "derive any advantage
from which their future cultivation can be ameliorated"202.
A similar situation was reported from the district of 24-
Parganas which had largely escaped the horrors of the 1769
famine "owing entirely to its situation, which being low
retained what rainfall and enabled the people to water and
preserve their crops" 203 . But in 1791:
In the higher parts which dried up
first, the rice plants are burnt up in
the same size as they were originally
transplanted. In the center parts where
the plants have grown to some height,
the ears which have formed are
perfectly empty husks without any
possibility of producing grain. In the
lowest parts which (were] the longest
moist have been long since entirely
dry, the few ears of grain which have
filled have a very sickly appearance &
cannot on largest calculation realize
200 See BRP,IOR P/70/40,Appendix to Proceedings of
April 1788 for a detailed list of types of rice produced in
different districts of Bengal.
201 Turning to jala lands during floods was impossible
as these lands were the first to be submerged.
202 BRC,IOR P/52/38,2 December 1791.
203 Ibid.,P/49/52,7 April 1775.
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one-fourth of the usual crop204
Dearth in late eighteenth century Bengal had
profoundly destabilizing effects on the state of
agricultural production and on the productive enterprises
of the peasantry at localized levels. The fact that they
occurred periodically after a major famine in 1769 meant
that there was very little respite provided to the
producers to recoup their losses, or to reclaim and extend
production on their own initiative. The best spots of
land205 , which produced the most valuable crops and were
the most productive, were immediately lost. This meant that
the producers were pushed into cultivating marginal lands,
which were relatively fertile but essentially inadequate to
meet current requirements of food and income in the contest
of sharply spiralling food prices.
Such situations were loaded with grave economic and
social implications. First, producers were invariably
compelled into working their lands under a state of
persistent uncertainty. According to Philip Francis:
The proportionate value of lands
fluctuates in all countries according
to the industry or ability of the
owners. In this country [Bengal] more
particularly it depends on accidents of
drought, inundation or favourable
season, of which no general calculation
can be made206.
Second, such conditions forced lands under cultivation
204 BRP,IOR P/71/45,16 November 1791.
205 These lands were so denoted "owing both to the
quality and their relative situation ...,in regard to
rivers,to the facility of obtaining water when wanted for
its cultivation & at other times of preventing inundation"
[BRC,IOR P/53/8,15 November 1793].
206 Ibid.,P/49/65,5 November 1776.
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to fluctuate sharply from season to season, "both in extent
and quality" 207 . This meant that there was a constant
movement from the more productive lands to relatively
marginal lands with each cycle of uncertain weather, or
there was a large scale lateral shift of an entire village
to seek out lands which were relatively better placed: "a
village in Bengal", noted Buchanan, "is removed 4 or 5
miles with very little inconvenience indeed" at the slight-
est sign of adverse weather, "such as an inconvenient
shower" 208 . In Rangamati, where the Brahmaputra forced
cultivated lands to fluctuate every year, the cultivators
had no choice but to "fix on any unoccupied land whenever
they may be injured or destroyed by the periodical
inundations", which meant that they, and the landed-
proprietors, "cannot depend upon sure income from
particular places"209.
But such shifts did not necessarily provide relief.
Apart from the physical inconvenience of leaving behind
their settlements, movements of this sort succeeded in
placing the cultivators in a number of difficulties. The
land which they previously cultivated was laid waste
(pateet), and they had to start afresh on other lands which
placed additional pressures on their already meager resou-
rces. In these new lands the migrants were given access to
pateet lands of varying productivity210 , usually on conces-
sional terms of revenue; but there was very little done in
the way of reducing the financial burden of bringing such
lands into cultivation as reclamation was "attended with
207 BRC,IOR P/51/22,23 July 1788.
208 "Ronggoppur",IOL.Ms.Eur.D.74,f.11O.This statement
additionally suggests the insufficiency of resources in the
hands of the peasants.
209 BRP,IOR P/72/30,13 May 1794.
210 This was in keeping with the strategies framed by
zainindars to improve the state of cultivation in their
lands.See chapter 3.
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great expence and more labour" 211 . They were therefore
placed in the unenviable position of having to incur debts
from the landed-proprietor or from the grain merchant.
Quite often the z1ndars or merchants provided these
people with the initial costs, but these were once again
loaded with high interest rates.
A dearth therefore was an intense short-term crisis of
subsistence and production, but the fact that they recurred
periodically in Bengal meant that these short-run crises
tended to fuse into one another. The natural rhythms of
agriculture were disrupted, so were the economic
foundations of agricultural production. Such instances
placed crippling burdens on the cultivators thereby making
them physically and economically dependent on other
sections of agrarian society.
The famine of 1788 was another major catastrophe.
Though not as intense as the famine of 1769/70, it
nevertheless had disastrous consequences on the peasant-
economy. The flood and the cyclone took an immediate toll
of lives as people drowned. The flood also killed large
quantities of cattle. In its immediate aftermath therefore
there was a steep rise in the price of draught animals
which meant that the cultivators were unable to plough
their lands 212 . The damage done to the established arable
211	 BRC,IOR P/51/25,1 February 1788.Peasants were
mainly required to cultivate waste lands in these
areas.These lands were variously called x,rroah or
mahsulat pateet,which denoted previously cultivated,but
currently waste,lands.These were relatively easier to
reclaim.They were also given portions of shikast pateet or
Ithas pateet which had never been cultivated previously and
as such had to be cleared,ploughed and prepared for cultiv-
ation (CCR,IOR P/68/5,21 September 1780,BRC,IOR P/51/25,3
December 1788].Obviously it was cultivating the latter
which caused the most severe strains on peasant resources.
212 Ibid.;also BRP,IOR P/70/40,25 April 1788.The toll
on the lives of draught animals was another major
difference between the devastation caused by floods and
droughts.During droughts,when crops withered,the parched
grain stalks became a major source for the survival of
(continued...)
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was also enormous. Thus in Jessore:
The effects of these calamities are not
confined to any one present injury.
They prevented the cultivation of those
lands on which the late or dry crops
are produced as the Ryotts were obliged
to sow thea on larith infinitely less
productive than those they had usually
sown them on, which were either covered
with water, or so wet as to be unfit
for use. That ground on which Cullye
(lentils] is grown was lost... . Some
crops approaching to ripeness, as til
[oil-seed], kudgoor [dates], the first
crop of cotton & Ca., others in a less
forward state, as mustard, barley,
tobacco, peas of several kinds, and in
some places the seed only sown (were]
entirely destroyed213.
Even those districts which had not suffered from the
cyclone, but had been extensively ravaged by floods, the
scale of agricultural devastation was vast. Thus Purnea,
still reeling from the famine of 1769/70214, was severely
flooded in 1787 when even its colla (high) lands were sub-
merged. The district of 24-Parganas was also disastrously
affected by a combination of a flood and a small-pox epid-
emic. In both districts therefore there were sharp
reductions of lands under cultivation, high food prices,
212( . . .continued)
these animals as they were let into these fields to graze
(see,for instance,SCC,IOR P/A/10 proceedings of April
1770,and BRC,IOR P/49/47,30 August 1774].During a massive
flood even this meager basis of sustenance was cut-off for
these animals.consequently cattle-mortality was higher in
a flood.
213 BRC,IOR P/51/22,23 July 1788;emphasis added.
214 In 1783 Purnea was still suffering from the
consequences of 1769/70 whereby there was "a deficiency in
the population and that above one half the lands [were]
lying waste merely from the want of ryotts to cultivate
them" (BRC,IOR P/50/46,10 June 1783).
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agricultural disruption, desertion and mortality215.
The additional problem during the famine of 1788 was
the inability of the peasants to revert to the Jala or char
lands. The jala lands were totally submerged, and the soil
so waterlogged was difficult to drain216 . The char lands
were similarly rendered uncultivable. Thus in eastern
Bengal:
The lands in the churs [chars] are in
a great measure overgrown with reeds
and canes, and the small quantity that
is sown, the Ryets cannot take care of
from the dread of Tygers, Buffaloes,
Hogs & Ca. that swarm in the surrou-
nding jungles217.
It is nevertheless significant that even amidst such
difficult circumstances the peasants tried to salvage a
crop of rice at the slightest available opportunity. In
Rangpur, there was a patch of fine weather for a fortnight
before the cyclone of November 1787 when "the waters had in
great measure subsided and the Ryotts in all quarters were
diligently employed in the important business of
transplanting rice". The cultivators of Rajshahi were
similarly engaged in trying to retrieve a rice harvest when
the cyclone struck, leading to fresh floods which totally
crippled all potential of a self-induced recovery 218 . The
surviving population was reduced to states of abject
debilitation, both physical and material. Thus in Dhaka:
215 See for Purnea,BRP,IOR P/70/18,31 August 1786 and
BRC,IOR P/51/17,19 March 1788;for 24-Parganas,BRC,IOR
P/52/14,7 July 1790.
216 "Remarks on the Several Collectorships in the Years
1788 and 1789",IOR,Home Misc.,vol.385,p.68.
217 BRC,IOR P/51/29,22 December 1788.
218 See BRC,IOR P/51/12,20 September 1787 and
Ibid., P/51/13, 20 November 1787 for Rangpur; Ibid., P/51/29, 22
December 1788 for Jessore.
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Those who remain have no cattle to
plough their ground, and are much
reduced in point of bodily strength
that their end is fast approaching, and
those with whom a little of the
necessaries of life are left are from
their distressed situation altogether
unable to cultivate their former
possessions; in consequence of which
the lands cultivated for the last two
years remain fallow219
The circumstances leading to peasant immiserization,
shaped over the preceding years, were strengthened by the
famine of 1788. Desperate for subsistence, the cultivators
were forced to part with their "implements of tillage", eat
into their seed-stocks, if any, and even to sell their
children220 as a last-ditch attempt to survive in a
situation so heavily biased against them, as the following
description shows:
To procure cattle, seed and the
requisite implements of cultivation,
and at the same time subsist with their
families till the reward of their
labours be reaped, is attended with
more difficulty than most of the
husbandmen are able to accomplish221.
219 BRC,IOR P/51/29,22 December 1788.
220	 Ibid.,P/51/51,9	 December	 1789;IOR,Home
Misc. ,vol.393,pp. 113-14, 120.
221 BRC,IOR P/51/51,9 December 1789.
Chapter 6
Agrarian Economy: Local Trade in Agricultural Produce,
Merchants and Agricultural Production
Some of the key elements in maintaining the rhythnrof
economic life are the manner, channels and agencies for the
distribution of food. Taken together, these elements
comprise the structure of local trade in agricultural
produce. Apart from its importance for the physical
survival of people, the question of trade in agricultural
produce is crucial in comprehending wider issues pertaining
to the structure and organization of internal markets', the
modes, methods and formation of mercantile activity, and
the relationships between the merchants and the producers.
These separate questions when combined together enable us
to construct a picture of commercialization of an economy
in a specific historical context.
The discussion in chapters 1 and 2 showed that the
principal factors influencing the flow of trade were (a)
the rising demand for food in the province (b) favourable
rural-urban price differentials (c) the creation of a
provincially integrated market for food and (d) a cluster
of famine and dearth years which not only provided large
mercantile profits, despite the climate of uncertainty they
created, but also enabled merchants to establish a number
1 This question is particularly important in the
context of eighteenth century Bengal because the writing of
economic history has hitherto been overwhelmingly concerned
with Bengal's relations with the world market,or with the
marketing structures and strategies for the high-profile
commodities like textiles,opium and indigo.
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of devices to control the entire range of local trade in
food-grains including the primary producer. This chapter
therefore seeks to examine the dynamics of mercantile
behaviour in the domain of local trade in agricultural
produce, especially that in rice or paddy, and to analyze
the mechanisms by which merchants translated their control
over trade in to an overt domination over agricultural
production and the peasantry.
Commercial IDrof lie of local marketing networks
One aspect, crucial to the movement of local trade in
Bengal was that many of the local marketing systems (hat,
bazaar and ganj) had become specialized agencies for the
circulation of food and other items of immediate
consumption. As already indicated, Bhagwangola, the main
centre feeding Murshidabad handled about 18 millIon maunds
of rice per year in the 1760s. Large markets (ganjs) in
Calcutta, like Baitakhana and Sovabazar, derived their tax
revenue chiefly from the rice and paddy brought there for
sale2 . Similar patterns can be seen even in those areas
where large towns did not exist. Purnea's annual trade in
grain was worth 2 million maunds; single parganas in Dhaka
circulated about 1.8 million maunds of paddy and rice a
year; and individual hats (village markets) in Bakarganj
handled on an average 350,000 maunds of rice and 120,000
maunds of paddy a year3.
Estimates of the share realized by agricultural
produce in the total amount of local trade are few, but
those available (figure 1) for rice and paddy do strongly
suggest that these shares were remarkably high.









circa 1807	 Dinaj pur	 67.9
circa 1807	 Rangpur	 49.64
Commercial dealings in these markets seem to have been
quite buoyant in the period between 1760 and 1800, both in
terms of the frequency of transactions and in terms of the
social participation in them. In Jessore "every pergunnah
and village have established Bazaars and hauts. Several of
the villagers keep shops in them, while others hold them at
their houses" 6 . The moodies (grocers) of Calcutta traded in
7bazaars and from their own houses, while the tahbazaris
went to markets during the day "exposed their goods on
stalls, or in temporary shops outside the established
market" and returned home at night, only to arrive the next
day "with no other intention than to vend their articles
which are usually of a perishable nature and must be sold
within the day..." 8 . In Dhaka, the hats assembled twice or
Ibid.;IOR,CCR P/67/76,12 March
1779;M.Martin, 1976,vol.3: Appendix F; Francis Buchanan
"Ronggoppur",IOL,Ms.Eur.G.11,table 38.
This was a market in close proximity to Calcutta and
handled the grain arriving from 24-Parganas,a district
situated to the south of that city.
6 BRP,IOR P/71/25,28 May 1790.
Literally below the market: a name given to the
itinerant petty-pedlars in the bazaars.
CCR,IOR P/67/72,16 September 1778;emphasis added.
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thrice a week, those in the city were open daily, and the
main items of trade consisted of "agricultural produce and
of native manufactures" 9 . Even in areas prone to repeated
floods, such as the low-lying areas of Rajshahi, markets
were held "for four & sometimes in some places for six
months of the year on board of boats"10.
These markets catered for a variety of local needs
both of commodities and services. A purely rural market
supplying a few villages (tarf) of Rangamati (with a total
of 256 houses in 1776) had 13 shops which included 4
grocers, 1 tobacconist, 3 dealers in cowries and 2 money-
changers (sarrafs)". A market established in early 1778,
about "760 cubits away" from the big Sovabazar of Calcutta,
had, by 1779, 54 shops comprising 39 tahbazariLs, 9 oodies,
3 fish mongers and 3 sellers of "threads and blankets"2.
A bazaar in Sutanuti (established in 1777), had by December
1778 managed to attract a sizeable number of 101 permanent
shops and 731 tahbazaris vending their goods in the open13;
6 new shops were added to this market in 1779, of which one
was that of a sarraf'4.
The apparent vibrancy in these markets can be
explained partly by the exercise of the Company's political
will in freeing the markets from the traditional social
control of the landholders and partly by the significance
of town demand. The hats of Jessore, for instance, seem to
have proliferated in the 1780s, precisely at a time when
its estuarine marshes were being reclaimed; and these
Taylor,l840: 294.
10 BR Misc.,IOR P/89/36,29 September 1790;emphasis
added.
h1 WBSA,PCR Murshidabad,vol.8,15 February 1776.
12 CCR,IOR P/67/65,24 January 1779.
' BRC,IOR P/50/13,22 December 1778.
14 Ibid.,P/50/18,27 July 1779.
298
markets functioned as a chain of feeder lines between the
Sunderbans and Calcutta, along with Katwa and Kalna which
formed the three consumption and redistribution centres in
western Bengal 15 . But equal emphasis must also be given to
the place occupied by rural demand in this situation. It is
perhaps significant that Tippera, commonly recognized as
having one of the most inhospitable terrains in its hilly
parts, had "upwards of 300 hauts" in 179016, and Sylhet had
"no fewer than six hundred gunges and bazars" in the same
year'7 . The flood prone area of Contai had hats where,
apart from the usual trade in agricultural produce, "small
quantities of thread, coarse weaving cloth, mats made of
split bamboos, brass and tutenag plates, koddalies
[spades], ploughs, plough shares and ruts for winding
thread" were sold at regular intervals' 8 . In Rajshahi, as
I have already mentioned, hats took to boats during peaks
of monsoon flooding. These examples indicate a widely
pervasive structure of rural demand. It is no accident
therefore, that the grain byaparis based in towns would
often be found sending their surplus stocks, ostensibly
kept to meet town demand, back into the countryside at the
slightest available opportunity.
A social profile of the eighteenth century btapari
Trade in agricultural produce was the task of a
specialized community of merchants at all levels of the
' Ibid.,P/51/7,26 February 1788.
16 Ibid.,P/52/19,7 September 1790.
17 Ibid.,P/52/]3,8 May 1790.
BR Misc.,P/89/41,15 April 1794.
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tiered markets in Bengal' 9 . At the ganjs and bazaars there
existed the "principal" or "capital" merchant, variously
called the goldar (golandar or owner of granaries),
aratadar (wholesaler) and the hhusi ahajan (wealthy in
grain) depending on the colloquialisms of different
areas20 . Below them existed a wide range of petty traders
who usually traded with their stocks, but also functioned
as part of an extensive network of commercial dealings
created by the town based merchants. The farias (pedlars)
of Bakarganj 2' and the palkar and baladiga of Purnea22 are
examples of such lower groups of traders who, while functi-
oning independently at one level also combined the role of
middlemen for some other, and obviously bigger, merchant.
This would make the structure of local trading networks
more of a multiform set of exchange relationships between
a number of differentiated partners rather than a
"pyramidal structure" with an easily identifiable base and
apex23 . Multifarious relations of exchange would explain
the function of the itinerant traders, like the ones in
Birbhum who were merchants "not residing but trading in the
zillah [district] through agents In grain"in 179624. Such
relationships would also explain the existence of bara
byaparis of Rangpur who came on boats "partly loaded with
salt and other commodities and partly with cash" and made
their purchases of "grain, tobacco, oil and sugar", which
19 have examined the constraints facing
peasants,even the richer ones,as merchants in greater
detail in Datta,1989.
20 For a discussion of the hierarchy of markets and
merchants in neighbouring Bihar,see Kumkum Banerjee, 1986.
21 Beveridge,1876: 282.
22 WBSA,Grain vol.1,17 October 1794;also Buchanan-
Hamilton,1928: 695-66.




were in turn sold to other merchants trading in the bigger
centres25 . In Dinajpur, the principal grain byaparls were
stationed in Rajnagar (the main grain mart of the district)
and traded through a wide range of commissioned agents
(gomasthas) who made spot purchases and then transported
the grain to Rajnagar for onward distribution26.
Such mercantile linkages also gave rise to various
circuits of exchange between a whole set of merchants
depending upon the nature of an individual's operations. In
Jessore, for instance, golandars sold to bhashaneah (river
based) traders, who in turn dealt with petty retailers
making spot purchases, but these retailers would often make
spot purchases directly from the golandars as well from the
"occasional vendors in the Bazaars" 27 . We also come across
a whole range of shopkeepers (dokandars) of Birbhum who
were "all retailers of grain" and dealt with the wholesale
merchant who resided In the zillah and the itinerant trader
who was usually non-resident28 . Then there were the
tahbazaris who, as In Calcutta, traded in open spaces
outside an established bazaar mostly in items of immediate
consumption. In Rangpur, Buchanan provides evidence for
the existence of 17 specialized retailing outlets ranging
from the grocer (moody) to the dealer in unbleached cloths
(kaporlya) 29 . The existence and the apparent proliferation
of such trading networks perhaps indicate the speed with
which the circuits of exchange were completed in the local
markets.
Who were the traders in agricultural produce? Data for
reconstructing the social profile of the entire range of
25 Buchanan,"Ronggoppur".IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75,f.85.
26 WBSA,Board of Revenue,Judicial Branch,2 June to 30
August 1790,14 July 1790;WBSA,Grain,vol.1,15 October 1794.
27 BR Misc., IOR P/89/40,20 January 1795.
28 WBDR,n.s.,Blrbhum, 4 June l796,p.64.
29 IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75,ff.83-84.
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merchants in this sector are scarce. There is some
evidence, however, for analyzing the social origins of the
"principal" traders in the following tentative fashion.
Buchanan lists merchants from Benares,47'tesumably of the
Khatri caste, and Gosains of north India as the richest
merchants in Rangpur at the turn of the century30 . In
Dinajpur, the principal trader was the family-based concern
of Bhoj RaJ, an Oswal merchant from Rajasthan 31 . The
longest single piece of evidence so far available of these
merchants comes from the letters of R.P.Pott, the
Comptroller of government customs at Murshidabad, who (in
1787) described "the whole body of grain beparis" in
Murshidabad as being composed of "four tribes", these being
"coyer. buccali. ouzlneah and moorchak"32.
D.H.Curly makes an orthographical study of these names
and then suggests that coger (kaya) refers to the merchants
from Rajasthan, buccali (baqqali) points to a traditional
group of grain merchants common in all parts of north
India, ouzineah (ujjaini) alludes to merchants native to
Ujjain and moorchak (murcha) was the name of a merchant
group trading with Murshidabad on the Jalangi river. Curly
further suggests that these names do not refer to specific
caste groups but rather to a set of regional identities and
occupational positions; and that the kaya and baqqal
probably represent a split between the Marwari and Bengali
merchants33 . A list of merchants trading in Rangpur in 1770
shows a dominance of the banias or baniks (saha. pal. seth
30 Ibid.,f.87.
31 Martin,1976,vo.2: 759.
32 BRP,IOR P/70/35,27 September 1787,letter dated 19
November 1787;emphasis added.




and poddar) 34 , while similar caste-names (pal, saha, sheel
and addi) figure prominently among the principal grain
traders in Calcutta's Sovabazar in l787. Of a total of
45,835 maunds of grain allegedly withheld from the markets
of Midnapur during the famine of 1788, grain ahajans, or
baniks figure prominently as responsible for controlling
37,710 maunds; the rest,8, 125 maunds, was held back by the
zam i ndars and	 wis36
The overall weight of the evidence does suggest that
wholesale trading in food-stuffs was the function of a
specialized social community, the hanik or hania37 , and it
is quite likely that it was in a process of transition from
previously occupational groups into a distinct social caste
in the eighteenth century. H.Sanyal's study of the Sodgops
'(an agricultural caste in south-west Bengal) and the Tills
(oil-pressers) documents the social movement of groups from
occupational categories to specific castes or sub-castes in
agrarian society from the seventeenth century 38 . His study
perhaps lends credibility to the view I propose of the
grain merchants coalescing into a specific caste during the
period under review.
vide,Mohsin,1973: 24-25.
BRP,IOR P/70/40,18 April 1787.
36 BRC,IOR P/51/21,2 July 1788.
" "Dealers in the necessaries of life are of the same
cast or tribe and connected with each other",and this was
seen as an important reason for enabling "them to form
combinations against the public with greater facility than
in other countries" [BRC,IOR P/52/26,21 October 1791].
38 H.Sanyal,1981.
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Mercantile strategies: creation of trading intermediaries
and circumventing state control
Crucial to the principal traders were the links they
could establish between their trading headquarters and the
supply bases, and the manner in which they did so is of
central importance to the ways in which they exercised
their control over markets. In essence what the merchants
did was to establish a chain of intermediate dealing
agents, the gomastha and the palkar. They traded with
loaned capital for a commission, buying up from the hats as
well as directly from the peasants". The reason why these
agents had easier access to the peasants' threshing floor
was due to their ownership of pack oxen which facilitated
40their movements in the muffassal . These agents were also
instrumental in forwarding seed advances to the needy
ralyat on behalf of the superior trader41.
Gomasthas and palkars either purchased directly from
the cultivators, and these purchases were made both at the
latter's house and at the hat'2 . The pai_kars took small
advances from the non-resident merchant (in Purnea these
See WBSA,Grain,vol.1,17 October 1794 for Burdwan;18
October 1794 for Jessore;lO October 1794 for Bakarganj;15
October 1794 for Dinajpur;17 October 1794 for Purnea;lO
November 1794 for Tippera.
40 Kumkum Banerjee (1986: 408),following Buchanan-
Hamilton,says that the paiJcars of Purnea did not use
oxen,considered sacred beasts,as they were men of pure
birth.Evidence to the contrary is however available.The
palkars of Purnea "from keeping a number of cattle are
enabled to go some distance into the country and purchase
the grain imnediately as it is harvested from the culti-
vator..."says a report from the collector of Purnea in
October 1794 (WBSA,Grain,vol.1,17 October 1794;emphasis
added).
41	 Datta,1986: 396-97,399.
42	 Beveridge,1876: 282; BDR.Dinajpur,vol.2,3 June
l788,p.23l.
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advances ranged from anything between 1 rupee and 30 rupees
at a time) 43 , gave "ample security for the money" and made
their purchases "at a rate sufficiently moderate to admit
of the pykars selling of it at the gunge price without loss
to himself" 44 . The kaya and baqqali merchants of
Murshidabad had their kinsmen stationed in the principal
markets of Dinajpur45 ; so did the non-resident merchants
purchasing their grain in Rangpur 46 and in Birbhum47 . But
the networks did not stop at this. Big traders also entered
into ties with other social groups not belonging to the
same caste or kin. The baladlyas considered to be of a
lower caste were the paikars of the grain merchants of
Rangpur48 and Purnea49.
The establishment of these trading intermediaries
represents the growth of an interlinked capital in Bengal's
countryside, a type of capital whose main concentration was
in towns, and which by a process of internal division
became fragmented into numerous clusters. Yet in essence
these clusters were only the other face of a centralized
deployment of capital. That the management of capital was
centralized is apparent from the way in which these
different merchants functioned. The Murshidabad-based
merchants, divided as they were into four major groups,
managed their affairs under the leadership of a head who
was appointed by the group. Each "tribe", writes
comptroller Pott, "has a head who manages the business in
WBSA,Grain,vol.1,17 October 1794.
Ibid.
WBSA,Board of Revenue:Judicial Branch,2 June-30






Murshidabad for the collective body" 50. What these so-
called "tribes" did was to form tightly knit groups (dala)
under the leadership of a paraank or dalapati. (the "head"
in Pott's language) who regulated the activities of its
members spread out over an extensive catchment area. The
Dinajpur merchants did so by having regular meetings
(baithak) with their dalapati in Murshidabad where they
formulated general principles and regulations in mutual
consultation51 . The importance of their trading concerns
meant that restrictions on commercial and social dealings
on the basis of caste could not be rigidly enforced. Other
castes had to be incorporated in the wider network of the
dala; even those considered low in the caste hierarchy were
brought into its ambit as, for example, the baladiyas of
Purnea and the sahu or teli merchants in Rangpur52.
All these factors resulted in a honeycomb of
intermediate agents who were crucial to the control these
merchants could exercise over markets. Close control over
supply lines from the muffassal and an overriding profit
motive were two inter-related considerations for any trader
and these intermediaries were one way in which such
aspirations could be realized.
Another crucial factor in merchant operations was the
manipulation of agricultural prices. The price mechanism
comprised two elements:the prices in the rurban centres or
in towns and the prices in the countryside 53 . The latter
sphere determined what the merchants considered their price
of procurement. The other aspect of the price situation (to
which I have already drawn attention) was its apparently
° BRP,IOR P/70/35,27 November 1787;emphasis added.
51 Martin,1976,vol.2: 758;also D.H.Curly,op.cit.
52 IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75,f.84.
"In distant parganas,far removed from proper means
of transport and market towns,grain sells considerably
cheaper, the price rising in places more contiguous to marts
of grain" (WBSA,Grain,vol.l,31 October 1794).
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volatile instability, even during relatively normal
agricultural years. Famines, or near-famines, and harvest
failures exerted further destablizing effects on prices.
To circumvent the problem of oscillating prices and to
ensure remunerative returns at both ends of the trading
scale were some of the principal concerns of these
merchants. Any interference in this sphere was viewed with
immediate hostility which even the Company realized much to
its chagrin, especially during times of scarcity. Thus in
August 1774, when an "unusual drought" was looming large
and prices had risen to "an alarming height" in the city of
Murshidabad, boats loaded with rice at Bhagwangola would
not proceed to the city as the byaparis "were in hopes that
the price would still rise, particularly if the
unfavourable weather should continue..." 54 . During the
widespread flood-induced famine of 1787, merchants
continued to send rice to Calcutta from the already
deficient places like Sylhet, Dinajpur, Dhaka and
Rajshahi:"the famine has already raised the price of rice
considerably and the merchants continue daily increasing it
by exportation" 55 . An attempt was made to place an embargo
on exports from Rangpur by the collector D. H.MacDowall,
but the byaparis continued sending their stocks to
Murshidabad, to be re-routed to Calcutta, saying that "we
have never sold grain at Rungpore, and from selling here
great loss will accrue to us..." 56 . In fact even Warren
Hastings was forced to deregulate prices and suspend ganj
duties to coax merchants to bring rice to Calcutta in 1784
(a year of a partial famine) as "they were deter'd from
bringing it to market because they were obliged to sell it
BRC,IOR P/49/51,13 February 1775.
Ibid.and 9 August 1787.
56 Ibid.,P/51/9,21 July 1787.
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at an arbitrary valuation"57.
Governmental efforts to meet this problem head-on met
with less success than had been anticipated. They simply
could not break through the mercantile web and deal
directly with the cultivators. Merchants bought all the
surplus grain available at the slightest suspicion of state
interference. "The mahajans having by some means obtained
information of Government's intention are endeavouring to
purchase up all the grain of the country in the expectation
of making their own terms" wrote the collector of Tirhut in
February 179558. In Syihet attempts to keep the state's
involvement in the purchases of grain under wraps failed in
October 1794 as "the rice merchants forming an idea that
the government are in want of grain store it up to enhance
the price and thereby distress the District" 59 . State
buying in Purnea was similarly troubled. The collector
there wrote in dismay that his attempts to purchase 10,000
maunds had increased the spot price of rice "by one-fourth
the next market day", whereas fifty merchants could
purchase 20,000 maunds in one day "without any enhancement
of price"60.
This covert resistance by the grain merchants made the
Company reverse its policy, initiated in 1794, to buy
directly from the producers at regulated prices and to
stockpile in "public granaries" 61 . This resistance forced
them to make purchases "by private arrangements with grain
merchants and other persons in such manner as may appear
" "Abstract of an Examination of Several Grain
merchants in Calcutta",Sir John Shore to Council,1 February
1788, in Ibid. ,P/51/7.
58 WBSA,Grain,vol.3,14 February 1795.
Ibid.,vol.1,19 October 1794.
60 Ibid.,31 October 1794;emphasis added.
61 Ibid.,p.2.
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best calculated to procure grain at the cheapest rate"2,
even though it was universally known that the "mohajons
always sell at a higher price than what can be purchased
from the ryotts"3.
Merchants, price control and profits
Having circumscribed the interference of the state in
agricultural prices the merchants set about determining
these themselves. It was commonly accepted that the sale
prices in towns and ganjs were determined by the merchants
themselves64 , presumably in their sessional bait.haks. The
merchants of Calcutta who purchased grain from the ones
trading from Murshidabad and Dhaka frequently complained
that coming to agreeable sale prices between these groups
was difficult because of the interference of the Company in
Calcutta's bazaars; their logic clearly being that prices
had to be negotiated between the traders themselves, and
that the merchants would trade wherever they received a
better price: "more will be brought to the market if the
merchants are permitted to sell [at] what price they
please" said the byaparis of Calcutta to John Shore in
February 178865.
Apart from manipulating prices during times of
scarcity (discussed below), these merchants also took
advantage of the seasonal flow of the principal riverain
62 Ibid.,p.147.
63 Ibid.,29 October 1794.
64 BRC,IOR P/50/30,5 January 1781;BRP,IOR P/70/40,1
April 1788;ibid.,P/70/44,20 August 1788;Taylor,1840: 296.
65 BRC,IOR P/51/17,1 February 1788.
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systems upon which the larger towns depended on their
supplies of food from long distances. The following
description pertaining to the supplies of food to Calcutta
in 1791 is extremely revealing.
The times when rice becomes most scarce
and dear are in a month or two after
the communication between the Great
River [i.e the Ganges] by means of the
Gelingee, Cossembuzar and Sooty Rivers,
with the river Hoogly are stopt (sic],
and become unnavigable, even for small
craft, which usually happens by the end
of November, or early in December, and
continues to the end of May, or
beginning of June, when these channels
of conveyance again are opened, and
become navigable; from which it appears
that all communication with the upper
provinces, and the importation of grain
from the these parts are shut up, for
about six months in a year. This
therefore is the season when rice
usually becomes dear, not because a
real dearth or scarcity reigns, but
that here in Calcutta, and the province
of Bengal, the corn-merchants in
wholesale and retail raise the price of
their grain: and this they always do
from December to June when the
comrinmicat6Lon with the upper country is
open again 6
It was precisely the determination of "the price they
please" which made the merchants hostile to state
intervention, as I have just shown. At another level it
caused them to chart out numerous strategies in order to
control prices and supplies as well as to ride the numerous
price crests and troughs. These strategies were designed to
control the source of all trade:the peasant. One such
agency was the chain of intermediaries who made spot
purchases from the raiyats houses as well from the hats.
This was complemented by the ownership of storehouses
66 BRC,IOR P/52/28,1 March 1791;emphasis added.
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(golahs) at various places capable of storing up to 5000
maunds of rice or paddy for more than five years without
damage, and by the possession of those crucial modes of
transportation which the raiyat lacked67.
The gomastha and paikar both purchased whatever
surplus was available and forestalled competition, thus
enabling particular merchants to emerge as preptive
buyers in their own trading regions. The golali.s enabled the
merchants to tide over seasonal variations in agricultural
prices between the time of ploughing and sowing (when
prices were at their highest and grain was sold or advanced
as seed loans) and harvests (when prices ebbed and grain
was purchased). These golahs also enabled them to even out
any disadvantages which may otherwise have arisen from
unseasonal price oscillations created by an intermixture of
good and bad agricultural years. In good years when grain
prices dropped sharply, the merchants would buy up, store
in their golahs and release in both directions (town and
country) in bad years brought about by crop failures 68 . The
gomasthas were under strict instructions to cease making
spot purchases (usually done immediately after the harvest)
if they felt that the prices were not low enough, or that
the peasants were bargaining for better terms69 . The
producers faced major problems if this ever materialized as
it would immediately jeopardize the payment of revenue to
the state in cash since "without the assistance of the
merchants, the ryotts suffer the greatest distress to
liquidate the demand for rent upon them" 70 . This pressure
forced the cultivators to suffer an enforced reduction of
price in order to appease the merchant. It is therefore
67 Datta,1986: 400-1.
68 Ibid.,pp.395,399-400.
69 WBSA,Grain,vol.l,17 October 1794.
70 BRP,IOR P/71/30,arzi of the Raja of Burdwan,31 July
1790.
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hardly surprising that the raiyats were often "obliged to
dispose of their grain on any terms, for one third, often
for baif less, than the custorzary aarket price"71.
Profits from trade seem to have emerged from three
levels. At the first level were those profits which accrued
from the act of selling in the towns. At the second level
we can see those profits which emerged while purchasing
grain from peasants, and at the third level were the super
profits which merchants made during times of scarcity. The
first two levels were ever present in any type of
transaction72 , whereas the third was periodic but immense
nevertheless.
Contemporary notions that average rates of profit from
selling grain in towns ranged from 15 to 20 percent under
normal circumstances73
 may have been a conservative
estimate as figure 3 shows:
Figure 374




Trade with the towns was not a profitable venture in
71 CCR,IOR P/68/7,4 May 1781;emphasis added.
72 In fact the distinction between the first and
second levels of profits is largely formal in an effort to
show the various channels which contributed to the making
of mercantile profit.In actual operation these two levels
were intertwined in a complex fashion,and it was level two
(profits made from underpricing the peasant) which actually
determined the range of profits which could be made in
level one.
cPC,vol.8,letter no.158,12 February 1788.
Calculated from Datta,1986: 389.
Year ProduceLocality
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grain alone. Betel leaf merchants of Dhaka, who had carved
petty monopolies of their own had an extremely lucrative
trade going precisely because of the price differentials
which prevailed between the town and the .uffassal: "the
difference between the price at which paun (betel-leaf] is
sold in the city of Dacca, and the rate at which it is
purchased, probably within three miles of the town, is
frequently one thousand percent" was how the profit from
this trade was described by W.Douglas, the collector of
Dhaka in October 1789.
Such profits could emerge because of the prevailing
modes of procurement which forced the peasant to remain at
the lowest rung of the price mechanism prevailing in the
countryside76 , and it was here that we see the second level
of profit in operation. The fact that peasants were coerced
into selling at prices below a third or even half the
"customary market price" perhaps indicates the techniques
of pricing strategies adopted by the merchants. In fact the
data available (figure 4) show that the extent of under-
pricing the producer could be higher than half the










" BRC,IOR P/57/50,24 October 1789;emphasis added.
76 Also cf.Datta,1989: 397-98.
" Calculated from ibid.,p.398.
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1794	 Murshidabad	 Rice	 44.4
1794	 Purnea	 Paddy	 33.3
At the third level (during years of scarcity) the
merchants made profits ranging from 150 to 200 percent by
manipulating the prices between town and country. Famines
were boon years for these merchants from another point:
these were also the years when villages became gross
importers of food and profits ranging from 40 to 20 percent
were easily made by sending grain to the uffassa178, but
these were much below the advantages arising from trading
with towns during such years79.
Merchants and food su pply during famine and dearth
The discussion in chapter 2 gave rise to two important
facts. First, a famine or a dearth, were occasions when the
per capita availability of food actually declined. Second,
getting supplies by acquiring food from elsewhere,
particularly from other provinces, was difficult, if not
impossible as a full-scale crisis would never be apparent
before late October (i.e. just before the maturation of the
aman harvest), by which time it was difficult to get food
from outside since a "considerable time must elapse before
the ships which may happen to be lying in the river
[Hughli] unemployed can be fitted out, as the owners
ascertain from what countries the rice can be procured at
78 Ibid.,pp.389-90.
" This relative disadvantage would perhaps explain
the higher relative mortality in primarily rural areas
(like Purnea,for instance) during the famine of 1769-70.
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a price which will be worth their while to procure it"80.
These facts meant that during a famine or a dearth the
province had only its internal resources to depend on for
food, and this raises the question of the internal
movement of food in bulk by the merchants.
When a scarcity struck, it tended to exacerbate the
already high demand for food in the towns and qasbas; it
also forced an immediate upward spiral in rural demand as
the producers now became net consumers of grain 81 . The
entire range of issues behind the events of 1769-70 leaves
a distinct impression that it was an artificial famine. The
artificiality of the famine was hinted at by Warren
Hastings when he acknowledged the severity of the Company's
revenue collections during the famine months. Hastings was
to reiterate this theme subsequently (in 1783) when he
wrote:
It appears from the enquiries then
made, and from the others which were
connected with the famine of 1769, that
the first want was artificial,
proceeding from the expectation of a
real want, and from the natural
inducement which it afforded to the
dealers in grain to with hold it from
the market in the hopes of deriving a
larger profit from a more distant sale,
and this, with the compulsive means
which were used to force the grain into
80 BRC,IOR P/52/36, 21 October 1791.Even in the mid-
nineteenth century a price rise after the arrival of the
winter harvest was fraught with serious implications of a
severe scarcity during the next year,but even as late as
that period the colonial state had been unable to collect
enough evidence "by which to gauge its full and terrible
significance" [Hunter,1869: ix].
81 This is not to say that under relative normal
circumstances they were self-sufficient.Rural artisans
invariably had to buy food and the peasants,barring a few
with relatively larger resources,had to take recourse to
the local hat to purchase a number of items of food (like
lentils,vegetables,salt) which they needed.Even basic
staples were often purchased.Their dependence on the market
was intensified during seasons of scarcity.
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consumption, and which drove the
proprietors into destructive expedients
for hoarding and secreting it,
(prevailed] as the principal cause of
the famine which ensued...82.
Hastings's analysis is important in so far as it
points to the actuality of the famine. It is also crucial
because his analysis clearly indicates that the famine in
1769-70 can no longer be interpreted as a food shortage
occasioned by "natural" causes alone. His estimation also
suggests that the actual misery was caused by an artificial
failure of supplies, a point which perhaps indicates that
supplies of food were available but did not, or were not
made to reach those places which needed grain most. There
is of course a clear bias in Hastings's analysis and that
lies in his propensity to blame the "merchants", obviously
the indigenous ones. For reasons which are obvious,
Hastings did not stress the fact that the Company's own
officials were also alleged to have profiteered during the
famine83.
Unfortunately not much is known about the activities
of the indigenous grain merchants during the famine months.
But Hastings's suspicion that they did attempt to profiteer
was apparently well-founded. As soon as the drought forced
prices to rise abnormally, the merchants started buying up
from those districts which still had some surpluses from
previous harvests. Merchants from Burdwan and Hughli
flooded to Midnapur and apparently carried off "much larger
quantities [of grain] than the Country (Midnapur] could
af ford" 84 . Similarly, the Murshidabad based merchants
82 Minute of Warren Hastings to the Council,20
November 1783, incorporated in consultations of BRC,IOR
P/50/68,8 September 1786,pp.621-22;emphasis added.
83 Brit.Mus.,Add.Ms.,29076,f.75 and 29132,ff.380,470..
84	 BDR,l4idnapur,vol.4,From E.Baber to C.Russell,7
March 1771,p.53.
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entered Rangpur, where stocks of food were available and
began "exporting the grain extremely fast, and it will all
very soon be taken away except what may be purchased to be
kept here" 85 . The net result was a rapid increase in the
spot price of grain, and such instances were reported from
Burdwan86 and Midnapur87 in western Bengal; prices were
also pushed up in eastern Bengal though not to the same
extent as most districts here had relatively larger stocks
of food available88.
The chief reason for such mercantile strategies was
the need to cater to town demand, but the situation in
1769-70 was different in so far as there was a phenomenal
rise in food prices in the countryside. In fact the
available price data suggest a higher price of food in the
villages than in the towns during the famine months. For
instance, while the average price of rice in Midnapur was
1.57 rupees a maund between September and December 1769, in
Calcutta rice could be purchased at 1 rupee per maund in
1769 89 .
 In July 1770, coarse rice in Murshidabad was being
sold for 1.14 rupees a maund 90 , but in the villages of
Rangpur it was selling at an unheard of price of 3.07
rupees91 . In November 1770, when the price of rice at
Murshidabad was 1.33 rupees a maund, the price at Natore,
"situated in the heart of the rice country", was 2.22
85 WBSA, LCB,vol. 1,17 August l770,p.40.
86 BPC,IOR P/1/44,20 November 1769;BRC,IOR P/49/42,7
December 1773.
87 BDR,Midnapur,vol.4,7 March 1771.
88 This fact was noted by the Board of Revenue in
their Minute (October 1791) on famines in Bengal,cf.BRC,IOR
P/52/36,21 October 1791,pp.494-518.
89 W.B.Bayly,1816: 516.
90 WBSA,CCR,vol.1,Proceedings of July 1770,p.444.
91 WBSA,Letter Copy Book of the Resident at the
Darbar,vol.1,7 August 1770.
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rupees92 . The result was a cross-flow of food supplies at
very high prices from town to country and from country to
town93 . Therefore the allegation that the merchants only
hoarded or "secreted" food during the height of the famine
does not seem feasible, since an action of that type would
go against the very essence of their enterprise of making
the maximum profit during times of scarcity.
The role of the East India Company during the famine
was apparently unique in the history of the province. In
the immediately preceding regime of the Nizamat, the state
seldom interfered in the arena of grain trade, except
during times of scarcity when it sought to regulate prices
and prevented merchants from setting up monopolies; the
essential idea behind such strategies was to keep supply
lines open to towns under threat of scarcity94 . On the
other hand the Company's political role was inextricably
linked to its commercial and revenue interests, which meant
that political rule was still intermeshed with variety of
trading interests: the interests of its own, those of the
private traders and those of its officials who traded for
themselves under the guise of their "native" agents.
With the first symptoms of the drought being apparent
the Company responded by stockpiling to feed its garrisons
in Bengal and Bihar "for six months to come"; the thought
of relieving "the miserable situation" occasioned by the
drought was subsidiary to the needs of revenue and feeding
the army95 . Thus in Chittagong "we have given directions
for buying up small quantities of rice for the Calcutta
92 WBSA,CCRM,vol.2,31 December 1770.
See Ibid for rice trade from Murshidabad to the
villages of Rajshahi;WBSA,Letter Copy Book,vol.l,7 August
1770 for trade in Rangpur between Govindganj,its principal
grain mart,and the countryside;also Hunter, (1897: 410] for
trade between Calcutta and Nadia during the famine.
See chapter 1.
IOR,Letters Received,E/4/20,23 November 1769.
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market as the new crop comes in, and have employ'd a
Gomasthah in the adjacent parts of the country for the same
purpose" 96 . As the drought intensified and the demand and
prices increased, the officials and private European
traders apparently took it upon themselves to profiteer
from the situation. They used their "native agents"
(gomasthas) to purchase grain by force97
 which allegedly
went to such an extent that the hapless peasants were
coerced into selling "seed requisite for the next harvest";
the rice thus collected was sold at famine prices in the
towns of Calcutta and Murshidabad98.
Yet the exact amount of the province's food stocks
which the Company or its officials actually cornered is
unclear. Estimates of rice monopolized by the state alone
range from 60,000 maunds99
 to 120,000 maunds1°°. Sinha's
estimate appears closer to the real picture because the
dastaks issued to officials in Bihar and Chittagong during
that famine amounted to 57,300 maunds, whereas the total
amount of rice actually handled by these officials was
46,000 maunds'°1 . The scale of the drought and the
entrenched power of indigenous merchants simply did not
allow Company officials to corner a major proportion of the
market during the famine. Most of Chittagong's grain
reserves had already been bought by local merchants before
the officials could intervene102 , and the supplies of
96 BDR.Chittagong,vol.1,30 November l7691p.100.
Anderson Papers,Brit.Mus. ,Add.Ms. ,45430,Richard
Becher to David Anderson,3 January 1773,ff.256-57.
98 Brit.Mus.,Add.Ms.,29076,f.75 and 29132,f.380.
Sinha,1968: 57.
100 B.B.Chaudhury,1983: 299.
101 Public Consultations,vol.38 (National Archives of
India),pp.315-16,413,416,I am grateful to P.J.Marshall for
providing me with this information.
102 BPC,IOR P/1/51,6 February 1772.
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Midnapur were snapped up by merchants from Birbhum and
Burdwan leading to a steep escalation in local prices for
a short time'°3.
Nevertheless it must also be pointed out that some
efforts were made by the state to regulate the amount of
exports of food from different districts. In Bihar, Thomas
Rumbold ordered the suspension of market duties on the
importation of rice to Patna and forbade grain to be
"carried out of the province" 04 , and in Chittagong:
Your (the Board's] orders for
preventing Monopolys [sic] of Grain &
to encourage the planting of such Grain
and Pulse as can be produced in the dry
season have been published thro'out the
Province, and we have satisfaction to
advise your Honour & Ca. that
precautions taken by the Chief (at
Chittagong] to prevent the exportation
on the first appearance of a scarcity
has kept the price here very
moderate'°5.
Exports of rice from Calcutta were immediately
reduced, partly as a result of insufficient supplies and
partly owing to the need to retain available food stocks
within the province. The duties collected on exports of
rice at Calcutta's custom house fell from 6134.68 rupees in
1769 to 1876.81 rupees in 1770106. However, this effort to
alleviate a crisis in the distribution of food was
inadequate. Chaudhury's explanation that this crisis was
caused by the interests of the state, private merchants and
the Company officials which put immense pressure on the
103 Chapter 2,Figure 11.
104 SCC,IOR P/A/9,1 August 1769.
105 BDR.Chittagong,vol.1,from J.Reed and T.Lane to
H.Verelst,30 November 1769,p.100-101.
106 BRC,IOR P/49/52,16 May 1775.
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market with the result that prices soared 107
 must appear
inadequate in the light of the above facts. One must also
bear in mind that local officials were also blamed for
maipractices. For instance, Muhammad Reza Khan was said to
have:
Entirely ruined the country by every
oppressive means and methods that he could
think of; for he in the very height of the
famine, having stopt (sic] the merchants
boats loaded with rice and other provisions,
bound for the city of Muxadavad
(Murshidabad], forcibly purchased from them
rice from 25 to 30 seers per rupee, and did
retail it out from 3 to 4 seers per rupee,
and all other eatables in proportion; yet
for all these execrable acts and deeds, he
has been winked at by the superior power,
who could have at times controul [sic] and
compel him from acting in so inhumane and
infamous a manner; and by this means several
lacks of people have starved and died, after
selling every substance of theirs, to
procure eatables, at the exorbitant rates
aforesaid108
Since Muhammad Reza Khan was later absolved of these
charges, this complaint must indicate the hostility of
grain merchants to official interference during periods of
scarcity. The food-supply situation during the famine of
1769/70 clearly shows that the availability or non-
availability of food in particular districts were
determined more by the amount of the local harvest actually
destroyed by the drought and by the grain merchants whose
activities the state could hardly control, than by the
profiteering activities of some Company or other officials.
The power of the merchants to determine the flow of
food during a subsistence crisis in direct contravention of
the state's will is also borne out by their behaviour
107 B.B.Chaudhury,1983: 299.
108	 Letter of Huzurimal to Company,10 October
1770,Brit.Mus. ,Add.Ms. ,29132, f.380.
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during periods of dearth. The chief features of a dearth
were a sharp decline in the per capita availability of food
at localized levels and a sharp escalation in spot prices
but stocks of food were available from the less-stricken
areas which meant that the byapari could circulate his
stocks with greater ease and profit. During the partial
drought of 1773 many merchants:
Have set up private gunges for the
reception of all rice and paddy brought
to the market by themselves and others,
and the more effectually to avoid being
detected, in what they are conscious to
themselves tends to a monopoly, have
resisted and turned out from their
golahs and landing places the sircars
[officials] and kyalls [welghmen] who
are employed by the [Company's] Customs
House'°9.
Establishing "private gunges" and disposing of the
Company's market-officials meant that these merchants tried
to avoid paying established duties and they were able to
circumvent state authority at the same time. From the
Company's point of view, such activities had three major
implications: (1) such "importations and sales admit of
collusive compacts which greatly enhance the price", (ii)
they freed the merchants "from the general and wholesome
regulations established in publick markets for the humane
purposes of preventing an artificial scarcity", and (iii)
such actions prevented "a precise knowledge of the quantity
of grain in Town and consequently those timely measures
which government upon the apprehension of real scarcity
might judge proper to adopt"'10.
Though the Company worried about the consequences of
mercantile strategies during situations of dearth, there
was very little which could actually be done to prevent
109 BRC,IOR P/49/38,19 February 1773.
110 Ibid.
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these consequences. In 1773, these merchants resorted to
buying-up of stocks as soon as the first signs of a dearth-
panic arose' 11 , and the result was a sharp price increase
because "they have leagued together to keep it (the price]
up and we (the producers] are perishing with hunger""2.
Once again we find the spectre of hoarding during a food-
crisis emerging as the dominant form of merchant behaviour,
but this was only a partial explanation of what happened
during the drought of 1773. Of greater importance was the
steep rise in the urban prices of food caused by the
"sudden demand at the several capital izarts" which caused
the merchants to export their stocks in that direction
rather than sell in the countryside where prices were
relatively less"3 . Thus boat-loads of rice were delayed at
Bhagwangola by local merchants in order to make the most
from a situation of high food-prices 4 . Temporary stock-
retention, rather than outright hoarding seems to have been
characteristic of these merchants during bad agricultural
years. Thus during the drought of 1775, merchants bringing
grain to the city of Murshidabad "have temporarily ordered
their boats to be detained in the Jellingee [river] to see
if the weather will hold fair [sic] for any time
longer""5.
Another illustrative example of such strategies comes
from the flood of 1784 in eastern Bengal. The flood
destroyed the aus harvest and severely threatened the aman,
and a large-scale food-shortage was imminent. The merchants
withheld stocks from previous harvests, thereby threatening
the inhabitants of Dhaka with the prospect of protracted
hhi Ibid.,P/49/42,2 December 1773.
112 Ibid.,P/49/47,30 August 1774.
h13 Ibid.,P/49/42,7 December 1773;emphasis added.
114 Ibid.,P/49/51,13 February 1775.
115 Ibid.,P/49.58,22 December 1775.
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starvation'16 . The initial reaction of the Board of Revenue
was to clamp down upon such merchants by instructing the
collector to give "public notice by beat of Tom Tom, that
all Traders in Grain who shall refuse to sell or to bring
usual supplies to market shall have their Property in Grain
seized by Government, and be liable to such other
punishment as the Circumstances of their offence appear to
dictate""7 . This seemingly harsh stricture had no effect
upon the merchants. The grain dealers simply refused to
sell at dictated prices and the impasse continued till
October when the collector was forced to concede: "the
dealers were declared to have authority to sell at
pleasure" in bazaars protected by Sepoys. The results were
immediate. Rice stocks appeared once again albeit at high
prices because the "general scarcity in the mofussil
[countryside] will not allow of its being cheaper""8.
Similar tendencies operated during the famine of 1788.
In a reply to a questionnaire from John Shore, the
principal grain-traders of Calcutta replied that the only
way in which merchants all over Bengal could be induced to
send supplies to Calcutta and Murshidabad was to free the
markets of state control by temporarily suspending "all
gunge duties" and by the abolition of all arbitrary valua-
tion in the prices of food. These would, they said,
"operate greatly to the relief of the inhabitants by
enabling the merchants to furnish them with grain so much
cheaper""9 . The traders could lend weight to their claims
because they had already purchased the internal surpluses
116	 Bangladesh	 District	 Records,Dacca
District,op.cit. 1 10 July 1784,p.81.
" Ibid.,15 July 1784,p.83.
"	 Ibid.,5 October 1784,pp.97-9B.
119 BRC,IOR P/51/17,1 February 1788.
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of food available' 20 and the demand of the cities could
only be met if they decided to bring in food' 21 . Both these
aspects are apparent from the following letter written by
Bhoj Raj, the principal grain dealer in Murshidabad, to
Nawab Mubarak-ud-daulah describing the state of procurement
during that famine:
There are three causes for the
increasing price of grain in the city
of Moorshedabad. First, the beoparries
of Calcutta and Calcutta... have
purchased and keep large quantities of
rice in the neighbourhood of the Rara
[Rarh] region [which is] the name of
the districts to the west of
Moorshedabad among rice merchants.
Second, at Bogwanpoor, where it is
known there are 22 Golahs, all the
Grain coming from the south [of Bengal]
arrives and is sold. This year whatever
arrives from the environs and from the
south, the Dacca merchants purchase
immediately on arrival of the boats and
carry it away. It is [therefore]
impossible to make any purchases there.
Third, what little arrives in the city
of Moorshedabad is purchased & carried
away by Calcutta merchants.
Under a situation of this kind, it was perhaps not
surprising for the state to think that "wholesale & retail
have their separate combinations, and have actually created
an artificial famine" and caused food prices to rise "to a
scandalous degree"122.
The problems faced by the state during a famine, or
even a dearth, were two: first, to prevent an over-
120	 Ibid.,P/5l/19,17 April 1788 and 18 April
1788;BDR.Dinajpur, vol.1,19 January 1788,p.89.
121 5000 maunds of rice per day were required to feed
the population of Calcutta and Murshidabad alone
(Ibid.,P/51/l6,1 February 1788,and P/51/17,14 March
1788] .Ibid,P/15/17,l February 1788.
122 Ibid.,P/51/l6,l February 1788.
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exportation of food from centres possessing some surpluses,
and second, to acquire adequate supplies to feed the towns
and the military establishment. As we have seen, forcible
embargoes on exports simply did not work.D.H.Curly suggests
that an embargo on exports of food and regulation of prices
were the two components of traditional famine relief
policies followed by the Nawabs of Bengal, and that they
were reasonably effective since they could replace "free"
markets with local systems of autarky and regulated
distribution in the short-run to relieve the pressures of
a famine'23 . This view does not conform to the actual
systems of food-distribution during a famine or dearth'24.
Our evidence shows that merchants constantly sought to
maintain conditions of "free" market, and any interference
met with immediate retaliation: stocks were deliberately
withdrawn from the direction desired by the state.
Merchants were not subservient to the will of the state at
all times, and neither could the state exercise its power
unilaterally over them. Thus during the famine of 1788, the
amlah of Rajganj, (in Dinajpur) tried:
To keep the markets in and about
Dinagepore supplied with a sufficient
quantity of grain for the daily
consumption of inhabitants, [for which]
I have been obliged to have recourse to







124 Additionally the entire evidence of price
regulations and restrictions on exports provided by Curly
pertains to food-shortages after the famine of
1769/70,which he interprets (without explaining why) as a
continuation of "traditional" famine-relief policies.
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merchants] have persevered in opposing
every mild endeavour I have practised
to induce them to comply with my
entreaties to relieve the scarcity,
which in fact is of their own
making.. 125
Food could only be procured by a negotiated settlement
with the grain-dealers, as was, for instance, done in Malda
in 1788. After the initial flexing of state-muscles, the
Company was forced to negotiate as the much desired food
refused to materialize. Kishan Mangal "a merchant of that
place" negotiated a "fair" price on behalf of the other
local merchants for the available grain stocks, and:
After [the price] being settled... (it]
was paid to the dealers who then went
away apparently satisfied. The only end
purpose was to prevent distress to the
Country from its being stripped of
provision, and this required none of
the violence which they (the merchantsJ
assert to have been done to them
(beforeJ 126
Food-supplies during years of scarcity were therefore
a source of constant friction between the state and the
local trading communities. Obviously, the state wanted to
take the credit for ensuring supplies but the reality of
the situation was different. For instance, Hastings
described the state's role during the severe dearth of 1783
in the following words:
Few men doubted that the scarcity proceeded
from the failure of the preceding harvest,
and the consumption of former years. The
members who composed the administration
chose to put this conclusion to the test.
125 BDR,Dlnajpur,vol.2,14 June 1788,p.231.
126 Ibid.,vol.1,19 January 1788,p.89.
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After having applied such measures as were
most likely to give a temporary check to the
complaints, they appointed a Committee,
consisting of the Senior and most
Intelligent Servants of the Company, whom
they invested with ample powers to collect
accounts of the actual quantities of rice
existing in the provinces; to compell [sic]
every proprietor of it to deliver to their
agents an exact account of what he poss-
essed; and in the event of want of a due
supply in the markets, to contribute to it
according to his ability. The threat of
confiscation was also proclaimed against any
who should attempt to elude the
investigation, either by secreting their
grain, or by delivering false accounts of
it; but if I may trust to my memory, only
one instance occurred, in which it was found
necessary to inflict that penalty. The
result of the measure was that markets were
in a short space of time abundantly
supplied; the price of grain gradually sank
in its level; and from the returns made to
the Committee, it appeared that there was a
sufficiency to last even a considerable
period beyond the next expected harvest127.
Hastings's analysis appears an unconvincing apology
for the failure of the state to ensure adequate food-
supplies during that crisis. Witness for instance, the
Bengal government's own admission (in 1788) that:
The most active temporary interference
of Government has been found productive
of no other consequence than a slight
alteration of the pressure of famine on
the poor class of natives'28
Later enquiries about the scarcity of 1783 showed
that:
127	
"Copy of a Memorial on the High Prices of
Wheat,February,1800",Brit.Mus.,Add.Ms.,29233,ff.132-132a.
128 BRC,IOR P/51/22,15 August 1788;emphasis added.
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Mr.Hastings allowed the price to fix itself,
the merchants having represented to him that
they were deter'd from bringing it to market
because they were obliged to Bell it
according to an arbitrary valuation. Re also
suspended the Calcutta Gimge Duties, which
were five chuttacks per rupee, and ten seers
per hundred maunds...129
The mechanisms by which food was made to move from one
area to another during a subsistence-crisis does show the
organized power of the grain-merchants in the late
eighteenth century. The sources of such power were
numerous. First, they owned golahs and the means of
transportation which were crucial not only for acquiring
the crucial supplies but for moving them around as well.
Second, the grain-merchants were socially cohesive as they
came from similar caste groups and therefore followed
common occupational strategies. They were additionally
organized in tightly knit groups (dala). People like
Thakurdas Nondi (in Rangpur), Bhoj Raj (in Murshidabad) and
Kishan Mangal (in Malda) were situated at the head of an
organized network of trading activities, hierarchically
arranged and spread over a wide catchment area. This
enabled effective trading; it also made it possible for
traders to disseminate information and to quickly forestall
competition, particularly from the state. Third, and
perhaps the most crucial, was the intermeshing of trade
with agricultural production. In fact one of the major
barriers in the way of acquiring supplies during the famine
of 1788 was "the usual and long standing custom of Grain
Merchants advancing (money] at the commencement of the
season for the crops" which meant that the "Riauts sell
what grain they can spare to the merchants in preference of
bringing it to publick market to be sold at a fixed
129 John Shore to Council,Ibid., P/51/17,1 February
1788.
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rate" 130 . The food surpluses of Birbhum were already
hypothecated to the merchants of Calcutta and Murshidabad
and as a result they were being provided with grain by the
peasants during the famine'31 . Such evidence necessitates
an analysis of peasant-merchant linkages in agricultural
production, and the following section is addressed to this
end.
Merchants and the agrarian economy
The connections between the grain merchants and
agricultural production were caused by a combination of
factors in the late eighteenth century, the details of
which have been examined in chapter 1. Briefly stated, the
linkages seem to have arisen out of a buoyant demand for
food both in the towns and in the countryside, rising
agricultural prices and a recurrence of famines and semi-
famine situations which plagued the province from 1769
onwards. These situations made it imperative for the
traders to keep a tight control over lines of supply which
they did in two ways: (a) by the creation of a wide network
of trading intermediaries (paiicar and gomastha) scattered
over an extensive catchnient area; and (b) by the
formulation of strategies designed to control the peasants'
freedom of choice in the market. An analysis of the latter
strategy provides a picture of mercantile penetration in
agricultural production.
There is some evidence to suggest that the grain
hyapari had started getting involved in the process of
agricultural reclamation as a device to ensure steady
supplies in the long-run. Data of merchants providing
130 Ibid.,vol.2,14 June 1788,p.231;emphasis added.
131 BRC,IOR P/51/19,17 April 1788.
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advances of money, through their agents, to cultivators
wanting to reclaim wastes are available from the district
of Jessore. Such advances seem to have become endemic here,
for we find the collector of this district referring to the
loans taken by the "poorer classes of ryotts" as the
"Invariable aode" of agricultural production by the
1780s'32 . In Rangpur, merchants could also be seen
participating directly in production, i.e. organizing
production with the use of sharecroppers, apparently in a
widely prevalent fashion' 33 . It is tempting to posit a
direct and widespread connection between the merchants and
the process of agricultural reclamation during this period,
but that would perhaps be over-reaching the available
evidence.
The merchants' participation in agricultural
production was guided not only by their long-term interests
as merchants, but also by certain constraints upon Bengal's
peasant economy and society which forced the producers to
reach out to external agencies to fulfil crucial production
requirements. One such constraint was shortage of material
resources in the hands of the "inferior ryott" or "the
poorer class of ryotts". Lack of resources made small
peasant production vulnerable to any unbalancing forces,
and the periodic incursions of famines and partial crop
failures made this vulnerability chronic. It was precisely
this susceptibility, caused by persistent shortage of
working capital and uncertainties of production, which
enabled merchants to enter the realm of production by a
somewhat circuitous combination of subsistence and
production loans.
Consumption loans were taken by the peasants for a
variety of reasons, the chief of which appears to have been




to tide over particularly bad agricultural years'34 . In
Birbhum, "money borrowed by the Ryotts assumes such a
variety of shapes, that I (the collector] am at a loss what
term to give it. Generally however (a loan] corresponds
with the exigencies of a borrower"'35 . Interest on such
loans ranged from 24 to 36 percent per annum depending on
the dictates of the creditor.' 3' In the context of a
persistent shortage of the means of livelihood and
productive resources, these subsistence loans were the
first steps in what subsequently would become a vicious
cycle137 . Once a loan was incurred, a series of good
harvests in continuous succession would be the only way in
which households could circumvent the prospects of
prolonged indebtedness. Alternating cycles of good and bad
agricultural years, because of the impact these had on the
price of their produce and on their incomes, tended to
drive these peasant households further into arrears so that
finally they were confronted by a seemingly insurmountable
wall of debt servicing as well as a range of creditors.
"His debts annually accumulating, the ryott becomes
enslaved to his creditor or gutchdar" wrote Henry
Colebrooke about the situation in Purnea' 36 . Subsistence
loans provided one lever by which merchants could get a
grip over the end produce antecedent to any interference in
134 The problem of excessive vulnerability during
scarce harvests was compounded by the virtual absence of
any kind of financial help from the East India Company (see
chapter 2].
135 BRP,IOR P/70/35,6 November 1787.
136 BRC, IOR P/49/38,15 December 1772;BRP, IOR P/70/35,13
November 1787;Datta,1986: 394.
137 
"Once begun,a chronic cycle of indebtedness tends
to reproduce itself.Prior debt prevents saving after the
harvest,because the creditor calls in his loan,and means of
personal and productive consumption will consequently be
likely to run short again before the next harvest" (H.Fri-
edmann, 1980: 172].
138 BRP,IOR P/71/26,18 June 1790.
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production.
Consumption loans were often accompanied by production
loans, and it even seems probable that loans of the latter
type tended to predominate. The "annual practice of the
byaparis to advance to the poorer class of ryotts a
sufficient quantity of grain to sow their lands, to be
repaid in kind at the time of cutting their crops" had
become the "invariable iaode" in Jessore by the late
1780s'39 . Half the standing crop of Burdwan in October
l794'° and "one half of the whole cultivation" of Dinajpur
circa l8O7'' were estimated to be the products of
production loans taken by the poorer peasants and the
sharecroppers. The cultivators of Purnea were "accustomed
to loans from the principal merchants which, however
oppressive are absolutely necessary to them as they are
unable to maintain cultivation unless they receive such
assistance"'42 . In Rangpur, where the general level of
indebtedness was said to be lower than in its neighbouring
district of Dinajpur, loans for the production of grain had
nevertheless grown into a "ruinous system" by the turn of
the century143
Production loans were given as advance payments'44
much before the commencement of the agricultural season, or
as our sources describe "long before the crops of the
139 BRC,IOR P/51/20,7 May 1788.
140 WBSA,Grain,vol.1,17 October 1794.
'' Martin,1976,vol.3: 906.
142 BRP,IOR P/71/25,26 May 1790.
143 IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75,vol 2,book 5,f.84.
'" "I am informed" wrote James Steuart in 1772 "that
large sums of money are yearly lent out to the occupyers
[sic] of the lands in order to advance the improvements of
the soil.The interest exacted for such loans is exorbitant
because the repayment of capital is precarious" [ " Memoirs
of the Coinage in Bengal" IOR,Home
Misc.,vol.62,p.46;emphasis added].
333
poorer ryotts are fit to gather" 145 . Bengal had two major
agricultural seasons, the winter (am.n) and the spring
(aus), and loans were contracted on both occasions. The
winter rice harvest was considered of greater market value
"bearing a higher price and sought after by all""6 and was
therefore a prime area of merchant intervention. The
seedlings for this harvest were universally sown in the
Bengali month of Assar (June-July) and reaped in Agra1im
(November-December). Advances on this crop were made in the
months of Pous or Nagh (December-January-February) and the
repayments were made in the subsequent month of Agrahan,
thereby completing a yearly cycle of loans and repay-
ments'47 . For the spring (aus) crop, merchant strategies
were two-fold: gomast.ha.s (commissioned agents) would be
sent to the villages "to purchase it from the ryotts before
they could dispose of their surplus crops 148;
alternatively, advances to the cultivator were made in the
month of Assin (September-October), six months before
sowing in the month of Baisakh (April-May), to be repaid
next Assin, immediately after the harvest in the month of
Bhadro (August-September)"9 . The timing of these loans
was critical as any delay, even by a month, could lessen
the amount of interest in the annual cycle of advances and
repayments. Thus a "man who shall make advances in Bhadoon
[Bhadro) expects and obtains a greater increase than the
man who makes his advance in Assln", wrote a contemporary
observer in October 1794 in relation to the system of
145 WBSA,Grain,vol.1,17 October 1794.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid,29 October 1794.
148 Ibid;emphasis added.
149 Ibid,17 October 1794;BRC,IOR P/51/21,29 January
1788.
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advances for the aus crop'50.
Such loans were not limited to the cultivation of rice
alone. Almost all major agricultural products were tilled
under varying degrees of advance contracts. As discussed in
chapter 5, betel-leaf in east Bengal, and sugarcane in
Birbhum were based on such arrangements with merchants who
then sent the entire amount of refined sugar to Calcutta.
Tobacco grown in Nadia and Rangpur was partly financed
through advances by the merchants of Calcutta, Dhaka and
Murshidabad, and the rest was purchased by their agents on
the spot. Ginger produced in Rangpur was sold immediately
by the farmers to merchants as "the whole is paid for in
advance"51.
How did these loans operate? The terms on which such
loans were given were elaborately laid down. First, the
peasant contracting for these loans was not given any wri-
tten documents; the whole episode was conducted on a
"verbal basis"'52 . Second, he was to receive a maximum of
two-thirds of the value contracted for in advance and the
"balance at the delivery of grain and at the rate that may
first be established in the pergunnah after the reaping is
over"'"; but the proportion of the total loan being given
in advance depended upon the type of rice being cultivated.
Thus in Purnea, peasants cultivating winter (amaii) rice
could hope to get up to half the amount in advance while
those cultivating the intrinsically inferior spring (aus)
grain had to be satisfied with a quarter 154 . Third, the
terms of the agreement had to be faithfully "observed and
150 cit.Datta,1986: 396.
'' IOL,Ms. Eur.D.75,vol.2,book 4,f.16.
152 BRP,IOR P/71/26,18 June 1790.
153 WBSA,Grain,vol.1,22 October 1794.
154 BRP,IOR P/71/26,18 June 1790.The retention of a
portion of the contracted advance by the lender was a
device to subsequently under-price the producer.
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abided" by the borrower as he was "under penalty of making
good every loss that may occur [to the creditor] from non-
payment, in addition to the amount being returned with
interest"155.
Regarding the modes of repayment, it appears that the
interest charged on such loans was higher than what was
demanded on loans of immediate subsistence. The available
evidence suggests that these were to be repaid in kind at
rates ranging form 38 to 50 percent'56, which would the
interest on such loans one and a half times greater than on
loans for consumption. Moreover, the price mechanism under
which such loans were given was crucial as well as
additionally profitable for the merchants. These were
advanced six months before the commencement of the sowing
season when prices were at their highest in the seasonal
swing. Repayments had to be made immediately after the
harvest when prices were at their lowest' 57 , thereby making
the cultivator part with a larger portion of the produce
while making adjustments for the seasonal price variation.
The loans "are made in the season when grain is dearest and
repaid when the price is lowest"' 58 . Peasants could stand
to lose between "2 annas per rupee"'59
 (or 12.5 percent)
and 25 percent"° in real terms while making these
adjustments. "The cultivators, of necessity, have to bear
with all this", remarked an Indian observer of agrarian
155 WBSA,Grain,vol.1,22 October 1794. Here the word
amount means the entire amount of the loan and not just the
portion actually given.
156 Datta,1986: 393,399.
'" "Settlement of account takes place as the crops
come in" [BRC,IOR P/51/29,29 January 1788].
158	 BRP,IOR P171 /2 6,	 26 April	 1790;	 also
Colebrooke,Remarks,p.67; Datta,1986: 399-400.
159 BRC,IOR P/51/21, 29 January 1788.
160 IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75,vol.2,book 4, f.84.
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matters in this period".
These loans symbolize the intrusion of merchant capital
Into the very core of Bengal's economy; they also provide
the nt of reference for studying the dynamics of social
domination over the processes of agricultural production.
These loans had become the "usual and long standing
custom""2
 between the merchant and the peasant all over
Bengal, which meant that, apart from debt servicing, the
cultivators were tied into selling straight to the merchant
"In preference to bringing grain to the market"" 3 . It is
therefore hardly surprising that the trader could procure
his supplies without having to make "purchases with ready
money""4 . Loans for subsistence signified the penetration
of the byapari, through the channel of peasant consumption,
Into the end produce of that peasant's labour without
exerting a direct influence over the process of production.
A consumption loan therefore placed the economic surplus of
a peasant household from one agricultural cycle to another
to the next at the disposal of the merchant. The loans
given as an advance on production were more complex, so
were the effects they had.
Theoretically, an advance for production could be
given under two situations. In the first situation,
advances could represent the payment for a commodity (I.e,
as a realization of the price of a commodity) before the
commodity was actually handed over, which could only happen
after the completion of the production cycle. An advance of
this type would represent a means of purchase. Such was the
situation in the dadni (advance contracts) system in the
early eighteenth century between the indigenous textile
161	 Anonymous, Risala-i-Zira 'at (tr. Harbans
Mukhia),section vii,p.l2, (mimeo).
162 BRC,IOR P151/21,14 June 1788.
163 Ibid.,14 June 1788.
164 IOL,Ms.Eur.D.75,vol.2,book 4, f.84.
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merchants and the East India Company.
The second situation would prevail where advances were
given as loans of working capital, and this was quite
extensively developed in the late eighteenth century. Here
advances were given to commence production as well as to
meet the costs of the producer's subsistence. The social
nature of such loans therefore differed substantially from
that of the first type in so far as the advance now covered
both the reproduction costs of labour (the costs of
subsistence) and the reproduction of the devices of
production (seeds, draught animals and ploughs). These
loans were advances at the start of the production cycle
and covered two of its most critical components: labour and
working capital. The third component, land, still belonged
to the primary producer, but the fact that the other two
were indirectly controlled by the merchant led to a subtle
reconstitution of the entire process of production. The
trader could henceforth control both the labour time and
the end produce of the peasant. The peasant technically
still owned the land but it was the merchant who
effectively determined its use. The content of
appropriation also changed. In a situation where advances
were given as the realization of the price of a commodity,
what accrued was a profit. Where advances represented the
flow of merchant capital in production what was
appropriated was the surplus product from wiHiln the
process of production. This explains why merchants in
places like Dinajpur and Rangpur could use the system of
advances to get grain from the peasants without using ready
cash while making their purchases, and the subordination
inherent in this kind of relationship becomes evident in a
petition of the raiyats of pargana Burdwan in which they
clearly accept that it "is only because of the merchants
that we have the means of purchasing our subsistence and
presez-ving our lives" 165 . The power inherent in a
165 BRC,IOR P/49/37, 30 August 1774; emphasis added.
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relationship of this kind is apparent from the fact that
when the merchants decided to call in, or discontinue such
loans, the peasants were immediately "obliged to dispose of
their grain on any terms"' 66 to appease the merchants as
without their financial assistance "the Ryotts suffer the
greatest distress 167•
166 CCR,IOR P/68/7, 4 May 1781.
167 BRP,IOR P/71/20,11 October 1790.
Chapter 7
Conclusions: Agrarian Society and Economy of Bengal in the
Late Eighteenth Century
One of the central objectives of this thesis has been
to establish that the late eighteenth century in Bengal was
a period of intense commercialization, brought about by a
combination of four factors: (i) a rising demand for food
and increasing agricultural prices, (ii) integrated
provincial markets, (iii) the revenue regime of the East
India Company and (iv) a cluster of famine and dearth
seasons. Each chapter therefore attempted to come to grips
with the numerous ways In which such a process was
unleashed and the social relations which caused this
development, and were in turn re-shaped as a consequence.
It Is perhaps necessary to address the major issues
involved in order to perceive the dynamics of the process
in a comprehensible form.
To start with, one of the central arguments of the
thesis has been to state that dearth and famine in our
period were subsistence crises of differing magnitudes in
an intrinsically commercialized economy (i.e. an economy
where access to food was determined by access to markets),
and these events tended to intensify the processes which
occasioned them initially. The discussion In chapter 2 has
perhaps indicated the correlation between bad harvests and
spiralling prices as two of the most important variables in
causing famine and dearth in eighteenth century Bengal.
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Thus a real decline in per capita availability of food
emerged as the distinct feature of these events even in the
middle of low levels of subsistence. The fact that prices
of food in the epicentre of such events tended to push
prices upwards in places not similarly affected must point
to the price mechanism as the crucial factor in determining
the magnitude, spatial spread and the social context of the
subsequent misery. There is therefore, following Axnartya
Sen, a strong case for arguing that famines, and even
dearth, were severe "entitlement/endowment crises" for the
harvest sensitive strata in Bengal.
There was practically no institutional financial
support for the afflicted either to cope with or to recover
from such disasters. There was furthermore very little
support from the village community or from "traditional"
ties of dependence and mutual help. What about the "moral
economy" of the poor? Essential to the "moral-economy"
argument are the conceptions of shared-poverty and mutual
assistance in a society living on the edge of frequent
crises of subsistence. Such threats are seen as the main
motivating force in the creation of elaborate patron-client
relationships and village hierarchies which are therefore
mutually sustaining'.
The evidence from eighteenth century Bengal provides
very little in the way of supporting such conceptions.
Customary expectations of succour from local landed
proprietors were the first to disappear. Each cycle of
adverse weather--harvest failure--subsistence crisis
created a fresh run of demand for taqavf and remission of
revenue from the producers which the local zamindar or
talluqdar was unable to provide. Incidents such as a dearth
or a famine immediately reduced their incomes and affected
their capacity to help the distressed producers. The
state's financial burdens (i.e. its revenue demand)
1 See Arnold [1988: 80-86] for the main postulates and
critique of the "moral-economy" thesis.
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remained largely unrelenting thereby hitting at their
ability of granting remissions of revenue, or even of
providing charitable relief in times of distress. It is
perhaps significant that gruel kitchens had been organized
in the city of Murshidabad during the famine of 1769/702,
but in the famine of 1788 there were no such places of
sustenance. Therefore, one of the features noted in
nineteenth century famines-- an immediate contraction of
urban private charity in the midst of high prices and food-
shortages3 , certainly appears to have been well developed
in the late eighteenth century. The reasons for such
contraction were many. Principally they were centred around
the fact that such actions were no longer central since the
so-called "traditional" social relations were increasingly
proving inadequate to meet the necessities of that specific
historical situation.
Some efforts to lessen the burdens on the producers
were nevertheless made by the landed proprietors from time
to time. Thus after the famine of 1769/70 the talluqdars in
the revenue-paying circle (chakia) of Murshidabad were said
to be spending " a great effort in improving their lands &
in extending cultivation at great expense, in advancing
money to the ryotts to clear the lands for cultivation and
devoting their time and attention to superintend & direct
the improvement of them" 4. ZaTBIDdarS of Malda had
"zealously" advanced "10 or 15000 ru[pee]s for Tuccavy" in
order to reduce the sufferings of the peasants owing to the
"Calamity inflicted by the Heavens" in 1769. But such
efforts were too few and too little to achieve any
substantial recovery in a post-crisis period. This was so








First, as has been mentioned, dearth or famine posed
financial problems for such people as these events
jeopardized their incomes from agricultural production. The
following petition from the zmindars of Rangpur during the
flood of 1787 reveals the likely conditions of small landed
proprietors during natural disasters:
We are poor zemindars, and you are not ignorant
of the least circumstance of our condition for
the last eighteen months. We have no other income
than our private lands... and even that though
managed with the greatest frugality is hardly
sufficient to defray the necessary expenses of
cloths and sustenance in so much that we can only
afford to wear the meanest dresses even when our
duty calls us to attend upon you [the collector].
We have this year been under the necessity of
mortgaging to the bankers the small quantities of
private lands which were allowed to us... . We
are in the utmost distress, and have no prospect
of supporting ourselves6.
Larger zamlndars (like the Rajas of Burdwan, Nadia,
Birbhum, Dinajpur and Rajshahi) were not so crippled, but
they were certainly constrained which meant that the
peasants in such lands were unable to recuperate in proper
time. Thus the peasants in the northern parganas of Nadia
(which had been worst hit by the drought and famine of
1769/70) could not commence agricultural operations "from
the suspense they are in to know from whom they are to
receive advances to enable them to go through the business
of cultivation" 7 . Large tracts of intrinsically good
quality land were still lying pateet in this district in
1776 because of the financial inability of the zmfndar to
6 The collector of Rangpur vouched that this petition
"contains a true and faithful description of the state of
the district" (BRC,IOR P/51/12,4 September 1787].
WBSA,CCRM,vol.5,23 May 1771.
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provide tagavi8. During the disaster of 1788 the
cultivators in Rajshahi had no traditional sources of help
to turn to since this district "is peculiarly
circumstanced, having at present in fact no zemindar to any
useful purpose, nor any inferior landholders in a condition
to do much to assist the Ryotts"9.
Second, there is no reason to assume that financial
help provided by these landed proprietors was an extension
of traditional ties of patronage and dependence. Bengal was
a highly commercialized economy, and the available evidence
suggests that the assistance given to the peasants to
settle their ruined affairs was designed by the zamiridars
to tie the cultivators in the grip of extended indebted-
ness, the ultimate purpose of which was to have unfettered
access to their labour or to prevent subsequent desertions.
It is perhaps extremely significant that all seed-loans
made by the zamLndars were to be returned "two-fold to the
person who furnished it"'° and each money-advance was
invariably taxed "with a heavy interest", while repayments
were "fraudulently devalued"". Therefore the facts that
villagers were forced to abandon their habitations, their
fields and a whole set of established relations at the
slightest sign of dearth, or that they could actually die
of starvation, or were forced to sell their last belongings
(even their children, and perhaps their wives) are signi-
ficant for they show a total collapse of the so-called
"moral-economy" of the poor in rural society.
One important conclusion which can be reached from the
analysis of dearth and famine is that these subjected all
social groups to the vicissitudes of the market. A bad
agricultural year was only a proximate cause of a famine or
CCR,IOR P/67/62,13 June 1776.
BRC,IOR P/51/20,7 May 1788.
10 BRP,IOR P/71/26,26 April 1790
' SCC,IOR P/A/9,16 August 1769.
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dearth, the actual deprivation was caused by a per capita
food availability decline because people could not afford
to buy food at prevailing prices and there were practically
no other "traditional" avenues open to them to get
sustained relief. Situations of dearth resulted in a flight
of grain to areas with higher food prices and this flight
was a conscious mercantile strategy to reap maximum profits
from a situation of acute distress. The flight of grain was
not always directed towards the cities. It is true that in
general price-differentials were higher in the towns but a
dearth or a famine forced prices in the countryside to rise
at par with those prevailing in towns. There was therefore
a cross-flow of grain with the merchant as its pivot.
Merchants invariably disregarded attempts made by the state
to impose embargoes on the export of food during crisis
years (chapter 6). This fact is crucial in so far as it
shows that mercantile accumulation occurred under
conditions of great uncertainty, and that it was done not
in subordination to the state but in direct contravention
of its authority.
A famine (even a dearth) in eighteenth century Bengal
can therefore no longer be visualized as a mere food-
shortage in a subsistence economy. These episodes reveal a
highly commercialized economy in the throes of massive
crises of subsistence. It was precisely this
commercialization which influenced the availability or
absence of food for the harvest-sensitive strata in the
province. The need to circumvent or cope with such crises
furthered the pace of commercialization.
In sum, famine and dearth had the following economic
consequences. For the producers the essential questions
were those of survival and economic reproduction. Our
evidence shows that both requirements were linked to the
larger issue of productive resources which were
continuously hit by such crises which made it was
impossible for the majority of the peasants in Bengal to
cope and recover from the effects of such episodes on their
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own assets. This in turn led them to look to external
agencies of support. Their problems were worsened by the
absence of any substantial state help. This led to the
creation of coping strategies which were fraught with a
number of significant economic implications. First, the
market became the central determinant of agricultural
production, and second access to the market was henceforth
mediated by the grain merchants. Insecurity can therefore
be advanced as one crucial factor in furthering the
commercialization of Bengal's rice production in our
period, when the very act of coping thus became an act of
commercial production and exploitation. The combination of
the two in this period had profound consequences both for
the state of the agricultural economy and for the social
relations which were shaped in the realm of agricultural
production, especially those between the merchants and the
peasants.
Three concerns central to our comprehension of dearth
and famines are (1) that these occurrences were primarily
critical crises of subsistence, (ii) they generated
conditions of extended aggravation in the living conditions
of a whole range of producers and labourers because of
their already acute shortage of resources, and (iii) they
created major dislocations in the rhythms of economic
production which could not be rectified by taking recourse
to traditional sources of support. Therefore, for the
producers the problems of coping with, or recovering from,
a dearth or a famine could only be resolved by looking for
sources located outside their traditional boundaries. The
questions are, who were these agencies, and what was the
price exacted by them for such help?
One important aspect which emerged while discussing
the causes of dearth and famine is that most peasants were
thrown into the market to purchase food from a specialized
community of grain-merchants who were the only major agency
for the bulk distribution of food during such situations.
The second important aspect, central to the entire matrix
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of agricultural production, was that these peasants were
dependent on the merchants for a wide variety of loans of
consumption and capital. The economic constraints which
engendered these two aspects assumed critical proportions
during a subsistence crisis, and the result was that all
recovery made subsequently, or the manner in which
producers coped, was made to depend on the dictates of
these grain-traders-cum-usurers. If the producer sought the
market to survive during a crisis, the market found the
producer in its aftermath.
It must also be remembered that the major problem
after a major crisis of subsistence was that of regressive
indebtedness which affected all categories of peasants in
varying degrees. Under such a situation the gains, if any,
made by the surviving peasants were bound to be short-lived
as the next crisis would invariably throw-up a new crop of
dispossessed migrants into the ranks of the rural poor. The
apparently substantial proliferation of sharecroppers
(variously called adhiars, bargadars and projakisans) in
the late eighteenth century, despite the favourable land-
man ratio and demand for labour, can be mainly explained by
the protracted impoverishment of the small-peasant by
dearth and famine. The distinction between the rich and the
poor in peasant society was extremely small and often
shattered by even the slightest variation in agricultural
output or price.
In many ways, dearth and famine constituted the single
most powerful influence on agricultural production and in
creating conditions for a large-scale impoverishment of
Bengal's small-peasantry in the late eighteenth century.
These were also jointly responsible for causing fundamental
shifts in local economic configurations through which the
cultivators were subjected to the dictates of external
financial agencies. Thus after the famine of 1788, the
cultivators of Dhaka:
Have borrowed sums at extravagant interest
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to enable them to cultivate a part of their
lands; which will absorb in a greater
degree, if not wholly their expected
profits, so that at the commencement of the
next season their situation is consequently
little improved, and the same necessity for
borrowing money every year will remain.
Hence it follows they are likely to proceed
in the shackles of vexatious and oppressive
usurers, and consiquently (sic] under
difficulties, that must ever prevent those
exertions necessary perhaps even to their
existence'2.
This is an important statement which indicates the
mechanisms and extent of peasant impoverishment after a
famine. It also points to the constraint of resources as a
critical factor in hampering the pace of self-generated
recovery after crises of such magnitude, and indicates the
degree to which financial agencies situated outside these
local peasant-economies used these events to penetrate into
the very core of agricultural production.
The description of the plight of the peasants of Dhaka
during the famine of 1788 is also an excellent
representation of their consumption needs during a famine
and their subsequent productive requirements coalescing to
create the sine quae non of their dependence on such
traders and moneylenders. A similar situation was recorded
for the cultivators of western Bengal after the famine of
1769/70, to survive and recover from which they were forced
to borrow "from different merchants at a most exorbitant
and unheard of premium" 13 . Such loans were not limited to
famines alone; they were contracted with equally crippling
consequences in times of dearth. Peasants were forced to
desert because the merchants in Burdwan stopped providing
rice to them. They were forced into petitioning the state
to "oblige the merchants to turn the grain in [their] hands
12 BRC,IOR P/51/51,Part 1,9 December 1789.
13 WBSA,CCRM,vol.5,18 May 1771.
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to us, setting what profit they deem just" as that was the
only way in which "we can purchase our subsistence and
preserve our lives"'4 . "Without the assistance of merchants
the Ryotts suffer the greatest distress"' 5 seems a good
summary of the structure of merchant-peasant linkages
effected through the medium of peasant consumption during
times of scarcity.
Turning to the question of landed property it was
argued that its real significance, its structure and
working, in the late eighteenth century cannot be
understood in the narrow confines of revenue administration
alone. The other explanation, that of an almost complete
collapse of landed property under the financial pressures
of the Company, appears inadequate as an interpretation. It
is undeniable that a number of zamthdaris disintegrated,
but new ones were formed with equal speed. Some talluqdars
could become bankrupt, but that did not stop others from
bidding for talluqas; nor did it prevent zamindars from
attempting to usurp talluqdaris and to oppose governmental
plans to separate talluqas from their jurisdictions.
Landed property was not a closed shop. Access to it by
birth (or caste) was equally balanced by entry through
purchase or office, and when a landed property was sold a
whole range of potential buyers (from zamlridars to
merchants to "ryotts") would come forward with their
bids'6 . Such sales had created a plethora of small landed
proprietors. In Dhaka for instance nearly 20,000
talluqdaris had been established by sale of zawiridari lands
between 1765 and 1790: zamindari officials and ijaradars
bought the larger properties, while others bought lands no
14 BRC,IOR P/49/42,22 August 1774 and 7 December 1773.
15 BRP,IOR P/71/30,11 October 1790.
16 See BRC,IOR P/49/40,16 May 1773;Ibid.,P/49/55,5
September 1775;Ibid.,P/50/61,17 September 1785;BRP,IOR
P/71/26,4 June 1790.
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larger than average peasant holdings'7.
Such sales do not necessarily reflect the financially
distressed state of the property. Auctioning the property
of a bankrupt zamir'dar or talluqdar was only one form of
land sales. Most properties were still sold privately and
prices were negotiated by the parties concerned outside the
state's purview. In fact talluqdarl.s were created by sales
of this type: each sale deed was properly witnessed,
endorsed and registered at the z1rw1ar1 sadr. It is true
that land values did not appear high enough to observers
versed in European property prices. It is also true that
there were distress sales when lands were put up at prices
lower than the jama of the current year, but these have to
be seen in consonance with the facts that zamiridaris could
fetch five times the assessed revenue and la-kharaji could
easily be worth ten times its estimated produce, prices
which appear strikingly high in a situation where a sale
price equal to two years jama was considered of good value
in the market'8.
In any case the supposedly low sale values did not
pose major barriers in the way of a land market in Bengal.
On the contrary such sales seem to have been on the
increase during our period. Cornwallis's belief that
"purchasers of Zemindarry land are become very numerous
since the acquisition of the Dewanny"' 9 aptly describes the
connection between a land market and landed property in the
province.
Property in land could also develop by other means.
Being a zamindari official was often a passport to landed
property. A "small pecuniary consideration for the
' Talluqdari jama ranged from 76001 rupees to 3.5
rupees per annum in Dhaka [BRC,IOR P/50/61,30 September
1785 and BRP,IOR P/71/26,4 June 1790].
18 John Shore to Board,BRC,IOR P/51/27,26 November
1788.
19 BRP,IOR P/70/23,18 June 1787.
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zemindars" was allegedly enough to enable zIvTari alls
to acquire hash lands "recorded in moffussul accounts as
bazee zemin" in Jessore20 . In pargana Bikrampur qanungoes
and iaohrirs had managed to obtain "a greater property in
the Pergunnah than the Zemindars themselves now hold.., and
to prevent detection of these and other acts of a like
fraudulent nature have either destroyed, or keep concealed,
the original papers of the pergunnah by which alone the
true jummah can be ascertained" 21 . While corruption was one
important factor in allowing officials to establish
footholds in landed property (at least this was the
official explanation given by the Company while coming to
terms with the power of the zamindari officialdom) the
situation was certainly more complex. Equally potent was
the role of "long custom & possession" of offices which in
Bakarganj allowed the tahsildars, initially appointed by
government to supervise collection of revenue from huzuri
talluqdars to acquire "a sort of hereditary claim to their
management from which they derive pecuniary advantage, as
well as influence of consequence". These tahsildars:
Can for some time to come have no such
hereditary claim as the zemindars, tho'
there is no doubt that possession may
at some future period give them a
handle to set up pleas of the same
kind. Thus a new set of en will he set
up, who will claim property to which
they have no title, at the expense of
those who are already admitted to
possess, or supposed to have, a right
in the soil22.
Finally there were the la-kharaji holders who effect-
ively constituted the only real owners of privileged
20 BRP,IOR P/71/13,27 August 1787.
21 Ibid.,P/70/30,21 June 1787.
22 Ibid.,P/71/26,4 June 1790;emphasis added.
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property in late eighteenth century Bengal because they
paid no revenue in a situation where other landed
proprietors were facing a heavy financial squeeze. The
Nixamat had apparently encouraged the establishment of such
rights as one device of pacifying the province's frontiers.
The Company's state could not touch these rights as they
had become entrenched over a long period23 . The zami.ndars
continued with grants of this type, albeit on a somewhat
reduced scale after 1765, in keeping with their traditional
functions of patronage, but the evidence also suggests
quite strongly that such lands were also used by them for
their own purposes: after all one of the most persistent
suspicions harboured by the Company was that la-kharaji was
often another zamindari device to acquire a haven of tax-
free assets.
The consensual image of these proprietors as rentier-
administrators essentially removed from the sphere of
agricultural production has been substantially rejected in
this discussion. Instead what has been advanced is a
picture where landed property is seen symbiotically related
to production and marketing of agricultural produce. Alt-
ruism or benevolence had nothing to do with such
investments24 . B. B. Chaudhury sees their participation in
production as a "source of increased rental income", but
does not consider their participation as a conscious
economic strategy adopted by a composite social class. For
Chaudhuri, investment in production was a matter of an
individual zamindar's choice or foresight, and as soon as
rental incomes were maximized zamindars would generally
23 See Sinha [1968: 274-75] for the failure of the
East India Company to exercise control,i.e. get revenue or
acquire information about the actual state or extent of
these lands before the Permanent Settlement;also Marshall
[1987: 126].
24 Sinha [1968: 217] suggests that zamindars in pre-
Permanent Settlement Bengal "were not unlike the great
banyan trees that shade the countryside" and after that Act
their powers became "extra legal,para feudal".
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withdraw from production25 . Chaudhuri's views are difficult
to sustain in our period for three reasons.
First, our evidence shows quite strongly that a
substantial portions of zamfrari incomes (at times as high
as 35 per cent) were derived from the sale of produce grown
in their khamar lands. Therefore such sales must induce a
necessary shift in our emphasis from rental incomes to
profits being derived from the marketing of the
agricultural surplus. Second, the patterns of surplus
appropriation in their khamar lands were based on a
specifically determined relationship between investment and
labour use. Sharecropping on the khamar was more than the
attempted maximization of rental income. It entailed the
exploitation of the producers' surplus (both labour and
product) within production and during the distribution of
the product. Sharecropping additionally meant the
establishment of a notional wage for labour which the
zamiridars forcefully tried to depress in order to aazlmize
the flow of surplus in their favour. Third, zarDindars were
not the only landed proprietors in Bengal. They were
certainly the dominant ones, but equal emphasis must be
given to the roles performed by the talluqdars and la-
khaz-aji holders in order to get a proper perspective of the
intermeshing of landed property with agricultural
production.
Finally, one has to consider landed property in the
context of social stratification. The fact that people
holding zamindari, talluqdari and la-kharaji rights
represented different grades of property, or that they were
hierarchically organized must not detract from considering
these people as a composite class positioned over an entire
range of small-holding, and often undifferentiated,
peasantry (see chapter 4). Socially they were the rural
elites, a position often bestowed by birth or descent but
one which could also easily be acquired by ready money.
25 B.B.Chaudhuri,1984: 143-44.
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Economically they were without doubt the rural rich by
virtue of the resources which were concentrated in their
hands. Our evidence has shown that nearly 10 per cent of
the gross agricultural output in the late eighteenth
century was controlled by la-kharaji holders alone. The
zRmindars controlled a lot more: their nankar alone
comprised ten percent of the gross jama of the entire
province. Did rural society have any other strata who could
claim similar economic or social power?
The discussion in chapter 4 suggested the widespread
existence of two major peasant-strata-- the middling and
the poor- - in pre-Permanent Settlement Bengal as two
analytical labels to make sense out of the profusion of
cross cutting peasant rights and categories which seem to
have caused so much confusion amongst the early Company
administrators. It has also been argued that locating a
"rich" peasant "class" in our period embodies a number of
difficulties, the chief of which is the lack of evidence.
It additionally leads to the essentially unhistorical
exercise of reading a late-nineteenth century situation
into the eighteenth, and to generalize from scanty evidence
pertaining to two north-Bengal districts (Dinajpur and
Rangpur) for the whole of Bengal. The rich-peasant thesis
is unacceptable for our period also because of the
smallness of peasant holdings in general, the favourable
land-labour ratio, the absence of inequalities within the
peasants on the basis of unequal landholding and the
virtual non-existence either of land concentration in a few
peasant hands or the dispossession of others.
Obviously there were a number of regional variations.
Even the same peasant-right could have differing social
contexts within a single district. Thus some pahikashta
cultivators in Burdwan were considered "superior ryotts"
while others occupied positions no better than
sharecroppers; in other districts they were apparently
indistinguishable from day labourers. But these variations
should not detract from attempting to establish features
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common to the peasants as a social class. The first of
these features was the very nature of their enterprise.
Without exception peasants were persons who cultivated
their land with their personal and/or domestic labour and
paid revenue. Another common feature was the emergence of
sharecroppers from the poorer peasantry all over the
province. Additionally, the manner in which the crop was to
be shared, the provision of capital inputs invariably
charged with heavy interest rates and the methods of
exploiting these peasants show basic similarities in all
districts where sharecroppers were used. These similarities
constituted the core of commercial production and
exploitation in a small-peasant economy.
The other common ground was the geographical mobility
of a large section of the peasantry. Descriptions of
peasant families, even entire villages, moving from one
area to another in search of somewhat better terms even
under normal circumstances abound in our sources. In fact
the growth of pahikashta in our period was entirely the
product of the peasants' propensity to move with their
families and meagre belongings. The result was that a
"pergunnah covered with small villages to day appears
depopulated the next" 26 . But this spatial mobility was not
necessarily accompanied by social improvement, nor did it
reflect a better bargaining position of labour. The
evidence unequivocally shows that the mobile peasants were
also the poorest who moved because of the scanty resources,
or were forced to migrate because of natural disasters
(floods or droughts) culminating in a dearth or a famine.
In the latter cases, mobility amounted to a permanent
displacement of a destitute peasantry. In a land-abundant
situation they did manage to resettle themselves, but there
is no reason to believe that their conditions improved over
the long-term. Migration provided only a temporary respite
from the crippling burdens of taxation and scanty
26	 BRC,IOR	 P/52/5,10	 February	 1790;also
Buchanan, "Ronggoppur",IOL,Ms. Eur.D.75,vol.1,book l,f.1l0.
355
resources.
Agrarian Bengal was in essence composed of clusters of
small-holding peasants. The richness of one social cluster
and the poverty of another was only a matter of degree, and
downward social spirals were more likely to happen than
upward mobility. Late nineteenth and early twentieth
observations that peasant society in eastern Bengal was
more homogeneous than in the west and the north27 , and the
suggestion that agrarian society in western and northern
Bengal was highly polarized between the rich farmer and
sharecropper, whereas the one in the east was predominantly
small-holding28
 may not be valid to describe the situation
in the late eighteenth century for a number of reasons.
First, peasants in our period were overwhelmingly
smallholders. Second, the "farming" system in north Bengal
was still rudimentary, and the use of sharecroppers was
prevalent over the entire province. Third, stratification
within the peasantry (as distinct from rural inequalities)
was yet elementary. Though the potential for large-scale
impoverishment was ever present in the economy, there were
very few avenues of selective enrichment. Even the so-
called "village oligarchy" in districts like Birbhum,
Rajshahi and Dinajpur (often accused of being "refractory"
and "rebellious" by the Company's administrators) do not
represent anything more than fragments of the middle-
ranking peasantry trying to cope with rapidly changing, and
often uncertain, configurations in rural Bengal engendered
by the Company's revenue regime and by the permanently
daunting spectre of famine and dearth. Moreover, the extent
to which they were actually peasants remains an enigma. Our
sources clearly indicate a strong presence of zamindari
of ficials among such people: a fact which must surely
indicate the inadequacy of labelling them as a "rich"
27 See Marshall [1987: 22-23] for a discussion of
these views.
28 S.Bose,1986: chapter 1.
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peasant "class".
The study of local trade in agricultural produce high-
lighted two essential developments in Bengal's economy in
the eighteenth century. First it indicated the formation of
a regionally integrated market for grain in the province.
Second it pointed to the primacy of the merchant in the
domain of local trade and to its economic implications.
Both these features definitely show an economy undergoing
a significant degree of commercialization.
A combination of rising demand for food, both in the
towns and (perhaps more crucially) in the villages, and
state intervention, especially after 1757, created the
necessary milieu In which local markets were integrated
Into an extensive provincial network. Here demand
Influenced the cross-flow of supplies from areas which were
otherwise geographically dispersed, and prices in one area
swayed the movement of goods from far-flung bases of
procurement. This period may have been the first time in
the history of the province when hats became an Integral
part of a wider commercial network. The formation of a home
market for agricultural produce benefited the merchants
most, and It is the dominance of the hyapari in the market
for agricultural produce which is an extremely interesting
phenomenon. These merchants could jointly regulate the flow
of food to the towns and to the countryside even if it
amounted to a contravention of the state's authority. They
could control prices and even influence their formation in
the various rungs of markets, including the modest hat. It
was the Integration of the hat In to the wider networks of
regional flow of food which provides the crucial insight
into the nature of marketing systems in the eighteenth
century. In his study of the north Indian situation Bayly
has remarked that "a fixed ganj Indicates a higher level of
economic activity than the bi-weekly peasant markets or
haths" 29. Nevertheless, in measuring the quantity and
29 C.A.Bayly,1983: 99.
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direction of commodity circulation, the role of the big
markets has to be studied in conjunction with the role,
numbers and spatial distribution of intermediate or even
small networks of distribution like the hats. The latter
provided the crucial mediating agencies of trade leading to
the towns or even outside the province. Any increase in
their numbers, or their establishment in previously
deficient areas (and the evidence does show that both were
happening in the eighteenth century) would enable the
peasantry to relate more easily to the market and
facilitate the creation of a pervasive gamut of mercantile
functions. A hat therefore no longer signified a "peasant"
market (as systems of exchange in a predominantly
subsistence economy) 30
 in eighteenth century Bengal. The
increasing frequency of commercial transactions at all
levels of markets, and the rapid completion of commercial
circuits within the village hat were the salient features
of local trade in our period which created, to use Perlin's
words, "a hierarchic interdependency between general and
local (economic] activities"31.
The merchants in their trading ventures displayed an
extremely well-developed mercantile acumen (the use of
command, capital and coercion) to control agricultural
trade. The use of advance contracts for procurement, the
creation of a widespread chain of trading intermediaries
who were linked through a centralized administration of
capital, and their responses to price movements suggest a
rational business ethic which perhaps was no different from
their contemporaries in West European markets. The degree
of functional specialization by a whole range of merchants
(from the big town-based wholesaler to the small shopkeeper
to the tahbazari) is perhaps a clear indication of the
intricate nature of the trade in agricultural produce as
well as the symptom of the scale of differentiation which
° George Dalton,1974: 240-43.
' Frank Perlin,1983: 75.
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existed in these specialized merchant communities32.
Finally, the crucial positions occupied by these
merchants in the matrix of agricultural production, and the
mechanisms by which these roles were translated into levers
of social domination over the peasants emerged as some of
the most important developments in Bengal's agrarian
economy. It would perhaps not be entirely unjustified to
speak of the late eighteenth century in Bengal as the
period when merchant-capital took its first major grip over
the rice producing small peasant-economy. The use of a
variety of loans to ensure steady returns on investments,
and to acquire a grip over the producers choice in the
market were devices shaped by the merchants to cover the
risks of investing among peasants with very little
resources or reserves, and in an economy often shaken by
natural calamities and price oscillations. Yet they
engendered what could only have been a silent trans for-
mation of petty production in agriculture.
One can justifiably speak of a transformation because
of the speed with which the so-called "subsistence" sector
of production was brought within the framework of an
integrated market, which allowed non-peasant groups
(merchants and zamindars) to intrude into the very core of
agricultural production, viz., the cultivation of rice and
other food-items in this period. At the same time, however,
this was a silent process because it was achieved without
any major social upheavals or fundamental changes in the
social context of production. In essence, the agrarian
situation in the eighteenth century was characterized by
clusters of commercial regimes exploiting the surplus-
product of a small-peasant economy without introducing any
changes in the existing labour process or land use. This
seems puzzling in the context of an economy undergoing a
high degree of commercialization.
32 For a similar picture of functional specialization
and differentiation among merchants in north India,see
Bayly,1978: 151-73.
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One fruitful way of looking at the problems of
merchant-peasant linkages and that of usury in the small
peasant economy of Bengal in the late eighteenth century is
through the distinction, introduced by Marx, between
"formal and real subsumption" of labour to capital. For
Marx, "formal" and "real" subsumption of labour to capital
were both based on the investment of capital I.n production
and on the appropriation of surplus-value from vit:hfn the
process of production. But conditions of "real subsumption"
could only be realized historically by a structural change
in the very essence of the labour process by which capital-
ism crystallized as the dominant mode of production33 ; no
such preconditions were necessary for labour to be formally
subsumed to capital. Under the latter, capital took over
and exploited "an ezisting labour process, developed by
different and archaic modes of production" without
reconstituting them in any major fashion34.
"Technologically speaking, the labour process goes on as
before, with the proviso that it is now subordinated to
capital" 35 . The economic structure under conditions of
"formal subsumption" was one of "capital's mode of
exploitation without its mode of production"36.
For Marx, under conditions of "formal subsumption",
capital takes an existing form of labour, intensifies its
hold over it, extracts surplus in a variety of forms from
the labour process but does not take over the labour
process itself, nor does it introduce any major changes in
technology, or land use in the case of agricultural
production. Since capital does not organize a new mode of
production, but takes over and controls an anterior one,
appropriation of the surplus can only take place by a
Karl Marx,1981: 1020-31.
Ibid: 1021; emphasis Marx's.
Ibid: 1026; emphasis Marx's.
36 Marx,1986: 732.
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plethora of compulsions being placed on the primary
producer. The existence of usury as the dominant form of
capital is only natural in a subordination of this type. A
loan is simply an advance of raw materials or implements,
or both, in the form of money charged with a heavy interest
through which the producers' surplus is henceforth
appropriated. Two pre-conditions historically necessary for
"formal subsumption" were (i) expanding internal trade and
(ii) an increasing inability of the small producer to
sustain production without external financial help". The
history of Bengal in the late eighteenth century confirms
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